

## **July 1995**

# **Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Number 30**

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### **Summary:**

A compilation of the latest news, events, and publications related to nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. The "Newsbrief" was produced by the PPNN and personally edited by Ben Sanders.

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# PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Number 30

NEWSBRIEF

2nd Quarter 1995

## Editorial Note

The **Newsbrief** is a quarterly publication of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN). It disseminates information about issues related to the spread of nuclear weapons and about moves to prevent that spread. The contents of the **Newsbrief** are based on publicly available material selected and presented so as to give an accurate and balanced, but necessarily compact depiction of pertinent developments, including events relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The limited size of the **Newsbrief** makes it necessary to choose among items of information and to present them in condensed and simplified form. Subheadings serve to facilitate presentation and do not imply judgements on the events referred to; they are not necessarily always the same. For example, the question of clean-up at the former weapons production facilities at Hanford, Washington State and at the Savannah River plant in South Carolina, which used to be covered under the subheading **Weapons-related Developments in Nuclear-Weapons States**, is here discussed under the subheading **Environmental Issues**.

PPNN's Executive Chairman, Ben Sanders, is editor of the **Newsbrief**. He produces it and takes sole responsibility for its contents. The inclusion of an item does not necessarily imply the concurrence by the members of PPNN's Core Group, collectively or individually, either with its substance or with its relevance to PPNN's activities.

This issue of the **Newsbrief** refers to events relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that took place, or that came to the editor's attention, in the period 25 March–30 June 1995. The main event of interest covered in this issue is the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 17 April until 12 May. An extended section is devoted to that Conference. The principal documents produced at the Conference, or relevant to events there, are reproduced in full in Section IV, **Documentation**.

In the seven years since its first issue, which covered the months January–March of 1988, the **Newsbrief** has made an effort to raise public awareness of the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, to help promote the viability of the international non-proliferation system, and especially to

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support a substantial extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that is at the core of that regime.

This result has been achieved with the indefinite extension of the Treaty but that achievement does not necessarily end the mission of the *Newsbrief* or of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, under whose aegis it is produced. Present plans call for the *Newsbrief* to be published at three-monthly intervals, as hitherto, at least during 1996; there is some hope that means may be found to go on after that year.

Readers who wish to comment on the substance of the *Newsbrief* or on the way any item is presented, or who wish to draw attention to information they think should be included, are invited to send their remarks to the editor for possible publication.

Unless otherwise stated, sources referred to in this issue, and publications listed, date from 1995.

## I. Topical Developments

### a. The NPT Conference

The following report on the **Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons** is based on information gained at that Conference by the editor as a member of the Conference staff, and on documents produced at and for it. The report is intended as a straightforward description of events at the Conference; no attempt is made to ascribe specific outcomes to the activities of one or the other delegation. No use has been made here of the many predictions, descriptions, comments and analyses regarding the Conference that have appeared in major newspapers and specialised periodicals and journals before, during and after the event. The editor owes thanks to Ms. Rebecca Johnson and the *ACRONYM Consortium*, and the *Disarmament Times*, whose excellent releases have been of much help to him in the preparation of this text.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference was held at United Nations headquarters in New York from 17 April until 12 May 1995. It was attended by delegates from 175 of the 178 states (then) party to the Treaty. Representatives of ten non-party states attended as observers. Also in attendance were representatives from the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency and five inter-governmental organisations as well as three observer agencies. Representatives of 188 research institutes and non-governmental organisations attended.

During the preparations for the Conference (see *Newsbrief 29*, pages 1 and 2, and **IV. Documentation**), discussion about the rules of procedure for the Conference had centred on the way in which the decision on the extension of the Treaty should be taken in case there should be more than one extension option to choose from and there was no consensus about any one of them. At its fourth session, in January, the Preparatory Committee had not been able to reach agreement on this matter and agreed that an informal working group, chaired by Antti Sierla of Finland, would meet in New York over the weekend preceding the Conference, to try and finalise rule 28.3(f), on the method

of balloting. The meeting was duly held, but again no agreement was reached, the particular disagreement being over the question whether a vote would be secret or open. Representatives of non-aligned states generally held out for a secret ballot, while others insisted on an open vote.

Also during the preparatory process, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee Nigeria had asked for the preparation of a background document setting out the various extension options (see *Newsbrief 27*). As this proposal did not meet with consensus in the Committee, Nigeria raised it at the 49th regular session of the UN General Assembly, which accordingly adopted resolution 49/75 F, in which it invited States parties 'to provide their legal interpretations of article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and their views on the different options and actions available, for compilation by the Secretary-General as a background document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference ...'. The Secretary-General duly invited states to provide their views on the matter. Eleven states did so, among whom France responded on behalf of the European Union. The Preparatory Committee itself did not make any request for the preparation of a background document and the document that was prepared by the UN Secretariat on the basis of the responses it received was issued only as a General Assembly document: **A/50/115**. The question of the extension options that presented themselves was never an issue before the Conference.

The Conference was opened on 17 April by the Chairman of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland. Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka was unanimously elected President. The opening session was addressed by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking on behalf of the host country; by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali; and by IAEA Director General Hans Blix. The Conference decided that pending adoption of a rule on the voting method with respect to extension the Rules of Procedure should be applied provisionally, and it charged the President with the task of finding a solution to the outstanding rule within ten days. Further, the Conference confirmed the appointment of Prvoslav Davinic as Secretary-General of the Conference and it duly elected Isaac Ayewah of Nigeria as Chairman of Main Committee I (disarmament issues, including security assurances); André Erdős of Hungary as Chairman of Main Committee II (safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones); Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands as Chairman for Main Committee III (peaceful uses); Tadeusz Strulak of Poland as Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Andelfo Garcia of Colombia as Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

Especially in the opening stages, states were generally represented at a high official level, a large percentage of the 116 speakers in the General Debate being foreign ministers or the equivalent. From the start, many of the presentations in the plenary indicated the speakers' preferences for one or the other extension option. Early on, it became obvious that there would be a numerical majority in favour of indefinite extension. There were also a sizeable number of non-aligned states who expressed themselves in favour of a 'rolling extension' of fixed periods, many of them advocating a series of 25-year periods; one, Venezuela, proposed a 25-year extension with another extension conference at the end; Nigeria opted for a single fixed period of unspecified length with the possibility of further renewal;

and several Arab states expressed doubt about the wisdom of any extension as long as Israel had not acceded to the Treaty. The address by South Africa's foreign minister received particular attention. This called for indefinite extension, along with the strengthening of the review process, mainly through the creation of a virtually permanent body that would meet between review conferences, both for the purpose of holding substantive discussions on specific aspects of the Treaty's implementation and to prepare for the next full-scale review conference; it also contained a proposal to adopt a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that would serve as a yardstick for the fulfilment of the undertakings assumed under the Treaty. While several non-aligned delegations, among them Egypt and Mexico, called for a link between the extension and specific time-bound steps, to disarmament, the South African proposals were not perceived as conditions for the extension.

Approximately halfway through the first week of the Conference and in parallel with the statements in Plenary, the three Main Committees began their review of the operation of the Treaty. Proposals for elements of the text of a Final Declaration were submitted almost from the beginning of the deliberations. Major areas of disagreement were identified at an early stage. As expected, the problems were very similar to those raised at previous NPT Review Conferences, with some variations in emphasis.

In Main Committee I the subjects of debate included questions such as whether all nuclear-weapon states had complied with article I, and the non-nuclear weapon states with article II; the issue of a legally binding agreement on security assurances; the subject of undertakings by the nuclear-weapon states to proceed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and the question of the scope of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

In Main Committee II debate centred upon the strengthening of IAEA safeguards; nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East; and the question whether nuclear export controls were discriminatory. An Iranian proposal for the creation of an international body to administer nuclear exports was a subject of considerable debate. In Main Committee III agreement was reached relatively early on all items except that here, too, Iran raised the subject of export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, by which it felt disadvantaged — a feeling shared to some extent by other developing countries.

Meanwhile, from 25 to 27 April, the Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned countries meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, had exchanged views on the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. As reported, the Ministers did not reach agreement on the proposals made by Indonesia, that the Treaty should be extended by a series of 25-year fixed periods which could be interrupted by a negative vote, and that a vote on the extension should be made by secret ballot. In their declaration, the Ministers recognised that 'in spite of its unequal obligations' the NPT had been useful in promoting international peace and security; expressed 'deep concern' that the nuclear-weapon states had not adhered fully to their obligations under the Treaty; underlined that the Conference offered a unique opportunity to achieve the

goal of comprehensive disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field; emphasised the need for the adoption of a genuine and comprehensive disarmament regime; called for a series of specified measures to fulfil the commitments of the Treaty; stressed the need for universality of the Treaty; and called for the continuation of NPT review conferences, at five-yearly intervals. The Declaration, which is reproduced in full in part c.ii of Section IV, **Documentation**, left members of the Non-Aligned Movement free to support any extension mode.

From the outset of the Conference, President Dhanapala had expressed his confidence that it would be possible for the extension decision to be taken by consensus. In a determined attempt to achieve this, from early on in the proceedings the President conducted a series of consultations with individual delegations, to ascertain their views and see how consensus might be achieved. It soon became clear to him that this might be attained if the wishes of members of the Non-Aligned Movement, as expressed in the Bandung Declaration, could be met along with an extension decision that would satisfy the supporters of indefinite and unconditional extension. One way to do so would be along the lines of the South African proposal for a continued and strengthened review process and the adoption of principles to measure progress in the implementation of the Treaty.

As a means to this end, the President called together senior delegates from different geopolitical areas and from the five nuclear-weapon states, with whom over a period of about ten days he conducted intensive consultations. On the basis of two South African papers, and taking account of a working paper submitted by Mexico, these 'President's Consultations' came up, after long and strenuous negotiations, with an agreed set of measures by means of which the review process would be strengthened, and with a set of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that would serve as a means to determine progress in the fulfilment of states' compliance with their undertakings under the Treaty. Once the coordinators of the various geo-political groups, who formed part of the President's Consultations, had obtained the concurrence of their groups with the results of the negotiations, and after consultations between the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (which led to more specific linkage between the documents on strengthening the review process and the principles and objectives), the respective papers were reformulated as draft decisions to be proposed by the President to the Conference.

By the end of the third week of the Conference, in accordance with the rules of procedure, the various extension proposals were submitted to the Conference. There were three proposals. Mexico tabled a draft resolution (**NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1**) by which the Conference would decide for indefinite extension of the Treaty, and which called for a series of consecutive steps towards nuclear disarmament. Canada, together with, initially, 103, and subsequently 110 co-sponsors, submitted a draft decision (**NPT/CONF.1995/L.2**) which consisted of a simple call for indefinite extension. Eleven 'like-minded' non-aligned nations submitted a draft decision (**NPT/CONF.1995/L.3**) providing that the Treaty would continue in force for 'rolling fixed periods of twenty-five years', with the possibility of interruption by decision of a majority of parties. The draft decision also contained a call for the identification at

each review conference of specific objectives for the full implementation of the Treaty. All three drafts are reproduced in part b of Section IV, **Documentation**.

The President himself submitted to the President's Consultations an extension proposal of his own. This would have the Conference establish the fact that a majority existed among states party for the indefinite extension of the Treaty and would decide by consensus that it should therefore continue in force indefinitely. In this way, article X,2 of the Treaty, which states that the decision on extension shall be taken by a majority of states party, would be complied with, yet the need for a vote would be avoided. This proposal was endorsed in the President's Consultations, where, however, the reference to consensus was deleted at the wish of a number of non-aligned representatives. It was also submitted to the General Committee of the Conference, where it readily found concurrence.

With respect to the voting procedure, consultations continued past the deadline of 27 April set by the Conference for the adoption of a new rule 28.3(f). These consultations finally resulted in agreement on a rule stating that ('without prejudice to rules which may be adapted for future conference.') '(a) All proposals shall be voted on by written ballot'. Extracts from the rules are reproduced in part c.iv of Section IV, **Documentation**. The decision made it possible for the Conference to adopt the rules of procedure definitively, and would have permitted a vote on the extension to be taken, should that have become necessary.

It had been the President's intention to call for the Conference's concurrence on a package of proposals: the draft decision on strengthening the review process (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4) [reproduced in part a.i of Section IV, **Documentation**], the draft decision on principles (NPT/CONF.1995/L.5) [reproduced in part a.ii] and his own draft extension decision (NPT/CONF.1995/L.6) [reproduced in part a.iii]. At this point, three days before the scheduled end of the Conference, a group of Arab states submitted a draft resolution (NPT/CONF.1995/L.7) [not reproduced here] that would, *inter alia*, have expressed 'deep concern' at the existence of Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and called on Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards; called on all states in the Middle East to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction; and called on the nuclear-weapon states meanwhile to extend security assurances to NPT parties in the area.

Since a number of states were unable to agree with this draft, it soon became obvious that action would inevitably have involved a vote. This, in turn, might have made it difficult to adopt the package of decisions proposed by the President without voting. After hours of intense consultations, especially, it was understood, between Egypt and the United States, the draft resolution was revised so as to omit mention of any state by name, and calling in general terms on 'all remaining states' in the area to accede to the Treaty. Mainly, it is said, because this general call would also have applied to two Arab states, the original sponsors decided they could no longer take responsibility for the draft resolution. Accordingly, the draft as changed (NPT/CONF.1995/L.8) [reproduced in part a.iv of Section IV, **Documentation**] was submitted under the names of the three Depositary Powers.

On 10 May, the three draft decisions and the second draft resolution were adopted without a vote.

Meanwhile, the three Main Committees had submitted the reports on their respective review activities to the Drafting Committee. The report of Main Committee I reflected only minimal agreement among its members while showing profound disagreements on a number of important issues of nuclear disarmament and of security assurances; the great majority of paragraphs were presented between brackets. The report of Main Committee II presented a text largely agreed upon, with several specific areas where agreement had not been reached. Main Committee III had been able to reach agreement on all paragraphs but one of its report.

The Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Ambassador Strulak therefore requested his Vice Chairmen, Messrs Patokallio and Fahmi; Mr. Starr, Vice Chairman of Main Committee I; Mr. de la Torre, Vice Chairman of Main Committee II; and Mr. MacKinnon, to continue or, as appropriate start, consultations on formulations that might settle disagreements on, respectively, the implementation of articles I and II in Main Committee I; a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in Main Committee II; security assurances, in Main Committee I; other nuclear-weapon-free zones, also in Main Committee II; and on export controls, in Main Committees II and III, respectively. Judging that there was little possibility of solving specific differences in Main Committee I on the implementation of article VI, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee took it upon himself to submit a brief summary of the issues that had played a part there, and when that did not obtain wide support, presented a second, longer summary.

In the course of the various consultations, agreement could be reached on formulations that might be included in a Final Declaration, for a number of the outstanding issues. On the discussions regarding the implementation of articles I, II and VI, however, no agreement could be reached in the Drafting Committee. At a late stage in the proceedings, the President himself took a hand, but notwithstanding strenuous efforts to find compromise language, in the late afternoon and evening of the last day of the Conference, it became clear that consensus was no longer within reach.

