

February 1, 1958

Notes of Cde. N.S. Khrushchev on a Message of N.A. Bulganin

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Summary:

Khrushchev, as well as Suslov and Mikoyan, offer corrections on a message drafted by Bulganin. Khrushchev advocates for the liquidation of NATO, the Baghdad Pact, SEATO, and the Warsaw Agreement, preferring instead to defer to the UN.

Credits:

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Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

NOTES [inserted by hand: of Cde. N. S. Khrushchev] FOR A MESSAGE OF N. A. BULGANIN

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KHRUSHCHEV. Say this thought here: if one is to be consistent and pursue the point of view which you are offering against our proposals for discussion, then why then create all sorts of pacts: NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad [Pact], when these pacts provide, as you call [them], the goal of defense at a time when the Charter condemns any wars. Special bodies have been created in the United Nations which follow this and they should take steps in event of a conflict or war. However, in spite of the existence of such a sentence in the Charter, bodies have been created which are in operation and at the present time they eliminated what is provided for by the Charter and have become a phenomenon which gives rise to distrust. The Charter of the United Nations is thereby already violated. In order for this not to happen possibly it is necessary to eliminate the bodies which were created to circumvent the UN. It might even be necessary to name and say, eliminate NATO, the Baghdad Pact, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact. Evidently, we are not prepared for such a decision right now and therefore it is urgently necessary and this would be a big step forward in the existence of such bodies which were created. Some decision needs to be made which would actually show that we have definite positions and are ready to pursue a policy in the spirit of the UN Charter.

ref page 4

KHRUSHCHEV. At the beginning of the page say: "which would promote reconciliation and strengthen peace in the whole world["]

In the middle of the page, one could say more bluntly that the right to use the veto in the Security Council by a certain number of countries in the UN should be directed at proposals which are submitted which proceeded not only from the interests of one country or group of countries which might have a majority in deciding this question, but when doing so to take into account the interests of that country or those countries in the minority when deciding this question. The United Nations is not a world government which decides questions and adopts laws obligatory for all countries, but when creating the United Nations a voluntary inclusion of each country in the UN was intended which, when joining the UN, would take a voluntary commitment on itself to perform the obligations imposed [Translator's note: one word missing] by the Charter, but the independence of the countries was preserved. Therefore, if the veto is eliminated then use by the majority to the detriment of the minority will begin and this will lead to the collapse of this organization because the minority will not accept these decisions and will sort of recognize the right of the majority to impose their will on the minority, which is never allowed in international organizations in any event, because this will lead to the collapse of this organization. This fact forces the approach to a solution of a question to be more flexible in order to proceed from mutually-acceptable questions which would meet the strengthening of relations and peace in the entire world, which the Charter of the United Nations should serve from the very outset.

Ref page 7

SUSLOV. Instead of the word "actual" say "primarily".

Ref page 9

MIKOYAN. In order that [they] not think that we want only two powers to come to agreement, it is necessary to say, "the same as the other great powers".

KHRUSHCHEV. I think that here [we] need to say not that we object, because we do not agree, but say, "[we] want to avoid this".

Ref. page 10.

KHRUSHCHEV. Here say: "This would make it easier and increase hope for the elimination of the 'Cold War' and strengthen peace in the peoples of the entire world["]

MIKOYAN. Don't say "illusions", but "pages".

Cross out the end of the paragraph, where it talks about studying "the experience in Geneva".

Comments on the telegrams to the Soviet ambassadors

To Paris

MIKOYAN. I have editorial corrections. The first phrase, where it talks about preparations for a conference "at the highest level", say "heads of governments".

Ref the 2nd page. Where it talks about Pineau, it turns out that we are sort of talking about preparations for a conference. It turns out here as if we are catching him and he took the bait. We put him in an awkward situation with this. It seems to me that it is not necessary to speak of this in a telegram, just as it is not necessary to speak about the invitation of Pineau to Moscow. We don't want to have meetings in Moscow.

To Brussels

Ref. the 1st page.

MIKOYAN. It is necessary to cross out the phrase where it speaks about Spaak. Here it says that the conference on the ambassadorial level cannot replace the conference of heads of governments we propose. He doesn't think this, but you are refuting this.

KHRUSHCHEV. It is necessary to express alarm, that we agree, but it is necessary to fear that evidently some want to substitute with a conference of ministers of foreign affairs and hold negotiations at this level. This needs to be said. Spaak has this in mind.