

July 2, 1969
**Radio Liberty Policy Manual: Annex: Uzbek
Broadcasts**

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Summary:

Radio Liberty outlines their policy regarding Uzbeks in the USSR with programming, with the goal of leading to "democratization, social justice, and national self-determination".

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July 2, 1969

RADIO LIBERTY POLICY MANUAL

A N N E X

UZBEK BROADCASTS

The provisions of the main text of the Policy Manual are generally applicable to all language services of Radio Liberty. Within that broad framework, this annex deals with specific aspects of broadcasts in Uzbek. It adds to the provisions of the main text but in no way supersedes or alters their importance in determining the content of Uzbek broadcasts.

The Role of the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service

The Uzbek broadcasts of Radio Liberty endeavor to:

1. provide Uzbeks in the USSR with full and free information in their own language;
2. give expression to and encourage those trends within Uzbekistan specifically, as well as the USSR in general, which can lead to democratization, social justice and national self-determination;
3. preserve and stimulate the growth of Uzbek cultural values and national identity, reflecting in its broadcasts a continuity in the history and life of the Uzbek people which antedates the Soviet era and will persist and flourish in the future.

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The Turkestanti Service endeavors to speak from the viewpoint of Uzbeks within the USSR. The content of its broadcasts is determined by the existing situation within the USSR and, specifically, the Uzbek SSR, the attitudes, needs and interests of Uzbeks. In reporting trends and developments within the Soviet Union and the world at large, the Turkestanti Service is particularly concerned with those of significance to Uzbekistan and the lives of Uzbeks within the USSR.

At the same time, RL Uzbek broadcasts do not presume to make final judgments which can only be made by Uzbeks now living in the USSR or which can only be arrived at through genuinely democratic processes. Uzbek broadcasts attempt to stimulate Uzbeks to think about their national problems and to provide them with information which may assist them in finding their own solutions. They do not incite anti-Soviet group action by Uzbeks and leave it to Uzbeks themselves to decide specific courses of action for the solution of Uzbek problems.

The Uzbek Audience

There are close to 8 million Uzbeks in the USSR, almost all of them in Soviet Central Asia. Uzbekistan has a very high rate of population growth, and it is estimated that about 6.5 million Uzbeks live in Uzbekistan, constituting 62% of its total population of 10.5 million. No reliable estimate can be made of the number of Uzbek listeners to Radio Liberty among this potential audience. Substantial numbers of Uzbeks outside the USSR live in Iran and Afghanistan and it is known that Soviet Uzbeks have had sporadic contact with these groups.

Those elements of the potential audience which are of most concern to RL's Uzbek broadcasts are the Uzbeks living within the USSR who are in a real or potential position to influence the course of events or to influence attitudes through their position as real or potential leaders of opinion. The specific target audiences of Uzbek broadcasts are those described in Section IIB of the Policy Manual: the real or potential decision-making elements of the Uzbek population. These include, particularly, the younger age-groups which reached maturity after the Stalin era and received a Soviet education and upbringing; thinking members of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and Komsomol; the scientific, technological and creative intelligentsia; lower ranking party and state officials and elected members of the legislative bodies of the Uzbek SSR; and finally, skilled workers and their supervisors in Uzbek industries.

It appears that radio sets in Uzbekistan capable of receiving Uzbek broadcasts of the Turkestani Service are more accessible to these categories of politically interested listeners, capable of influencing the course of events or of shaping attitudes, rather than the masses of unskilled workers and collective farmers who obtain their information almost exclusively from several principal Soviet radio stations.

Among Radio Liberty's target audiences, the younger, "take-over" generation is particularly important to Uzbek broadcasts. Audience research data indicate that the majority of RL's actual union-wide audience is below the age of 40. Assuming that a similar pattern applies in Uzbekistan RL's Uzbek broadcasts reach primarily a young audience. This orientation is desirable and further efforts should be made to expand the youthful

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While there are a number of minority groups in Uzbekistan, of which the largest are Russians (13.5%), Tatars (5.4%), Kazaks (4.9%), Tajiks (3.8%) and Karakalpaks (2.1%)**, it can be presumed that all but the Russians will understand the Uzbek language. Therefore, the bulk of the population can be considered a part of the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service's potential audience. Moreover, the Tajik population of northern Tajikistan is bilingual and uses Uzbek as its second native language.

