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Saddam Being Briefed about the Iran-Iraq War and Discusses Iraqi-Syria Relations and Hafiz Al-Asad

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Summary:

This audio file contains: discussions of the Iran-Iraq War, including Iranian attack preparation and defenses; Iraqi military details and attack plans; prisoners of war; negotiations with Syria and Lybia; Syrian relations with Iran; statements by Hafiz Al-Asad about Iraq.

Original Language:

Arabic

Contents:

Transcript - Arabic

Saddam Hussein	الحمد لله على السلامة يا أبو أحمد، أفضلوا	Welcome back, Abu-Ahmad, Please come in,
Mv1	صباح الخير	Good morning
Saddam Hussein	صباح الخير صباح الخير أفضلوا، دا سألناك على سفرك الكوبا، ايش لون أهل السليمانية؟	Good morning, Good morning, Please come in, how was your trip to Cuba, how are the people of Sulaymaniyyah?
Mv1	الله يحيك، [غير مسموع]	They are fine, thank you very much [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	أي ممتاز، بالبيان ما تشانوا منطين ال يعني فخابرتهم ظلت على بالي الحتشاية، اللي حتشينا بيها، جلتهم منوا من الأفواج الخلفية اللي أشرت؟ جالوا لي لأن [غير مسموع] جلتهم تتذكر تفصيلاً مع الأسماء، فأن ذكرت	Excellent, that was included in the announcement, I have contacted them, that issue was still on my mind – you know – what we discussed before. I asked them which rear Regiments have participated? They told me [Inaudible] I asked them specifically, they will have to provide specific details about that – together with the names – have they mentioned that?
Mv1	ورى ست ايام من العملية،	Yes, six days after the operation / mission
Saddam Hussein	لا لا نفس اليوم اللي قائد الفيلق دز رسالة،	No, no, that was the same day when the Corps Commander have sent a letter.
Mv1	نفس اليوم اللي دز رسالة قائد الفيلق، عملية هذه الأخيرة اللي سوها المتطوعين، قبلها بتشتير ال اول يوم المعركة، ما لطيف الزبياري، مع لطيف ومع الجوهر ومع العمر سورتي، بأول بأول يوم، احتلوا أهدافهم، أحتلوا أهدافهم وأنطوني تقرير جالوا هادول ما رضوا ينفذون أصلاً	The same day that the Corps Commander have sent the letter that was the last operation that was conducted by the Volunteers. That was before the first day of the battle, by a long time. That was Latif al-Zibari, with Latif and Jawhar and 'Umar Surti, that was the first day, and they have occupied their targets, they have occupied their targets and they have also given me a report, they told me, those did not want to execute [TC: the mission] from the onset.
Saddam Hussein	لا هاي حتشينا عنها،	No, we have talked about that
Mv1	أي	Yes
Saddam Hussein	حتشينا عنها،	We have discussed that
Mv1	هي هذه، ما ما كلفوهم غير ها	That was it, they did not assign

		them anything else except that tasking. And the tasking was to occupy, they did occupy and I came and told you that they have occupied
Saddam Hussein	ها شي أنت تتصور بالعملية الأخيرة أيضاً [غير مسموع]	Perhaps you are talking about the last mission [Inaudible]
Mv1	العملية الأخيرة هذا البطل، ايش اسمه؟	The last operation, this hero, what is his name?
Mv2	عمر رسول،	'Umar Rasul
Mv1	عمر رسول،	'Umar Rasul
Mv3	[الصوت بعيد بعض الشيء] عمر [غير مسموع] سبعين واحد بقيادة عضو في حزب البعث، ومستشار فوج، و [غير مسموع] هذا الهدفها،	[TC: Sound is bit far away] 'Umar [Inaudible] seventy one in his command at the Ba'ath Party, and a consultant of a Regiment, [Inaudible] the objective
Mv1	سبعين ما المتطوعين،	You meant seventy volunteers?
Saddam	ليش ما ذكروا، يذكروها	Why they were not mentioned? Or have they mentioned them?
All	[الجميع يتحدثون في آن واحد]	[TC: Everybody is talking at the same time]
Saddam Hussein	أنا اتذكر اثنين أنذكروا،	I recall that they have mentioned two of them
Mv1	أكرم [غير مسموع]	We have honored [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	أي ما رحنت بتفاصيل، بس أني بس أريد لي واحد منهم يسوي لي شغلة زين حتى نجول يابا كم	I did not go into details, but what I want is that one of them can do a good job, this way we can say that oh
Mv1	[غير مسموع] اللواء مالهم ألف وخمسمائة وأنطوهم سرية ما هو يحتلواها الهدف ورفضوا، رفضوا لأن الحقيقة منطقتهم يعني عندهم وجه نظر، كان التفسير العسكري مالهم، أي جال نسير نضعض يعني إذا هجموا على هذا، المنطقتين، جا هذا جال أني أني بس مو فوجي كل أخذ زمرة من، جالي ما يخالف،	[Inaudible] the 1500 Brigade, they gave the a company to occupy that target, and they have refused, they have refused, frankly, they have a point, as their area has issues, in terms of military interpretation, he said that they will be doomed if they attack that target, those two areas, the other one came to him and said, you are not going to use the entire Regiment, only a section of it will be used in the mission, he said, no problem
Saddam Hussein	هو تره كل هي [غير مسموع] الإيرانية،	You see, this is all Iranian [Inaudible]

