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**Record of a Conversation between L. I. Brezhnev
and N. Ceausescu and I. G. Maurer on 25 July 1965**

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Summary:

Ceausescu emphasizes the importance of repairing Sino-Soviet relations. The two leaders end their conversation by discussing Ceausescu's travel plans for an upcoming visit to the USSR.

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Secret

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION*

between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu and I. G. Maurer
on 20 July 1965

*The record of the conversation was not reviewed by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev.

On 20 July Cde. L. I. Brezhnev met with Cde. N. Ceausescu and Cde. I. G. Maurer at the residence of the CPSU delegation to the 9th RCP Congress near Bucharest and had a conversation with them. Members of the Soviet delegation Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov, V. G. Komyakhov, N. G. Yegorychev, and I. K. Zhelyagin were present at the conversation.

At the start of the conversation at the request of Cde. Maurer Cde. Brezhnev informed the Romanian leaders of the conversations with Cde. Le Duan in Moscow. They then touched on the latest letter of the Vietnamese comrades on questions of the military situation of the DRV; Cde. Brezhnev noted that according to the assessment contained in this letter, the situation is becoming complicated: American bombardments have destroyed communications and a threat is being created of isolation of the DRV from the socialist countries. The Vietnamese comrades raise the question in this connection of the urgent supply of new anti-aircraft missiles to them and several MIG-21 aircraft squadrons. They are expressing a desire to send part of their pilots who have flown MIG-17s for retraining to master MIG-21s. They are also asking that Soviet pilots be sent to the DRV, but it is not clear from the document for what purpose - to train the Vietnamese or to fly themselves. The letter speaks of volunteers, but in very indefinite form. In particular it is pointed out that if the DRV government finds this possible then, depending on the situation, it will ask for volunteers to be sent to the DRV.

The situation in the DRV is actually difficult - its economy is gradually being ruined, although it ought to be noted that the Americans fear subjecting Hanoi to raids, knowing of our missile installation and not wanting to go too far.

We are not receiving any information from the South of Vietnam. We only know from newspapers that local battles are going on.

Yu. V. Andropov. The most significant operation was the attack on the airfield. The Vietnamese hoped for the rainy season, but it is ending right now.

Then L. I. Brezhnev told about the aid being given to the DRV and the recent request of the Vietnamese comrades about the transportation of Soviet weapons which have accumulated on the border with the PRC. Noting that the Vietnamese comrades invariably express sincere gratitude for the aid given them, L. I. Brezhnev informed the Romanian comrades of the talks with the DRV government delegation headed by Cde. Le Thanh Nghi concerning questions of economic aid to the DRV in the upcoming five-year plan. He said, we recommended to them that they not especially overexert the economy during a period of war and concentrate attention on strengthening the country's defensive capabilities. After mutual consultations the Vietnamese comrades agreed that for the time being it is advisable to limit themselves to determining the volume of aid for 1966.

Then touching on the work of the RCP Congress L. I. Brezhnev said: when the question of the composition of the delegation to your Congress was discussed in the CPSU CC Presidium a unanimous opinion was plain that it was necessary to send a representative delegation to you headed by the CPSU CC First Secretary. We were charged with expressing our sympathies and fraternal feelings toward the RCP and the Romanian people in the name of the Communists and the entire Soviet people, and to take part in the work of the Congress, which always represents a new milestone in the life of the Party and the country, and in economic development. It seems to me that the CC Presidium of our Party acted correctly in setting such a task before us. Before departure the comrades also told us that although our delegation did not have the nature of a Party-government delegation and official talks were not envisioned, nevertheless in its concept this trip serves the cause of a further strengthening and development of our fraternal friendship and our relations. This is the unwritten mandate, if one can say so, that we received from the CPSU CC

Presidium. For our part we would like to do this in the best way. We are very pleased with the work of your Congress. The atmosphere of enthusiasm and the businesslike, concrete approach to the solution of problems made a great impression.

I would not like to make the question of our aid to the DRV an object of official discussion here, but we have to face many difficulties in Vietnamese matters.

