

**July 8, 1993**  
**General Report on the Thirteenth Meeting of the  
PPNN Core Group, 8-12 July 1993**

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**Summary:**

Summarizes events and agenda of the thirteenth meeting of the PPNN core group in Southampton, UK.

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## GENERAL REPORT ON THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF THE PPNN CORE GROUP

8-12 July 1993

### INTRODUCTION

1. The Thirteenth meeting of the PPNN Core Group was held at the Chilworth Manor Conference Centre, Chilworth, Southampton, UK from Thursday 8 July to Monday 12 July 1993. This meeting was organised on behalf of PPNN by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, [MCIS] Southampton, UK. From Friday 9 July to Monday 12 July, the Core Group extended participation in its meeting by convening a seminar on **Issues at the 1995 NPT Conference** attended by 38 nominees from 36 states. Participation included representatives from four of the five nuclear weapon states (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States); from 8 states that had recently acceded to the Treaty; and from states representing a broad geographical spread of States Parties to the NPT [for details, see separate report on the seminar]. In addition, the meeting was attended by three invited speakers [George Bunn, George Quester and Tariq Rauf]; three rapporteurs responsible for drafting elements of the seminar report [Simon Crowe, Helen Leigh-Phippard and John Redick] and one observer from a funding organisation [Hilary Palmer].

2. All members of the PPNN Core group were present, with the exception of Olu Adeniji and Davidson Hepburn, who were prevented from attending due to professional commitments. Support staff in attendance were Emily Bailey, Jan Bird, Darryl Howlett and Marcel Lettre (student intern).

### CORE GROUP BUSINESS SESSIONS

3. Four papers on the work of PPNN had been circulated to members of the Core Group in advance of the meeting:

PPNN/13/3 -	Publications and Outreach
PPNN/13/4 -	Financial Position of PPNN 1993 - 1995
PPNN/13/5 -	PPNN Core Group Meetings and Conferences, 1993/1994
PPNN/13/6 -	Target Schedule of PPNN Activities 1993 - 1995

4. The contents of PPNN/13/3 and PPNN/13/4 were noted by members of the Core Group. The financial position of PPNN is secure to early 1994, but it remains imperative to gain several large two year grants before 1994 in order to guarantee that the full programme of activities can be implemented through to the end of 1995. The Core Group was delighted to learn that three further annual grants might be provided through JAIF. In view of the current financial difficulties, however, it was accepted that the stipends paid to Core Group members would remain at their current levels of \$1,000 rather than be increased to \$1,250 as envisaged in the 1990 5-year expenditure budget.

5. The Chairman reported that Jan Murray, who had resigned from the Core Group in November 1992 because there was no certainty that she would remain in the nuclear industry, had now taken up a post with a uranium mining concern in Australia. In these circumstances, it was appropriate to invite her to rejoin the Group. The Core Group warmly welcomed this development, and unanimously supported the Chairman's action.

6. The Chairman also reported that after extensive consultations, he had issued an invitation to a retired Chinese diplomat to join the Core Group and participate in the current meeting. This initiative was strongly supported by members. Contact was made with him by telephone in the course of the meeting, and it was believed that the outcome of the approach would be positive.

7. PPNN/13/5 outlined the revised 1993-4 programme. This would consist of three major activities:

- i. A PPNN Core Group meeting and a regional seminar covering South Asia to be held in Sri Lanka from 3-8 November;
- ii. An "extended" PPNN Core Group meeting on the theme of **The New Non-Proliferation Environment** and a PPNN regional briefing seminar/workshop on **The 1995 NPT Conference** for representatives of states in the Americas to be held in Central America/the Caribbean in Spring 1994;
- iii. A PPNN Core Group meeting and a PPNN briefing seminar/workshop on **The 1995 NPT conference** in late October/November 1994 to be held at a venue easily accessible by delegates to the UN General Assembly in New York.

8. The Core Group noted that there were various reasons why the venue for the Spring 1994 meeting had been changed from the Middle East to the Americas. Discussions were proceeding on a possible venue for the latter meeting in either Venezuela or the Bahamas.

9. The Core Group discussed at length the programme for the meeting in Sri Lanka, and significant changes were suggested to the draft which had been circulated.

