

**July 10, 1969**

**Cable No. 2124, Ambassador Shimoda to the  
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Issues concerning the  
Signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
(Opinion Statement)**

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**Summary:**

Ambassador Shimoda cautions that Japan's signing of the NPT still "requires further consideration from a long-term perspective."

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**Original Language:**

Japanese

**Contents:**

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Translation - English



極秘

## 注意

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## 電信写

差異がありと認めざるを得ない。

かかる新政権の態度にかんがみるも、わが方としては対米関係全般ないしはオキナワ問題に対する考慮よりして、本件条約の署名を特に急ぐ必要は必ずしもないものと思料される。またかりに将来米側がわが方のすみやかなる署名を要請し来ることありとするも、その際は中共の核兵器開発とソ連の本条約に対する態度未決定を理由として、わが方の態度決定には更にしん重を要する旨を回答せられ差支えなき次第と考えられる。

2。今回のわが国の ENDC 加入表現は、わが国の NPT 早期署名を正当化するものではなく、逆にわが国の如く、経済的にも技術的にも高度の核開発能力を有する国が、本条約の署名にしん重な態度を持続しおる事実が、いかに関係国に対し大なる外交上の PRESSURE を加えわが方の BARGAINING POSITION を強めおるかを如実に物語るものと考えられる。もしわが国が米ソの言うなりに当初より本条約の署名国となりおたりとすれば、米ソ両国といえども今回の如く強引なやり口をもって、わが国の ENDC 加入を推進することはなかつたものと想像される。この点米ソ両議長国の専おうを非難したメキシコ等のいふぶんには一理ある次第であつて、米国はともかくソ連の見地よりするも、その国際的発言権に格段の差

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がある。日本と外モウとをS I N G L E O U Tして自由  
 國、共產國それぞれの代表としてE N D Oに加入せしめる  
 ことを認めたのは、むしろソ側にとつての大なる譲歩と評  
 価せざるを得ない。

3。もとよりソ連としては、日本のE N D O加入承認を対  
 価として日本のN P T署名を求め、更にドイツに対して同  
 様、同条約署名を迫るのが真のねらいと考えられるところ  
 。いずれにするも、本件経緯はいかにソ連がわが国のN P  
 T署名に高い価値を付しおるかを物語る半面、わが国の同  
 条約署名後においては、果してソ側がわが方発言に対し同  
 条約署名前と同様の重要性を付し続けるや否やを疑わしめ  
 るものありと見ざるを得ない。右はもはやN P T署名問題  
 をはなれ、対ソ関係の全般の見地よりわが方としては十分  
 ぎん味を要する点と考えられ、特にオキナワ問題解決のあ  
 かつきには、いよいよ北方領土問題の解決に取り組まんと  
 するわが方として十分考慮に入れる要ある点と考えられる  
 。

4。わが国のN P T署名反対論者の中には、日本が将来核  
 武装に進むための行動の自由を留保しておくことを主がんと  
 するものあるべきところ、本使はかかる見解に与するもの  
 ではない。逆に現在の核保有国をして真の核軍縮に進まし  
 めんが為には、なおしばらく行動の自由を留保しておく必要

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ありとの見地に立つものである。

即ち将来の見とおしとしては、ソ連はドイツがNPTを署名批准するまでは決して同条約を批准することなかるべく、その間米ソ両国はミサイル交渉を進むべきところ。同交渉はたとえ成功するとしても米ソ核戦力の現状とう結を合意するが関のやまであり、とうてい真の核軍縮までは進み得ざるものと予想される。

元来米ソ両国が協力してNPT作成に乗り出した動機としては、(イ)核兵器保有の独占的地位を固定することにより、国際政治におけるゆう位をこうきゆう化せんとするりこの動機と、(ロ)非核保有国の技術的進歩を放任することにより多数国が核兵器を保有するに至る場合のNUCLEAR CHAOSの出現を見ることに対する恐ふ心との両面があつたものと認められるところ。若し日独等潜在的核兵器保有国がNPTに署名すれば、(ロ)の恐ふ心は一応解消することになり、(イ)のりこの目的のみが達成せられることとなる。かくの如き状態において核保有国側がその有利なる地位を自ら投打つて魯いに核軍縮にすすむものと期待することは、余りにNATIVEな考え方と認めざるを得ない。

5。これに反し日独がNPTのわく外に留まつたまま現在の国際情勢に大なる変化なく事態が推移するものとすれば

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日独の経済的地位は年を追つてますます強化されその国際的地位も向上するに反し、核保有諸国の中には核兵器の維持開発の負担にたえかね、その経済状態は悪化し、社会的不安すら激化するものが出てくる公算大であり、この傾向が継続すれば、将来必ずや日独両国はそのきよ大なる経済力と、潜在的核保有能力を武器として、核保有諸国を相手に真に核軍縮を決意実行せしめこの地上より核兵器を絶めつするための途をひらく大外交を展開し得る時期もとう来るに非ずやと予想される。いずれにするも、わが国が一担NPTに署名すれば、25年の長きにわたり行動の自由をそくばくされることとなる次第につき本条約の署名は長期的見地よりなおしん重に検討を要する問題であり、特にわが国と同様の立場にあるドイツとは、今後共歩調を一にしてしん重に行動し行くを得策とするものと考えられる。

ジュネーブ、国連、独、ソ連に転電した。

(了)

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July 10, 21:15 - Sent from the United States

July 11, 10:55 - Received at MOFA

To: Minister for Foreign Affairs

From: Ambassador to the United States Shimoda

Subject: Issues concerning the Signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
(Opinion Statement)

No. 2124 Top Secret

Recently, it seems that there is a discussion in Japan that Japan should sign the NPT since it joined the committee on disarmament [Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD)]. It goes on to say that it is appropriate to sign the NPT when the minister or the Prime Minister visits the United States this fall. Regarding this matter, the following is my opinion for your reference.

