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**PPNN - What Next Some Thoughts about the Future  
by the Executive Chairman [Draft]**

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**Summary:**

Elaborates on further plans engaged after the year 2000 by the PPNN and the present situation of the Program.

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Dear (name - we should be able to "merge" them),

We are nearing the end of the last period for which PPNN has concrete plans and the funds to carry them out. Whether we shall have the means to continue until the end of this year, or need to stop somewhat earlier, still depends on some additional funding we hope to get.

We - that is John Simpson and I - had for some time lived with the thought that after the current phase of PPNN's existence, the project would come to an end. However, we have heard from very many people that PPNN's demise would be greatly regretted, and we have been asked - indeed urged - to see what we could do in order to have at least some of its major activities go on. Our most recent briefing seminar, in Princeton, this March, did indeed demonstrate that our work is in many respects unique, and that governments have come to rely on it in connection with their preparation for the NPT Review Conference. Another element in our work, for which we have, over the years, acquired a large and enthusiastic constituency, is the quarterly **Newsbrief**.

In its last two sessions, the Core Group discussed the matter. It did not reach a clear conclusion beyond the general wish that the Programme should go on. Interestingly, almost every single element of the programme was highlighted by one member or the other as being of particular interest and worth continuing. It was left to me to sum up the situation, put my ideas on paper, and send that around to members so that those who want to, can make comments. I am taking the liberty of also sending it to some former members.

Here is my paper. If indeed we conclude that we should go on, we need soon to start looking for new funding. Should you wish to react, therefore, I would greatly appreciate it if you could let me have your views within a month or so.

With many thanks and kind regards.

core Group plus  
Shaber  
Fischer  
Delpach  
Smeent  
Timmerbaer  
Okawa  
Scheinman  
Jayman

PPNN - What Next?  
Some Thoughts about the Future  
by the  
Executive Chairman

**Introduction : Start of PPNN**

The time has come for the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) to reflect on its future; ponder what it has achieved so far; decide what, if anything, it could do further; and work out how it would do it.

PPNN was founded in 1987, in the aftermath of the Third Review Conference of the NPT which, apart from the First Review Conference, was the only one that succeeded in adopting a Final Declaration. The direct purpose was to benefit from the insights and authority of the dozen or so people who had been most instrumental in that success, to help prepare the ground for the next Review Conference and make an early start with preparations for the Treaty's extension in 1995.

This worked. Based on a Core Group of around 20 diplomats, civil servants, physicists and academics, all with a special interest in nuclear non-proliferation, hailing from 16 countries, and using an ever-expanding network of national and international organizations, PPNN's initial activities aimed primarily at the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the NPT in particular. PPNN did so by:

- (a) fostering the exchange of ideas on major issues with a view to finding solutions for urgent problems;
- (b) analyzing relevant issues and publishing the results; and
- (c) conveying information to target audiences.

It did so by assiduous networking in and through the Core Group; running a specialized publication programme, including a quarterly **Newsbrief** on relative events; and holding a series of briefing seminars for persons involved in international meetings on non-proliferation, especially the 1990 Review Conference.

**Phase Two**

Following the Review Conference of 1990, in Phase Two of its existence the stress in PPNN's activities shifted to regional issues. Some of these were discussed at meetings in the areas at issue, where PPNN was able to make some contributions to the establishment or reinforcement of nuclear-weapon-free zones. PPNN staff also became increasingly involved in the work of other governmental and non-government bodies

engaged in regional issues. In the latter part of Phase Two, the emphasis shifted to preparations for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. This involved an intensive effort to brief prospective delegates, working out conference tactics, and providing an environment for early consultations among key participants. PPNN members also became actively engaged in the actual work of the 1995 Conference.

### **Phase Three**

After the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, PPNN increasingly addressed itself to substantive issues of nuclear disarmament and procedural aspects of the newly strengthened review process. The lack of progress during the three or four years directly preceding the 2000 NPT Review Conference in realizing the Principles & Objectives adopted in 1995, and the problems encountered in applying the strengthened review process, led PPNN to lay more stress in its briefing events and its publications, on ways to overcome that stagnation and to work out solutions for dealing with procedural aspects.

