

October 18, 1973

**From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a
Conversation with US Secretary of State H.
Kissinger, 18 October 1973'**

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Summary:

Dobrynin describes Soviet efforts to achieve a ceasefire in the Middle East and the Soviet Union's position on a possible Security Council resolution. He also raises the possibility of Kissinger visiting Moscow.

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Contents:

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION

with US Secretary of State H. KISSINGER

18 October 1973

First. I quickly got in touch with Kissinger and, citing L.I. Brezhnev's instructions, said the following to be passed to President Nixon.

We continue to hold intensive consultations with Arab leaders on the question of the terms of a ceasefire and the establishment of peace in the Middle East. It will take us some time to complete them.

At the same time, of course, we ourselves continue to think about what provisions and wording the Security Council resolution should contain so that, taking into account the situation which has developed in the Middle East, it best meets the task of ending the war and establishing a lasting and just peace in the area.

In our opinion, the Security Council resolution should include the following basic provisions:

1. A call for the sides to immediately cease fire and all military operations, leaving troops in the positions they currently occupy.
2. The requirement to immediately begin, following the ceasefire, the phased withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242, completing it as soon as possible.
3. A decision to immediately begin appropriate consultations simultaneously with the ceasefire aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

As concerns the third provision, on holding consultations, it seems necessary to us that rapid and effective steps are to be undertaken right after the ceasefire to achieve a Middle East settlement.

At the same time, it is necessary to establish a limited number of participants in these consultations, which is subject to clarification. We have no objections to these consultations taking place between the USSR and the US if the countries directly interested (the Arab countries and Israel) agree with this.

Another question of fundamental importance arises.

The fact that previous UN decisions on the Middle East, including Security Council Resolution 242, have not been implemented for many years, forces [us] to take measures to ensure that the same does not happen with the new Security Council resolution.

In other words, who give the guarantees and how would the implementation of this Security Council resolution be guaranteed, both in terms of a ceasefire and, the main thing, with respect to the subsequent withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories they have occupied, as well as other provisions of the agreement about a settlement in the Middle East that would be achieved?

For its part, the Soviet Union agrees that, together with the United States of America, if there was consent of the parties to the conflict, to guarantee the implementation of

the provisions of the Security Council resolution officially and in writing, both regarding the ceasefire and regarding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories within a certain period. (...)

Fourth. In connection with our appeal today to the President about Middle Eastern Affairs, we now have the following thought, which we are submitting for consideration.

Given the current nature of the important message of L.I. Brezhnev and the results of negotiations by A.N. Kosygin in Cairo, that is, with the advent of an important stage in the entire conflict, it might be advisable to consider - for tactical purposes - the question of possibly now inviting Kissinger to Moscow to continue further discussions.

1. He, Kissinger, would certainly be impressed by this personally.
2. The visit of the Secretary of State to Moscow would only emphasize the special role of the Soviet Union in a settlement and in world affairs.
3. If the White House has avoided such a trip for the time being, then here we would still have a positive relationship [*pozitiv*] with the Administration: we invited the Secretary of State for a serious conversation, which would further reinforce the significance of our appeal to the President today.
4. If Kissinger agrees, he would then have to postpone his trip to Peking, scheduled for October 26, for a while, which would also be good.

[...]

SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE US
(A. DOBRYNIN)