I. G. Maurer Why do you think such difficulties are being created?

L. I. Brezhnev First, because we are not informed. What is the alternative? [Whether] there is one or several opportunities to solve the Vietnamese problem, we don't know this. This is a factor of no little importance. In spite of the frank conversation with Cde. Le Duan and other Vietnamese comrades to whom we spoke about the insufficiency of information about the situation in Vietnam, as before we do not know the state of affairs there. The information [that] comes is sparse and only from newspapers. But we have complex equipment there, two training centers, and a group of officer personnel. We have expressed a readiness to send more of our jet aircraft to the DRV, but there is only one airfield on the territory of North Vietnam. Then we raised the question with the Chinese comrades of the possibility of using their airfields at which our aircraft could be based. The Vietnamese comrades also turned to them with the same request. And what did we receive in reply? The Chinese leaders accused us of wanting to occupy territory of the PRC. Aren't these difficulties? On the one hand, we are helping the DRV but on the other, our aid might not always be effective. We have supplied the DRV with missiles, but the Vietnamese cannot use them. They do not take our people, they say that they will train their own [people]. The first group of such anti-aircraft artillerymen should finish training in September, and the second in October. In addition, there still is not sufficient confidence how they will shoot.

Yu. V. Andropov ...and will the Americans will wait until they go through training.

L. I. Brezhnev The situation is difficult. Imagine that tomorrow the Americans bomb our missile installations. What will the Chinese say then? I can say in advance what kind of article they will write. They will call this a betrayal on our part, they will write that our missiles are worth nothing and that we are not able to shoot. Isn't that a complication? And there are many such questions.

We also have to encounter great difficulties in moral terms. You know that we offered to meet with the Chinese comrades together with DRV representatives in order to discuss the situation which has developed. We were guided by sincere feelings. However, the Chinese comrades declined this offer. They not only did not agree to such a meeting, but also attacked us with new accusations. Is it easy to endure such slander? I will tell you more. You obviously know about the statements of the Chinese that they will not begin to fight in Vietnam unless the Americans attack their territory. Is this not a complication for the Vietnamese and for us? What is this, a bribe to the Americans? For what are they paying the Americans? For they have essentially given the Americans a promissory note: you can bomb North Vietnam, just don't touch PRC territory. The Vietnamese have to pay too high a price for such statements. One only has to think about the meaning of such statements: we will not participate, the Vietnamese will triumph by themselves. You know the forces of the DRV and the military might of the US well. There is no doubt that the Americans will not achieve their goal and be forced to leave Vietnam, but they will destroy it.

So not only aid in weapons is important, but also morale factors. I am no longer talking about the Chinese leaders trying to belittle our role in every possible way. It is not secret that they are disseminating statements around the entire world that our aid to the DRV is insignificant and essentially plays no role. So, what are we to [do] - resort to atomic weapons? Is this what the peoples of the world want? Neither you nor we nor other peoples want this. This would not be aid to Vietnam, but real war. We cannot do this.

I. G. Maurer Did the Vietnamese comrades ask for atomic weapons?

L. I. Brezhnev I am speaking about this as about the possibilities, inasmuch as the Chinese comrades assert that our aid is insignificant. Therefore I ask, what are we to do further? In their last appeal the Vietnamese comrades reported with great alarm that communications are being disrupted everywhere.

I. G. Maurer I cannot understand why the Chinese comrades are acting this way.

L. I. Brezhnev We also cannot explain their position. Their actions are incomprehensible. Perhaps only in this question do they act this way. We addressed them with a letter about collaboration in the field of the exploration of space with the best motives. We also sent you such a letter, and thought that you could, for example, take part in manufacturing an apparatus for space research. In a word, we were guided by the best, peaceful, intentions, proceeding from the fact that it necessary to combine the efforts of the physicists of our countries. Everyone replied to us in a fraternal way. The Chinese accused us of all mortal sins. I can familiarize you with their reply. They write that our offer causes harm to the international Communist and worker's movement inasmuch as we also approached Yugoslavia, which in their opinion is the main agent of international imperialism, with the same offer. They think that we want to drag them into the same group as American imperialism.

I can also ask you a question in a fraternal way. Why do they reply to us this way?