Mv1	راح بزمرة	He proceeded
Saddam Hussein	لأن يحتاج إلى مجموعة صغيرة والتصميم أكيد وما يحتاج إلى لواء يتحرك، تطحن المدفعية جبل ما يصل إلى هدفه، فاحتاج إلى أنا أكثر شيء مية وخمسين مقاتل وعزيمة،	Because he requires a small group, a proper plan and design, he does not need an entire Brigade to move in, to utilize intensive bombardment to soften the target before he reaches it, the most they require is one hundred and fifty fighters plus determination
Mv1	مسرع جرح [غير مسموع] حتى شهيد [غير مسموع] بالأسلحة الخفيفة،	[Inaudible] martyrs, [Inaudible] light weapons
Saddam Hussein	علي ايش لون موضعكم،	'Ali how were your positions?
Mv4	والله سيدي موضعنا أنشاء الله كل يوم [غير مسموع] [المتحدث بعيد عن الميكروفون]	By God Sir, God's willing, we are improving everyday [Inaudible] [TC: speaker is far away from the microphone]
Saddam Hussein	ايه البطء حالها مفروضة بس المهم استمرارية	I know, we cannot help it but being slow, the important thing is continuity
Mv4	[غير مسموع] ذريت لسيادتك يعني ال [غير مسموع] وصلنا إلى حالة جيدة، بس أتفجأنا [غير مسموع] فأنا أعتقد [غير مسموع]	[Inaudible] I have informed your Excellency [Inaudible] we reached a good level, but we were surprised, [Inaudible] I think
Saddam Hussein	أي هوال أحنا كل ما نتأخر ننطيمهم فرصة ليتفننوا في وسائل الدفاع، وهاي طبعا فرصة خدوها، ومتوقعة هذه يتفننون في وسائل الدفاع وعرقلة عملنا،	Yes, this is it, the more we are delayed, and the more we are giving them the opportunity to be creative in terms of their defenses. It is expected that they seize the opportunity [TC: Iranians] to be creative in their defenses, and this delays our operation,
Mv4	[المتحدث بعيد عن الميكروفون] [غير مسموع]	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	من خلال التصاوير كأنما الأرض الحرام، واسعة بيا وبينهم، إذا كانت التصاوير أد تنطينا صورة عن	From the aerial photograph, it is as if the off limit forbidden land between us [TC: Iraq and Iran] is wide, that is if the aerial photograph give us the picture on
Mv4	سيدي بأخر فيلم [غير مسموع] أكثر من خمس مية يا سيادة الرئيس	Sir, in the last film [Inaudible] more than five hundred Mr. President
Saddam Hussein	أكثر من خمس مية،	Yes more than five hundred