The Conference thus ended in the late evening of 12 May with the adoption of its Final Report, reflecting in particular the decisions adopted earlier, but without a consensus Final Declaration with respect to the results of the review.

## b. Other NPT-Related Events

- On 6 April, shortly before the opening of the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, the representatives of **China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom** and the **United States** addressed individual letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, setting out the contents of declarations each had made in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, with respect to negative security assurances. On 11 April, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 984 on positive security assurances, sponsored by the five nuclear-weapon states. The pertinent texts are reproduced in parts d and e in Section IV, **Documentation**.

By a letter dated 17 April, the representatives of **France**, the **Russian Federation**, the **United Kingdom** and the **United States** sent the Secretary-General of the Review and Extension Conference the text of a declaration made in connection with the NPT, which included the following paragraph:

We solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

The pertinent document is reproduced in full in part c.i of Section IV, **Documentation**. It is noted that the letter from **China** with regard to security assurances repeats that country's non-first-use pledge and refers to the 'complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons'.

- On 12 May, the last day of the NPT Conference, the observer for **Chile** announced that his country had met the constitutional requirements for accession to the Treaty and would shortly deposit its instrument of accession. This took place on 25 May in Washington, making Chile the 179th party.

#### c. Further Non-Proliferation Developments

- In Johannesburg, South Africa, the expert group preparing the draft **treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa** is reported to have finished its work. The draft was to be submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for consideration during its meeting in Addis Ababa, on 21-25 June. If approved by the OAU Council, the text would be submitted to the meeting of African Heads of State for endorsement during their meeting on 26-28 June. (*Reuter's* 2/6; *Direct Information*, 7/6)
- **Cuba** signed the Treaty on the Denuclearisation of Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) on 25 March. (*Financial Times*, 27/3; *IAEA Document INFCIRC/472*, 5/5)
- In **Switzerland**, the Parliament has approved legislation tightening controls of nuclear exports. The new provisions require licenses to be obtained by any Swiss corporate body or individual for any transaction involving nuclear fuel, equipment or parts thereof, including small components that could assist in a nuclear programme, even if the items traded never touch Swiss soil. (*Nucleonics Week*, 27/4, 1/6)
- The **United States** Administration has requested an appropriation of \$108 million for fiscal year 1996, to help it achieve its over-all nonproliferation objectives. In testimony before the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis stated that these funds are needed to provide bilateral assistance in specific non-proliferation projects (\$10 million); fund export control assistance, especially in former Soviet Republics (\$15 million); make a voluntary contribution to the IAEA for safeguards and technical assistance (\$43 million); for the Korean Energy Development Organization — KEDO (\$22 million) and to support international science and

technology centres under the Nunn-Lugar program (\$18 million). (*USIS European Wireless File*, 6/4)

- From 5 to 7 April, in Helsinki, the **Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)** held its annual Plenary Meeting. It reviewed the guidelines for nuclear transfers and considered ways of updating them. Reportedly, it agreed to amendments with respect to items of which the export should take place under international safeguards, which now not only consist of nuclear equipment and materials but include the associated technologies. The meeting was attended by the 31 members of the NSG (which was joined most recently by New Zealand and South Africa), and observers from the European Union and Ukraine. The Republic of Korea has expressed the intention also to adhere to the NSG guidelines and, as of this Autumn, to participate in its work. (*Japan Times*, 16/3; NSG Press Statement, undated; *SpentFUEL*, 24/4)

#### d. Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Limitation

- According to assessments shortly before the beginning of the NPT Conference in New York, the START II agreement was expected to pass the US Senate relatively smoothly, although not before the Conference opened, but doubt existed about the likelihood of the Russian Duma taking the matter up until some time in 1996, after the national elections.

During their summit meeting in May Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin were reported to have discussed possible further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of their respective countries. They ordered their respective experts 'to develop concrete steps including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces'. It has been announced that Moscow would allow the USA to inspect Russian SS-25 missiles that have been converted to civilian use, to ensure that they are not being held back for military purposes. The two sides are also reported to have agreed tentatively on reciprocal inspection visits of stocks of fissionable material withdrawn from weapons, so as to check on progress of dismantling.

An experimental electronic system for the remote-control monitoring of stocks of weapons-grade nuclear material has been demonstrated in Russia and the United States. A cooperative six-month experiment is under way at the Kurchatov Institute in Russia and at the Argonne-West Laboratory in Idaho to demonstrate the system. It is hoped that this system can eventually be used in supervising compliance with disarmament agreements; reportedly, it might also be suitable for use in the surveillance of nuclear storage sites, to enhance security and deter theft.

Bilateral talks to clarify the interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which were scheduled to be resumed in March in the Standing Consultative Commission, were postponed indefinitely.

The agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on the sale of 500 tons of former Soviet weapons-grade enriched uranium (HEU) is said to be in danger of coming apart. The first shipment consisting of

one metric ton of the material in blended-down form has left St. Petersburg. The total amount to be shipped in 1995 is 6 tons, but further shipments are said to be in question because Moscow considers the price the United States has offered too low, in part because the blending-down process has apparently been found to be more difficult and costlier than expected. Russia has said that if no agreement can be reached on a better price and more favourable supply conditions, it will retain the material itself. The total amount of HEU in Russia is said to be 1,200 tons. It is also reported to have 170 tons of plutonium. The uranium issue was expected to be discussed at a meeting between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in late June. Meanwhile, the US itself is also converting former weapons-grade HEU into reactor fuel. The glut of enriched uranium is posing problems for suppliers. The US Administration is consulting the Congress on legislation designed to reconcile disarmament policies with the interests of the domestic market.

(**Arms Control Today**, March, May; **Nucleonics Week**, 6/4; **Washington Post**, 17/5; **NuclearFuel**, 5/6, 19/6; **New York Times**, 12/6, 14/6, 19/6; **Address by ACDA Dep. Dir.** at UN Conference Nagasaki, 13/6; **Asahi Evening News**, 14/6; **Japan Times**, 15/6; **Economist**, 17/6)

- In late March it was reported from **Germany** that after the decision by German utilities not to support the production of plutonium (MOX) fuel at the Siemens fuel fabrication plant at Hanau, that company would not take any initiative to use that plant for the production of MOX fuel from plutonium derived from dismantled Russian warheads. Since then, however, government officials have urged the utilities to continue supporting completion of the plant. Reportedly, the German government attaches much value to retaining the means to turn Russian plutonium into fuel for peaceful purposes. The US Administration is said to support the use of the plant for the manufacture of MOX fuel from former Soviet weapons material, and American officials were planning to visit Hanau in late June. The parliamentary opposition parties and the government of Hesse, where the facility is situated, are said to be opposed to the plan. (**Nucleonics Week**, 30/3, 22/6; **NuclearFuel**, 5/6, 19/6)
  - The **United Kingdom** has announced that by the end of 1998 it will eliminate the free-fall WE177 bomb, thus ending the Royal Air Force's nuclear role. The measure is reported to lead to the elimination of 100 nuclear weapons. It means that by 1998 the *Trident* sea-launched ballistic missile will be the only remaining British nuclear-weapon system, consisting of 4 *Vanguard*-class submarines, each carrying up to 96 warheads, of which 1 or 2 will be operational at any one time. The Ministry of Defence has further revealed that once the 'Trident' submarine-launched missile system has been fully deployed and the WE177s withdrawn, the number of warheads in the UK inventory will be 21 per cent fewer than in the 1970s with a total explosive power 59 per cent lower than at that time. In a later statement it was revealed that over the same period the total number of operational warheads would be reduced by 30 per cent with the operational explosive power being reduced by 62-63 per cent. British media claim,
- however, that the nuclear material derived from the gravity bombs that are being scrapped will be converted for use in Trident warheads and that the new system, which will shortly be entirely missile-based, will actually expand the country's nuclear capacity. In response to questions in the House of Commons regarding the UK's long-term intentions with respect to nuclear weapons, Foreign Secretary Hurd has said that there was 'no pressure' on the country to abandon nuclear weapons. The day before, Defence Secretary Rifkind had already denied in the Commons that the abolition of nuclear weapons was a commitment under the NPT, and said that doing so would be 'a remarkably foolish initiative, which would weaken our essential defence'.
- It has been announced in London that plutonium generated at the Calder Hall and Chapelcross reactors will no longer be used for military purposes. The news was confirmed in the statement by Foreign Secretary Hurd at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York.
- (**Times** [London], letter from Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, 23/3, ditto 5/4, 13/4; **House of Commons**, written answers, 28/3, 4/4; **Independent**, 18/4; **NucNet News**, 25/4; **Nucleonics Week**, 27/4; **House of Commons**, oral answers, 2/5, 3/5; **UK Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995**, 3/5).
- In the **United States**, discussions are going on between the Department of Energy (DoE) and environmentalists, about the safest way to dispose of excess plutonium. The plutonium is in a variety of forms, not all of which reportedly is suitable for conversion into MOX fuel for use in reactors. DoE says it focuses on plutonium vitrification and on conversion into MOX, and burning it in existing US light-water reactors or CANDUs. Other options are, reportedly, direct disposal in deep boreholes, and immobilisation with radionuclides. Environmentalists favour the former two options. Scientists at DoE's Savannah River complex are said to give serious attention to recent studies that warn that in the long term fissile material concentrated in underground storage could reach autocatalytic criticality; this, supposedly, could militate against storage of vitrified unirradiated plutonium. According to *The New York Times*, an internal study released at Savannah River 'strongly endorses' the idea. Debate on the matter is going on. (**SpentFUEL**, 3/4, 24/4; **New York Times**, 13/3. See also section **n. Environmental Issues**)
  - **Ukraine** has announced that it will begin destroying its strategic missile launch silos this summer, but earlier this year it had not yet settled on the method to be used. The US government has promised Kiev another \$20 million, in addition to the \$185 million it had previously pledged to donate to help Ukraine get rid of its nuclear armament. There are reportedly still 130 SS-19 missiles in Ukraine, 46 SS-24s missiles and 44 strategic bombers, but the country is set to get rid of all nuclear weapons on its territory by the end of 1996. **Belarus** is scheduled to do the same. **Kazakhstan** has announced that all warheads from the 104 SS-18 strategic missiles previously deployed on its territory have been returned to Russia. This makes it the first of the former Soviet Republics to have become 'nuclear

free'. (UNJAR [Kiev], 26/1, in **JPRS-TAC-95-001**, 14/2; **Enerpresse**, 4/4; **New York Times**, 6/5; **Arms Control Today**, June)

### e. Nuclear Testing

- China** reportedly plans to carry out five more nuclear tests before a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is concluded, by the end of 1996: two during the current year, and three in 1996. The number of tests China is said to plan would thus be least one higher than had been expected last year, when Chinese officials were quoted as saying that a total of no more than five or six tests were still needed. Since then, three tests have taken place: two of them in 1994. China's 42nd test, said to have had a yield between 40 and 150 kt, was held on 15 May, at the Lop Nor testing site. In Beijing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China would carry on testing until a test ban had been concluded. China's choice of a date for the latest test, a few days after the extension of the NPT, is seen as politically regrettable, all the more since preparations for the event must have been conducted while the NPT Conference was underway. Strong criticism has been expressed by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Finland, Japan (which has announced that it would cut its grant aid to China by an as-yet undetermined amount to express its displeasure at the test), New Zealand, Kazakhstan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Concern has been expressed at China's announcement that it would stop testing once a comprehensive test ban 'has entered into force', since this might mean that China would continue testing after 1996, even if agreement has been reached on a treaty. (**Jane's Defence Weekly**, 8/4; **National Public Radio [USA]**, 15/5, 16/5; **Daily Telegraph**, 16/5; **Libération**, 16/6; **International Herald Tribune**, 16/5; **Guardian**, 16/5, 23/5; **Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 16/5, 23/5; **Enerpresse**, 16/5; **New York Times**, 16/5, 23/5; **Le Monde**, 17/5; **Nuclear Proliferation News**, 15/6)
- On 13 June the President of **France**, Jacques Chirac, announced the resumption of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific which, as he stated in a news conference, had been halted 'a little too early'. The President announced that, starting in September, France would carry out a series of eight underground tests, intended to calibrate equipment that would allow computer simulations to check the reliability of French nuclear weapons. According to an earlier report, the tests are needed to develop new warheads for the M-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and for a cruise missile. According to Chirac, the series would have to be completed by May 1996 and in the autumn of that year France would be ready to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty. The decision was not unexpected. Shortly before his election, Chirac said that the country should consider resuming nuclear testing temporarily to maintain its nuclear arsenal, which he said was an absolute priority. Noting that some experts had said that France must 'carry out several more nuclear tests if it wants to be able to do without them afterwards', Chirac had added, 'we must clearly announce the date on which France will put a final and total end to these experiments'. In a radio broadcast on 7 June, defence minister Charles Million had said that a study led by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff had found tests necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal. As apparently predicted by Alain Juppé, the new Prime Minister, reactions from abroad have been very negative. France's decision, which President Chirac has called 'irrevocable', was assailed at the meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) leading industrial nations at Halifax, Canada. A large number of heads of state or government have denounced the tests. Particularly strong protests have come from Australia (which has since recalled its Ambassador in Paris), Japan and New Zealand. At a meeting in Washington, President Clinton is said to have pressed President Chirac to refrain from testing. China has expressed the hope that France's decision will not jeopardise the conclusion of a test ban in 1996. *Greenpeace* has sent a ship to the testing site at Mururoa Atoll to demonstrate against the tests. According to recent polls, 56 per cent of the French population are opposed to further testing. Questions have also been raised about the cost aspects of nuclear testing and doubts are expressed within France about the need, given recent reports of progress in the development of simulation technology. The leaders of the Socialist parties of 15 European countries, meeting in Cannes, have condemned France's decision. (**Le Figaro**, 11-12/3, 12/4, 3/5, 5/5; **Agence France Presse**, 18/3, 27/4; **La Dépêche**, 18/4; **Libération**, 19/4, 11/5; **Le Monde**, 22/4, 5/5; **L'Express**, 27/4; **Les Echos**, 4/5; **Arms Control Today**, June; **Guardian**, 7/6, 8/6; **New York Times**, 8/6, 14/6, 18/6, 23/6; **Times [London]**, 8/6; **Japan Times**, 13/6, 15/6, 16/6, 20/6; **Asahi Evening News**, 14/6, 15/6; **Defense News**, 19-25/6; **Economist**, 24/6; **International Herald Tribune**, 26/6)
- Late in May, official sources in **Kazakhstan** were quoted as saying that a small nuclear device that had been stuck since 1991 in a shaft at the Semipalatinsk test site (see **Newsbrief 29**, p. 3) would be blown up. Reportedly, the device, which was deteriorating rapidly, was to be destroyed with conventional high explosives. Attempts to recover the device or neutralise it by other means appear to have failed. (**National Public Radio** newscast 27/5); **Standard [London]**, 28/5)
- In June, there were reports in the international press that officials in the **United States** Department of Defense were calling for a resumption of underground testing. The reports, may have been triggered by discussions in the Administration about the inclusion in a test ban treaty of restrictions that would permit low-yield explosions to test the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Suggestions that the US might resume testing have led to the comment that it is not serious about its commitment to conclude a CTBT in 1996 and has only said it would obtain support for the extension of the NPT. There appears to be wide-spread concern that, rather than seeking exceptions for the purpose of reliability testing, nuclear-weapon states would use them for the development of new weapons. (**Asahi Evening News**, 19/6; **International Herald Tribune**, 19/6; **Japan Times**, 19/6, 20/6; **Economist**, 24/6)
- On the basis of interviews with former senior Soviet scientists the British *Daily Telegraph* has disclosed that the **Former Soviet Union** set off 116 nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs): 81 within Russia, 30 in Kazakhstan and the rest in Turkmenistan,

Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Some of these projects are said to have miscarried, when explosions caused destructive earth tremors; vented into the atmosphere, causing radioactive contamination of the environment; contaminated or destroyed ore deposits instead of facilitating mining operations; or, while increasing the output of gas and oil, caused the contamination of wells and of connected aquifers, including nearby rivers. There are still said to be experts who believe that under the right conditions PNEs are a viable technology. (*Daily Telegraph*, 8/2, in *JPRS-TAC-95-001*, 14/2)

- On 6 April, on the negotiations carried out in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the **United Kingdom** dropped its insistence on the right to test 'under exceptional circumstances', to check the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. **France** also indicated that it agrees with the removal of the relevant bracketed text. (*Times* [London], 7/4; *Financial Times*, 7/4; *Enerpresse*, 11/4; *Trust & Verify*, April)

#### f. Nuclear Trade and International Cooperation

- **Cuba** is said to have plans to complete the Juragua VVER power station with help from **Russia** and with instrumentation and control equipment from Germany. Reportedly, companies from Brazil, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom are forming a consortium to finance the work, which is estimated to cost \$800 million. Juragua-1 is said to be 80 per cent complete and would take two years to finish; Juragua-2 is about half finished. Although there will be IAEA safeguards, politicians in Miami and Washington have expressed concern. (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27/5; *Nucleonics Week*, 1/6; *Japan Times*, 13/6)
- **Russia** is reported to have agreed to accept spent fuel from the four VVER-440 reactors at Kozloduy, in **Bulgaria**, for reprocessing. All six units at the station are now operating, but calls to close the two oldest units, numbers 1 and 2, which have been in operation for 20, respectively 19, years, are becoming frequent and their shut-down is under serious discussion. Faced with the resulting loss of generating power that would result, Bulgarian authorities are said to be considering the completion of the half-built VVER-1000 reactor at Belene, on which construction was halted in 1990. That project has so far cost the equivalent of \$1.3 billion. All major equipment for the plant is already in place and well-preserved; completion is expected to cost \$700 million. (*East European Energy Report*, March, in *UI News Briefing*, 95/14; *Enerpresse*, 6/4; *Nucleonics Week*, 4/5)
- Early in May, negotiators from **Euratom** and the **United States** agreed on the text of a new nuclear cooperation agreement. In talks held in mid-March, many of the outstanding secondary issues were settled and more understanding was thought to have been reached on the conditions under which the US could withdraw or suspend its consent over the retransfer of nuclear material of US origin. At that time some important issues still remained open, including, reportedly, that of the scope of US consent rights; a definition of the concept of 'alteration in form and content'; the issue of 'perpetuity'; and what was meant

by the term 'storage'. Since US Vice President Al Gore had spoken of the matter with the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, there had been speculation that the US Administration felt under pressure to reach an agreement in principle before the start of the 1995 NPT Conference, so that it would be able to demonstrate its readiness to cooperate with the European nations on peaceful nuclear commerce. In a subsequent round of negotiations, held on 29 March in Brussels between Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis on the one hand and Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the European Commission and Christos Papoutsis, its energy commissioner, on the other, rounded off several days later in a tele-video conference, all remaining problems were thought to have been resolved. As reported, agreement was reached on a package deal that contained a formulation on perpetuity of consent rights, including arrangements for consultations about the application of such rights, should that become necessary. The Europeans were understood to have accepted that US consent rights should also apply to MOX plants; and the American side was said to have agreed to global suspension of prior consent — a point to which the European negotiators had attached much value.

The text was duly approved by the European Commission and forwarded to the General Affairs Council of the European Union. In its session of 29 May, however, the General Affairs Council did not consider it but sent it back to member states for further study. At its next session, on 12 June, it again decided not to deal with the matter, as it did not consider the study to be completed. The text is now not expected to be considered in the General Council until 17 July. A number of members of the European Union are understood to have warned for undue haste in concluding an agreement of this importance which, they stress will affect their nuclear trade for the next thirty years, and have called for time to correct what they see as significant shortcomings. Before the June meeting of the Council, the question was said to be whether the governments and the Council would be willing to allow the European Commission to find a compromise on the outstanding points with the American negotiators; if not, a final settlement was expected to take much longer. Several states are said to consider that the Commission may have overstepped its negotiating mandate. The critics include most of the European states with nuclear industries. There reportedly is resentment over the US insistence on retaining consent rights over the use of American-origin nuclear materials; some states reputedly see this as contrary to the NPT and the international safeguards system and feel that accepting it would amount to the abandonment of European sovereignty; this was said to be in particular the view held by France, which held the presidency of the European Union during the first half of the year. With regard to America's generic programmatic consent, the states in question were reputed to be determined to ensure that the US could only use its veto in truly exceptional and clearly defined circumstances. There were also comments that the text contained a number of unclear elements (one view reported was that it was 'verging on the incomprehensible'), and there were urgent calls for clarification. Reportedly, European industry by and large supports the draft agreement, which makes it probable that it will eventually be accepted.

Once approved by the General Affairs Council of the European Union, the agreement will go to the US President for submission to both Houses of Congress. If within 90 days Congress raises no objections, the agreement will go into effect. Even then, however, it is expected that there will inevitably be a short hiatus between the expiration of the current agreement and the entry into force of the new one, but this is not expected to have serious commercial consequences.

(SpentFUEL, 20/3, 27/3, 3/4, 10/4, 15/5, 22/5, 12/6, 19/6; Nucleonics Week, 23/3, 6/4, 13/4, 18/5, 1/6, 15/6; NuclearFuel, 27/3, 10/4, 5/6, 19/6)

#### g. IAEA Developments

- At a four-day meeting in late March, the IAEA Board of Governors considered a set of proposals by the Agency's Secretariat, known as 'Programme 93+2', for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system. After long debate, the Board reportedly endorsed the direction of 'Programme 93+2', reaching consensus on the general thrust of the proposed new system, which should provide for verification by the Agency of the 'correctness and completeness' of declarations by states party to comprehensive safeguards agreements, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities and of the absence of undeclared activities. Reportedly recognising that a strengthened safeguards system would require states to grant the Agency greater access to information and locations than had previously been required, the Board asked the Secretariat to submit for consideration at its meeting in June specific proposals on the implementation of the Programme, preparatory to presentation to the General Conference of the IAEA, in September. Some Board members are said to have expressed reservations about the need for greater access to sites and to have argued that the proposed extensions were going too far.

The proposals duly submitted by the Secretariat for the June Board are understood to have been in two parts. With respect to activities for which the Agency's Secretariat believes existing instruments, notably the safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153, give it the necessary authority, and which it would be practical and useful to implement at an early date, specific implementation measures were proposed. For those measures for which the Secretariat thinks it does not now have express authority, it presented proposals for implementation through additional authority that would complement that given in the safeguards agreements.

The former part is understood to include the collection of environmental samples at sites where the IAEA already has the right of access; the acquisition of information for which it has not previously asked, but which it believes it has authority to require, including parts of the fuel cycle that precede the introduction of safeguards material into a reactor or enrichment facility, such as mining, processing and conversion plants; and information on past operations. It is said to be the Director General's intention that a start should be made right away with the implementation of those measures. Even so, some measures that come within part of the

Programme may require negotiation. An example given is increased cooperation with states' systems of accounting and control, on which the Agency seeks more information, which it feels it has the right to ask for, while some states may need persuasion to provide it.

With regard to the second part of the Programme, where the Secretariat sees a need for extended access to locations and information, the Board has asked the Secretariat to present for discussion at its December meeting, model legal documents through which it would be given the necessary additional authority. It seems that the Board is divided on the nature of the legal mechanism that would be required. Some governors are said to favour the preparation of draft protocols to existing safeguards agreements, or a revised version of the model safeguards agreement, either of which would first have to be formulated in general terms and subsequently negotiated for formal adoption with each of the states concerned. Other governors apparently think that the matter might be settled in state-by-state arrangements, which presumably would take less time to conclude.

Activities for which the Secretariat apparently considers it necessary to obtain such additional authority include declarations of, and physical access to, locations where the state has declared that activities are carried out that are 'functionally' related to fuel cycle operations; an example given is heavy-water production. Another issue is that of obtaining full access to sites where a state has identified nuclear materials to be present: environmental sample collection would be done at the site, not just the facility. Yet another area that would reportedly come under the second category of measures is an expanded declaration, giving a complete description of the nuclear fuel cycle.

A report by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) has analysed the capabilities and shortcomings of the IAEA safeguards system, and recommends *inter alia* that the Agency explore the feasibility of 'internationalizing certain aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle'; lowering the 'significant quantity thresholds' of which diversion should be detected; and increasing the use of containment and surveillance techniques. It also recommends concentrating more effort on 'problem nations'.

(Reuter's, 27/3, 31/3, 14/6; United Press International, 27/3 IAEA Newsbrief, March/April; Jane's Defence Weekly, 8/4; NuclearFuel, 10/4, 24/4; See also 'Activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency Relevant to Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Background Paper prepared by the IAEA, NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part 1, 1/2; Direct Information, 29/6)

#### h. Peaceful Nuclear Developments

- While some press reports from Armenia claim that the Metzamor nuclear power station has been 'reopened', it appears that fuel loading has only just begun at unit 2 of the plant. It is now expected that this reactor, a Soviet-built VVER-440-230, may start operations some time in the autumn. IAEA experts have confirmed that

extensive retrofitting has taken place of major components of the plant, but there was some talk that the pressure vessel might have to be annealed before restart. Experts are also said not to be sure of the adequacy of the upgrades made to the seismic resistance of the station. Restarting unit 1 is said to be under discussion but a decision on this matter would reportedly have to depend on the results of a feasibility study. (**East European Energy Report**, March, in **UI News Briefing**, 95/14; **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung**, 22/3; **Nucleonics Week**, 23/3; **Reuter's**, 25/5; **NucNet News**, 20/6; **Japan Times**, 21/6)

- Work on the completion of the Temelin VVER-1000 nuclear power station in the **Czech Republic** is proceeding. The American contracting firm, Westinghouse, is reported to have completed the fuel design; the safety analysis for the plant is said to be almost ready. Westinghouse claims that once the current work has been completed, safety at Temelin will be equivalent to that of the reactor just finished at Sizewell, in the UK. The design changes still have to be approved by the Czech regulatory authorities but that process is said to be well under way. Additional work, for which further funds must be obtained, is expected to cause delays in the rest of the upgrading work and consequently start-up. Hitherto, fuel delivery had been scheduled for the end of 1996 and it had been hoped that unit 1 might be loaded before the end of that year. As matters stand now, start-up of unit 1 is not expected until mid-1997. The anticipated delay plays into the hands of opponents of the completion of the station, who claim that it proves the validity of their assertion that it makes no sense to try and use Western technology to upgrade Russian-designed reactors. The persistent campaign conducted in Austria against completion of Temelin has received further ammunition from an internal report supposedly prepared for Czech authorities about chaotic situations in the management of the reconstruction of the plant. The Austrian government is reported to have offered the Czech Republic the equivalent of \$50 million if it discontinues its nuclear energy programme, but this was formally turned down when Austria's Prime Minister Vranitsky visited Prague, in May. (**Kurier**, 13/4, 9/5, 13/5; **Nucleonics Week**, 13/4, 27/4; **Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 14/4; **Salzburger Nachrichten**, 9/5; **Standard**, 9/5; **Die Presse**, 13/5; **CSTK Ecoservice Czech**, 15/5 in **UI Newsbriefing 95/21**, 23/5)
- Shortly before the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was to vote on the financing of the completion and safety upgrade of two VVER-440s at Mochovce, in the **Slovak Republic** — the EBRD had been expected to contribute 30 per cent of the estimated total cost of \$880 million — the Slovak government asked for a postponement of the vote. While Austria is indefatigable in its resistance to the completion of the station, also within the framework of the European Union, which it joined on 1 January, there had been indications that some other members of the European Union — among them Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — also oppose it. Opponents of the completion of the station, including Austrian environmental groups, allege that Slovakia is unwilling to meet the requirements set by the EBRD and by western sponsors, such as the demand for an increase

in the price of electricity by 25 per cent (a demand since repeated by the EBRD, but resisted by Slovakia because, according to its prime minister, its enactment would bankrupt most small businesses in the country). However, there are indications that the move for postponement was in fact prompted by expectations of finding other sources of financing, in particular from Russia. That country has since indeed offered to support the project with a credit of \$150 million. It is also reported that the Czech Skoda Company has offered to complete the reactors at a price 30 per cent below that of Electricité de France (EDF), the company that was to have done most of the work through a consortium jointly owned with the Slovak Electrical Utility. EDF has already invested \$70 million in the project and there were earlier reports that it was confident it would be enabled to continue. However, it has now been reported that the recent dismissal of a number of high Slovak officials who were said to have had ties with EDF would indicate that it may have to withdraw from the project after all. Earlier, hints had appeared in the press that the Slovak Republic might have hoped to negotiate more favourable conditions for a new deal with EDF, which would take the cheaper offer by Skoda into account. There had also been suggestions that a consortium might be created involving Czech, French and Russian firms. It was further said that the American firm Westinghouse had been asked by Skoda to provide 'support' for the completion of the Mochovce station. That cooperation might also take the form of a consortium, which would include Skoda and other Czech nuclear organisations, and possibly the Russian enterprise Atomenergoproekt. Germany's Bayernwerk is also mentioned as a potential investor; reportedly, it has urged, and presumably made it a condition of its involvement, that western industry should be given control of safety aspects at the project. One obstacle to a scheme involving western firms could be the form of financing. There is a suggestion that the eastern European organisations might enter into barter arrangements, but for western firms to participate, other means would have to be found. Slovakia is thought not to have the same long-term credit capability at the US Export-Import Bank as does the Czech Republic, on whose Temelin nuclear station Westinghouse is working. Opponents of the completion of Mochovce, especially in Austria, express doubt that the Slovak Republic will be able to carry on without western support. It has been noted that at the annual meeting of the EBRD, in April, the Mochovce question was not publicly discussed. As of late May, all options as to who would carry out the project and how and by whom it would be financed, still seemed to be under discussion.