I. G. Maurer After all, this is the general area of cooperation.

L. I. Brezhnev Especially as we did not approach the capitalist countries, but wrote only to friends, including the Chinese, and receive accusations from them in reply. But how much do we have to endure from them in personal terms [?] They throw mud on us almost every week. You have evidently read one of their "famous" articles in which they write that the current CPSU leadership is more perfidious and dangerous than the Khrushchev [leadership]. They declare that the Soviet leaders need "to be shot", "hung", and even "boiled in a kettle". They write this way about the leaders of our Party who came from among the working class, and who have devoted all their lives to the cause of the Revolution and socialism and the struggle for the happiness of their people. Whom are they planning to shoot? The working class? But its representatives have not yielded and will never yield to provocations. We are not replying to such slander.

I. G. Maurer This is very good.

L. I. Brezhnev. We are speaking about contentious questions in positive terms, avoiding polemics. It doesn't bring any benefit. This is the opinion of the leadership of our Party and the majority of the fraternal Parties approve such a position which we have. Of course, it would be good to restore fraternal relations with the CPC, and to openly talk with the Chinese comrades. We would like for them to say during a conversation that we are not right. But they have a problem with such a discussion, they will not agree to a conversation. We don't know what they want. And there is the greatest difficulty in this. We are talking to you about this frankly.

I. G. Maurer In Cde. Ceausescu's report at the 9th RCP Congress it says how conversations are needed in the event differences in views appear. It said there that such conversations need to be held in a spirit of calm and mutual respect.

L. I. Brezhnev. We agree with all the political positions contained in the report of Cde. Ceausescu. This is also the unanimous opinion of the CC of our Party. We also hold to such a policy in practice.

Not so long ago the DRV and PRC were visited by representatives of the Italian, British, and other fraternal Parties who had doubts on some questions. As these comrades said in conversations with us, such visits helped them dispel doubts, to see the real state of affairs, and to better understand the difficulties of the DRV. Cde. Le Duan and the other Vietnamese comrades have also told us about these difficulties. We understand their situation and are taking it into consideration. In one of the conversations Cde. Le Duan frankly told us that the Chinese comrades advised the Vietnamese to declare that our aid with volunteers should have a symbolic nature. But what does it mean symbolically to send 500 volunteers to the DRV? So that they are killed? If volunteers are sent then it is necessary to send considerably more, and with their weapons. We are giving the DRV great military and civil aid, although naturally we cannot write about this. Other countries, the VNR [Hungary] and the PNR [Poland] are also helping Vietnam with weapons, medicines, and loans. You have also come to the aid of the Vietnamese people. Right now the DRV has great difficulties with the supply of weapons to South Vietnam inasmuch as the Americans have blocked the 17th Parallel. It is true there is a "Ho Chi Minh Trail", but it takes five months to travel it. Moreover, it is apparently monitored [*kontroliruet*] by the

Americans.

We like it that the Vietnamese comrades have a high fighting spirit and firm confidence in victory. We also support them vigorously in political terms. There is no statement of our Party or state figure in which the aggressive acts of American imperialism in Vietnam and other regions of the world are not condemned. We firmly and consistently support the four conditions of Pham Van Dong.

Some days ago I talked with Kim Kwang-hyop. As is evident from the conversation the Korean comrades have also discussed the question of how to give support to Vietnam without clashing with the Chinese. And we are doing everything possible in this respect. All this is recorded in the documents; possibly it will be needed for history.

I. G. Maurer Of course, from these documents it is no easier for the Vietnamese.

L. I. Brezhnev. But neither you nor we can do much in current conditions. Don't all our actions mean that we are fighting imperialism [?] If this is not fighting then one thing remains: let's begin a war. But I do not think that anyone would support such actions.

I. G. Maurer This needs to be avoided, war is a terrible business. Do the Americans themselves really not intend to leave Vietnam? This would be a wiser step for them.

L. I. Brezhnev. I also think so. A whole series of attempts by Rusk to find a mutually-acceptable way out of the situation which has been created speak of this. But for now progress [*razvitiye*] is only occurring militarily. The Vietnamese comrades do not intend to enter into negotiations and ask [us] to support their position. Both you and we, and all fraternal countries support them. In a word, the alternative is this: either the Americans leave or there is a war. In any case that's how the situation appears. Basically, a year has already passed, but a resolution of the other problems is not moving forward. Everything is concentrated on Vietnam.