Education has made great strides in Uzbekistan and nearly 170 thousand students are receiving higher education. Since women are assuming an increasing role in the social and economic life of the nation, they constitute an important sociological group. Therefore, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service will endeavor to plan programming which will have an impact on this group and increase the proportion of female listeners.

Uzbek Attitudes: National Consciousness

The Uzbeks, along with other peoples of Turkestan, have had something which one could define as national self-awareness since the beginning of the 16th century. By the end of the 19th century, when European ideas were transmitted to them via Istanbul and Kazan, this

** A considerable but unknown number of Crimean Tatars can also be found in Uzbekistan. All statistics are based on the 1959 census.

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self-awareness began to take a more Western form. The Uzbek people possess a community of language, customs, religion, and a common territory. They are fully conscious of a scientific and cultural tradition extending back over a thousand years. A precursor to the modern Uzbek language, Chagatay, (or old Uzbek) was a lingua franca (along with Persian) of all of Central Asia for more than six hundred years.

The Uzbek SSR covers an area of 174,000 square miles. It borders Afghanistan on the south, the Tajik and Kirghiz SSR on the east, the Kazakh SSR on the north and Turkmen SSR on the West. The majority of the Uzbek people live within their Union Republic, but there is a substantial Uzbek population in Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The major product of Uzbekistan is cotton, although there are vast reserves of natural gas. Light industry is also increasing.

Most of the area of present-day Uzbekistan was conquered by the Russian Empire in the last half of the 19th century. By the time of the October Revolution, several political factions had appeared in Turkestan, most of which were centered in the cities of Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva. After several years of turmoil, Bolshevik troops managed to gain political control of the region, and by the end of 1924, Uzbekistan was merged into the incipient Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet guerilla warfare was effectively quashed by 1937. Most of the early Communist leadership was executed during the Great Purge.

It is clear that the Uzbeks consider themselves a separate nation, but what type of a nation is vague. There are two prominent possibilities: firstly, that they see themselves as the nucleus of a Turkestanian nation including the Turkmens, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Tajiks; secondly, that they would prefer to have a separate state. The third possibility is that they might not be averse to a union on a federalistic basis with other peoples of the USSR (including the Russians). This appears, however, highly improbable.

Specific grievances against the Soviet regime include the discrimination against Islam and Uzbek language and traditions, as well as the effort to denationalize the population. Russians and other non-indigenous cadres occupy many posts in the Republic for which the Uzbek people now possess qualified technical and political personnel. This is resented by the Uzbeks who have reached a point in their development where they can take over the entire responsibility for the direction of their national territory. Many Uzbeks also, undoubtedly, resent the fact that Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital and largest city, has become a Russian center (Russians actually form 57% of the city's population). Other grievances are similar to those of other nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Some Uzbek dissenters are convinced Communists. It should be noted that Muslim Communism (represented by Sultangalievism) has tended to regard a solution of the national problem as more important than that of the class struggle. Other expressions of Uzbek dissent appear to be

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similar to those which have manifested themselves elsewhere in the USSR with their present focus on literary, artistic, and intellectual freedom, the abolition of censorship, and the observance of legality.

The General Content of Uzbek Broadcasts

The Turkestani Service, taking into account the growing national consciousness of Uzbeks, assumes that listeners to RL's Uzbek broadcasts prefer, if possible, to obtain all their information in the Uzbek language and are likely to be more impressed by information of particular concern to the Uzbek population. At the same time, the Turkestani Service also assumes that many Uzbeks may supplement their knowledge by listening to RL's Russian broadcasts, particularly, when transmission in Uzbek or related languages cannot be received.

RL's Uzbek broadcasts attempt to provide a broad and balanced picture of world events and substantive information on varied areas of human activity, with particular attention to those which are of immediate and real concern to Uzbeks in the USSR.

The main emphasis of Uzbek broadcasts, however, is placed upon the existing situation in the Uzbek SSR and the needs and interests of the Uzbek nation and Uzbek citizens. Trends and developments within the USSR, as a whole, are of major concern to Soviet Uzbeks to the extent that they have immediate or future significance for the lives of Uzbeks. Of special relevance are those trends and developments which emerge among

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the Muslim peoples of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus. For example, the protest movement among the Tatars, of whom a large number reside in the Uzbek SSR is of immediate concern and has potential long-range significance.