There is a report that despite its opposition to the completion of the station, Austria has started work on laying an underground cable that would carry current into the country from Mochovce.

The situation at Mochovce is at the centre of attention both from supporters of nuclear energy, especially in central and eastern Europe, and of anti-nuclear environmentalist organisations such as *Greenpeace*. A decision to finish and retrofit the 90-per cent complete Mochovce power station would be seen as a precedent for the possible completion of other unfinished power reactors of Soviet design, of which there are two in

Bulgaria, six in Ukraine, and twelve more in Russia itself. Reports about the future of the twelve old Russian plants vary widely, between shut-down at the end of the decade and continuation until the end of their design lives. An official of the IAEA has been quoted in the Austrian press as saying that the Mochovce reactor did not conform with Western safety standards, and that it was technically almost impossible, and certainly uneconomical, to build a containment around the reactors. Referring to the closure of similar reactors at Greifswald in the former German Democratic Republic, the speaker expressed the expectation that the Mochovce plant would be completed in any case, and added that the question now was whether this would be done with Russian or with Western technology. Slovakia's Prime Minister Meciar has stated that his country would not be able to shut down the two old VVER-440 power reactors at Jaslovské Bohunice by the end of the decade unless there was a guarantee that Mochovce would be completed.

Concern was caused by an alert at the Bohunice station in late April. This was found to have been caused by an electrical problem in the monitoring system at the plant, which automatically tripped the alarm.

(**Guardian**, 23/3; **Kurier**, 23/3, 10/4, 11/4; **Salzburger Nachrichten**, 23/3; **International Herald Tribune**, 23/3; **Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 23/3, 10/4; **Die Presse**, 23/3, 24/3, 25/3, 3/4, 4/4, 11/4, 4/5, 12/5; **Times** [London], 23/3, 10/4; **International Herald Tribune**, 23/3 **Nucleonics Week**, 23/3, 30/3, 6/4, 13/4, 21/4, 4/5, 1/6; **NucNet News**, 24/3, 29/3; **Daily Telegraph**, 27/3; **Reuter's**, 28/3; **Wall Street Journal**, 30/3; **Financial Times**, 31/3; **Standard**, 31/3, 6/4, 12/5 18/5; **Nuclear Engineering International**, April; **Neue Zürcher Zeitung**, 7/4; **Christian Science Monitor**, 12/4; **CSTK Ecoservice Czech**, 15/5 in **UI Newsbriefing 95/21**, 23/52; **New Scientist**, 27/5; **Reuters**, 28/5; **Safe Energy Journal**, June-August, in **UI Newsbriefing 95/25**, 20/6)

- In Ukraine, the French-led *Alliance* consortium that is making a feasibility study for a new 'sarcophagus' for the damaged Chernobyl-4 reactor unit has concluded that a new shelter is urgently needed and will also have to cover Chernobyl-3, which Ukraine had hoped to keep running for a considerable time to come. *Alliance* has reportedly found the original sarcophagus to be unstable and vulnerable, not only to earthquakes, but also to heavy snowfall, rain and gales, and seriously affected by high radiation levels. Ukrainian specialists are said to have pointed out that *Alliance's* proposal does not fully meet with the original terms of the project for which it tendered, which specifically provided that the design of the new shelter should not affect operation of unit 3. Kiev has also reacted sharply to a report in the British publication *The Observer*, that pillars supporting the shelter constructed over the ruins of unit 4, which also covers part of the services and auxiliary equipment of the still operational unit 3 (reported to have been the country's best performing nuclear unit in the first quarter of 1995), are in imminent danger of collapse; Ukrainian nuclear safety experts deny reports about inadequate seismic stability and reject the claim that the walls of the building on which part of the structure rests are not strong enough to support it. Allegations that the

*Alliance* report was suppressed by the European Commission, as it indicates the possibility of a calamity exceeding even that of the first explosion, have been hotly denied in Brussels. Reportedly, Ukraine's Advisory Commission on Nuclear Policy and Ecological Safety supports the idea of upgrading units 1 and 3 and running them until the years 2007 and 2011, respectively. According to recent reports, repairs are now also under way at unit 2, which was shut down after a fire in its turbine hall in 1992. There is said to be a plan for the start-up of this unit some time next year, if no Western funds are forthcoming for the construction of plants to replace Chernobyl.

As reported in the press, it is not clear what the long-term plans are regarding Chernobyl. In mid-April a high-level delegation of the European Union visited Kiev with the purpose of persuading the Ukrainian government that the entire Chernobyl station should be closed as soon as possible. Following their discussions, Ukraine's President Kuchma stated that the Chernobyl station would be shut down by the year 2000 and that by mid-May a schedule would be developed for the decommissioning. While members of the European Union's team noted that the President's undertaking did not contain conditions, according to some reports the closure will depend upon large-scale assistance from Western countries; estimates range from \$4 billion to \$6.5 billion, which would include the cost of constructing a 3,000-MW gas-fuelled combined-cycle power plant to replace part of Chernobyl's current output, as well as the provision of a stockpile of natural gas. At its summit meeting of July 1994, the group of seven most highly developed western states (G-7) had offered Ukraine \$800 million in energy-related assistance with the condition that Chernobyl-1 and 3 should be closed.

The Ukrainian authorities are said to maintain their demand that before Chernobyl can be closed (it currently generates 5.8 per cent of Ukraine's electricity needs) three still incomplete VVER-1000s (Zaporozhe, Khmel'nitski and Rovno) should be finished. The various media reports do not reveal where the necessary funds would come from, but a deputy Director General at the European Commission has recommended that the Commission should lend Ukraine \$400 million for the purpose, to be repaid from income generated by the excess electricity produced and there are reports that an industrial consortium, led by Electricité de France, has been selected as the contractor for the project. Ukrainian sources are said to express the expectation that if the West wishes Chernobyl to shut down, it will have to provide the bulk of the funds needed. The Ukrainian media also make repeated mention of the need for a new nuclear power station to be built at Slavutich, near Chernobyl, reportedly in the first place with a view to employing the present staff of the station. On this issue, however, views within the Ukrainian government are said to be divided.

According to an announcement released in Kiev on 27 May, eleven western companies, from Finland (*Stromberg*), Denmark (*Danish Power Consult*), Germany (*Asea Brown Boveri A.G.*, *ABB Kraftwerk*, and *Mannesmann*), Italy (*SAE Sadelmi*), Japan (*Kawasaki Heavy Industries* and *JGT*), Sweden

(*Skanska and Svenska Vattenfall AB*), Switzerland (*Sulzer*) and the United States (*ABB Combustion Engineering* and *CMS Energy Corp.*), have agreed with the Ukrainian government and with a range of Ukrainian enterprises to work out a plan for the shut-down of Chernobyl and for its replacement by a gas-fuelled thermal energy plant. As foreseen by President Kuchma, the plan would provide for the closure of the nuclear station by the year 2000. In the announcement, decommissioning Chernobyl is estimated at \$1.7 billion and the cost of the new power plant is given as \$2 billion. That would take 36 months to construct and would give work to 6,000 people. According to the same report, the head of the Ukrainian nuclear power authority says that the long-term task of closing down Chernobyl, including the price of a new sarcophagus and the clean-up of the area, will take until 2030 and cost up to \$10 billion. At their meeting in June, the leaders of the seven most advanced industrial nations (G-7) agreed to continue funding of short-term safety upgrades at Chernobyl and applauded President Kuchma's plan to decommission the plant by the year 2000. The communique issued at the end of the G-7 meeting did not mention funding. Reportedly, half the cost of shutting down the station will be borne by Ukraine, and the rest will come from Western states, the European Union and international financial institutions. Ukrainians are said not to be unanimous in their support for the use of a large gas-fired facility, because the country is dependent on Russia for the supply of much of its natural gas.

(*NucNet News*, 17/3, 28/3, 4/4, 10/4, 11/4, 18/4, 23/5; *Nucleonics Week*, 23/3, 30/3, 21/4, 4/5, 1/6, 22/6; *Observer*, 26/3; *Reuter's*, 27/3, 10/4, 13/4, 14/4; *Independent*, 28/3; *Financial Times*, 11/4, 29/5; *Associated Press*, 13/4; *New York Times*, 14/4, 28/5; *Washington Post*, 14/4; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15-17/4; *NucNet News*, 26/5, 29/5; *Handelsblatt*, 29/5)

#### i. Weapons-related Developments in Nuclear-Weapon States

- The United States is assessing alternative ways of producing tritium for use in nuclear weapons. The question still is whether to do so by means of a particle accelerator, as the Department of Energy (DoE) is said to prefer, or in a reactor. In May, the National Security Committee of the House of Representatives passed the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, which provided \$100 million for work on tritium production (for which DoE had requested only half that much) and directed DoE to use \$60 million of that amount developing multi-purpose reactor technology. Part of these funds were to be used to carry out a plan by a nuclear industry consortium for the privately-financed construction of a 'triple-play' reactor at the Savannah River weapons complex in South Carolina, that would combine tritium production and power generation and would use MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium. DoE, which had not yet decided which technology was to be given preference, resisted the move as premature and as a circumvention of its ongoing review. It was said to find the 'triple-play' proposal inappropriate, because burning the 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium would supposedly take two 1,350-MW reactors 25 years, while for tritium production a 600-MW reactor would suffice. The funding has now been cut back to the

original request. In the ongoing discussions supporters of the accelerator technology, which does not use fissionable material, cite its non-proliferation advantages. It is also pointed out that traditional US non-proliferation doctrine rejects the use of reactors for combined weapons and civil purposes and that the use of weapons-grade plutonium as a reactor fuel would conflict with Washington's attempts to discourage states from using a plutonium-based fuel cycle. (*International Herald Tribune*, 2/5; *Nucleonics Week*, 1/6, 15/6, 22/6; *SpentFUEL*, 5/6)

#### j. Proliferation-related Developments

- **DPRK** : United States Ambassador Stephen Bosworth has been appointed executive director of the *Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation* (KEDO), the consortium set up in early March to implement certain provisions of the 'Agreed Framework' between the DPRK and the United States, particularly the supply of two light-water reactors to Pyongyang. Young Jin Choi of the Republic of Korea, and Itaru Umezumi of Japan have been named as deputy executive directors. With Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States as its founding members, KEDO has been joined also by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Japan and South Korea are expected to pay more than 80 per cent of the costs, while the US share is said to be \$20 million to \$30 million a year over ten years. Australia has pledged \$5 million and New Zealand \$350,000. The US administration has requested \$22 million for 1996.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang, reportedly loath to be seen as in any way dependent on the South, has persisted in its public refusal to accept South Korean reactors, while the United States has consistently maintained the view that Seoul should be the principal supplier. The US negotiator of the Agreed Framework, Amb. Robert Gallucci, has confirmed once again that it had been made clear to the DPRK throughout the negotiations that South Korean reactors were the only viable choice. Negotiations between the DPRK and the US, held in Berlin in late March, did not lead to agreement. The talks were resumed on 12 and 13 April; when again no agreement was reached they were recessed until the 18th, for what was seen as possibly the last round of negotiations on the subject. The impasse was to have been resolved six months after the signature of the Agreed Framework, i.e., by 21 April which, according to Washington, had to be seen as a *target date*. The DPRK's negotiators insisted that this date constituted the *deadline* by which agreement should have been reached and that there was no scope for extending the talks any further; as no agreement had been reached by the 21st, its negotiators left Berlin for Pyongyang. Earlier, a DPRK spokesman had warned that if by that date no solution had been found, his country would be compelled to resume its nuclear activities.

According to European press reports, in Berlin the DPRK advanced the idea that the reactors might be called American-designed rather than South Korean, and that US firms should play a leading part in their construction; the US side was said to be willing to draw up a contract omitting mention of South Korea, on the understanding that the latter would in fact be the main supplier. The American negotiators were also said to

have suggested that a US firm might act as programme coordinator; the DPRK reportedly rejected this idea and demanded that the prime contractor should be American — something South Korea is against. In what was seen as a last-minute attempt to avoid a break-down of the implementation of the Agreed Framework, the United States then reportedly offered to continue the negotiations at a higher official level, this time in Geneva. Pyongyang initially seemed to reject this offer, saying that it would take a 'decisive measure' after it had a detailed report on the talks and would take measures for the defence of its sovereignty. Subsequently, however, the DPRK advised the United States that it would be willing to resume the talks but apparently at a somewhat less senior level.

Matters were apparently held up briefly by misunderstandings about the supply of American oil to the DPRK. According to the US Secretary of State, further supplies would wait until the reactor issue had been settled. It soon turned out, however, that the two issues were not seen as connected: Washington said that the supplies would continue as long as the nuclear freeze was maintained, and when the DPRK agreed on a mechanism that would allow the US to verify that the oil was used only to generate heat and electricity for non-military uses.

On 20 May, talks resumed, this time at the American Embassy at Kuala Lumpur, in Malaysia, which appears to have been chosen after considerable debate over the venue. For the USA the talks were led by Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Hubbard; the DPRK was represented by Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kim Gye Gwan. Reportedly, the talks covered not only the reactor issue but involved 'full and in-depth discussions on the implementation of the Agreed Framework'. The meeting lasted several weeks. After three weeks of intensive negotiations, the two sides announced on 13 June that they had reached agreement on the provenance of the light-water reactors, which, as foreseen, will be a South Korean-designed advanced version of an original American reactor type. The prime contractor selected by KEDO is the South Korean state-controlled electric utility company. The joint statement issued by the DPRK and the United States announced that the reactors to be supplied by KEDO would be 'the advanced version of the US-origin design and technology currently under production' and that an American firm would serve as programme coordinator to supervise the project. Americans will also lead in KEDO's contacts with the DPRK. Reportedly, the wording used has overcome Pyongyang's reluctance to be supplied with South Korean reactors. Seoul, on the other hand, is said to be satisfied because the statement specifies reactors with two coolant loops, signifying a design it has adapted from US technology. According to reports from Tokyo and Seoul, the US Administration has taken particular care to keep Japanese and South Korean officials informed of developments in the talks at Kuala Lumpur.

Another potentially divisive issue is said to be the DPRK's demand for help to improve its infrastructure, including its power grid, roads and port facilities. It is said to seek approximately \$1 billion for this purpose, in addition to the other assistance it is promised under the Agreed Framework.

In Washington, some senior officials and a number of influential members of the US Congress believe that the negative tone Pyongyang adopted during the early stages of the talks must be seen as a portent of its determination sooner or later to resume its nuclear efforts, reload the experimental reactor and end its freeze of the construction of the other nuclear installations. Comments from Washington indicate that in such a case the Administration would have no choice but to seek sanctions against the DPRK. During the talks in Kuala Lumpur, the DPRK negotiators are said to have assured their counterparts that the freeze on their nuclear activities would be maintained as long as talks with the USA continued. Conversely, Washington is said to take the view that as long as the freeze is maintained, it will continue the talks.