I. G. Maurer This is right. It is a blocking of all paths to a greater mutual understanding in the world.

L. I. Brezhnev. In our opinion, the departure of Indonesia from the UN was not aid for Vietnam, for influence can be exerted through this organization. We enjoy the right of veto in the Security Council. Of course, the UN needs to be strengthened, to get the PRC admitted to it, and the Security Council expanded. But the Chinese comrades declare their intention to seek the creation of a new organization of the United Nations [SIC]. Doesn't this create additional difficulties? It is necessary to pursue a policy with consideration for all these peculiarities. Our position in the area of foreign has become firmer. The tone of our statements is calm, but decisive. This position of ours meets with the approval of the other fraternal Parties and countries, and we will pursue this line in the future. Of course, we are always prepared to listen to and take into account the opinion of the other fraternal Parties on this question.

Cde. Ceausescu, we have an instruction from the leadership of our Party for you not only to invite you to the USSR at the head of a Party-government delegation, but to also come to agreement about the most convenient time for you for such a visit. A fraternal friendly reception will be given you in the Soviet Union.

N. Ceausescu As regards the visit of our Party-government delegation to the Soviet Union, we agree and thank you for the invitation. Right now it is difficult for us to name a time, but we will have an opportunity to talk about this question before your departure. In turn, we would like to know what time is more convenient for you to receive our delegation and how quickly you need a reply to be given on this question.

L. I. Brezhnev Of course, it would be better not to delay this visit.

We could suggest you visit the Bratsk GEHS [hydroelectric station], the largest in the country, to visit any republic of the Soviet Union, and during your stay in Moscow we would exchange opinions on questions of mutual interest. We will not name you a time for the visit, decide yourself. Maybe September or October will be convenient for you.

N. Ceausescu Possibly, we will make such a trip at the beginning of September.

L. I. Brezhnev In such an event it would be best before 6 September, inasmuch as Cde. A. Novotny is arriving to visit us on this day, or somewhat later, when he goes on a trip throughout the country.

We would also like to consult with you on one more question. We intend to also talk about this with the representatives of the other member countries of the Warsaw

Pact. During the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw there was a discussion of holding one more Warsaw Pact PKK [Political Consultative Committee] meeting this year. Then there was discussion of expanding the representation of the Warsaw Pact member countries in the Joint Staff. Other questions connected with improvement of the work of the ?political? and military bodies of this organization might be discussed. [We] might also give a political assessment of the situation which has developed in connection with the events in Vietnam. The very fact of such a meeting would demonstrate our friendship and the unity of the socialist countries. Therefore it would be useful to meet at the highest level in Warsaw, Bucharest, or another place.

I. G. Maurer As concerns the Combined Staff we had an agreement with Cde. Grechko that he would prepare a specific proposal about the organization of the work of such a Staff. According to our agreement with him, this proposal should initially be discussed by our military bodies, and then it ought to be taken to the highest level to adopt an appropriate decision.

L. I. Brezhnev Cde. Grechko told me about his conversation with Cde. Ceausescu and you. I ought to tell you that we welcomed your agreement to discuss this question, and your positive attitude toward the question of improving the structure of this body. It is true that he did not mention that you had an agreement to tentatively bring this question for a discussion by military bodies. Considering this agreement, [we] might act as follows: let Cde. Grechko not alone, but with the ministers of defense of the other Warsaw Pact countries, prepare the necessary materials which would be submitted for the consideration of the corresponding governments. This question could be discussed afterwards at the level of CC Secretaries and heads of governments.

I. G. Maurer We will think about this.

N. Ceausescu. Good proposals will come - we will accept [them], the bad ones - let them work [on them] some more. Now I am speaking about this in principle. It seems to us that there is no sense in putting off the next meeting of the Warsaw Pact PKK to the next year. The Americans are also taking this into consideration. During [meetings] [we] can talk again about multilateral nuclear forces.

This question is still not removed, although the implementation of NATO's plans has been slowed.

In any event, a year has passed, but they still have nothing.

Our internal questions could be reflected in a joint communique about the meeting, and talk about the creation of a joint body. Let the Americans think about this. NATO also has its joint staff of the armed forces. Of course, aggravate [it] to the limit. This question is not needed, but it is necessary to contrast something to them in this area, if only for political considerations.

N. Ceausescu We will be able to again talk about this question before your departure. Of course, there is definite benefit in raising it. We will think about this.

L. I. Brezhnev. One need not officially call this meeting a meeting, but meet to hold an exchange of opinions with representatives of fraternal countries.