Mv1	أكثر في المية قريبة لل	Yes more than five hundred
Mv4	يعني بالأخير بالخمسة مية شايف	As a final number, I see a five hundred
Mv1	أي بالأخير	Yes a final one
Mv2	يعني رد السد اللي خمس مية نفر،	I would say they need five hundred five hundred by the barrier
Mv4	يعني رد الساحة عم بتسد اللي في الخمسة مية نفر، ثم سيدي، [غير مسموع] معيين أسلحة مضادة للدبابات، رشاشات	Sir, five hundred persons are needed [Inaudible] to be equipped with anti tank weaponry and rifles
Saddam Hussein	وجودهم كل شو محدود ليكون أمام الأرتال،	Their presence will be limited, they are to in front of the Column [TC: Military unit]
Mv4	[المتحدث بعيد عن الميكروفون] [غير مسموع]	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	بس ال الأرض الأرض اللي يشوفه بالصورة الجوية ما يصور أن ممكن لإنسان يعيش بيها، يعني	But the land, the land that they we see in the aerial photos, if one see those photos, you will not believe that a human being could live in it, I mean
Mv2	وما الحماية ما تحمي	The defenses are not sufficient to defend anyone
Saddam Hussein	نعم جيبها اللي علقت عليها الصبح،	Yes bring it [TC: schematic diagram] the one that I have commented on in the morning
Mv4	[غير مسموع] معرقله،	[Inaudible] obstacles
Saddam Hussein	بهيتشي يا با، أزودنا بسيجار،	That is the way, Hey, how about you give me a Cigar [TC: Saddam is addressing his personal attendant]
Attendant	نعم سيدي	Yes Sir
Mv3	جلناهم سيدي حضوركم معناه ال أسلحة الجو من تطلع الشمس، السميتات [غير مسموع] مدفعية، سيدي خسائرهم	We told them your Excellency that your presence means that the Air Force, must [Inaudible] sunrise, the Helicopters [Inaudible] the artillery, Sir their casualties
Saddam Hussein	لا خسائرهم واضحة لأن تقرير الاستخبارات هم حتى الآن زاجين حوالي اثنين وعشرين فرقة، يعني آخر تقرير قرينه الاستخبارات دا عدد الفرق اللي رُجبت في هذا المكان	No their casualties are clear, because the Intelligence report has indicated that up till now, they [TC: Iranians] have dispatched 22 divisions, in other words, the last intelligence report

		that I have read, it included the number of divisions that were dispatched to that place, its grand total were more than twenty one division.
Mv3	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	منها النظامية، أظن اثنين ناقص زائد، وكل الباقيات تسعناش فرقة حرس، فا يعني من يكون هذا التقرير ودا يعتمد على استنطاق الأسرى يعني حوادث الأمور اللي ممكن توثيقها، لما واحد وعشرين ثلاث وعشرين فرقة، أنزجت هنا شنو اللي هي أستاذ أتفضل يمي تشوفوا تشوفوا الجاع، ما أدري هذا، هذا هو القصف، إذا هذا هو القصف، شلون ممكن لبشر يعيش ها هاي الجاع، هذا هاي مثل وجه الأجدري، ايه ها هي، هذه مثل، حتى تكون واضحة، المشاه اليوم تتبع على المشاه اللي موجودة هنا كلها مُدمرة،	I think it included the regular forces, I think two of them, plus or minus, and the remaining nineteen were Guard Forces. So in light of that report and this also depends on interrogating Prisoners of War, these are the facts that could be documented as they are measurable. When you place between twenty one to twenty three divisions in that location [TC: Saddam is pointing to a map] what do you think will be the outcome? Mr., why don't you come near me, so you can see what I am demonstrating, see this bottom, I do not know, this is the bombing here, I wonder, how can a human being live in such a location under such heavy bombardment, this bottom, it looks like the face of al-Ajdari, [TC: Saddam is joking with one of his deputies], this is the place, it is clear, the infantry report also supports that all of these are destroyed,
Mv3	خسائرهم تشبيرة، سيدي التصوير اللي ما السميتيات [غير مسموع] القوة الجوية،	Their [TC: Iranians] losses are huge Sir. The aerial photographs taken by Helicopters [Inaudible] the Air Force
Saddam Hussein	والله القوة الجوية وحتى صورة من الأقمار الصناعية، حصلنا عليها بالفترة الأخيرة، كلها بنفس النتيجة، أي هي ما القوة الجوية،	By God, the Air Force and even we have obtained a Satellite imagery in the recent period, all of these imageries and photos indicate the same results, they are from the Air Force
Mv4	لو ما السميتيات واحد [غير مسموع] أوضح بالفلم، شوية	Perhaps the photographs taken from Helicopters are more clearer than the film?