Republican members of the US Congress remain critical of the Agreed Framework. Many senators see the instrument as basically a treaty and want the Administration to submit it for ratification. The House of Representatives has held up action on the allocation of the \$10 million needed to fund improved storage of the deteriorating fuel rods of the experimental (5 MWe) reactor at Yongbyon. A 'sense-of-the-Congress' resolution has been introduced in the Senate that would link funding for the execution of the agreement with the demand that Pyongyang initiate talks with Seoul and accept mutual nuclear inspection. The House International Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs has agreed on the text of a resolution whereby both Houses of Congress would express concern over the DPRK's commitment to carry out the letter and the spirit of the Agreed Framework and ask President Clinton to be more rigorous in enforcing the nuclear proliferation obligations of the Framework and ensuring South Korea's role in the process. Specifically, the president would be enjoined not to take further steps toward upgrading diplomatic relations or relaxing restrictions on trade with the DPRK without the latter taking specified actions towards the South and ceasing deployment of ballistic missiles and exporting missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. The draft resolution also calls for a series of actions by the North, to permit the full and immediate application of IAEA safeguards and implement other elements of the Agreed Framework.

By late June, there seemed to be a chance that relations between the two Koreas might improve, when talks began on the provision by Seoul of large quantities of rice and other food aid to the DPRK. Reportedly, the latter had asked for 300,000 metric tons of rice and South Korea had expressed readiness to provide 150,000 metric tons free of charge, with the apparent possibility of additional supplies. However, judging by the persistently belligerent tone adopted by Pyongyang towards its southern neighbour, suggestions in the press that once these supplies had been agreed upon, other inter-Korean issues might be discussed, would not seem to be justified.

At the annual conference of the *Japan Atomic Industrial Forum* a South Korean analyst, basing himself on 'most credible intelligence estimates', stated that before 1989 the DPRK had extracted about 12 kg of plutonium.

A group of Japanese parliamentarians visited the DPRK in late March to discuss normalisation of relations between the two states and financial Japanese assistance to the North, in the form of compensation for the occupation of the country between 1910 and 1945. The semi-official mission was approved by the cabinet, after the establishment of KEDO.

In what is seen as an important development in opening up contacts with the DPRK, the United States has announced that it will import a significant amount of magnesia from that country. It is further expected that the two countries will soon open diplomatic liaison offices in their respective capitals.

There are intermittent reports of disagreement between the DPRK and the IAEA over the safeguards to be applied. The DPRK is said to persist in the position that current safeguards are based on its understandings with the United States, under which the Agency's present inspection access is limited. The IAEA, on the other hand, reportedly holds that its rights derive from the safeguards agreement that exists between it and the Pyongyang government, and claims the access rights foreseen in that agreement. According to the IAEA, in mid-March the DPRK was observing its undertaking to freeze nuclear operations, and had allowed more Agency safeguards inspectors to enter the country. In mid-April, the IAEA's Director General denied a report from South Korea that the DPRK had resumed its nuclear activities; he confirmed that the Agency's inspectors were still on-site and had not noticed any unusual activity.

An American company recently received a contract worth \$5.8 million from the US Department of Energy to help stabilise the 8,000 spent-fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor that are in the spent-fuel pool and are corroding. The water in the cooling pond is said to be heating up; the filtration system is not functioning properly, and algae are developing on the surface. There is said to be a plan to seal the spent-fuel rods in stainless steel containers which will be left in the pond. A team of American technical experts has had discussions at Yongbyon on ways to stabilise the situation.

At the NPT Conference in New York, in April/May, during discussions about the implementation of IAEA safeguards, the DPRK delegate expressed objections to the mention of the DPRK's non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty. In a letter to the President of the Conference, the DPRK's Permanent Representative to the UN on 9 May announced the withdrawal of Pyongyang's delegation. The letter is reproduced in part c.iii of Section IV, **Documentation**. Pyongyang has since let it be known that it does not recognise the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

(**Arms Control Today**, March, April; **Washington Post**, 15/3, 28/3, 19/5; **International Herald Tribune**, 18/3, 24/3, 27/3, 13/4, 19/4, 25/4, 26/4, 9/5, 16/5, 25/5, 26/5; **Nucleonics Week**, 23/3, 30/3; **Neue Zürcher Zeitung**, 27/3, 28/3, 31/3, 25/4, 20-21/5; **Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 27/3, 29/3, 31/3, 10/4, 13-14/4, 20/5, 29/5; **Financial Times**, 28/3, 22-23/4, 26/4, 2/5, 12/5, 13/6; **Outlook on the 104th Congress**, Special Report from **Nucleonics Week**, 30/3 and **NuclearFuel**, 10/4, 24/4,

5/6, 19/6; **Tribune de Genève**, 31/3; **Economist**, 1/4, 17/6; **USIS European Wireless File**, 6/4; **Reuter's**, 6/4, 10/4, 26/5, 27/5; **Associated Press**, 9/4; **Die Welt**, 11/4; **New York Times**, 15/4, 21/4, 22/4, 23/4, 2/5, 16/5, 21/5, 26/5, 7/6, 9/6, 11/6, 14/6; **BBC Summary of World Broadcasts**, 17/4, in **UI News Briefing** 95/16; **Washington Post**, 21/4; **Arms Control Today**, May; **Wall Street Journal**, 18/5; **Independent**, 27/5; **Japan Times**, 10/6, 11/6, 13/6, 15/6, 18/6, 19/6; **Asahi Evening News**, 14/6, 15/6)

- Persistent efforts by the US Administration to dissuade **Russia** from its plans to supply **Iran** with two light-water reactors (see **PPNN Newsbrief** 29, pages 8 and 9) have had no success so far. The issue is seen to have put a strain on bilateral relations already worsened by Russia's military action in Chechnya, its unwillingness to withdraw armoured forces from the Caucasus region in compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the suspicious attitude towards the former enemy prevalent among the Republican majority in the US Congress. The Iran issue was reported to have been at the forefront of discussions during the visit of President Clinton to Moscow, on 9 and 10 May, and made itself felt also during the NPT Conference. In March, the US Senate voted against the extension of nuclear cooperation with Russia, should that country proceed with the sale of power reactors to Iran. Confirming this decision, in early April American officials warned that the United States would not be able to extend its agreement with Russia on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which expires in May 1995, unless plans for the export of reactors to Iran were dropped. It had been proposed to expand the scope of the agreement and plans had been made for extensive support of Russia's nuclear industry; these plans would also be shelved. As reported in the American press, the US gave Russia intelligence information allegedly showing that Iran has a crash programme to build nuclear weapons which, the US fears, might be helped by the provision of Russian reactors. American press reports say that the information is based on solid but circumstantial information, pieced together from many sources. They cite what are seen as 'highly credible' stories of international arms dealers being asked by Iranian officials to supply assembled nuclear weapons, or at least the fissile material needed to assemble such weapons. In parallel to these presumably direct attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, US intelligence sources point to a wide-spread and unambiguous pattern of buying restricted dual-use equipment and technology. There is also speculation that Iran's extensive nuclear power programme that is now so much in the public eye may be a cover for a weapons effort that might be underway outside the known facilities of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

The Director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgeny Primakov, is quoted in press reports as saying that Russia had not found convincing evidence of the existence in Iran of a coherent military nuclear programme. During a visit to Moscow in early April, Secretary of Defense Perry urged Russian government officials to cancel the deal. At the same time, however, he said that American aid to Russian military conversion should not be held up by its opposition to the Russian move. Earlier, Secretary of State Christopher is

said to have offered the Russian Foreign Minister financial assistance in the construction of modern reactors and the clean-up of nuclear waste sites in return for the cancellation of the Russian-Iranian deal. It was reported that the US Administration had also indicated that it might try to get Russia involved in the supply of reactors to the DPRK. None of these moves seems to have changed Moscow's mind, although it has apparently let Washington know that it would be in favour of strong non-proliferation constraints on the use of the nuclear power plant. Moscow has repeatedly given formal and informal assurances of its intention to make certain that Iran cannot use the plutonium produced in the reactor fuel. Reportedly, the agreement foresees that the irradiated fuel may be returned to Russia for reprocessing, in which case the extracted plutonium will be retained there, or Iran might keep the fuel after use, but would not be permitted to reprocess it. A senior Iranian nuclear energy official has confirmed that his country would not wish to retain the spent fuel, and would return it to Russia. American analysts believe that the Iranian announcement may have made the US arguments against Russia's supplying the reactors even less likely to convince Moscow not to go through with the deal. However, Washington's concern is seen as not only connected with the plutonium which the reactors might produce — although the possibility has been raised that Iran might eventually refuse to return the irradiated fuel to Russia and disregard the injunction against reprocessing — but arises from the risk that Iran will gain expertise from the project in nuclear science and reactor operation, and that it will also become easier for Iran to import dual-use nuclear equipment that might be used in a weapons programme.

Meanwhile, although there are said to be several hundreds of Russian nuclear specialists at the Bushehr site, little progress in construction work has been reported so far. An American journalist recently permitted to visit the site reported that there were conflicting analyses as to what structures the Russian contractors will be able to salvage from among those hit in Iraqi air raids in the 1980s. Apparently, views differ between the Iranians and the Russians, with the latter estimating the work to be done to be greater than the former seem to have expected.

'Concern and outrage' was expressed in Washington when, in late April, a report surfaced there that Russia had agreed to provide Iran with gas centrifuges for fuel enrichment. This was believed to have been agreed in what American officials said was a 'side deal' to the agreement regarding the construction of the power reactors; it was understood to cover various items of reactor equipment and a research reactor. The Russian Foreign Ministry let it be known that it was not aware of this deal, which is said to have been concluded by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy (Minatom). During the summit meeting in Moscow, in May, it was announced that President Yeltsin had agreed to cancel the gas-centrifuge sale. Later reports indicate that the rumoured centrifuge offer may either have been an attempt by Minatom to make the reactor deal more attractive to Iran and to make quite certain that the terms of the sale would be accepted, or that it may have been devised as an item on which President Yeltsin could be seen to make a concession to President Clinton.

The Director of the AEOI, Dr. Reza Amrollahi, is quoted as saying his country had never expressed an interest in gas centrifuge technology and would get the enriched fuel for its reactors direct from Russia. He denied an American newspaper report that he had said that Iran intended, over the next 20 years, to build ten nuclear power plants, adding that Iran had no nuclear plans beyond the completion of Bushehr within the next ten years, and the construction of one (sic) Chinese power plant. In another report Dr. Amrollahi was quoted as saying that Iran had already invested \$6 billion in nuclear power development, of which reportedly \$780 million was spent on the completion of one of the Bushehr reactors by Russia. \$800–900 million would be spent on a feasibility and siting exercise conducted by China, which would also involve training.

Just before the NPT Review and Extension Conference opened, Secretary of State Christopher met in New York with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, reportedly to dissuade China from supplying Iran with two 330-MW pressurised water reactors. This approach was publicly rebuffed by Minister Qian. Pursuant to a ten-year old agreement, China has so far supplied Iran with a research reactor in Isfahan, and a small calutron to study uranium enrichment, and has trained Iranian scientists. According to one American newspaper report, the US appeared less concerned about China's undertaking to supply power reactors than it was about Russia's promise to do so, since it believed that China might not be able to provide Iran with all the reactor equipment required and would need technology from Germany and Japan, where it had obtained parts for reactors it built domestically of the type it would supply to Iran. However, those states have undertaken not to export such equipment to Iran.

According to a Chinese report after the NPT Conference, problems have arisen with the proposed sale of the power reactors. These are said to include differences about siting and questions about economic, business and commercial aspects of the contract. Some Western sources speculate that China, hoping for better relations with the USA, may be reconsidering the sale.

Washington is said to have turned down a German request to allow it to provide further assistance in the construction of the Bushehr station under any condition. While, reportedly, Iran seeks to buy nuclear-usable equipment from a range of sources (press reports mention Argentina, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Kazakhstan and Russia) doubt has been expressed about the feasibility of combining such purchases into one integrated systematic programme. Germany has categorically denied that any German nuclear equipment or know-how has been legally exported or is known to have been smuggled to Iran since the late 1980s. There has been a report that Washington is also concerned about the possibility of South African assistance to Iran, following what are alleged to have been discussions, this Spring, about the sale of nuclear technology. Speculation that Iran seeks to recruit scientists from Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States is countered by an Israeli expert with the argument that Iran, which is said already to be a relatively closed society, might not wish to introduce foreign personnel into a programme as sensitive as the

development of nuclear weapons would be. Turkey has let it be known that it would not welcome countries in the region with nuclear weapons with which to threaten their neighbours, but it has also said it has no information that Iran's power station would be used for military purposes. Meanwhile, according to a press report published in the US, Arab sources have expressed the view that the American Administration lacks hard evidence that Iran is indeed engaged in a clandestine nuclear-weapon programme. Western arms control experts have expressed surprise that the US wishes to stop nuclear supplies to Iran when it is ready to supply the DPRK with similar reactors.

In late April, US President Clinton announced that he would shortly issue an executive order prohibiting all trade by American firms with Iran. US firms are already forbidden to import Iranian oil into the United States, but they and their foreign subsidiaries are said to be the biggest buyers of Iranian oil, which they sell on the open market. In 1994, these firms reportedly bought \$4 billion worth of Iranian crude oil, i.e., one quarter of that country's oil exports. Western countries show little support for the American initiative; several European countries, especially France and Germany, have expressed strong criticism. Japan initially postponed the transfer to Iran of the second instalment of a ¥150-billion loan but has now also advised the USA that it will not ban all trade with Iran. The timing of the American announcement was also criticised, as it might have reinforced Iran's resistance to a lengthy extension of the NPT. As matters turned out, however, at the Conference Iran adopted a relatively mild stance, although it expressed opposition to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. On the issue of nuclear export controls Iran sought to include in the agreed paper on principles a provision for unimpeded access to peaceful nuclear energy, but it did not succeed. Observers believe that its relatively mild attitude may have been due in part to the influence of Russia as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the supplier of its reactors.

The statement issued on 17 June at the conclusion of the summit meeting of the G-7 calls on all states 'to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability'.

Israel is alleged to consider attacking Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability.

