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**Programme for Promoting Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, NPT Conference 17/4/95-12/5/95,
'Darryl's meeting with Sven Jurchewsky [sic] 145/95'**

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Summary:

Summary of meeting with Canadian diplomat Sven Jurschewsky about strategy for the NPT review confernece.

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NPT Conference 17/4/95 - 12/5/95

Darryl's meeting with Sven Jurchewsky, 14/5/95

Following is Darryl's account of his conversation with Sven Jurchewsky (Canada), 14 May 1995, reported 15/5/95.

Canadian resolution - crucial role of Honduras - realised agendas had changed and decided to start to move the resolution forward - very effective - gained 20+ votes.

Principles - started off in Chilworth in a conversation between Sven and Peter Goosen - decided idea would be better off coming from South Africa (greater moral force) and Canada would work on strengthening the review process - South Africa/Canada axis (key personal relationship).

Debated whether principles would have dates in them - key date would be CTBT. Number of different ideas on date for CTBT. Very worried about French on CTBT - concerned might start testing and principles idea would fall apart.

Principles not ideologically based, interest based - Canada and South Africa recognised that world changed and ideology was no longer key to issues but some of the older players had not realised this.

Worked out principles - focused in on regions and tried to link principles with regional strategy - underlying philosophy interest-based.

Cut-off proposal - Canada thought it might not be possible to get global agreement - so tried to identify regional interests that could be developed. Wanted cut-off as a principle but didn't want too specific a proposal - broad-based mandate.

Elimination of nuclear weapons - tried to move debate away from arguments about a time-bound framework towards a more piecemeal and incremental approach - so that each state has an interests involved but not trying to deal with whole package at once.

Universality - bonding concept to try to get all states involved - proved very difficult to negotiate.

President's Consultation Group - met for 14 days without a break. Hard debate with NWS on some of the principles - South African principles had NOT been discussed with US before. Principles went to G7 first - G7 very active. In G7 French allied with Canadians and helped a great deal - crucial to success (and hadn't expected French support).

Traditional caucus groups broke down into regional groups, in ways that NAM couldn't deal with - end of the NAM on this issue.

Cosmopolitan Committee - attempt at bridging committee to bring in as many of regional groups as possible.

Very difficult to manage caucus groups - so fragmented.

Debate at Conference - probably unique, may never happen again. Fundamentally different to all debates at previous Review Conferences - those who fought on old agenda lost. Problems for Mexico - unclear unclear about where it was going - attempt to have Canadian/Mexican discussion - got nowhere. Japanese also tried to get involved but got lost. Those who fought on new agenda - on interests - won.

Attempt to keep review and principles separate - some problems with language - 'inter alia' - phrase almost blew it because of problem of wording. (Middle East resolution, paragraph 5?).

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Problems for NGOs - very few recognised that world had changed and debate of a different order. Those that can pick up on this will flourish, those that don't will fade away.

Canadian Foreign Ministry since 1979 been having discussions on globalisation and consequences for sovereignty and concept of the state. Name changed to Department of External Affairs and Trade. Looking at interests and regional groups. Looking at globalisation and specifically its regional consequences - discovered proliferation of regional groups - new debate base don moral force of arguments plus interests.

Was a Final Declaration possible? 3 explanations for why not achieved:

1/ ran out of time. Wasn't view that would have enough time to resolve differences - couldn't deal with complexity of review once extension decided.

2/ pay-off argument. Had been deal going all along - in return for extension decision NAM would be able to say at the end that didn't like message and show could still change things. NAM strategy could be seen as counter-productive - carrying on ideological debate but if focusing on interests strategy then interest would have been to get positive statements e.g. on Article IV.

3/ Western group didn't have political will to carry debate further. But clearly states in that group that did want to work hard for Final Declaration.

Combination of (2) and (3)? 3 explanations probably crucially interlinked.

Problem that Indonesia had was acute. Real problem in trying to coordinate strategy in Bandung. [John - Alatas proposal for NAM strategy in Bandung, Benin objected and eventually walked out]. Some playing ideological game, some focusing on regional strategy and some on national interests. Could not be coordinated.

Role of PPNN - 3 areas:

1/ considered by many delegations as most effective NGO. Allowed states representatives to develop personal relationships - relationship between Sven, Peter Goosen and Dhanapala crucial in PCG.

2/ provision of materials

3/ provision of expert advice.

PPNN appears to operate on basis of interests rather than ideology.

Treaty had provided crucial vehicle for discussion to take place - few states willing to see Treaty collapse because provided underlying gel and forum for crucial discussion - and that only treaty to promote nuclear disarmament. Without Treaty could not have discussion - other fora (e.g. Disarmament Commission) don't have same context or moral force - also other fora too big and unwieldy and not enough flexibility.

Subsequent conversation with John, Darryl and Emily:

Game plan that NM and G11 would coordinate and work together - Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico (But Sven said Australia lost game due to its focus on ideology). N. B. Australia expected Indonesia to come out for indefinite extension in exchange of views - devastated when Indonesia didn't do so. Indonesia in impossible position - direct hard interest in indefinite extension but also leader of NAM on anniversary of Bandung - needed to hold NAM together but couldn't.

Must also have been discussions between Canadians and Nigerians. Sven lectured Ayweah about problem of bad faith.

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Ghana said all NAM wanted to do in MCI was record a set of historical facts (i.e. no progress under Article VI for 20 years but decisions in last 5 years, distinguish between unilateral arms reduction measures and multilateral arms control negotiations in good faith - but West wouldn't allow them to do so - NAM couldn't stomach it.