Saddam Hussein	يعني مثل ما واحد مثل ما جال الرفيق عدنان ها واحد لازم بيده قلم ومنقط الجاع كل ها هو قصف،	I mean just like someone, just like what Comrade 'Adnan has said, you have to hold a pen in your hand, and to dot this bottom, all of this area is where the bombing is taking place
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني ال ايه يعني دا أني أحس أنه تصرف ربعا بيه خلل،	[TC: Saddam is lighting a match] I mean, I feel that our people have not acted properly, there is a fault in their action
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي نعم	Oh yes
Saddam Hussein	أبو علي، يعني لأنه هل بطأ هو صحيح يعني الأرض ملعونة بنت ملعون تا نشوفها حتى بالتلفزيون شوفناها بعيونا جانب منها نموذج، لكن اللي هذا البطء والتضحيات يعني أقل من استحقاقهم، من استحقاقهم، دا ينمردون، يعني التفوق الناري حالة حالة لا تُطاق، بالجماعة اللي دي دي يدفعوهم للاقتراب في مناطقنا أعتقد مجاميع،	Abu-'Ali, what do you think? Because I do not know, this slowness, and I agree that the land is hostile and not hospitable, it is a cursed land, and even we see that on TV, we saw it with our own eyes, we saw an example of it, however, this slowness in our movement, and the sacrifices are way too much in comparison of their achievements. This superior fire power is unbearable, I wonder why we are allowing them to come close to our locations,
Mv4	سيدي لو أكو مخطط كبير، يعني [غير مسموع] مخطط واضح، شنو، تبين [غير مسموع] على سبيل المثال، [غير مسموع] اللي جنابك تتذكرها عبارة عن مستطيل، تقطعها من الشمال إلى الجنوب، أو من الشرق إلى الغرب، أربع [غير مسموع] في نصه، لكن أنشاء الله [غير مسموع] سيدي تتذكر جبل عشر أيام نسوي [غير مسموع] أشبه بالحاله [غير مسموع]	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] Sir, if there is a larger schematic Diagram, I would have demonstrated [Inaudible] for example, [Inaudible] you recall, it was a rectangular, from North to South, or from East to West, Four [Inaudible], however, by God's willing [Inaudible] Sir do you recall ten days ago, [Inaudible] we
Saddam Hussein	لا ما يمشي عليه كل شيء ما يمشي غير الرجل بصعوبة،	No this will not work, you can only pass this on foot, and with greater difficulties
Mv4	شلون سيدي، أكو، [غير مسموع] هذه المنطقة منطقة اشتباك [غير مسموع] [الصوت بعيد] فخدنا	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] this area Sir, is where the engagement is taking

