

July 7, 1977

**Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the
Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence
Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations
with the People's Republic of China'**

Citation:

"Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'", July 7, 1977, Wilson Center Digital Archive, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), CIA-RDP80M00165A000500350006-6.
<https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/300352>

Summary:

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Chun & Jane Chiu Family Foundation

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

Approved For Release 2006/07/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A000500350006-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Executive Registry
77-1781

Rec'd 8 Jul 77

SECRET GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to
Normalization of Relations with the
People's Republic of China

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 6/26/2003

As per the June 27 PRC meeting on our China policy, you are requested to undertake a study of the impact of our establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China under the following conditions:

1. With the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking, diplomatic relations and the Treaty with the Republic of China would lapse.
2. The terms of recognition would enable the people of Taiwan to sustain a prosperous economy and evolve their relationship with the mainland in peace.
3. Advanced consultation with Taipei and our allies most directly concerned -- Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, Bangkok, Jakarta, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, Wellington, London, Paris, and Bonn -- would have been undertaken. The move would not come as a surprise or shock.
4. Key Congressional figures would have been forewarned of the move and the reasons for it.

Naturally, were such a delicate inquiry to become public, it would have a significant policy impact. I therefore request that the intelligence estimate be undertaken through particularly secure channels.

15/
Zbigniew Brzezinski

SECRET GDS

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE C-14)

MORI/CDF

Approved For Release 2006/07/27 : CIA-RDP80M00165A000500350006-6

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/IC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI	X (Attn: [redacted])			
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	A/DCI/PA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

25X1

Remarks: Got this LDX'd over to us. Am told it was signed and we'll eventually get hard copy. Due to sensitivity, will look to you to make any additional controlled distribution.

25X1

B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary
8 Jul 77

Date