1. The NPT was originally a product of the U.S.-Soviet cooperation under the previous Johnson administration. The new Nixon administration appears to be less enthusiastic for this treaty than the previous administration. It reportedly explained to Chancellor Kiesinger during the recent presidential visit to [West] Germany that the U.S. government hopes Germany to sign the Treaty but would by no means put pressure on the issue. As for Japan, it have to admit that there was a significant difference in how Secretary Rogers handled the issue during the minister's recent visit to the United States (the Secretary himself made no reference to this matter and the ACDA Director Smith attended the beginning of the second session briefly to touch upon this matter) in comparison to the attitude of former Secretary Rusk trying to persuade former foreign minister Miki to sign the treaty.

Considering the attitude of the new administration, it could be said that we do not necessarily need to rush to sign the treaty in light of the overall relationship with the United States or the Okinawa issue. In addition, though the United States might ask us to promptly sign the Treaty in the future, we will have no problem by replying that our stance on this Treaty requires more cautious consideration because of China's nuclear weapons development and the Soviet Union's non-determination of its stance on this Treaty.

2. Japan's accession to the ENDC does not justify Japan's early signing of the NPT. On the contrary, it showed significant diplomatic pressure to the countries concerned and strengthening Japanese bargaining position, both of which were caused by the fact that a country having advanced economic and technical nuclear development capabilities, such as Japan, has maintained cautious attitude toward signing the NPT. If Japan had been a signatory to this treaty from the beginning as the United States and the Soviet Union have asked, both countries would not have pushed forward Japan's accession to the ENDC in such a forceful manner. In this regard, Mexico and other countries had a point in criticizing the arbitrary U.S.-Soviet chairmanship. Besides the United States, there is a significant difference in the power to speak up in international society from the perspective of the Soviet Union. It was rather a big concession to the Soviet Union to admit to single out Japan and Outer Mongolia to join the ENDC as representatives of the free world and the communist world, respectively.

3. From the outset, a true intention of Soviet Union is probably a demand for Japan to sign the NPT in exchange for the approval of Japan's membership in the ENDC, and for Germany to sign the NPT in a same way. In any case, while the circumstances of this case show how much value the Soviet Union attaches to Japan's NPT signature, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union will continue to attach the same importance to

Japan's voice once Japan signs the Treaty. It is considered to be no longer a problem of signature of the NPT but should be fully examined from the perspective of overall relations with the Soviet Union. In particular, it appears to be the point that should be considered in dealing with the problem of the Northern Territories after settling down the Okinawa problem.

4. Some Japanese opponents against NPT signature focused on Japan's freedom of action that should be reserved to proceed with nuclear armament in the future. I do not agree with such a view, and conversely, believed that it is necessary to reserve freedom of action for a while in order to make current nuclear weapons states to proceed with genuine nuclear disarmament.

In other words, looking to the future, the Soviet Union will never ratify the NPT until Germany signs and ratifies it. In the meantime, though the United States and the Soviet Union should proceed with missile negotiations, their agreement would freeze the status quo of their nuclear forces at best, even if they are successful. It is not expected to be genuine nuclear disarmament.

The United States and the Soviet Union are believed to started to work together to create an NPT as they were motivated by (a) a self-benefiting desire to advance their status in international politics by fixing the exclusive status of possessing nuclear weapons, and (b) fear of seeing the emergence of a nuclear chaos in the event that a large number of countries possess nuclear weapons as the technical advancement of non-nuclear weapons states are condoned. If Japan, Germany, and other potential nuclear weapons states sign the NPT, fear of (b) will be resolved and only the purpose of (a) can be achieved. Under such circumstances, the expectation that the nuclear weapons states will pursue nuclear disarmament by throwing off their advantageous position on their own is too naive.

5. On the contrary, if Japan and Germany remain outside the framework of the NPT and the current international situation remains unchanged, while the economic position and international status of both countries will be improved year by year, some nuclear weapons states will likely suffer from the burden of maintenance and development of nuclear weapons. Their economic condition will deteriorate, and even social unrest would be intensified. If this trend continues, it is natural that there will be a time when Japan and Germany are able to use their enormous economic power and potential nuclear capabilities as weapons to carry out epic diplomacy that will pave the way for the abolition of nuclear weapons by letting nuclear weapons states to determine nuclear disarmament. In any case, the signing of this Treaty is a matter that requires further consideration from a long-term perspective, as Japan's freedom of action will be compromised for a long period of 25 years if it signs the NPT. In particular, it is thought that Japan should cooperate and act in a cautious manner with Germany that is in the same position as ours.

Transferred to [Japanese diplomatic missions in] Geneva, the United Nations, [West] Germany, and the Soviet Union.

(End)