		place, [Inaudible] we have taken the vehicles from them and utilized our military drivers
Saddam Hussein	أيش لون الله سبحانه وتعالى، على بالك اللي يعني مطرة فوج مطرة، أو بتعمد، وأثنين وعشرين سننيمتر المعدل العام للمطر في البصرة، آخر مرة، ما صايرة بالتاريخ	I wonder why God almighty, this is unbelievable, an non stop pouring rain, what was it, the average rain drops in al-Basrah was twenty two centimeters. This is unprecedented, I do not recall anything like that through History,
Mv4	[غير مسموع] سيدي الرئيس طلعتنا سيدي الرئيس ترك الغدا [غير مسموع] والله وري مال سيدتك أنا لسه [غير مسموع] ما شفت الشارع، ما صايرة، أني أني بالبصرة من أربعة وستين، ما مر بيا [غير مسموع] بس ايش راح يصير من نطلع من هذا القرية لازم يمشي ويا أحياناً تيجي على عقدة معينة، ورا نفس الرتل الثاني يستدير حتى يروح يقاتل، فحتى يروح يقاتل، لازم يمشي من [غير مسموع] الفيلق على رجلية سيدي الرئيس، هو بنفسه ما يجدر فكيف، واللي أنجرح هذا من اللي عنده جاكم بعض الأحيان، [غير مسموع] يحطه على ظهره ويمشي بيه، فكل هاي المكان سيدي هما، فكل ها المكايين سيدي هما عدهم أدراج، القصف ما اشتغل علينا في الهواء [غير مسموع] ظلت الانفجارات سيدي إلى ثاني يوم والحرائق ارتفاعها مائتين متر، فا بالليل شفنا البوابة، [غير مسموع]	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] [Inaudible] Mr. President has left his lunch. [Inaudible] By God, this has never happened before in al-Basrah, as soon as your Excellency has left [Inaudible], I could not even see the street, this is unprecedented. I am living at al-Basrah since 1964 and I have never seen rain like that before, [Inaudible] but see what was happening, as we leave a village, some times you are maintaining a particular speed, [Inaudible] the second column would want to turn around in order to resume fighting, so in order for that column to engage in firing, it has to [Inaudible] the Corps on foot, Mr. President. It could not do it, so how [Inaudible] [Unintelligible] fires continued till the following day, two hundred meter high
Saddam Hussein	أي بالشط شتير، تاها رسماً اثنين وعشرين فرقة هما حتى الآن، داخلين الجاع كلها ما تستوعب أكثر من جاعهم اللي بيديهم، ما تستوعب أكثر من فرقنتين زائد، روحة أربعة، معناه ثمانتاش فرقة، طلعت من المعركة،	Yes, there is many at the shore, until now, they are twenty two divisions. They are entering the bottom area, this area will not be able to accommodate more than two divisions, lets say three divisions, let us say four divisions, this means that there

		will be remaining eighteen divisions have left the battle field.
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	أنفضحت قدرتهم بالتطوير من مكان آخر، من أي مكان أحنأ يعني عملياً بهذا المكان صار النا شهر	Their weakness in development have been exposed and scandalized, practically, we are at that place for almost a month,
All	شهر ويومين، لا اليوم ثلاثين يوم	One month and two days, no today is the thirtieth day
Saddam Hussein	يعني اللي عنده حيل جزئي يُفترض يطور، من كانه أخرى لأن أحنأ ها قطاعاتنا منين دا نجيبها دا نجيبها من باقي القطاعات، يعني ما عدنا احتياط وزايد عن المسك بالموضع الدفاعي عدا الحرس الجمهوري، ولا كلها عملياً نسلحها من الأرض، دا نترك مكائتها ضعيفة، بعضهم بدون بديل،	I mean if it [TC: Iran Forces] has partial strength, it is expected to develop contingency plans, for example if we want additional troops, where would we get them? We would get them from other sectors. We do not have an additional reserve forces to maintain defensive posture except within the Republican Guards. Other wise we will be exposed, and they will remain weak and without substitutes
Mv4	[غير مسموع] فا أتلجاني مسؤول الدفاع الجوي سابقاً و[غير مسموع] جال لي سيدي ما عدنا فرصة ناسوب لأننا نخاف من الطائرات [غير مسموع] فأرجوك توجه وياه، [غير مسموع] ليجونا ركفوه، جا دا يجونا يعني هجمات بتلتي من كل القواعد على الهدف، جالوا ليش تحتشي يعني الليدر اللي يجول [غير مسموع] شوف هذا ربع عد ما كو جاي عامل الأجهزة لأنه مسر الطيرات فبتش عينا على قد يجي اربعة، أربعة حتى الليدر اللي راتشوا ها وهيش إلى أخره دا لا واين دا يروح سيدي دا يروح على الأماكن اللي بالتصوير الجوي وبالاستراق اللاسلكي هما نقاط اللي يتركزون بيها، الجانب البعيد من شط العرب الأرصفة القريبة من شط العرب المقابل اللي عندنا واللي هما	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] [Inaudible] the former Air Defense commander has called me [Inaudible] he told me, Sir, we do not have a chance to aim, because we are afraid the aircrafts will locate us. So he told me, Sir I beg of you [Inaudible] we have been attacked by all bases, [unintelligible] through aerial photography and wireless induction, [Inaudible] the areas that they are concentrated at, the other remote area of Shatt al-'Arab shore, the nearby curbs which they use as traffic artery, the city of al-Fao, [Inaudible] they use as artillery units, general quarters, the three projects [unintelligible] Air force, Army Aviation, forty battalion, the day before last