The Turkeistani Service makes a particular effort to cross-report to Uzbeks significant trends and developments toward national self-expression and democratization which occur in other republics of the Soviet Union, in other Communist-ruled countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe, as well as in world communist parties, and in Turkey, other Moslem countries, together with all newly independent states of Asia and Africa, with particular attention to those matters which are pertinent to the situation of Uzbeks in the USSR.

In developing programming materials, the Turkeistani Service proceeds from the most authoritative and comprehensive information available on the basic views and moods of RL's Uzbek listeners and their degree of knowledge and understanding, and from a careful study of events and trends within the Uzbek SSR, other non-Slavic republics, and the Soviet Union, as a whole.

Soviet and foreign newspapers, periodicals, scholarly journals, and books provide sources of information which may be used in RL's Uzbek broadcasts. Additional sources are RL's audience research and unofficial channels which often add a dimension to the one-sided picture in the Soviet press and inevitably limited coverage of the foreign press.

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Moreover, RL research facilities provide analysis in depth about Uzbek affairs which will be utilized in Uzbek broadcasts to the maximum extent. Contact with Soviet Uzbeks travelling abroad and with emigre Uzbeks who have visited Uzbekistan sometimes provide interesting information concerning internal developments. Before such information can be used as the basis for modification in programming policy or practice, it must be evaluated by responsible RL policy officers and tested against other available data.

Language and Terminology in Uzbek Broadcasts

Uzbeks are strongly attached to their ancient language, which has been discriminated against or repressed by both the Tsarist and Soviet governments. The emergence of Chagatay (old Uzbek) as the lingua franca of all educated Turks in the area which roughly corresponds with today's Uzbekistan took place in the fourteenth century. The Uzbek language belongs to the southeastern group of Turkic languages. Modern literary Uzbek is based on the Tashkent-Fergana group of dialects.

The Uzbek language has been subjected to constant pressure from the Russian language. The need to know Russian as a prerequisite for occupying many posts in the Uzbek government and administrative apparatus or for pursuing a career in one's field of specialization within the Soviet Union, as a whole, forces many Uzbeks to study and work in the Russian language. The Soviet government's educational policies have also increased the role of the Russian language in Uzbek schools at the expense of the Uzbek language, thus contributing to the gradual process of

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Russification. Russian words have also been artificially introduced into the Uzbek language, particularly its scientific terminology, and its latinized script was replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet as a further consequence of the Soviet government's policy of Russification.

National sentiment is directed mainly at guaranteeing the use of Uzbek as the official national language, its use by governmental and educational institutions and by mass media of Uzbekistan, and, at opposing any encroachment by Russian language signs, texts, publications, films, posters, etc. At the same time, attempts are being made to preserve and restore the purity of the Uzbek language by eliminating russified forms.

RL's Uzbek broadcasts recognize that language is a strong indicator of national sentiment, and, that the language question constitutes one of the principal grievances of many Uzbeks concerning Soviet policy toward Uzbekistan. These broadcasts are aimed at helping the Uzbek people to preserve their language as a prime element of their culture and to evolve their own language patterns and expand the usage of Uzbek, while resisting Soviet efforts to assimilate them. The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service attempts to encourage and sustain indigenous pressures on behalf of the Uzbek language by reporting back and cross-reporting significant or parallel developments affecting language usage and policies, and, by its own broadcasts of Uzbek literary texts.

While following closely any evolutionary trends in the Uzbek language, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service does not attempt to set itself up as arbiter of good Uzbek language or to lead the campaign for purification of the Uzbek language. It does not support Russification and sympathizes

authors who are known for their conscientious and careful fostering of the mother tongue, and by the standards of language in all serious Soviet Uzbek journals.

Attempting to employ the best language consistent with a Soviet audience, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service endeavors to use, as a general rule, the language and terminology familiar to its audience and to avoid unfamiliar forms used by non-Soviet Uzbeks, even though these may be, in some respects, purer than those used by educated people in the Uzbek SSR. Even if a word or expression would be comprehensible to this audience, it should not be employed if it will sound strange or different to the listener and cause him to think that he is being addressed by a radio station or an announcer not belonging to his world.