N. Ceausescu. We very clearly expressed our position about the Vietnamese question in the report at the Congress. Nevertheless, we think that it would not be bad at the Congress to adopt a special appeal to the peoples of the world on this question. The presence at the Congress of representatives of fraternal Parties and peoples and their applause will of course mean support to such an appeal.

L. I. Brezhnev. You spoke very well in your report about the support to the just fight of the Vietnamese people. We also share your views about a special appeal about the Vietnamese question at the Congress.

[Translator's note: End of available text. The customary mention of who recorded the conversation is missing]

Secret

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION*

between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu and I. G. Maurer
on 25 July 1965

*The record of the conversation was not reviewed by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev.

Bucharest

On 25 July a conversation was held in the residence of the Soviet delegation between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu and I. G. Maurer, who paid a visit to the CPSU delegation before its departure for its homeland.

Yu. V. Andropov, V. G. Komyakhov, N. G. Yegorychev, and I. K. Zhelyagin took part in the conversation.

In the course of the conversation L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu shared impressions of the work of the 9th RCP Congress and the meetings and conversations with representatives of some fraternal Parties, and also exchanged opinions concerning other questions.

N. Ceausescu In relations with China a crisis of trust needs to be overcome. Of course, no little time will be needed for this. Too much subjectivity has accumulated in recent years. At one time we openly spoke about this with N. S. Khrushchev. During a meeting with him in Gagry [SIC] in March of 1964 we said that there are differences* [SIC, although there is no text linked to this asterisk] the Chinese have differences with other fraternal Parties on many questions, that one cannot agree with many views of the CPC leadership. But this does not prevent cooperation with them on those questions where there is agreement. One cannot deny that they are working in special conditions which cannot fail to be reflected in their world view. This relates first of all to PRC relations with the US. The Americans are creating military bases close to Chinese territory and they oppose PRC admission to the UN.

We think that in relations with the CPC the situation can be repaired, although time, patience, and restraint will be needed to do this, of course. During a recent meeting with Cde. Kardelj I told him that if critical articles are published all the time, then this will not help the matter. And he agreed with me. But last evening I said the same thing to Deng Xiaoping. Before this he and Cde. Kardelj did not look at one another, but last evening they shook hands for the first time.

L. I. Brezhnev Deng Xiaoping greeted me every day. Earlier we had a quite open conversation with him during the meeting near Moscow. Of course it is true that there are extraneous features [*nasloeniya*] in relations with the CPC. But in a number of questions it is hard to understand the Chinese comrades. These questions go beyond the bounds of our conversation today. Did you not wonder why the CPC leadership did not see what was new in our actions after the October CPSU CC Plenum and did not accept the offers to meet either on the Vietnamese question or the question of our bilateral relations? And in other areas there are quite a few complex questions which are hard to understand.

I agree with you that maximum patience and restraint need to be shown. We are acting that way. We not only consider polemics in the international Communist movement harmful, we also do not conduct it. Our policy will also be the same in the future, firm and consistent. At the same time it is hard to explain some actions of the Chinese comrades. In France they organized the publication of the newspaper "Nouvelle Humanite" in which were printed materials directed against the Communist Party of France. Why did they do this? Imagine if suddenly a "New Pravda" appeared in the morning in Moscow or "New Scinteia" in Bucharest.

N. Ceausescu You are right, such actions are impermissible.

At the same time right now one cannot accuse only the Chinese of everything. In their speech at our Congress the delegation of the Communist Party of Japan wanted to touch on the question of the so-called factional group of Shiga. In the initial text of its speech it sounded approximately like this group, acting against the CPJ, was being supported by some socialist countries. We asked the Japanese comrades to leave this place out of their speech, and they removed it. We did not want such public statements made from the rostrum of our Congress. We also asked Cde. Vermeersch to leave out of her speech the place which contained criticism of the Chinese.

I. G. Maurer. This says that it can be avoided without discussion

L. I. Brezhnev Of course, no little time will be needed to overcome the differences

with the CPC.

N. Ceausescu As concerns our visit to the Soviet Union, when in your opinion would it be more convenient for you?

L. I. Brezhnev You have chosen September. This is a convenient time for us. Cde. Novotny is coming to us on 6 September. He will spend one day in Moscow and then go on a trip throughout the country. You can come a day or two after his departure, spend several days in Moscow, and then make a trip around the country. Cde. Novotny is returning again to Moscow and leaving, but you will return from a trip around the Soviet Union several days after his departure from Moscow. Our meeting will also conclude with conversations, an appropriate reception, and farewell ceremonies. Perhaps the second half of September suits you, for example 22-25 September?