(**Davar** [Tel Aviv], 13/1, in **JPRS-TAC-95-001**, 14/2; **Anatolia** [Ankara], 1/2, ditto; **Reuters**, 18/3, 4/5; **United Press International**, 23/3; **Washington Post**, 24/3, 4/4, 18/4, 4/5, 5/5; **Washington Post National Weekly Edition**, 15-21/5; **Independent**, 24/3, 22/5; **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung**, 30/3, 4/5, 5/5; **International Herald Tribune**, 30/3, 18/4, 3/5, 4/5, 9/5, 15/5, 18/5; **Nucleonics Week**, 30/3, 21/4, 28/4, 4/5; **Arms Control Today**, April; **New York Times**, 3/4, 4/4, 9/4, 18/4, 22/4, 29/4, 1/5, 3/5, 4/5, 6/5, 8/5, 14/5, 18/5, 19/5, 19/6; **Guardian**, 4/4, 11/4, 15/5; **Times** [London], 4/4; **NuclearFuel**, 10/4, 8/5, 22/5; **Direct information**, 19/4; **Le Monde**, 19/4, 4/5; **Standard** [London], 23/4; **Arms Control Today**, May; **Daily Telegraph**, 3/5; **CRS Issue Brief**, 23/5 [see **Recent Publications**, below]; **Japan Times**, 10/6, 11/6, 19/6)

- The IAEA is said to be investigating allegations that **Iraq** may have resumed its efforts to pursue a nuclear-weapons programme. There are reports that a defecting Iraqi nuclear scientist named Khidir Abdul Abbas Hamsa, known to the IAEA as having worked until 1990 on electromagnetic uranium enrichment (EMIS), has vanished in Greece while supposedly trying to reveal details of a secret Iraqi nuclear-weapons programme. It is feared that he may have been kidnapped and killed by Iraqi agents. Information faxed to *The Sunday Times* is said to indicate the existence of nuclear activities not so far disclosed, involving the use of computers to develop design codes for nuclear weapons. Although reportedly authentic-looking, the information has not so far been substantiated, nor does it appear to be certain that it has indeed come from Hamsa.

The inquiry headed by Lord Justice Scott into clandestine UK sales of strategic equipment to Iraq, is said to be ready. Apparently, it concludes that senior members of the Government misled the public and Parliament about arms-sales policies which were supposed to be the same with respect to Iran and Iraq, when in fact they were more flexible with respect to the latter.

(**Sunday Times**, 2/4; **Standard**, 9/4, 16/4; **Reuter's**, 12/4, quoted on **National Public Radio Newscast**, 12/4; **NuclearFuel**, 24/4; **New York Times**, 7/6)

- In **Israel**, Haifa University has held a seminar on nuclear weaponry, news media and public opinion, attended by academics and journalists, which is believed to have been the first occasion that the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons was discussed in an open forum. (**Times** [London], 17/5)
  - **Libya's** head of state, Muammar Ghadafi, is reported to have called for an Arab nuclear deterrence against Israel and the United States. (**Die Presse**, 18/5)
  - Contacts between **Pakistan** and the **United States** are said to have intensified recently. During a visit in late January, US Secretary of Defense, William Perry said that the 'Pressler Amendment' had not helped achieve American non-proliferation goals in South Asia because lack of US assistance with the supply of conventional weapons had made Pakistan rely more on nuclear means. In February, there were reports that Washington had definitely decided not to supply the 28 F-16 aircraft which Pakistan has bought, and was looking for a third-country buyer so as to obtain the \$658 million with which to reimburse Pakistan. In testimony before a Senate subcommittee in early March, senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense called for the modification of the Pressler Amendment and seemed to indicate that, if this was done, the F-16s could be delivered to Pakistan after all.
- Construction of the 40-50-MW natural-uranium, heavy-water cooled and moderated reactor at Khushab in Punjab province is said to be progressing (see **PPNN Newsbrief 28**, p.17). Once completed, it would give Pakistan a substantial plutonium-producing capability. Prime Minister Bhutto is quoted as saying that the country has no plutonium-extracting capabilities and no plans to reprocess plutonium, but American officials cite the presence at Chasma of a partially completed

reprocessing plant which, once finished, would give Pakistan the means to extract the plutonium produced in the Khushab reactor.

(**Defense News**, 6-12/2; **Arms Sales Monitor**, 20/3; **International Herald Tribune**, 10/4; **Arms Control Today**, May)

- A Russian intelligence report claims that in 1985, Romania began working on a nuclear weapon programme, under cover of its peaceful nuclear activities. Allegedly, it used its US-supplied 14-MW 'Triga'-reactor and subsequent supplies of 38.7 kg of highly-enriched uranium for this purpose. The report also asserts that Romania used its nuclear power programme that was supported by Canada for military purposes. It claims that Romania had developed the technology of producing weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium, which supposedly led then head-of-state Ceaucescu to say in 1989 that his country had the technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons — a statement qualified by an official US source as 'wishful thinking'. The report says that the clandestine nuclear-weapon programme continued for two years after Ceaucescu's death. In 1991 the Rumanian government opened all its nuclear activities to IAEA inspection and subsequently it advised the IAEA that it had separated a small quantity of plutonium, which the Agency's analyses are said to have found was done in 1985. Romania has since eliminated the programme to the satisfaction of the IAEA. The Russian allegations were formally denied by Romania's resident representative to the IAEA in a statement to the Board of Governors. (**Die Welt**, 7/4; **Standard**, 7/4; **NuclearFuel**, 10/4)
- A senior IAEA safeguards official has revealed that well before it was publicly announced that **South Africa** had manufactured and had subsequently disposed of nuclear weapons, the Agency had noticed discrepancies in that country's figures for enriched uranium, and that on the day of President de Klerk's announcement inspectors were visiting the Pelindaba enrichment plant to clarify these discrepancies. (**SAPA [Johannesburg]** 25/1, in **JPRS-TAC-95-001**, 14/2)
- Newly-declassified military documents in **Switzerland** are reported to indicate that in the late 1950s and early 1960s the Swiss military pursued plans to equip the army with tactical nuclear weapons. The project is said to have been dropped in 1964, while it was still in the planning stage, allegedly because of the technical problems involved, but also because of the cost of the means of delivery. (**Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 5/4; **Corriere della Sera**, 4/5; **Tribune de Genève**, 4/5; **Profil**, 10/4; **Neue Zürcher Zeitung**, 13/5; **Spiegel**, 29/5)

#### k. Illicit Nuclear Trafficking

- At its meeting on 27–30 March, the **IAEA Board of Governors** discussed activities of the Agency designed to assist Member States in strengthening their national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and the provision, on request, of assistance to states in analysing confiscated nuclear material. The Board is said to have reaffirmed that the control and physical protection of nuclear material is a national respon-

sibility, but to have endorsed the intention of the Agency's Secretariat to establish a database on illicit trafficking. (**IAEA Press Release PR 95/4**, 31/3)

- In **Estonia** two men have been arrested trying to sell 5 kg of natural uranium. (**Guardian**, 11/5; **Die Presse**, 11/5; **Salzburger Nachrichten**, 11/5)
- A parliamentary investigation is underway in **Germany** following allegations in the press that last summer's plutonium smuggling affair at Munich airport was staged by officials of the German federal intelligence service, with the knowledge of the coordinator of the service, Bernd Schmidbauer and that the German intelligence service had been aware since 1993 that the material would be moved and that even Chancellor Kohl may have been aware of the operation — an allegation strongly denied in Bonn. The action is said to have been inspired by the wish to demonstrate that a market for nuclear material existed in Germany. The matter has also been raised in the Bavarian provincial parliament. The Federal secret service has denied having had prior knowledge of the affair but Schmidbauer's statement that the event had been a 'successful preventive action' is seen as confirming allegations that the transport of the material to Germany and the arrest there of three presumed traffickers resulted from a well-directed 'sting' operation. Recently, there have also been reports that Russia's deputy minister for nuclear affairs, Viktor Sidorenko, who was on the airplane that took the smugglers to Munich, was involved in the plot and was to take the proceeds of the sale back to Moscow. Schmidbauer has reportedly acknowledged that a German intelligence informant was present in Madrid when the plans for the transaction were made, well before the actual transaction took place. There is also a suggestion that Bavarian law enforcement authorities were involved in the event, and it has been noted that even before the aircraft that contained the illicit consignment took off from Moscow, the Bavarian environmental protection authority had been alerted to its impending arrival. Bavaria's Interior Minister has denied any prior knowledge. The IAEA is quoted as the source for the assertion that some of the plutonium seized may have come from sensors used in Soviet tanks to ascertain the presence of chemical warfare agents. American laboratory experts are quoted as saying that on the basis of the analysis made by Euratom of the smuggled material they are not in a position to determine its origin, although, reportedly, they are 'generally comfortable' with the assumption that the material could have come from Eastern Europe or the former USSR. An analyst from Euratom, testifying at the trial of the men who were arrested in connection with the smuggling case, has reportedly said that the isotopic inconsistencies in the material was such that he could not think for what use it might have been intended. Russian officials are quoted as saying that notwithstanding Bonn's promise to cooperate with them in investigating claims that the material came from Russia, German officials refuse to respond to Minatom's requests for information that might help to clear up allegations about the possible involvement of deputy minister Sidorenko in the case (see also the item on the safety of Russian nuclear material stocks, below.)

- (**Spiegel**, 10/4, 24/4, 1/5, 15/5; **Kurier**, 10/4, 12/4, 21/4, 22/4; **Salzburger Nachrichten**, 10/4, 11/4, 2/5, 11/5; **Guardian**, 10/4, 11/5; **Neue Zürcher Zeitung**, 10/4, 11/4, 13/4, 11/5; **Die Welt**, 10/4, 11/4, 10/5, 15/5; **Die Presse**, 11/4; **Standard** [Vienna], 11/4, 12/4, 18/4, 13-14/5; **Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 12/4, 15-17/4, 22/4, 24/4, 26/4, 28/4, 10/5, 12/5, 23/5; **Financial Times**, 12/4, 19/5; **Leipziger Volkszeitung**, 20/4; **Die Woche**, 21/4; **New York Times**, 21/4, 18/5; **Die Welt**, 21/4, 28/4, 11/5, 13/5; **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung**, 22/4, 24/4, 25/4, 26/4, 10/5, 11/5, 18/5, 22/5; **Nucleonics Week**, 27/4, 25/5; **Times** [London], 11/5; **Daily Telegraph**, 11/5; **Standard** [London], 14/5; **Corriere della Sera**, 14/5, 15/5; **Libération**, 15/5)
- In January, customs officials in **Lithuania** reported the discovery of various 'nuclear substances' being taken across the border. The discovery was said to have been made with the help of stationary radiation detectors donated by the United States. Customs officials complain of a shortage of such equipment, which appears to be present at only a few border posts. (**Baltic News Service** [Tallin], 27/1, in **JPRS-TAC-95-001**, 14/2)
  - Police in the **Slovak Republic** have seized an automobile carrying 17 kg (37.4 lbs) of uranium. The car was said to be headed for Hungary. Nine persons — four Slovaks, three Hungarians and two Ukrainians — have been arrested as the result of joint Slovak/Hungarian investigations which reportedly have been going on since November 1994. The exact nature and the enrichment level of the material have not been revealed, but it appears to be mainly natural uranium. (**Reuter's**, 21/4; **Associated Press**, 21/4; **New York Times**, 22/4; **Financial Times**, 22-23/4)
  - European officials reject the claim by **Russia's** Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) that a thorough inventory of its fissile material has revealed that none is missing. German officials are quoted as saying that any such statement is worthless and that the regulatory agency designated by President Yeltsin as responsible for safeguards in Russia, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), lacks the manpower and the funds to carry out any material balance at a large production facility. Reportedly, the Russian assertion contradicts earlier statements by Minatom officials, that spoke of large amounts of plutonium not being accounted for (a high official of the Russian National Security Council said last December that at Tomsk-7, several hundred kg of plutonium were never registered) and of 'kilogram amounts' of HEU having been diverted from a fuel processing plant. Following the news that a group of engineering officers working at the Sevmorput naval shipyard near Murmansk were able, with very simple means to purloin 4.5 kg of 20 per cent enriched uranium from the submarine fuel stores there, it has been reported that stockpiles of naval propulsion fuel are particularly vulnerable to theft. Improvements are thought to have been made, but physical security of nuclear material stored at a number of naval establishments is still suspected to be seriously deficient. It is reported that the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow has launched a pilot programme for physical protection and has upgraded its physical security arrangements and material control and accounting procedures; and that various nuclear production complexes have also taken extensive measures to improve their security arrangements. For the first time at some installations measures are introduced with US assistance to combat insider theft. (**NuclearFuel**, 27/3; **Nucleonics Week**, 30/3; **Arms Control Today**, March; **Stern**, 24/4; **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, May/June)
  - Two Russians arrested in Ukraine were found to be carrying 6 kg of enriched uranium, reported to have been brought in from Russia. The exact source of the material, which is said to be more highly enriched than reactor fuel, but well below weapons use, has not yet been determined. (**BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts**, 25/3 in **UI News Briefing**, 95/13; **Nucleonics Week**, 6/4)
  - In the **United States**, three persons have been arrested for having smuggled, allegedly in collusion with a Russian General, 8 tonnes of zirconium into the country from Ukraine and trying to export it to Iraq, in violation of prohibitions on trade with that country. The deal was reportedly set up by American undercover agents posing as Iraqi officials. Two tonnes of the material, which is used in the manufacture of reactor fuel, is said to have been shipped to a warehouse in Cyprus. Investigations in that country disclosed the presence of an further 35 tonnes of zirconium, which, according to Cypriot officials was legally shipped there from Russia. (**International Herald Tribune**, 9/6, 10-11/6; **New York Times**, 9/6, 12/6; **Guardian**, 12/6; **Japan Times**, 13/6)
  - Upon the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Jacques Atali, former advisor to the President of France, has prepared a report on illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. The report, said to be highly alarmist and to contain unsubstantiated warnings against the ever growing risk that nuclear weapons will spread not only to additional states, but to terrorists, organised crime and ideological groupings, has been published by the French firm Fayard, under the title *Economie de l'apocalypse: Trafic et prolifération nucléaires*. (**Le Monde**, 18/4; **Standard** [Vienna], 19/4; **Süddeutsche Zeitung**, 19/4; **Leipziger Volkszeitung**, 20/4)
  - Accounts continue to surface about the existence of a compound of mercury, antimony and oxygen, called *Red Mercury*, which, if mixed with californium, would turn into an extremely dense, highly volatile, explosive material that could be used to trigger nuclear explosions and would greatly simplify the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In May, police in **Romania** were said to have arrested five people who were trying to smuggle 1.7 kg of *Red Mercury* to Turkey. (**Die Woche**, 12/5; **Independent**, 25/5)
- ### I. Environmental Issues
- The transport of 28 canisters of vitrified high-level radioactive waste from France to **Japan** has been in the centre of media attention recently. The specially constructed British ship carrying the fourteen-ton cargo, *Pacific Pintail*, arrived at its destination, Mutsu-Ogawara Port, near the Rokkasho-Mura nuclear installation, on 26 April, after a voyage of 63 days. Before docking, the ship was forced to wait off-shore for almost

a day, barred from entry by the Governor of Aomori Prefecture, where the port is situated, until the central Japanese authorities assured him that the waste would not remain forever at the Rokkasho Waste Management Center, but would eventually be moved to a permanent site. The likely period of storage is variously given as 30 to 50 years. Previously, a debate is said to have taken place in the Aomori prefectural assembly about the possibility of withholding docking rights for the *Pacific Pintail*, in protest to the refusal of the Japanese central authorities to make the route public, apparently against their initial intention and at the express request of the British government. The decision to route the ship around Cape Horn, so as to avoid it passing through the Caribbean area where states expressed objections to its presence, met with scorn from *Greenpeace*, which called this 'one of the most dangerous ocean routes possible'. Reportedly, a Chilean navy vessel threatened to use its weapons to keep *Pacific Pintail* out of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone claimed by Santiago but it seems that the ship remained on its set course. Chile is said to be thinking of closing the zone to all future nuclear shipments. A ship belonging to *Greenpeace*, the *Solo*, shadowed *Pacific Pintail* on its entire voyage, issuing daily press releases that called on governments of states near the route to protest the shipment. The United States Administration has repeated its assurance that there was no reason for concern about the safety of the shipment. An IAEA official has also stated that this was not a high-risk cargo and that even if the ship sank, it would be many thousands of years before radioactivity might begin to leach out. The Solomon Islands decided to allow the *Pacific Pintail* to pass through its territorial waters; *Greenpeace* is said to have asked the Solomons' government to retract the decision. The shipment is expected to have been the first of many. Reportedly, after storage at the Rokkasho nuclear complex the material is meant to be moved to a permanent disposal site that has not yet been selected. (*SpentFUEL*, 20/3, 1/5; *Reuter's*, 21/3; *NucNet News*, 21/3, 25/4; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23/3; *Nucleonics Week*, 23/3, 30/3; *Atoms in Japan*, April; *BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts*, 11/4 in *UI News Briefing* 95/15, 5-11/4; *Reuter's*, 25/4; *New York Times*, 26/5)

