

October 24, 1996

**Report on the twentieth meeting of the Program for
Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) Core
Group**

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Summary:

Summarizes events and agenda of the twentieth meeting of the PPNN Core group.

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*Report on Twentieth PPNN Core Group Meeting***PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION****GENERAL REPORT ON THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF THE PPNN CORE
GROUP: 24 - 27 OCTOBER 1996****Introduction**

1. This report is intended solely for use as an *aide memoire* by members of the PPNN Core Group and as a means of giving funders and former members of the Group an indication of the range of issues discussed at the meeting, and the flavour of those discussions. It exclusively represents the views of PPNN's Programme Director, John Simpson, who bears full responsibility for its contents, and has not been adopted by the Core Group as its report.

2. PPNN held its Twentieth Core Group Meeting from Thursday, 24 October to and including Sunday, 27 October 1996. The meeting took place at the Chauncey Conference Center, Princeton, New Jersey, United States. It was chaired by Ben Sanders, Executive Chairman of PPNN, and organised on behalf of PPNN by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies of the University of Southampton, UK.

3. On Friday, 25 October, PPNN's Core Group met to consider a number of substantive issues and discuss its current programme of work. From dinner on the evening of Friday, 25 October through to the late afternoon of Sunday, 27 October, an international seminar was held on ***The 1997 Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference: Issues and Options***. This was primarily intended for senior government officials who were dealing with matters relating to the 1997 Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference (PrepCom) and who were either members of Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York or were delegates to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations.

4. All members of the PPNN Core Group were present. Support staff in attendance were Abigail Sanders of PPNN, and Sarah Hamiduddin of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies. Emily Bailey and Deborah Ozga of PPNN and Marcel Lettre [former PPNN intern] of the American University, Washington, acted as Working Group rapporteurs for the Briefing Seminar. Ben Sanders acted as a fourth Working Group rapporteur. Hilary Palmer attended the meeting as PPNN Development Consultant to the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies.

5. The Core Group addressed itself to four specific types of issue:

- * questions related to the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation system over the previous six months;
- * functional issues;
- * regional issues;
- * PPNN's future activities.

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Core Group Reporting Session: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System

6. A document outlining possible issues on which reports might be made, PPNN/CG/20/6, had been circulated to members. In the course of the discussions, the following matters were explored: options for an UNSSOD IV; bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force; strengthening OPANAL; the Middle-East nuclear situation; DPRK developments; attitudes of European governments to nuclear disarmament; the role of civilian technologies in the development of new integrated military systems; prospects for less-developed countries acquiring advanced military systems and the role of WMD as a force equaliser; the CTBT negotiations; NWFZ in Southeast Asia and Africa; START II ratification; stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons; NATO expansion; counter-proliferation; residual Iraqi WMD capabilities; US ratification of CWC; impact upon India of the CTBT and the limited support for its 1996 bid to have a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council; the ICJ Advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons; the international mission to examine French nuclear test sites; further measures of French nuclear disarmament; and the status of the IAEA 93 + 2 programme.

7. A draft Issue Review by John Simpson, on *Substantive Issues for the 1997 and subsequent PrepComs for the NPT Review Conference in 2000* had been distributed to members. Time did not permit discussion of this paper but members were asked to submit comments in writing before mid-December.

Functional Issues

8. Oleg Bukharin of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, initiated discussion of these issues by making a presentation on *The Dismantling of the Soviet Nuclear Legacy in Russia*. In the course of the session the following points emerged:

- * for technical reasons, all tactical weapons in Russia would need to be retired by 2003 as by then they would have reached the end of their shelf-lives;
- * similar technical attrition also affected Russia's strategic forces, but with varying time scales;
- * Ukraine had observers at the Russian dismantlement sites, but Belarus and Kazakhstan had declined to implement such arrangements;
- * up to 200% overcrowding was occurring at weapon storage sites, while dismantling facilities required refurbishment as they dated from the 1960s. Rates of dismantlement above 2000/annum were difficult to attain for safety/security and economic reasons;
- * lack of storage for nuclear components was the primary bottleneck to dismantling - the Russian military had no money to pay Minatom for constructing new facilities;
- * the option of burning weapon-grade Pu in reactors was the only disposal option for this material now being considered;