Over time, PPNN's growing reputation as an impartial and authoritative source of information has come to mean that increasingly its expertise was called upon by government officials, media representatives and academics. PPNN came to assume the position of institutional memory on the creation and development of the NPT; of a frequently consulted source of advice; and of a means to help newcomers to the field familiarize themselves with the many aspects of this extraordinarily complicated subject. PPNN's work in these areas achieved a peak in the closing year of Phase Three of its existence, when the Executive Chairman and the Programme Director were asked to serve as members of their respective national delegations to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, but ~~was~~ also to assist officers of that Conference in a variety of ways.

### **Present Situation**

The current phase in PPNN's work is the last one for which concrete plans have been formulated and funding has been obtained. Whether there is a further need for PPNN's services, and what form these would take, will depend to a large degree on the outcome of the Review Conference. This outcome is unpredictable, but there are many indications that the Conference will not manage to adopt an agreed Final Declaration and that dissatisfaction with the current situation in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will cause the Treaty, and with it the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to emerge from the Conference to a greater or lesser extent, weakened. Given the growing feeling that international governmental institutions have demonstrated that they are unable to bring solutions in these areas, many experts are convinced that the few international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the field will have a greater part to play in fighting the erosion of the regime. Among those NGOs, PPNN holds a prominent position. The assets it can bring to bear in this regard are referred to later in this paper.

Given the uncertainty of the outcome of the Review Conference, of its impact on

the regime, and of the actions that will be called for to keep it from deteriorating further, it might be best if PPNN could take some time off for quiet contemplation of the ways in which it might be most useful in the future. One might imagine the Executive Chairman and the Programme Director spending a sabbatical year analyzing the situation, with the help of some members of the Core Group and a few other highly-qualified experts, who might meet once or twice to formulate a new agenda. It is hard to see, however, how this could be realized.

Although a scheme of this kind might be relatively inexpensive (the main cost would be for travel and meeting facilities) it would require the Mountbatten Centre in Southampton to continue employing staff to deal with the subject, at least part-time. Since there would be no immediate concrete product of this one-year's activity, and the possibility of a follow up would remain uncertain until the end, the project is not likely to attract funders. It also has the practical drawback that there will have to be a gap, once proposals for a clear programme have been worked out, until funds for a follow-up are in hand. Production of the PPNN **Newsbrief**, which is one of the attractive elements in the current programme, for which there is a continuing demand, would have to continue without interruption, also during the 'contemplative' phase of PPNN's existence, and it is doubtful whether funds could be solicited for this purpose when the rest of the programme is so 'thin' and uncertain of result. One last objection to the idea of the 'contemplative phase' is that it would be likely to diminish PPNN's current repute: 'out of sight, out of mind'.

On balance, this argues for the uninterrupted continuation of PPNN's existence.

### **Current Problems**

Among the negative factors that currently affect the non-proliferation regime and the NPT the following are most obvious:

- counterproductive events in international relations:
  - problems with the entry-into-force of CTBT;
  - friction over NMD;
  - absence of verification in Iraq;
  - proliferation risks in Russia;
  - tension over NATO expansion;
  - Russian and NATO nuclear doctrines;
  
- regional hot spots:
  - tension in the Korean Peninsula;

- conflict between Mainland China and Taiwan;
  - confrontation between India and Pakistan; and
  - Israel's nuclear policy.
- problems directly involving the NPT:
- lack of progress in the realization of P&Os;
  - problems with the strengthened review process;
  - lack of universality;
  - disagreements over implementation of Article IV;
  - states' tardiness in accepting Additional Protocols to safeguards agreements;
  - slowness in application of Integrated Safeguards Systems.

These issues are mostly inter-connected and often overlap.

### **The Consequences**

Whatever the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, those responsible for the maintenance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the integrity of the NPT, and the implementation of its review process, will continue to need, possibly to a greater extent than heretofore:

- an insight into the principal elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and of the various aspects of the NPT, its operation and its review process;
- authoritative information on the events that shape developments in these areas;
- an ongoing means of monitoring those developments, in particular as they impact on the implementation of the regime and the Treaty;
- ways of analyzing this impact, and of devising approaches to deal with it, so as to maintain a viable nuclear non-proliferation regime and NPT, and if possible reinforce them.

### **PPNN's Capabilities**

In the course of its existence so far, PPNN has tried to meet many of these needs. In doing so, through the activities outlined on page 1, above, it has brought, and further developed, the following general assets:

- knowledge of/insights into the nuclear (non) proliferation situation;

- combination of disciplines;
- credibility/objectivity;
- prestige/repute;
- international contacts, approach and composition.