- In the **United States**, *Virginia Power*, which is said to have been the first US utility to demonstrate spent dry fuel storage, has plans to construct such a storage facility at North Anna. Following the positive vote of the Mescalero Apache tribe in New Mexico on the establishment of a commercial spent fuel storage facility on tribal lands, a group of nuclear utilities has decided that there is enough interest for the construction of a monitored retrievable storage facility. The group, said to consist of at least twelve utilities, plans to start site studies in June and is said to expect to submit a license application in 1996. The project is seen to face many hurdles on its way to realisation. (*NEI Infowire*, 23/3; *NuclearFuel*, 27/3; *SpentFuel*, 10/4)
- Clean-up activities at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in the State of Washington are said to be held up by the difficulty of determining the precise composition of the nuclear waste in the 177 underground tanks at the site. Characterisation of the waste in the tanks is seen as crucial to further work in improving their safety. A report

of the Department of Energy (DoE) of early April says that the US will have to spend at least \$230 billion over the next few decades to clean up nuclear wastes generated in research, production and testing of nuclear weapons. (*Nucleonics Week*, 30/3; *Financial Times*, 4/4)

### m. Miscellaneous Events

- The House of Representatives of the **United States** has passed a bill that would abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and give its tasks to the State Department. The Senate is expected to adopt a similar measure. The Congress reportedly would not have the votes to override a Presidential veto. (*Nucleonics Week*, 15/6)

## II. PPNN Activities

- **PPNN Briefing Book Volume 1 (Second Edition)** on the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, **PPNN Briefing Book Volume 2 (Third Edition)** containing Treaties, Agreements and Other Relevant Documents on nuclear non-proliferation, and **PPNN Study Six** 'The Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Issues at the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, by John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, examining issues at the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, were published in April and distributed to all delegations to the 1995 NPT Conference.
- **PPNN Issue Review No. 4** 'NPT Review Conferences and the Role of Consensus', by Ben Sanders and **PPNN Issue Review No. 5** 'The Regional Track for the Last Three NPT Holdouts — Israel, India and Pakistan' by David Fischer, were published and distributed in April and May respectively.
- PPNN Core Group and staff members played a variety of official and unofficial roles at the **1995 NPT Conference**. Members of the Core Group participating in an official capacity at the Conference included the President of the Conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala; seven members of delegations; and the senior advisor to the Conference Secretariat, Mr. Ben Sanders. Six other Core Group members and two staff members attended as representatives of PPNN.

During the course of the Conference PPNN activities focused on two main areas: meetings to discuss the progress of the Conference and providing impartial information and analysis to Conference delegates and the global media. Meeting activities included nine informal lunch meetings and three press briefings in the UN, organised in collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the Monterey Institute for International Studies and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. In addition, PPNN distributed over 250 copies of the PPNN Briefing Book (not including copies mailed to all delegations in advance of the Conference) and copies of all other PPNN publications to delegations.

In parallel to the indefinite extension of the NPT, a revised review process was agreed and a set of principles and objectives for the implementation of the NPT were adopted. This collateral package of measures may have significant consequences for the future of the

NPT and it is PPNN's intention to continue its activities by helping Parties to prepare for the 1997 PrepCom and to assist in ensuring its success.

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## IV. Documentation

### a. Decisions and Resolution adopted by the NPT Conference

#### i. Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1 as published in NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I). Presented to the Conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.4, proposed by the President.]

1. The Conference examined the implementation of article VIII,3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII,3, of the Treaty, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.
3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.
4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.
5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.
6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused

consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.

7. The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

## ii. Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2. Presented to the Conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.5, proposed by the President.]

*Reaffirming* the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Welcoming* the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of the trust between States,

*Desiring* a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII (3) of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

*Reiterating* the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*The Conference affirms* the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realisation and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

### Universality

1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

### Non-proliferation

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

### Nuclear disarmament

3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:
  - (a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of

a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

- (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;
- (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

### Nuclear-weapon-free zones

5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.
6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.
7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

### Security assurances

8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

### Safeguards

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III(1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.
11. IAEA safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented and the IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA

full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

#### *Peaceful uses of nuclear energy*

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and as well as III of the Treaty.
15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.
16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.
17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.
18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.
19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The IAEA should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.
20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

*The Conference requests* that the President of the Conference bring this decision, the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process of the Treaty and the Decision on the Extension of the Treaty to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

### **iii. Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3. Presented to the Conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.6, proposed by the President.]

*The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (hereinafter referred to as 'the Treaty') convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with articles VIII,3 and X,2 of the Treaty,

*Having reviewed* the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Having reaffirmed* article VIII,3 of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty and the Decision on Principles and

Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament also adopted by the Conference,

*Having established* that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X,2 of the Treaty,

*Decides* that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with its article X,2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

### **iv. Resolution on the Middle East**

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES.1. Presented to the Conference as NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 (as amended), sponsored by: Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.]

*The Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,*

*Reaffirming* the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Recognizing* that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

*Recalling* that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

*Recalling also* General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

*Recalling further* the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

*Bearing in mind* Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

*Noting* Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

*Bearing in mind* the other Decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. *Endorses* the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard as well as other efforts contribute to, *inter alia*, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;
2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in its report Main Committee III of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1) recommended that the Conference 'call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities';
3. *Notes with concern* the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in paragraph VI/3 of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
4. *Reaffirms* the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and *calls upon* all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
5. *Calls upon* all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. *Calls upon* all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

## **b. Proposed decisions and resolutions not adopted by the NPT Conference**

### **i. Draft Resolution on Extension Proposed by Mexico**

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1]

*The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.*

*Convinced* that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

*Noting* that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts must be made towards achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Convinced* that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Recognizing* the importance of maintaining the validity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a vital instrument for promoting nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the importance of preserving in that Treaty an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

*Reaffirming* the belief that universal accession to the Treaty would greatly strengthen international peace and enhance the security of all States and, accordingly, urging States that are not parties to that international instrument to accede to it without delay,

*Desiring* to enforce the consolidation of the Treaty in order to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons,

*Recalling* that paragraph 2 of article X of the Treaty establishes that, 25 years after the Treaty's entry into force, the States Parties will have to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods,

*Convinced* that the decision on the extension of the Treaty should lead to further progress in nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the preamble and article VI of the Treaty,

1. *Decide* that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons shall remain in force indefinitely;
2. *Decide also* that conferences to review and evaluate the Treaty shall be held every five years and that the conference to be held in the year 2000 shall, as its first task, evaluate fulfilment of the commitments made at the 1995 Conference and the steps taken to achieve the Treaty's universality. To ensure their effectiveness, the conferences shall:
  - (a) Retain the structure for the review meetings, by establishing three main committees which shall review how each of the Treaty's provisions has been implemented;
  - (b) Seek to establish specific objectives for attaining full compliance with each and every provision of the Treaty and its preamble, including, whenever possible, the setting of goals with a specific time-frame;
  - (c) Promote the establishment, within the context of the Treaty, of the necessary arrangements to permit the conduct of negotiations on specific issues between one conference and the next;
3. *Urge* all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to conduct intensive negotiations, as a matter of high priority, on the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible but in no case later than 1996;
4. *Reiterate* their conviction that, pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear tests through unilateral or agreed moratoriums;

5. *Appeal* for the immediate launching and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, including possible consideration of the question of material already stockpiled;
6. *Urge* all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards early agreement on a common approach designed to provide the necessary assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and recommend that the Conference on Disarmament actively pursue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on binding commitments on this subject and that it include in its next annual report to the United Nations General Assembly a section on this subject covering, *inter alia*, the alternatives discussed and the progress achieved;
7. *Call upon* the nuclear-weapon States, in the light of their statements during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to cease all production of nuclear weapons in accordance with an effectively verifiable ban and to redouble their efforts to reduce their respective arsenals still further, with a view to their total elimination;
8. *Recommend* that a programme of action for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race should be considered as a major priority by the Conference on Disarmament;
9. *Reaffirm* their determination to strengthen still further the barriers to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to encourage the ongoing efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards;
10. *Reaffirm also* the right of all parties to the Treaty to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the further development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, according to their priorities, interests and needs;
11. *Recognize* that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of agreements freely concluded among the States of the region concerned, strengthens regional and global peace and security and contributes to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and urge all States to support and respect those regional agreements and encourage the efforts being made to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

### **ii. Draft Resolution on Extension Proposed by Canada**

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/L.2, co-sponsored by Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federal States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of Palau, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uzbekistan]

The Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in accordance with

Article X.2 of the Treaty, decides that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

### iii. Draft Resolution on Extension Proposed by the 'Group of Like-minded States'

[Text reproduced from NPT/CONF.1995/L.2, co-sponsored by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Zimbabwe]

*The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article X of the Treaty, decides:

- (a) That the Treaty shall continue in force for rolling fixed periods of twenty-five years. At the end of each fixed period a review and extension conference shall be convened to conduct an effective and comprehensive review of the operation of the Treaty. The Treaty shall be extended for the next fixed period of twenty-five years unless the majority of the parties to the Treaty decide otherwise at the review and extension conference;
- (b) That, in conformity with paragraph 3 of Article VIII, five years after the adoption of this extension decision, a review conference shall be convened and subsequent review conference shall be convened at intervals of five years thereafter to conduct effective and comprehensive reviews of the operation of the Treaty;
- (c) That the review conferences shall identify specific objectives to be achieved with a view to the full implementation of the purposes of the Preamble and the obligations and commitments undertaken by the Parties under the Treaty and shall make concrete recommendations for the attainment of such objectives. These objectives include, *inter alia*, the attainment, within specific time-frames, of the following:
  - (i) A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;
  - (ii) A legally binding international instrument to provide comprehensive assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
  - (iii) A cut-off in the production and the elimination of stockpiling of fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapons purposes;
  - (iv) The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
  - (v) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones;
  - (vi) The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes;

as well as the commitment of States parties to achieve universality of the Treaty as a means in promoting international peace and security.

### c. Other Documents Relevant to the NPT Conference

#### i. Letter Dated 17 April 1995 from the Representatives of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America Addressed to the Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

We have the honour to forward to you the text of a declaration by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We should be grateful if you would kindly take the appropriate steps to register the present letter and its annex as a document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, and to have it distributed to the participants in the Conference.

(Signed) Gerard Errera, Ambassador France

(Signed) Grigori V. Berdennikov, Ambassador Russian Federation

(Signed) Sir Michael Weston, Ambassador United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar, Ambassador United States of America

#### *Annex — Declaration Dated 6 April 1995 by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

We wish to express our continuing strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, our desire that the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference in New York should decide on its indefinite and unconditional continuation in force and our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those in article VI.

We welcome the fact that the nuclear arms race has ceased and that, in keeping with the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, important steps have been taken towards nuclear disarmament, as a result of the agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as well as the significant reductions made by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in their nuclear weapon programmes.

We welcome the important progress made at the Conference on Disarmament in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty to which we are all contributing actively.

We also welcome the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We urge that the negotiations begin forthwith.

We underline the importance of the harmonized security assurances which we have given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the commitments as regards the provision of appropriate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty victim of aggression or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. We believe that these strengthen international peace and security.

We solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

We reaffirm our determination to continue to negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, and we pledge our support for its conclusion without delay.

We call upon all States parties to the Treaty to make the treaty permanent. This will be crucial for the full realization of the goals set out in article VI.

We call upon all States that are not parties to the Treaty to accede to it soon, thereby contributing to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

A truly universal and fully implemented Treaty is in the interest of all.

#### ii. NAM Coordinating Bureau — Ministerial Meeting, Bandung — 27 April 1995

1. The Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned countries meeting in Bandung, Indonesia 25-27 April 1995 exchanged views on the Review and Extension Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

2. The Ministers of the States Parties to the Treaty observed that the Review and Extension Conference on the NPT is taking place at a crucial moment in history following the end of the cold war with the Non-Aligned Countries commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Bandung Declaration and when the international community is preparing for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations.

3. The Ministers of the States Parties to the Treaty recognized that the NPT in spite of its unequal obligations, has been useful in promoting international peace and security. They praised Non-Aligned States Parties for adhering faithfully to the obligations they entered into under the Treaty.
4. They further expressed deep concern that the nuclear weapon States have not adhered fully to the obligations under the Treaty. They underlined that the Review and Extension Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty offers a unique opportunity for States Parties to the Treaty to achieve the goal of comprehensive disarmament, in particular in the nuclear field.
5. The Ministers of the States Parties emphasized the need for the adoption of a genuine and comprehensive disarmament regime to meet the security needs of all countries, in particular the non-nuclear weapon States through the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by the nuclear weapon States under the Treaty, namely:
  - a. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
  - b. international legally binding instruments to provide comprehensive assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,
  - c. a cut off in the production and elimination of stockpiling of fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapons purposes,
  - d. elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,
  - e. establishment of nuclear weapon free zones,
  - f. the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes
6. The Ministers of the States Parties emphasized the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty as a means of promoting international peace and security.
7. In the light of the above considerations, the Ministers of the States Parties to the Treaty agreed that:
  - a. The Treaty shall be extended in accordance with the options provided in paragraph 2 of Article X,
  - b. in conformity with paragraph 3 of Article VIII, five years after the adoption of this extension decision, a regular review conference shall be convened, and subsequent regular review conferences shall be convened at intervals of five years thereafter to conduct proper and comprehensive reviews of the operation of the Treaty with a view to monitoring implementation commitments indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

**iii. Letter Dated 9 May from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the President of the NPT Conference**

H.E. Mr. President,

With regard to my delegation's attendance at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I have the honour to remind you that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is at the special status in the NPT.

