

September 23, 1966

Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the President, enclosing 'Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation'

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Summary:

In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of "pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities."

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September 23, 1966

FOR: Mr. Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the
President, 100 E. O. B.
SUBJECT: Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on
Non-Proliferation

Enclosed is the compendium which you
requested on recent developments in the field
of non-proliferation.

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

enclosure: Summary of Recent Soviet
Signals on Non-Proliferation
(Secret - Exdis)

cc: Mr. Ben Read

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Sept. 22, 1966

Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation

During the early part of this year's Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, the Soviet representative emphasized the importance of achieving an agreement on non-proliferation. In conference statements at Geneva the Soviet representative stated that an agreement on non-proliferation was one of the measures that could be agreed to in the present international situation.

In July the Soviet representative at Geneva emphasized in his speeches that barring the "transfer" of nuclear weapons was the "essence" of the matter, because the U.S. draft did not bar "transfer" of nuclear weapons. In view of the Soviet representative's emphasis on "transfer", Mr. Fisher was instructed on July 27, to seek the personal views of the Soviet representative (Roshchin) on a new formula, as set forth below, for the key Article I of a treaty, which Mr. Fisher was instructed to put forward as his personal suggestion which he had been thinking about recommending to Washington.

("Each of the nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear-weapon state, and not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.")

In Geneva, while they were reserved about commenting at length on a "personal suggestion", the Soviet delegate and his deputy, during a series of Co-Chairmen's meetings made the following principal points:

1. They viewed the search for a new formulation as a hopeful sign; moreover, the new language was a step in the direction of the Soviet position.

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2. The primary problem which prevented the "personal suggestion" from becoming a basis for negotiation of an agreement was the omission of language (such as that presently appearing in paragraph 4 of Article I of the existing U.S. draft) dealing with the possibility of indirect dissemination through third states or alliance arrangements.

(Paragraph 4 calls upon the parties: "not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this article directly, or indirectly through third states or associations of states, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any state, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.")

The private discussions in Geneva also indicated some Soviet concern about existing U.S. bilateral arrangements and particularly the possibility that, in the future, such "secret" arrangements could be a cover for German access to U.S. nuclear weapons. The Soviet deputy representative said that while existing arrangements probably need not be dealt with in treaty language, someone should discuss this matter with the Soviets since Soviet evaluation of this question would be an important factor in making a decision on any new treaty text. (It is clear from remarks made by both Soviet and Bloc delegates at Geneva that they have a general understanding of the existing bilateral NATO arrangements, particularly those involving nuclear weapons on Quick-Reaction Alert Allied aircraft, although they may not be completely advised of all of the safeguards which surround them.)

On August 3, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet, Chairman Kossygin reiterated the Soviet view that a non-proliferation agreement was not excluded by the fighting in Viet Nam.

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On September 9, Vorontsov, the new Soviet Counselor in Washington and former Soviet deputy representative in Geneva, without indicating disagreement with it, indicated to the ACDA General Counsel that the Fisher suggestion had been reported back to Moscow. He asked how it would deal with the problem of the MLF, saying that this problem must be dealt with in the treaty "or in the negotiations". He also said the Soviets had been working hard on preparing for private talks in New York on non-proliferation.

On September 14, Ambassador Dobrynin indicated to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow, that the Soviets realize the non-proliferation situation has changed, with pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities. Dobrynin indicated that the Soviets realize that if a non-proliferation agreement is not obtained soon the situation will be hopelessly complicated by demands from non-nuclear powers for guarantees. When Kohler recalled that last year Gromyko had said "consultation" constitutes "access" to nuclear weapons, and commented that this was not negotiation, Dobrynin said that he got Kohler's point. Dobrynin then said that the central question on nuclear-sharing was "ownership".

On September 14, Shustov, a member of the Soviet "PUGHASH" delegation made a point of telling Henry Kissinger that the Soviets were most anxious to conclude a non-proliferation treaty, if possible during this session of the General Assembly. He said the sole obstacle was the clause making possible a collective nuclear force, and said further that the Soviets had no interest in disturbing existing consultative arrangements in NATO, noting that unless the McNamara Committee contained elements of physical possession of nuclear weapons by the Germans it would not be precluded by the "new Soviet conception". He added that the Soviets were prepared to modify their treaty draft considerably in the direction of simplicity and avoidance of excessive legalism. He also said that the Soviets did want a clause barring "direct or indirect" access to nuclear weapons.

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In a conversation with a U.S. delegation officer in New York on September 21, Goldblatt, a senior member of the Polish EMDC delegation, insisted that the Soviets had come to New York anxious to reach early agreement with the U.S. on a non-proliferation treaty. He stressed that Viet Nam remained no obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement.

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