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- * no new nuclear weapons had been produced in Russia since the late 1980s. If after 2000 production failed to restart, technological disarmament would occur as weapons reach the end of their shelf-life;
- * the 1994 US-Russian agreement on transparency and transfer of fissile materials to safeguards had yet to be fully implemented. This would not be easy for ways would have to be devised to avoid disclosure of information on weapon design to each other. Procedures would also have to be worked out to ensure that such information was not disclosed to the IAEA. During the recent General Conference of the IAEA, the two states and the Agency announced that they had started discussions on this issue;
- * any *ad hoc* working group on disarmament at the CD might be tasked with starting a debate in a systematic manner on how to monitor and verify the dismantling process for nuclear weapons and the disposition of the fissile material arising from it, as well as how to go to zero nuclear weapons and how to measure and verify this.

Regional Issues

9. Jan Prawitz, Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Defence Research Establishment, Division of Nuclear Weapon Physics, presented a draft Issue Review to the Core Group on *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic*. Among issues raised in the presentation and in the course of the subsequent discussion were:

- * the NWFZ proposal has not been taken seriously by the Central European states as their aim is to acquire full membership of NATO;
- * NATO enlargement does not envisage automatic deployment of nuclear weapons in the areas of enlargement;
- * is the idea worth discussing when it seems unlikely to be implemented? Yes, because elements may go into any NATO-Russia Charter/Treaty and it is a good idea whose time has not yet come.
- * although a NWFZ treaty was possible 18 months ago, it may be impossible to achieve now. But a Norwegian/Danish/East German status for Central European states is a distinct possibility;
- * the strength of NATO's Article 5 guarantee has never been its wording, or the deployment of nuclear weapons on European NATO territory, but the organisational and doctrinal arrangements to support it;
- * a key question is what advantage a NWFZ would offer to the NATO states. This would be heavily dependent on the future evolution and implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, and whether Kaliningrad and perhaps other areas of Russia were included in the NWFZ. This in turn would breach all the current understandings of the nature of such a zone;

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- * the principal advantages of the Zone appear to be that it may be a means of tension reduction in the context of NATO expansion, and a non-stationing agreement may be an essential element in any NATO-Russian Charter/Treaty;
- * the existence of such as Zone would imply the NATO nuclear-weapon states were offering a no-first-use security guarantee to states within it [including Kaliningrad/Russia] - this would be a qualitatively new element in the security situation in the area.

PPNN's Future Activities

10. Four papers on the work of PPNN were circulated to members of the Core Group in advance of the meeting:

PPNN/CG20/2 - Financial Position of PPNN
PPNN/CG20/3 - PPNN Meetings Programme, 1996-7
PPNN/CG20/4 - PPNN Briefing Seminar, March 1997
PPNN/CG20/5 - PPNN Publications and Publication Plans, 1996-7

11. Before embarking on a discussion of these papers, members addressed the response that PPNN might make to any approach from the Canberra Commission for PPNN to facilitate their future work. This generated a lively discussion, in the course of which the following points emerged:

- * PPNN should focus more on disarmament issues than it had previously - this means rethinking the structure of its briefing conferences to enlarge the role disarmament would play within them, as well as adapting its deliberative work;
- * PPNN's contribution to the debate on disarmament should be deliberative, and should concentrate on elucidating ways and means. As a consequence, it was essential to preserve PPNN's individual and unique identity as a non-advocacy body which discussed issues frankly and did not attempt to achieve consensus positions - the Canberra Commission operated on different principles, hence its greater concern with public advocacy;
- * Disarmament was now being addressed by many groups - PPNN was unique in its focus on non-proliferation in its widest sense as an essential factor in, and a precondition for, nuclear disarmament, as well as in addressing those aspects of nuclear disarmament that have a direct impact on the non-proliferation regime in general and on the viability of the NPT in particular;
- * While there might be merit in offering support services to the Canberra Commission, especially if it were to help PPNN find funds for its further work, the two groups were different in objectives and nature and should remain clearly separate. While PPNN should orient itself to a greater extent than before on the issue of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, it should approach this issue in the same way it has previously dealt with the question of NPT extension: by focusing on the need to abolish all nuclear weapons as an eventual goal, in as an objective a fashion as possible, and without PPNN as a group advocating a specific

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- way to solve that problem. Therefore, it was felt that, while a dialogue with the Canberra Commission or its successor would be appropriate, PPNN should not enter into a formal relationship with that body.
12. The contents of PPNN/CG20/2 were noted by members of the Core Group. It was accepted that funding applications for a further phase of PPNN's work between 1998 and 2000 would have to be submitted in July 1997, after the 1997 PrepCom but probably before the Core Group Meeting scheduled for the second part of that year. A plea was also made that UN rules for long-distance travel should also apply to PPNN meetings, though PPNN's financial situation appeared to preclude this in most cases.
 13. PPNN/CG20/3 presented proposals for PPNN's programme of activities for 1996/1997. Some debate occurred on whether the twenty-second Core Group deliberative meeting should be held in June or September 1997. This meeting is intended to include a dialogue on the outcome of the 1997 NPT PrepCom with Heads of Delegation to that event. The discussion did not settle what the best date would be to ensure a good attendance by those persons. This is to be looked into further. It was accepted, however, that the venue should be within easy reach of Geneva.
 14. If additional funds can be raised, PPNN will hold a further briefing seminar, but this time with a stress on regional issues, in Bangkok in November 1997. The title will be **South East Asia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation**, and it will be held in conjunction with the Monterey Institute for International Studies, Monterey, and the Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Bangkok.
 15. It is now planned that PPNN will hold the first Core Group meeting of the 1998-2000 phase in early 1998 in France. This deliberative meeting will be combined with a briefing seminar principally intended for senior diplomats to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva dealing with issues relating to the 1998 PrepCom.
 16. PPNN/CG/4 outlined proposals for the twenty-first PPNN Core Group meeting and a briefing seminar on **The 1997 Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference**. The meeting will be held at the Arden House Conference Center, Harriman, New York. *[In the light of experience at the Chauncey meeting, it is now planned to hold the deliberative Core Group meeting from the evening of Wednesday 5 March to lunchtime on Friday 7 March, and to hold the Briefing Seminar as originally scheduled from the evening of Friday 7 March to the late afternoon of Sunday 9 March 1997, if accommodation can be secured for the Wednesday evening - these changed arrangements will be confirmed to members of the Core Group as soon as possible].* More attention will be given to disarmament issues in the deliberative Core Group meeting, which should, if feasible, include a dialogue with representatives of some of the organisations in the United States and elsewhere who are undertaking research programmes into the modalities of the global elimination of nuclear weapons. *[The programme for the Briefing seminar has also been revised in the light of experience at the Chauncey Seminar in order to lessen the burden on Core Group members and to reduce the number of topics on which presentations will be made, so as to add to the time*

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available for discussion. A new draft programme for the meeting is attached at Annex A].

17. The contents of PPNN/CG/5 were noted by the members of the Core Group. It was accepted that it would be desirable to produce further volumes in the PPNN Studies Series if financial resources permitted this, rather than concentrating exclusively on Issue Reviews. The plan to produce and distribute three further Issue Reviews by early 1997 was endorsed. These would be: *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic* by Jan Prawitz; *Issues of NPT Compliance and Implementation* by Lewis Dunn; and *Substantive Issues for the 1997 and subsequent PrepComs for the NPT Review Conference in 2000* by John Simpson. In addition, Harald Müller offered PPNN an English language version of a study he and Annette Schaper were producing in German on a fissile-material cut-off.
18. A proposal also emerged that work should start on two significant PPNN Studies in 1997, involving more than one author. One would be on the end-state of nuclear weapon elimination; the strategies that might contribute to achieving this; the role that the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime would play within those strategies; and the problems of compliance and implementation that might be involved. The second would be an examination of how a process of nuclear elimination might be developed and promoted using as its starting point universal and regional controls over fissionable materials, rather than focusing on the control and elimination of delivery systems.