The use of certain Soviet terminology is unavoidable in RL's broadcasts when there is no substitute for this terminology which would be readily understandable to the Uzbek audience, as in the case of the names of Soviet organizations, and the like. The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service uses this kind of terminology in its broadcasts; it also adopts accepted Soviet Uzbek translations of the names of foreign organizations, treaties, laws, resolutions, titles, etc., as well as Soviet Uzbek pronunciation of foreign place names and proper names. In other cases, it may be necessary for the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service to use Soviet terminology of a propagandistic nature (such as "peaceful co-existence"), if such expressions possess an accepted meaning for the audience which can only be rendered with difficulty in any other way.

The Turkestan (Uzbek) Service's Approach to Specific Issues

1. Democratization and Self-Determination

The Soviet government of Uzbekistan was originally imposed by force upon the Uzbek people. Uzbeks were not allowed to exercise their right of self-determination in regard to the issue of joining the USSR, and do not now have a free and representative voice in the central regime. Both the All-Union and Republic governments do not allow the Uzbek people, as they do not allow other peoples of the USSR, a free and representative voice in electing their leaders or making decisions affecting the political, economic, social or cultural affairs affecting the Uzbek Republic. Nevertheless, the Republic already possesses some authority and its officials have a natural interest in expanding this authority through decentralization of the All-Union government. Moreover, Republic authorities do make some decisions which are in the interest of the Uzbek people. They should be supported in RL broadcasts to the extent that their efforts, directly or indirectly, accord with the aspirations of the Uzbek people.

In its efforts to encourage democratization in Uzbekistan, the Turkestan (Uzbek) Service provides ideas and information and stimulates thinking individuals to work for their individual and national rights. RL's Uzbek broadcasts emphasize not only the ultimate aim of truly representative government, but also stress the importance of achieving political, economic and social reforms in the present system which increase the voice of the people and enhance their interests.

The Constitution and laws of the Uzbek SSR, as those of the Soviet Union itself, embody rights which are more honored in the breach than in the observance.

Many articles of the Constitution of the Uzbek SSR are not observed in practice: basic rights such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, and demonstrations; the right to maintain relations with foreign states; and the right of secession from the USSR. Thus, many constitutional rights of Uzbekistan itself and the legal rights of its citizens are either ignored or violated.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service seeks to encourage those elements in Uzbekistan working for the substance contained or implicit in present provisions for the government and social organization of the Uzbek SSR. The Turkestani Service calls attention to existing laws and urges that public and social organizations adhere to their own charters by carrying out the functions for which they were supposedly created. These broadcasts stress the necessity for observance of the rule of law within the context of the Constitution of the USSR, All-Union laws, the Constitution of the Uzbek SSR and Uzbek laws. In particular, the Turkestani Service supports efforts, within the country, aimed at the realization of civil liberties and cultural freedoms which are guaranteed in Soviet laws, and of the open knowledge which guarantees justice. The Turkestani Service also views these laws in the larger context of international law, the UN's Declaration of Human Rights, and decisions or declarations of international legal institutions.

The Communist Party of Uzbekistan, as presently constituted, is undemocratic, not responsive to the needs of the people of Uzbekistan but to direction from Moscow. The Turkestani Service assumes that it is possible for the role of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan to change, as it has in certain instances in Eastern Europe, through circumstances which permit the CP of Uzbekistan to assert greater independence and cause it to seek the support of the Uzbek people by representing national interests and instituting domestic reforms, desired and supported by the people. The Turkestani Service approves local initiative and attempts to stimulate independent thinking which would lead the Uzbek leadership to undertake local and republic reform and to promote the real interests of the Uzbek people rather than to follow slavishly the instructions of the CPSU leadership and apparatus.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service expresses approval of those policies and actions of the Uzbek leadership which promote the real interests of the Uzbek people. On the other hand, it assists the Uzbek public by voicing the latter's opposition to or pressure against policies or actions detrimental to the interests of Uzbekistan and Uzbeks and by informing RL's audience about such policies or actions. In doing so, the Turkestani Service draws a clear distinction between the CPSU and the CP of Uzbekistan, and it focuses on issues, policies and acts, while refraining from vilification of individual communists.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service views these efforts to promote the evolution of a more democratic system in Uzbekistan as part of a broader historical trend toward democracy and self-determination, a process which

is also reflected in the entire USSR. It regards the realization of these rights by Uzbeks as interdependent with and conditioned on the recognition of similar rights for all nationalities of the USSR as well as minority groups in Uzbekistan. The Turkestani Service reports fully to its listeners on developments affecting other nations and nationalities both within and outside the USSR. While recognizing the essential right of each individual to democracy and self-determination, it does not attempt to prejudge the question of whether it is feasible to achieve this within a communist system, or the ultimate outcome of exercise of the right to self-determination, whether it be independence, federation or alliance.