Saddam Hussein	لا هي هاي المعركة هذه م متحسم معركات راح تحسم حرب، يعني ماكو شاره يعني نهنا اللي يربح المعركة هنا هو يعني خاصة بالنسبة النا من نربحها تتحسم الحرب يعني لأنه إيران كلها راح تحترج بها المكان، هذا بس يهدى الإمكان يا أبو علي نقلل تضحياتنا	This will be decisive in terms of the battle fate, this will decide a battle, it will decide the war, I mean from now on, he who wins the battle here, he will win the war. Especially if we win this battle, we will win the war, because all of Iran will burn in that location, but do your level best Abu-'Ali to reduce our casualties our sacrifices,
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	سيدي [غير مسموع]	Sir [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني أني أبدأ ما عندي اعتراض على البطء القضم يعني ما طول أحنا وصلنا لها الحالة طولنا للآن ما متوقع أن نمشي أسرع، هاي راح نظل ب[غير مسموع] الأمتار ننجز ونام عليهم الجاع بس التضحيات أنقللها بوسائلنا اليومية يومية أنطور ونفكر بالجديد وإلا يعني هذا معركة حرب يعني	I mean from my point of view, I have no objection to the slowness; it seems that this will be our pace, and I do not envisage that we will be faster than that or that our pace would increase. We will remain advancing few meters at the time, we will achieve progress and crush them in that bottom area. The only thing we must do is to reduce our sacrifices through our daily efforts, and I emphasize the word daily, daily, daily, we have to improvise new techniques, because this is battle will settle this war, no doubt about that
Mv4	سيدي بال افتهمت بالأيام الأخيرة، خسرنا اليومية أنخفضت بالأرقام إلى الثلث، [غير مسموع]	Sir I understood the last few days that our daily casualties have been reduced by one third [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني أنخفضت أنخفضت ثلث لو أنخفضت إلى ما يعادل ثلث الخسائر،	In other words, it was reduced to a third
Mv4	يعني في جنابك أول أيام [غير مسموع] المعدل اليومي	Sir your Excellency, on the first day the [Inaudible] daily output
Mv4	[غير مسموع] أحنا اتباركنا بالوقت وبالمكان هذا سيدي الرئيس ولأسباب	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone]

Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	[غير مسموع] أحنا جبنا كل [غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	المرحلة الأولى كان ألهم تفوق بالمدفعية يعني أحنا لأنه وصلت على التوالي	At the first stage, they were superior in terms of artillery,
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أحنا سيدي زدنا من مشاكلنا الآن جماعة [غير مسموع] قادة المدفعية جالو سيدي المدفع إذا ضرب [غير مسموع]	Sir we have increased our own problems [Inaudible] Artillery Commanders have told me, 'Sir, if the artillery launcher fire, it overheats [Inaudible] 2 degrees,
Saddam Hussein	هي ما أني أول مرة أعرفها أن يختل بعمره ودقة الرمي،	This is the first time I hear about that, that as the artillery gun ages, its accuracy is reduced
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	بعدين المدافع باليمة تمر منه سيدي الرئيس أتشوقها فد جمره، فأحنا تتذكر جنابك بوجودك ولحد اللحظة، أنا يومياً مع المجهود الحربي، أتأكد أن [غير مسموع] ندخل كتيبة مدفع، فيضربونا من هذا الجانب ويضربونا من الأمام، بس تغطية دي، ترفان متقابلان هما يتهربون وأحنا ما نتهرب [غير مسموع] فشفت جنابك تصميم المقاتلين، يعني قسم من الأسلحة صار ما عدت تشتغل، إلا بالفرع، لأنه بتجيه رشفه يمتد فوقة عند سلاح جاموا هيتشي بس نشوفه ما تشوف مع البندقية يعني، ومنطقة منطقة لعين بس أحنا سيدي	Also, the artillery guns, when you pass by them Mr. President, you will see how hot they become, so, do you recall Sir, and in your presence, and until this moment, everyday I spend some time at the War Efforts Section, in order to ensure [Inaudible] that we bring on board an artillery Battalion, they are hitting us from this side, they are hitting us from that side, they are hitting us from the front, but all this is a cover, it is like two opposing teams, they are running away, and we are not, [Inaudible] so you see, your Excellency, the determination of our men, some of the weaponry are no longer functional, [Inaudible] rifle, and this area is atrocious, but we are managing
Saddam Hussein	ولا واحد له خلق يكون [غير مسموع] يعني يفقد الوعر، يعني الجندي الجندي يتكرر ما يخالف، بس ينرفع يتوحد ترى كل شيء انكسر سويت جول، يعني	No one will have the guts to remain in such an atrocious area, the soldier, the soldier, will have hard time moving with his gear in such muddy area.
Mv3	مو يتعطب عملياً	They will be practically hindered
Saddam Hussein	أتصور بهذه الحالة يعني أني بالله يومين ما نمت مو على الكون والخسائر، من المطر المطر الأخير،	Imagine such state, by God, I have not slept for two days, I was worried sick about the casualties