The DPRK, taking into consideration of the DPRK-US agreed framework, dispatched to the conference a delegation which made every effort to fulfil its responsibilities, expecting that the conference would strengthen in good faith the non-proliferation regime and contribute to the world peace and security.

However, the document drafted at the conference meetings unreasonably represents the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula according to the outdated prejudices, ignoring the realities.

All these show that certain countries are using the conference against my country, as they are only interested not in settling but in further complicating the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula by disregarding and crippling the DPRK-US agreed framework which is aimed at fair resolution of it.

In these circumstances, I, upon authorization, inform you that the DPRK delegation will not participate in adopting decisions or documents at the conference.

I will be grateful if my delegation's absence from these actions could be duly recorded and this letter could be made available to all the participants of the conference.

Pak Gil Yon, Ambassador Permanent Representative

**iv. Extracts from Rules of Procedure and Annexes**

**VI. VOTING AND ELECTIONS**

*Adoption of decisions*

**Rule 28**

The tasks of the Conference being to review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty, the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, and to decide, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article X of the Treaty, whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.

**1. General**

- (a) Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.
- (b) If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting.
- (c) In cases where a vote is taken, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

**2. Review**

- (a) If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve a consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for forty-eight hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.
- (b) If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting shall take place and decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, providing that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference.

**3. The extension**

- (a) Proposals for a decision in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article X of the Treaty may be submitted by sponsor(s) in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference until the end of the review process but no later than 1800 hours on Friday 5 May 1995.
- (b) In order to achieve a consensus decision on the extension of the Treaty, the President may conduct informal consultations from the outset of the Conference and keep the General Committee informed in this regard.
- (c) The requirements of paragraph 2 of Article X of the Treaty shall be considered met when there is a consensus in support of a proposal that is in accordance with that paragraph provided that the Conference is quorate as defined in Rule 13.
- (d) If by Monday 8 May 1995 the Conference has not reached a decision by consensus on the extension, the President shall defer the vote for 48 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference after the end of the period.
- (e) If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached a consensus decision on the extension, voting shall begin on Wednesday 10 May 1995 on all proposals that have been submitted.
- (f) All proposals shall be voted on simultaneously by written ballot.\* Each State Party shall have one vote, to be cast in favour of one of the proposals.

- (g) If none of the proposals obtains the required majority, the proposal receiving the lowest number of votes, in that and each subsequent round, shall be eliminated. Further rounds of voting shall take place on the remaining proposals in accordance with subparagraph (f).
- (h) A proposal may not be amended in accordance with Rule 24, but may be revised or withdrawn by its sponsor(s) at any time except when a vote is in progress.
- (i) No Parties may move that part of a proposal be voted on separately.
- (j) After each round of voting, consultations may be undertaken by the Parties with a view to reaching a decision. To this end the Conference may decide, by a majority of Parties to the Treaty, to permit the submission of a new proposal which shall be included in subsequent rounds of voting conducted in accordance with subparagraph (f).
- (k) Voting shall continue until a proposal acquired the required majority.
- (l) The Conference may be closed only when the decision required by paragraph 2 of Article X of the Treaty has been reached.

\* This rule is without prejudice to rules which may be adopted for future conferences. The method of balloting shall be decided by the Conference in accordance with Rule 28.1. Examples of the ballot papers and procedures are attached to the Rules of Procedure.

#### *Voting rights*

##### *Rule 29*

Every State Party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

#### *Meaning of the phrases 'representative present and voting' and 'majority of the Parties to the Treaty'*

##### *Rule 30*

1. For the purposes of these rules, the phrase 'representative present and voting' means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.
2. For the purposes of these rules, the term 'majority of the Parties to the Treaty' means more than half of the total number of all States Parties to the Treaty.

#### *Elections*

##### *Rule 31*

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.

##### *Rule 32*

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.
2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in this special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

#### *Appendix 2*

(to rule 28.3 (f) )

#### VOTING PROCEDURE A

Voting shall take place as follows:

Before each ballot takes place, the Secretariat shall issue, to each State Party participating in the Conference, copies of all the documents containing the proposals which have been submitted, and a duly authenticated ballot paper listing, by their document

number and in an order to be determined by drawing lots, all the proposals submitted (model ballot paper attached).

The ballot paper shall be headed by the name of that State Party.

Each State Party shall have one vote, to be cast by placing an X opposite the proposal it favours on the ballot paper, and depositing its ballot paper in the ballot box. Any ballot paper not conforming to the above requirements shall be declared invalid.

The Conference shall elect three tellers (one from the Western Group delegations, one from the Eastern Group delegations and one from the Non-Aligned Movement delegations) who shall supervise the voting process and the counting of the votes by the Secretariat.

At the end of each ballot and before the next ballot, the Secretariat shall, under the supervision of the tellers, draw up and circulate lists indicating the result of the vote, which States Parties voted for which proposal, and which ballot papers (if any) were declared invalid.

[sample ballot paper not reproduced here]

#### VOTING PROCEDURE B

Voting shall take place as follows:

Before each ballot take place, the Secretariat shall issue, to each State Party participating in the Conference, copies of all the documents containing the proposals which have been submitted, and a duly authenticated ballot paper listing, by their document number and in an order to be determined by drawing lots, all the proposals submitted (model ballot paper attached).

Each State Party shall have one vote, to be cast by placing an X opposite the proposal it favours on the ballot paper, and depositing its ballot paper in the ballot box. Any ballot paper not conforming to the above requirements shall be declared invalid.

The Conference shall elect three tellers (one from the Western Group delegations, one from the Eastern Group delegations and one from the Non-Aligned Movement delegations) who shall supervise the voting process and the counting of the votes by the Secretariat.

At the end of each ballot and before the next ballot, the Secretariat shall, under the supervision of the tellers, draw up and circulate lists indicating the result of the vote, how many State Parties voted for which proposal, and how many ballot papers (if any) were declared invalid.

[sample ballot paper not reproduced here]

#### **d. Unilateral Security Assurances**

##### **i. Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on security assurances, issued by my Government on 6 April 1995 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (see annex).

In issuing this declaration, my Government recognises that those States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that such weapons will not be used against them. The revised negative security assurance now given in the Conference on Disarmament by the United Kingdom is a solemn and formal undertaking by my Government which meets these concerns. The positive security assurance also contained in the declaration reiterates and expands on the assurance which my Government gave in 1968 by recognising the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to be reassured that the nuclear-weapon States would take appropriate measures in the event of the former being attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons.

These assurances have been given by my Government after consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States. They are extended to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and demonstrate the continuing determination of the nuclear-weapon States to strengthen and make permanent that Treaty.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 68 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.  
(Signed) David H. A. HANNAY

**Annex — United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declaration on security assurances made in the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995 by Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva**

The Government of the United Kingdom believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international agreements seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are vital to the maintenance of world security. We note with appreciation that 175 States have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime which has made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. We are convinced that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions.

We will continue to urge all States that have not done so to become parties to the Treaty.

The Government of the United Kingdom recognises that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. In 1978 we gave such an assurance. Assurances have also been given by the other nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Recognising the continued concern of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States should be in similar terms, and following consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States, I accordingly give the following undertaking on behalf of my Government:

The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasises the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty's Government does not regard its assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1968 the United Kingdom declared that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking 'effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace'. Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

I, therefore, recall and reaffirm the intention of the United Kingdom, as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an

object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

This Security Council assistance could include measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security, and appropriate procedures, in response to any request from the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

If a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom would also be prepared to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance.

The United Kingdom reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognised under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

**ii. Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith China's national statement on security assurances (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could make arrangements to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 68 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(signed) LI Zhaoxing, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations.

**Annex — Statement on security assurances issued on 5 April 1995 by the People's Republic of China**

For the purpose of enhancing international peace, security and stability and facilitating the realization of the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China hereby declares its position on security assurances as follows:

1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.
2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have entered into any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices.
3. China has always held that, pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. China strongly calls for the early conclusion of an international convention on no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as an international legal instrument assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. China, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action within the Council to ensure that the Council takes appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and imposes strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. This commitment naturally applies to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any non-nuclear-weapon State that has entered into any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to manufacture or

acquire nuclear explosive devices, in the event of an aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against such State.

5. The positive security assurance provided by China, as contained in paragraph 4, does not in any way compromise China's position as contained in paragraph 3 and shall not in any way be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons.

**iii. Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to forward herewith a statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, issued yesterday, announcing a declaration by President Clinton on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 68 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council. (signed) Edward W. GNEHM

*Annex — Statement issued on 5 April 1995 by the Honourable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, regarding a declaration by the President on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.*

The United States of America believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international conventions and treaties seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a cornerstone of global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a central element of this regime. 5 March 1995 was the twenty-fifth anniversary of its entry into force, an event commemorated by President Clinton in a speech in Washington D.C., on 1 March 1995. A conference to decide on the extension of the Treaty will begin in New York on 17 April 1995. The United States considers the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without conditions as a matter of the highest national priority and will continue to pursue all appropriate efforts to achieve that outcome.

It is important that all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognised principles of international law, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to the Treaty.

The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression. Any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a legitimate desire for assurances that the United Nations Security Council, and

above all its nuclear-weapon-State permanent members, would act immediately in accordance with the Charter, in the event such non-nuclear-weapon States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

Among the means available to the Security Council for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and to restore international peace and security.

United Nations Member States should take appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, and the Security Council should consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression.

The Security Council should recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

The United States reaffirms the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

**iv. Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement dated 5 April 1995 by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation regarding the presentation of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (see annex I) and a statement dated 5 April 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation consisting of a national statement on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States (see annex II).

I should be grateful if you could have the text of this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 68 of the preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the fiftieth session, entitled 'Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons', and of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

*Annex I — Statement dated 5 April 1995 by the Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*

Recognizing the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, respecting the legitimate desire of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that Treaty to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, based on the provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is authorized to make the following statement (see annex).

It should be pointed out, furthermore, that as the President of the Russian Federation proposed at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, work on a further United Nations Security Council resolution on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States has been harmonized. The draft resolution, prepared with the participation of Russian representatives, is being submitted to

the Security Council for its consideration. The main provisions of the draft resolution are as follows:

In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council will immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Council and will seek to ensure that they provide, in accordance with the Charter, necessary assistance to the State that is a victim of such an act of aggression or that is threatened by such aggression.

The draft resolution provides, further on, for the possibility of taking appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim of such an act of aggression for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance and for payment of compensation by the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

We believe that the adoption by the Security Council of this draft resolution would be welcomed by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and would help strengthen the non-proliferation regime, international solidarity and world stability.

***Annex II — Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 5 April 1995***

Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

**v. Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the contents of the declaration on security assurances made on behalf of France by the Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this document and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 68 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE

***Annex — Statement concerning security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States made by the Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995***

The issue of security assurances given by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States is, for my delegation, an important one:

Firstly, because it corresponds to a real expectation on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those which, have renounced atomic weapons by signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Secondly, because it involves our particular responsibilities as a nuclear Power;

Finally, because it has acquired new meaning since the end of the cold war, with the growing awareness of the threat which the proliferation of nuclear weapons represents for everyone.

It is in order to meet that expectation, to assume its responsibilities and to make its contribution to efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons that France has decided to take the following steps:

Firstly, it reaffirms, and clarifies, the negative security assurances which it gave in 1982, specifically:

France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on France, its territory, its armed

forces or other troops, or against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State.

It seems to us natural that it is the signatory countries to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — that is to say, the overwhelming majority of countries in the world — who should benefit from these assurances, since they have made a formal non-proliferation commitment. Furthermore, in order to respond to the request of a great many countries, France has sought as much as possible to harmonize the content of its negative assurances with those of the other nuclear Powers. We are pleased that this effort has been successful. The content of the declarations concerning the negative security assurances of France, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are henceforth practically identical.

Secondly, and for the first time, France has decided to give positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Its accession to the Treaty made this decision both possible and desirable. Accordingly:

'France considers that any aggression which is accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would threaten international peace and security. France recognizes that the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are entitled to an assurance that, should they be attacked with nuclear weapons or threatened with such an attack, the international community and, first and foremost, the United Nations Security Council, would react immediately in accordance with obligations set forth in the Charter.

'Having regard to these considerations, France makes the following declaration:

'France, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, pledges that, in the event of attack with nuclear weapons or the threat of such attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, France will immediately inform the Security Council and act within the Council to ensure that the latter takes immediate steps to provide, in accordance with the Charter, necessary assistance to any State which is the victim of such an act or threat of aggression.

'France reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack, including an attack with use of nuclear weapons, occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.'

In this area also, we are pleased that the content of these positive assurances has been the subject of close consultations with the other nuclear Powers.

Thirdly, France, with the four other nuclear Powers, has decided to submit to the United Nations Security Council a draft resolution which constitutes a first in many respects, and which reflects our intention to meet the expectations of the international community globally, collectively and specifically;

Globally: for the first time, a draft resolution deals with both negative and positive assurances;

Collectively: for the first time, a resolution of the Security Council specifies the measures which the Security Council could take in the event of aggression, in the areas of the settlement of disputes, humanitarian assistance and compensation to the victims.

The draft resolution solemnly reaffirms the need for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fully respect their obligations. That is not a *petitio principii*, but a reminder of a fundamental rule. The draft resolution also emphasizes the desirable nature of universal accession to the Treaty.

The decisions which I have just announced correspond to our intention to consolidate the non-proliferation regime and particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the cornerstone of that regime. It is our hope and firm conviction that the initiatives we have just taken will contribute thereto.

### e. United Nations Security Council Resolution on Security Assurances

[Text reproduced from Security Council resolution 984. Sponsored by China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America]

*The Security Council,*

*Convinced* that every effort must be made to avoid and avert the danger of nuclear war, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular emphasis on the needs of developing countries, and reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to these efforts,

*Recognizing* the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive security assurances,

*Welcoming* the fact that more than 170 States have become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stressing the desirability of universal adherence to it,

*Reaffirming* the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with all their obligations,

*Taking* into consideration the legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, further appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

*Considering* that the present resolution constitutes a step in this direction,

*Considering further* that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, any aggression with the use of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security,

1. *Takes note* with appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264, S/1995/265), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
2. *Recognizes* the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
3. *Recognizes further* that, in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any State may bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council to enable the Council to take urgent action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, such aggression; and *recognizes also* that the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the Security Council will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Council and seek Council action to provide, in accordance with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the State victim;

4. *Notes* the means available to it for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security;
5. *Invites* Member States, individually or collectively, if any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance, and affirms its readiness to consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression;
6. *Expresses* its intention to recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression;
7. *Welcomes* the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
8. *Urges* all States, provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control which remains a universal goal,
9. *Reaffirms* the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security;
10. *Underlines* that the issues raised in this resolution remain of continuing concern to the Council.

### The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Newsbrief

The **Newsbrief** is part of the outreach effort which constitutes a major element of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN). It is addressed to an audience interested in the subject of nuclear (non-)proliferation, to inform and help them alert their respective environments to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

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