2. The Issue of Russification

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service encourages, among listeners, the realization that they share with the Russians and other nationalities of the USSR the burden of centralized dictatorship by an authoritarian regime, and that freedom from such central control can be most effectively achieved by cooperation among all Soviet nationalities on certain questions of common concern, such as human rights, literary repression, and localism ("mestnichestvo") condemned by Moscow.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service approaches the issue of Russification - which may be defined in this context as the replacement of Uzbek values by Russian ones, or ultimately, the assimilation of Uzbekistan by the Russian nation - in specific terms only; loose and indiscriminate application of the label of Russification to broad trends and general developments in Uzbekistan can easily be faulted by the aware listener.

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Specific, clearly defined examples of Russification which are well supported by facts, as well as by objective research and analysis, are discussed by the Turkestani Service in a calm, factual tone that allows the details to speak for themselves.

The Turkestani Service avoids overplaying the issue of Russification and treats it only as warranted by available, verified facts; over-emphasis of the issue, particularly in ways which might imply continued success of the center's nationality policy, could cause listeners to despair of the preservation of their national distinctiveness and may lead them to believe that RL has little faith in their own ability to maintain this heritage. In judging the suitability for broadcast of materials on this question, precedence will be given to statements and assessments emanating from within Uzbekistan, and secondly, to reports on the situation by concerned segments of free-world communist parties, individual communists and the like. Provided their tone and content is consonant with the Turkestani Service's own station policy, statements by other Western organizations of Turkestani people or Uzbeks may be acceptable.

The Turkestani Service does not, either through the tone of its broadcasts or the views expressed in them by its own broadcasts, attempt to incite or encourage, among Uzbeks, hostility to Russians as a people. We emphasize that the regime's nationality policy is an instrument of central, authoritarian control that may, in fact, have the support of some Uzbeks; we avoid suggesting that Russification has the active support of the Russian people as a whole.

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The Turkestani Service's policy on this matter is based on the realization that cooperation among concerned segments of all nationalities is essential to modification of the Soviet system, and that it is, therefore, essential to avoid any stimulation of antagonism among the peoples of the USSR.

3. The Issue of Colonialism

The Turkestani Service avoids describing Uzbekistan as a colonial area, thereby, possibly offending listeners in Uzbekistan who, whatever their grievances, do not regard themselves as colonials. The Turkestani Service does not apply the label of colonialism to the situation there, since generalities of this nature are not likely to impress thinking listeners. The same limitations pertain to other parts of the Soviet Union.

Instead, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service discusses specific issues involved in Moscow-centralized control over Uzbekistan and other areas in terms of verified facts and sound analysis. Comparisons may be made with conditions existing in Asia and Africa under colonial administration on the basis of concrete facts and information. Broadcasts related to this subject must not sound propagandistic, but should be calm and factual.

4. The Treatment of Territorial Problems

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service does not raise territorial issues, either directly or indirectly, in its broadcasts. Where objective

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developments which relate to territorial issues have to be reported in order to maintain the station's credibility as a source of reliable news reporting, the Turkestani Service's tone and treatment will reflect the position that all such questions must be settled on the basis of the expressed will of a representative Uzbek government and the Uzbek people aimed at the achievement of peaceful understandings with Uzbekistan's neighbors. This applies both to Uzbekistan's own conceivable claims to territories not now a part of the USSR or territories involving other peoples of the USSR. The term "Turkestan" is acceptable in RL's Turkestani Service only in a geographical or historical sense.