10. PPNN/CG13/6 outlined a future publishing schedule for the Programme. Production of PPNN Study 4, **Nuclear Export Controls** by Harald Müller and Lewis Dunn, was in hand and it was planned to distribute it in October 1993 with Newsbrief 23. A possible draft of PPNN Study 5, **Nuclear Security Guarantees and Assurances as a method of reinforcing the NPT**, had been prepared by John Simpson and was discussed later in the meeting. A draft of PPNN Study 6, **The Implementation of Article IV: The Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy** was to be prepared by Jayantha Dhanapala for circulation at the November Core Group meeting.

In addition, it was suggested that an Issue Review on the future development of the IAEA might be published, based on the paper by David Fischer that also was to be discussed later in the meeting.

## **CORE GROUP SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS**

11. During its regular reporting session, members discussed the following items;

- \* the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference;
- \* the prospects for, and implications of, the opening of negotiations on a CTBT;
- \* the role of the UN Security Council in relation to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular its actions in the case of North Korea;
- \* the position of specific CIS states in relation to the NPT; and
- \* the prospects for bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force.

12. Under the heading of NPT related issues, members discussed a paper by John Simpson outlining a possible draft of PPNN Study 5 - **Nuclear Security Guarantees and Assurances as a method of reinforcing the NPT.** Points raised in the course of the discussion which followed included:

- \* Olu Adeniji and Mohammed Shaker might supply sections on negative and positive assurances respectively for the study, which should be published in mid-1994 to have maximum impact;
- \* the origins of the paper lay in the political rhetoric of a past era, but new security assurances would have to address real security problems, such as those posed by North Korea, Iraq, and potentially by Iran;
- \* in 1968, the provision of negative security assurances was not feasible. In 1993 it is, and it is now positive assurances that are more difficult to contemplate;
- \* the paper should attempt to rethink the future relevance of positive security assurances of the type previously offered through alliances to the non-proliferation regime [including stationing of weapons on other states soil], as these were likely to be more significant in future than negative ones;
- \* the whole concept of negative assurances was now outdated, as the threat was from ambiguous nuclear weapon states rather than the five declared ones;
- \* the existing draft needed to be recast to give greater prominence to present and future issues and to lay somewhat less stress on the historical element;
- \* the paper needed to address the possibility of assurances through regional arrangements and by non-nuclear weapon states, and the implications of such assurances for the working of the UN Security Council; for the central role currently played by the five recognised nuclear weapon states in providing assurances; and for the processes of ensuring compliance with international non-proliferation norms;

- \* the paper needed to clarify the relationship between positive security assurances, especially nuclear ones, and disarmament;
- \* the paper needed to address the future of nuclear deterrence, and declarations on the non-use of nuclear weapons, as the relevance of positive security assurances was intimately linked to this;
- \* the paper would have to address the relationship between nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and how security assurances could deal with them;
- \* a significant future issue might be how to provide security for non-nuclear weapon states against threats from emerging nuclear weapon states: in this context the face-off between North and South Korea was part of the unfinished business over the future of nuclear weapons;
- \* was it useful for the five nuclear weapon states to declare prior to the 1995 NPT conference their ultimate intention to move to a non-nuclear weapon world?

14. Under the heading of Functional Issues, David Fischer introduced his paper on **The Future of the IAEA**. In the course of this discussion, the following points were made:

- \* the IAEA's role as a promoter of nuclear power has become relatively less important in comparison to its other functions, partly because nuclear energy has ceased to be an expanding source of power, except in the Pacific area;
- \* the provision of nuclear safety and waste management advice were now mainstay IAEA activities;
- \* the period of continued application of the IAEA safeguards system would be a subject to uncertainty until the 1995 NPT conference decided on the further duration of NPT/IAEA safeguards;
- \* the limits of the pre-1991 safeguards system had always been recognised, but no action had been taken to extend them. Action had now been taken to correct this, and the system had worked effectively in the Korean case;
- \* the advantages of grafting a CWC-type challenge inspection system onto the IAEA system were doubtful, though it might be useful to consider whether and how one might develop alternative safeguarding concepts to complement the existing system;
- \* it had been proposed that the IAEA should manage the CTBT verification system, even though it lacked seismic expertise;
- \* a further significant role for the IAEA would be as a custodian of fissile material arising from the dismantling of nuclear weapon stocks.