N. Ceausescu We may prefer to arrive earlier, 1-3 September. We would be in Moscow until 6 September, and return from the trip around the country on the 10th. The problem is that we have to go to Bulgaria in the second half of September in accordance with an agreement with Cde. Zhivkov. Moreover we have to hold another session of the Grand National Assembly.

L. I. Brezhnev We are ready to receive you at the beginning of September. If there are questions requiring discussion beforehand, for example, in the area of economic cooperation, then your comrades can come to us earlier. We will give instructions to our specialists to consider these questions with your representatives.

N. Ceausescu Good, we agree with this.

L. I. Brezhnev Practice has shown that it is better to discuss questions this way. Cde. Novotny, for example, acted this way. We also agreed this way with Cde. Zhivkov. During the visit you could visit Leningrad, in particular the factory which will build the turbines for the hydroelectric station at the Iron Gates, and speak to the workers there. They would take suitable commitments to fulfill this honorable assignment. It is also useful, in our opinion, to visit the Bratsk GEhS. You can make a visit to Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan or to any other republic of the Soviet Union. In general, we leave to your discretion the question of the choice of the place to visit.

N. Ceausescu You know better what is more interesting to show.

L. I. Brezhnev We will outline a program for your stay in the USSR and send it to you for coordination together with a description of those places which, in our opinion, would be useful to visit. You can choose what is better for you to visit. Of course, corrections to the program can be made in the course of the visit.

N. Ceausescu We think that the main reliance needs to be made on a discussion of the questions of mutual interest. This time let's look at this less - we will still have time for this.

L. I. Brezhnev. Still, something needs to be seen. You haven't been to Siberia, have you?

N. Ceausescu I have been there several times, in Baykal in particular.

L. I. Brezhnev But you haven't been to the Bratsk GEhS?

N. Ceausescu No, I haven't been there.

I. G. Maurer. It is true that both you and we have a busy calendar.

N. Ceausescu After all, [we] also need to work at home.

L. I. Brezhnev But we suggested you make a trip throughout the country.

N. Ceausescu I suggested [it] to you at the expense of a day off.

L. I. Brezhnev (joking) Here is where the differences come in.

N. Ceausescu (also joking) Such differences do not interfere with our relations. There is no subjectivism in them.

L. I. Brezhnev During our meeting it is necessary to clear our relations of anything superficial. The CPSU CC Presidium is considering our upcoming meeting as a new stage in the development of our friendly relations.

N. Ceausescu We also think that it is necessary to look into everything superficial which has accumulated over the years, point by point.

Yu. V. Andropov Of course, problems do not disappear by themselves if they are not examined.

L. I. Brezhnev The date of your arrival in Moscow can be confirmed in a telephone conversation. I will call you on arrival in Moscow. Let's arrange to maintain telephone contact.

N. Ceausescu Good, we agree.

L. I. Brezhnev There still remains the question of the Warsaw Pact PKK meeting.

N. Ceausescu We have exchanged opinions on this question and we consider such a meeting useful. It remains to clarify what questions we should consider in order to be prepared to discuss them.

L. I. Brezhnev If you agree, [we] can proceed this. The ministers of the armed forces will prepare the military questions, and the foreign policy questions [by] the ministers of foreign affairs. They will report the questions to their leadership and we will meet and discuss what they have prepared. It is important that you are for such a meeting in principle.

N. Ceausescu I don't know how the other comrades will react both through military channels and through ministry of foreign affairs channels, but it would be good to also invite the Albanians to this meeting. If they don't come, that's their business, but [they] ought to be invited.

L. I. Brezhnev How is it best to do this, in your opinion?

N. Ceausescu Say that we plan to discuss such and such questions.

L. I. Brezhnev We acted that way the last time, but they declined. The reaction from their side to such an offer was nasty.

N. Ceausescu Let it be on their conscience. Still, it would be possible by agreement with the other members of the Warsaw Pact, send them one more invitation.

L. I. Brezhnev Good, this can be discussed with the other members of the Pact.

The conversation was recorded by Ye. Karpeschenko