		that resulted from this rain, for two days I did not sleep, I was worried about the enemy's advancements, I was concerned about those helpless [TC: troops stuck in a muddy rainy environment] the troops were taking their positions in a muddy soil, and a muddy rain is pouring on top of them, this environment requires humans made of steel in order to cope with such environment
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	أمشي بجارتنا، سياسة، متى تجولي ليش وقت ما توقع المطر بالبصرة، إخلاص،	Does anyone knows when the rain will stop at al-Basrah?
Mv3	سيدي بعمر البصرة، هاي أول مرة، أنا بالبصرة من عام أربعة وستين، [غير مسموع] إلى يومنا هذا ما من [غير مسموع]	Sir, this has never happened before, at al-Basrah, this is the first time. I have been living at al-Basrah since 1964, [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني نهاية آذار نجد نجول بيه أكو احتمال نيسان ماكو مطر،	Is it safe to say at the end of March that this rain will be over? Or perhaps April?
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	المفروض سيدي [غير مسموع]	Supposedly Sir [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني قياساً على السنوات ولا مو قانون الله هذا قانون، وأحنا مان	Just comparing to previous years, we know this is God's law, we are in
Mv4	وربيع ينتهي ب	The spring will end in
Saddam Hussein	هو عنده دواب وعنده بشر وبالكرة الأرضية، وكل مكان وعنده يعني مو بس عنده بس الفاو، ألي يمطر عليهم، ويريحهم، بس أريده نجول قياساً على السنوات،	This is a phenomena happens throughout earth, not only al-Fao, I am just trying to get a feel on when this rain will end in comparison with previous years.
Mv3	سيدي بالبصرة ماكو ما صارت، يعني،	Sir, this has never happened before in al-Basrah
Saddam Hussein	لأ حسه عصاير بالله أذار كله تحملوه، نيسان ها ماكو مطر، ما حتى واحد يحسب حسابة، يشوف ايش كتر ينتظر،	March will end soon, we will have to endure it, but what about April, will there be any rain as well? This way we will have to take precautions and redo our calculations, and see how much