Finally, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service urges the Uzbek SSR to undertake measures aimed at defending the cultural rights of Uzbeks in the USSR outside the borders of the Uzbek SSR, mainly in the Tajik, Turkmenian, Kazak and Kirgiz SSRs. While the Uzbeks resident in the other Central Asian republics are sufficiently closely related to the other Central Asian nationalities not to be culturally deprived, it is in their relations with the Slavic nationalities where they are most likely to encounter discrimination. The Turkestani Service supports the right of large groups of Uzbeks outside the Uzbek SSR to have their own schools and churches, to publish newspapers in their own language, and to organize an Uzbek cultural life in their areas of settlement.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service's Approach to Historical and Cultural Questions

1. Themes Connected with History in Uzbek Broadcasts

In view of the scarcity of reliable books available to Uzbeks concerning their long and ancient history, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service devotes appropriate attention to pre-Soviet historical themes. Where present Soviet historiography distorts or maintains silence on aspects of pre-Soviet history, the Turkestani Service attempts to draw attention to these omissions and to correct distortions. Since Soviet historians find only negative elements in the history of Uzbeks and their related peoples up to and including the 19th century, and even portray the Russian conquest of these areas in the late 19th century as a positive development, it is the task of the Turkestani Service to present a balanced view of the whole historical period without, however, giving listeners the impression that in this and the subsequent period of Soviet rule there has not been substantial economic, technological, social and cultural progress - the question to be asked is whether Uzbekistan and Uzbeks in general have benefited as much as they should have, and whether Uzbeks have not reached the point where they can govern themselves and should be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination denied to them in the past. The Turkestani Service shows that when, in the period from 1920 to 1924, the Soviet government turned the Turkestan General Governorship into the Turkestan Autonomous Socialist Republic and the Russian protectorates - the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates - into the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Republics, Uzbeks had no real voice in this decision. The same was the case when the Soviet government, in 1924, created the Uzbek SSR within the framework of the USSR.

In treating historical themes, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service avoids any airing of Uzbek grievances against other peoples inside or outside the Soviet Union. The Turkestani Service marks historical anniversaries in the spirit of national consciousness and not as an outlet for recriminations and attacks directed against Russians or other peoples, even by implication.

The history of Soviet rule in Uzbekistan is prominently featured in RL's Uzbek broadcasts because much of this history is suppressed or distorted in contemporary Soviet historical works. These historical lacunae or outright distortations apply particularly to the extension of Soviet power to Uzbekistan, the period of collectivization and purges in the Thirties, the period of the Second World War when many people were deported to Uzbekistan from the Caucasus and other areas, etc. Since the Soviet leadership cannot avoid the responsibility for the events that occurred during the half century of Soviet rule, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service makes every effort to illuminate the dark pages of Soviet history; but its treatment should be aimed not so much at indicting the leadership as it is at pointing the way toward reforms which would prevent such crimes and abuses in the future. Moreover, this stress on the past should not be so consuming a preoccupation that the Turkestani Service becomes vulnerable to charges of being anachronistic and reactionary.

2. Themes Connected with Religion in Uzbek Broadcasts

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service supports freedom of conscience and religious belief. At the same time it recognizes that the consciousness

of being Muslim cannot be separated from the national self-consciousness, traditions and mores of Uzbeks, regardless of their attitude toward the formal aspects of religion. In this context RL's Uzbek broadcasts may provide regular Muslim religious broadcasts. Nevertheless, the Turkestanti Service does not identify Radio Liberty with religion generally or with Islam except in its broad national and cultural context. Non-believers, particularly young people born under a system which professes and advocates atheism, may be interested in the content of religion, the more so in view of the regime's attempts to deprive them of this knowledge. Aside from satisfying their curiosity about religious forms, the Turkestanti Service also offers information about a variety of philosophical and religious beliefs, particularly about trends in modern Islamic thought and philosophy, which could assist listeners in their search for independent ideas and convictions.

3. Themes Connected with Uzbek Literature

In view of the Chagatay literary tradition which goes back to the 14th century, the Turkestanti (Uzbek) Service stresses Uzbek literature as a manifestation of the spirit of the Uzbek people, which the Turkestanti Service seeks to keep alive and flourishing.