ANNEX A**PPNN BRIEFING SEMINAR MARCH 1997**

1. The second briefing seminar of PPNN's current phase will be held in conjunction with Core Group Meeting Twenty-One at the Arden House Conference Center, New York State from Friday, 7 to Sunday, 9 March 1997. Starting in the evening of Friday, 7 March, with a dinner that will conclude with a keynote speech, it is now planned that it will follow a day and a half of deliberative meetings involving the Core Group alone. Members of the Core Group will assemble for their deliberative meeting in the evening of Wednesday, 5 March, and start their discussions on the morning of Thursday 6 March. On the afternoon of that day and the morning of Friday, 7 March there will be a dialogue meeting involving representatives of groups in the United States and elsewhere who are studying the modalities of nuclear weapon reductions and ultimate elimination. Members will have the afternoon of Friday, 7 March free for rest and relaxation.
2. The target audience for the briefing seminar will be heads or senior members of missions to the United Nations in New York of states parties to the NPT, together with such officials from capitals and members of CD delegations who may wish to take part, assuming they pay for their own travel. The aim would be to have approximately forty participants - which has been found to be the optimum number for the kind of briefings PPNN has held in the past - all of whom have a direct interest in the preparations for the work of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference of the year 2000 and/or are likely to be in national delegations to that meeting.

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3. The aim of the seminar is to brief and discuss with the audience the review process of the NPT, as revised at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and topics likely to play a role in the substantive and procedural discussions at the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 1997.
4. Comments from participants after the Chauncey meeting indicated that some felt too much time had been taken up with presentations, not enough time had been available for discussion, and that a more structured final plenary session was desirable. In response to this, it is now proposed to limit the presentations to two per session and to impose a strict time limit of 10 minutes for each. This will inevitably mean that some members of the Core Group will no longer have a designated role in the meeting, but it is hoped that they will feel free to participate in the discussions in the working groups of their choice. We are also proposing that the final plenary will consist of a presentation by the Rapporteur on the basis of a short paper which will then be circulated; initial comments on the paper by members of a small panel of Core Group members; and then questions and comments from the floor. The Chairman will also have a list of pre-prepared topics / questions that he can address to the panel to keep discussion moving and to cover all the key issues.
5. A list of the states from whom we plan to invite participants is attached. Normally our seminars involve around forty invited participants. To obtain that number we usually issue invitations to about three times that many delegations, because in our experience fewer than one-third (ie about forty) of the states invited accept the invitation. Even then, some tend to drop out at the last moment. If the response is greater than expected, however, we should be able to make arrangements for a limited overflow, albeit at the cost of some comfort, e.g. by accommodating late-comers in neighbouring hostelryes.
6. Against this background, the draft programme for the seminar is as follows:

Friday, 7 March

1900	Participants arrive
1930 - 2115	Reception and Welcome Dinner
2115 - 2215	Welcome and Keynote Speech

Saturday, 8 March

0900 - 0915	Opening Remarks - Ben Sanders
0915 - 1030	Plenary Session 1: The 1995 NPT Conference: <i>What it Means for the NPT Review Process that Begins in 1997</i> - Jayantha Dhanapala
1030 - 1100	Coffee
1100 - 1300	Working Group Session 1
1300 - 1430	Lunch
1430 - 1530	Working Group Session 2
1530 - 1600	Coffee
1600 - 1700	Working Group Session 2 (Continued)
1930 -	Dinner