PPNN has demonstrated over the past twelve years that it has the following specific abilities:

- getting knowledgeable/influential persons together;
- operating a wide network of experts;
- organizing and running conferences;
- generating new ideas for non-proliferation solutions;
- educational skills;
- provision of venues for diplomatic contacts;
- provision of institutional memory;
- provision of advice on non-proliferation policy and conference tactics.

### A Future ?

When it met in Norway, in December 1999, PPNN's Core Group began discussing a possible future task for PPNN. It continued that discussion during its meeting on 10 March 2000. The main conclusion reached there was that, if it was at all possible financially and if the people concerned were willing and available, PPNN should continue. Current members, and two former members who had consented to present papers and participated in the Core Group session, all saw PPNN as the principal multinational non-governmental body in the field, possessed of a unique combination of assets and abilities of which use should be made for the further benefit of the non-proliferation regime, especially now that this threatened to disintegrate.

As to the subjects PPNN should deal with in future, there was no clear consensus. Of the task elements listed: holding briefing seminars; producing issue reviews or studies; acting as a Track-II forum, especially on regional issues; the **Newsbrief**; serving as institutional memory and a source of advice; monitoring and analyzing ongoing relevant events and situations; using Core Group meetings, where appropriate also with the involvement of outside experts, primarily to exchange ideas that might enhance the regime and the viability of the NPT; fulfilling the role of a permanent NPT Secretariat; helping to refine the review process - each one was mentioned by one or the other speaker as worth continuing, taking on, or singling out as of special importance. It was left to the Executive Chairman to refine these ideas and send the result around to Core Group members for further comment.

### Fields of Work

Using suggestions made in the Core Group, comments received from seminar participants, and his own views, it is the Chairman's conclusion that PPNN could do useful work in the following areas:

- Monitoring events in the area of nuclear (non) proliferation, with emphasis on urgent regional issues, and analyzing them for significance and impact; developing ideas on possible approaches and solutions;
- Disseminating information on current developments and main issues, through the PPNN **Newsbrief** and Issue Reviews and/or studies;
- Briefing government officials, public media representatives and research personnel, especially on, and prior to, major conferences on the subject.

The programme would be reduced in scope as compared to the one currently pursued. Work should go on with as little interruption as is practically possible, but the programme could be built up incrementally over time, from a modest re-start to full operation, reaching a climax with a major briefing meeting just before the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

### Programme Elements

PPNN would emphasise its function of monitoring and analyzing current events in its areas of interest, laying more stress on discussing and devising ways of dealing with problems. Current events would continue to be reflected in the quarterly **Newsbrief**; ideas for solutions would be reflected in the publications programme.

The principal networking function would continue to be exercised in periodic meetings of PPNN's Core Group, composed of between one dozen and twenty persons from the same professions as heretofore and from as many countries as possible (taking account of the desirability of co-opting women and persons from developing nations), with some of the current members possibly yielding to younger individuals. The meetings would concentrate on exchanges of views on developments and ideas how to cope with them.

At least once a year, a Core Group session would be combined with a two-day session to analyze the results of the Review Process during that year, as well as to review the state of the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty. As appropriate, officials of the UN and IAEA; the Secretary of the Conference on Disarmament, several selected members of the Conference on Disarmament, and the principal officers of the preceding Review Conference, to the extent that they are willing to retain their association with the subject, would be invited to the "analytical" session. Results of analyses and proposals formulated

at those meetings would be distributed to all NPT parties.

Shortly before the 2005 Review Conference, or possibly before the last session of the Preparatory Committee preceding the Conference, a major residential briefing conference would be held for persons likely to participate in the Conference.

#### **Phase Four**

During the first year of the new phase, PPNN's activities would be limited to one Core Group meeting, perhaps in France (since there is a suggestion that the French government might provide funds), combined with a two-day analytical session, and the publication of four issues of the **Newsbrief**, possibly curtailed to some extent if that would save money.

To the extent that funds are available and the need is felt, the frequency of meetings may be raised to two a year, the second to be held in the UK or US, or in a region of special interest.

At least initially, the number of Issue Briefs could be reduced. Consideration might be given to issuing several together at a possible average of three sets every two years.

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25 March 2000