The Turkestanti (Uzbek) Service recognizes both achievements and shortcomings of Uzbek literature and measures contemporary Soviet Uzbek literature against the standards of Uzbekistan's rich literature. The Turkestanti Service points out, as circumstances require, the elements of discrimination existing in the Uzbek SSR with regard to both literature

in the Uzbek language and in minority languages, and advocates the rights of all to be disseminated and developed on Uzbek territory. An important aim of RL's Uzbek broadcasts is to preserve and advance Uzbek literature, and, in accordance with this aim, the Turkestani's Service urges the publication of more books and periodicals in the Uzbek language and in languages of minority groups in Uzbekistan, including translations of these works directly in foreign languages and translations from foreign languages into Uzbek and other languages of the Uzbek SSR. Since Uzbek writers are seeking the same freedom of expression and abolition of censorship sought by other writers under communist rule, Uzbek broadcasts devote particular attention to the cross-reporting of developments concerning the creative intelligentsia in the USSR (especially those of the Turkic peoples), Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. At the same time, since this quest of Uzbek writers and poets for creative freedom and abolition of censorship is frequently manifested in underground literature, the Turkestani Service includes in its broadcasts material of good quality of this kind that finds its way to the West, taking care to note that it is broadcast without the permission or knowledge of the author.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service seeks to promote closer ties between Uzbek writers and those of other countries. With this aim, RL's Uzbek broadcasts give information about all significant literary events in the West, about new literary works appearing there, and about the ideas and trends emerging in contemporary Western literature.

When Radio Liberty broadcasts the text, in whole or in part, of literary works originally written in Uzbek, the Turkestani (Uzbek) Service does not alter this text, in any way, to correct or change language and terminology, regardless of whether it emanates from internal or emigre Uzbek sources.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service's Approach to the Uzbek Emigration

In view of the negligible number of people from various ethnic groups of Soviet Central Asia abroad, it is difficult to distinguish a specifically Uzbek emigration. Although many such people migrated earlier to the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan in addition to those in Chinese Turkestan, there was very little emigration from the Soviet Union until the Red Army, in the period from 1936 to 1939, crushed a Basmachi independence movement and introduced forced collectivization. A second large emigration took place during the Second World War. After the repatriation following the war the bulk of the remaining Central Asian emigration was to be found in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, Turkey and the Arab countries. In Turkey, there were an estimated 10 thousand; in Saudi Arabia, 25 thousand. The Tajiks and Turkmens were mainly in Afghanistan and Iran, the Kirgizes and Kazaks in Turkey, and Uzbeks scattered throughout the area. Generally speaking, the Central Asian nationalities have tended to pool their forces in the emigration in Turkestani organizations.

Emigre leaders claim that the Turco-Moslem population of the Soviet Union, at the close of the Second World War, numbered from 25 to 40 million people, a large proportion of whom lived in an area that formed a natural

unit - Turkestan. The peoples of Turkestan - the area east of the Urals to the other side of the Chinese border in Sinkiang - fell under foreign rule in the comparatively recent past. Both parts of this claimed Turkestani nations, i.e. that formerly ruled within the Russian Empire and the other under China, have known brief periods of independence since the Russian and Chinese conquests.

Nevertheless, divergent theories exist in the emigration concerning the future Turkestan. One solution allegedly favored by those who wish to maintain a monopoly by the Uzbeks is based on the unity of the six present Soviet republics of Central Asia, plus Chinese Turkestan, but without Azerbaijan or the Idel-Ural area. An opposing solution called for a Turkic Moslem state to include everything east of the Caspian Sea, thus giving the Tatar-Bashirs a strong voice. Another proposal was for a Northern Turkestan of Kazaks, Kirgizes, Bashkirs, and Tatars. Whether the peoples of Soviet Central Asia after a half century of Soviet rule would choose any of these or a totally different solution is an open question.

While Radio Liberty shares with most of the Central Asian emigration objectives which seek freedom and democracy in Soviet Central Asia, its position supports self-determination for the Uzbek nation and people and leaves to them the decision as to independence, association with other nationalities of Central Asia, Uzbekistan's future form of government etc. RL will report on various proposals for the political future of Uzbekistan and Central Asia, but cannot be a medium for advocating any specific political goals. Similarly, Radio Liberty cannot permit itself to become identified with any particular Turkestani or Uzbek organization which has such political goals.

The Turkestani (Uzbek) Service may report news of emigre political activities and events, describe leading emigre personalities, and may also quote politically responsible portions of speeches by prominent emigres abroad or of documents and statements issued abroad of interest to the listeners. Reporting of this nature must not tend to be limited to or favor certain organizations, thereby, indirectly identifying Radio Liberty with the political goals of any particular organization. Nor should it violate common sense or good taste. Interviews may not be conducted with representatives of political organizations speaking in this capacity, although they are permissible if these persons are appearing as individuals and they are not introduced or prominently presented in RL broadcasts as political representatives.