Report on Twentieth PPNN Core Group Meeting**Sunday, 9 March**

0900 - 1100	Working Group Session 3
1100 - 1130	Coffee
1130 - 1230	Working Group Session 4
1230 - 1400	Lunch
1400 - 1500	Working Group Session 4 Continued
1500 - 1530	Coffee
1530 - 1700	Plenary Panel Session II: <i>Issues Facing the 1997 PrepCom and Procedural Options</i>
1700	Seminar Concludes

After the Saturday plenary session, the seminar will split into 3 groups, which will be briefed in turn by four briefing teams on the following basis [The briefings will be based on pre-circulated papers prepared by the presenters]

Briefing Team A: The Review Process

Chair- Jayantha Dhanapala

- i. The functioning of the PrepCom - Ben Sanders & George Bunn
- ii. The Implementation of the NPT- Lewis Dunn

Issue Cluster B: Disarmament I

Chair -Sverre Lodgaard

- iii. Multilateral Disarmament Initiatives and the CD Agenda after the CTBT - Peter Goosen
- iv. Further P5 disarmament measures: the way ahead - Harald Müller

Issue Cluster C: Disarmament II

Chair- Oleg Grinevsky

- v. Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones - Olu Adeniji
- vi. NPT Universality - Mohamed Shaker

Issue Cluster D: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Chair - Thérèse Delpech

- vii. IAEA Safeguards - 93 + 2 - Martine Letts
- viii. Export Controls and Peaceful Uses - Djali Ahimsa

Core Group members are requested to submit their papers for the Aden House meeting, or to update those presented at the Chauncey meeting, by February 14, in order to circulate them prior to the meeting, and to enable them to be available in that form for participants in the PrepCom.

States to be Invited to Send Participants to PPNN's March 1997 Briefing Seminar

Report on Twentieth PPNN Core Group MeetingEurope

Austria
 Belarus
 Belgium
 Bulgaria
 Croatia
 Czech Republic
 Denmark
 Estonia
 Finland
 France
 Germany
 Greece
 Hungary
 Ireland
 Italy
 Latvia
 Lithuania
 Malta
 Netherlands
 Norway
 Poland
 Portugal
 Romania
 Russian Federation
 Slovak Republic
 Slovenia
 Spain
 Sweden
 Switzerland
 Turkey
 UK
 Ukraine

Asia and the Pacific

Australia
 Bangladesh
 Cambodia
 China
 Fiji
 Indonesia
 Japan
 Kazakhstan
 Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
 Korea, Republic of
 Kyrgyzstan
 Laos, People's Dem Republic
 Malaysia
 Maldives
 Mongolia
 Myanmar
 Nepal
 New Zealand
 Phillipines
 Singapore
 Sri Lanka
 Thailand
 Turkmenistan
 Uzbekistan
 Viet Nam Soc. Rep. of

Africa and the Middle East

Algeria
 Benin

Central African Republic
 Chad
 Comoros
 Côte d'Ivoire
 Egypt
 Gabon
 Ghana
 Guinea
 Iran
 Iraq
 Jordan
 Kenya
 Kuwait
 Lebanon
 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
 Madagascar
 Malawi
 Mali, Republic of
 Mauritania
 Mauritius
 Morocco
 Mozambique
 Namibia
 Niger
 Nigeria
 Saudi Arabia
 Senegal
 South Africa
 Syrian Arab Republic
 Tanzania
 Togo
 Tunisia
 Uganda
 United Arab Emirates
 United Republic of Cameroon
 Yemen
 Zaire
 Zambia
 Zimbabwe

The Americas

Argentina
 Bahamas
 Bolivia
 Canada
 Chile
 Colombia
 Costa Rica
 Ecuador
 Grenada
 Guatemala
 Guyana
 Honduras
 Jamaica
 Mexico
 Nicaragua
 Panama
 Paraguay
 Peru
 Trinidad and Tobago
 USA
 Uruguay
 Venezuela