

## **January 25, 1990**

### **USSR: Showing a New Urgency In German Policy**□□□

#### **Citation:**

"USSR: Showing a New Urgency In German Policy", January 25, 1990, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency, October 29, 2019. <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/209536>

#### **Summary:**

An analysis of the ramification of German reunification on Soviet security and Moscow's efforts to keep limited troops in East Germany.

#### **Original Language:**

English

#### **Contents:**

Original Scan

3452

~~Top Secret~~

6.2(d)

USSR:

Showing a New Urgency in German Policy

[redacted] Moscow believes developments in East Germany and at the CFE talks require rapid movement on setting the security framework for eventual German reunification. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)

[redacted] Moscow expects pressure for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany to build after the elections on 6 May and will seek Bonn's support for— at a minimum—keeping some Soviet forces in East Germany temporarily. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] if CFE provides a new legal basis for US and Soviet troops in Germany, it might help keep the now inevitable reunification of Germany stable and gradual. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)

Comment:

[redacted] Although the Soviets want to delay reunification as long as possible, their efforts to set a security framework for German unity that locks in the presence of foreign troops probably reflect their belief that the time frame has shrunk. Moscow is certain to press the US hard to agree to regular ambassadorial-level Four-Power meetings. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

6.2(d)

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] Moscow hopes Bonn's desire for unity will induce it to agree to a mutually satisfactory arrangement on the continued stationing of Soviet and Allied troops in Germany for a negotiated period and, over the longer term, in a united Germany's relations with NATO. Genscher is not likely to accept any Soviet formula that would legitimize a Soviet presence in East Germany; he is likely to aim for lower manpower ceilings within a CFE framework that would permit a freely elected East German government to call for a complete Soviet withdrawal. [redacted]

6.2(d)

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