		we will have to wait
All	الجميع يتهامون، عن متى يأتي الربيع	[TC: everybody is talking at the same time, about God's wishes to have that much rain]
Saddam Hussein	أستغفر الله، الواحد لازم يكون صبور، هاي يعني أنتشعملها بشهر زمان وننهض، أحنا نظل عن نقضوا مثل الجنفد، سياسة الجنفد والحية نقضها	Ask God for forgiveness, we will have to be patient, we will have to sit tight and wait, perhaps a month, we have to act like a hedgehog [TC: animal] we have to act a hedgehog and a snake
Saddam Hussein	من زيلها ونظل مما نوصل راسها،	I mean attack it at the tail and keep advancing until you reach the head
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	الله كريم إنشاء الله، مطر علينا وعليهم، [غير مسموع]	God will reward us with his beneficence, the rain is on us and them [Inaudible]
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	والله الرفيق [غير مسموع] طالب بكل مكان محتمل بس شنو هو حجم القطاعات، الموجود بالخارطة العراقية، مال الاستخبارات، الثقل الأساسي انسحق أهنأ، إذا عمل تشبير يضعنا أمام اختلال في ميزان القوى على المستوى السوق ما عد ممكن أن يحصل،	By God, Comrade [Inaudible] [TC: Ziban] what is the size of the sectors, what we have at the Iraqi map which was provided by Intelligence Service, we have destroyed the bulk of their forces, I mean I do not think that we will face an incident that will upset the balance of power, nothing that could happen now that could impact our achievements or offset our victories
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	سيدي ترى شو التجهيزات أيضاً من انسحبت ال مستخدمات،	Sir that is true, we have even noticed their retreating provisions
Saddam Hussein	لا بل الفيلق السادس ولا بغيره،	Not with the Sixth Corps or others
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	يعني أيش جد جمعولها؟	I just wondered how much they amassed
Saddam Hussein	تشانوا معولين يطورون من إتجاه شوارطه وما زال هذا الاحتمال قائم، لكن وضع قطاعتنا الآن أفضل، هو ما تعاملت مع الأرض وانتصرت وأتعزيزت هاي اللي جدرنا نعززها بيه فهما دازين اللواء الخمسة وخمسين، واللواء من السبعة وسبعين بعده ما واصل، تشام واحدة،	They were relying to advance from Shuwartah and this possibility still exists. However our sectors now are in better positions. First our troops are battle hardened, they know the land, they have achieved victories, they were supported and reinforced with whatever we are able to support with. So they have dispatched the 55 th Brigade and a

		Brigade from the 77 th , perhaps few
Mv3	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	خمسة وخمسين وصل،	The 55 th [TC: Brigade] has already arrived
Mv3	سبعة وسبعين دخل المواضع، مال [غير مسموع] أسرى وتم استنطاقهم، جالوا أحنا من السبعة وسبعين،	The 77 th have already entered its position [Inaudible] we have interrogated Prisoners of War, who has confirmed that they belong to the 77 th
MV4	سيدي الرئيس هادول اللي عندهم [غير مسموع] بالمواضع بيقون ويجوا دول يتخللون من عدنا	Mr. President, those who [Inaudible] at the sectors and they infiltrate through our territories
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri	نفس الرفاق العسكريين هناك، نفس الرفاق، [غير مسموع]	The same military Comrades, the same Comrades [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	لا جاي جاي بمستوي يخل ترتيباتنا ما عد	I do not think they will be able to upset our arrangements
Mv3	يللموا لواء	They will assemble a brigade
Saddam Hussein	ما عدا هما إذا يريدون يجون خللي يجون خلف قطاعتنا على شط العرب، عليش الفيلق السادس	If they will come, let them come behind our sectors, on Shatt al-'Arab [Arab Shore], perhaps through the Sixth Corps
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	سيدي اسمحلي يعني بالنسبة لإستخبارات [غير مسموع] يعني أني رأي والله [غير مسموع] والله أشك بالاستخبارات يجوز بالفترة الأخيرة سعدوا إليها ضباط، أحنا أحتشليك يعني الي شي صار عنا بالشمال، قبل ما يجي اللواء المظلي الاستخبارات دذت تقرير، دذت تقرير الهم جالتهم جاءت لوائين من السبعة وسبعين، فرقة سبعة وسبعين، لواء الثالث واللواء الثاني، ودخلوا بمواضع اللواء خمس مائة وأربعة، دخلوا [غير مسموع] واللواء المظلي صار وراهم خلفهم، واللواء المظلي من ست أفواج، مو من أربع أفواج يعني لواءين	Sir, permit me to say, with regard to Intelligence Service [Inaudible] my opinion is that [Inaudible] By God, I suspect that our Intelligence have been penetrated by some Officers, let me narrate what happened to us in the North. Before the arrival of the Airborne Brigade, the Intelligence Service has circulated a report informing that there were two Brigades form the 77 th . I mean the 77 th Division, the Second and Third Brigades, and they have advanced to sectors of the 504 th Brigades, they entered these sectors, and the Airborne Brigade remained behind them, the Airborne Brigade consists of six Regiments, not four regiments, I mean two brigades
Saddam Hussein	جيب الناشاي جديد، برد، كل شايانا	Bring us new Tea, this one is cold already, all our tea is cold

Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	جايلهم ها الخير هذا التقرير ذلولهم اياه بالوقت اللي آخر يوم اللي حررنا بيه مجموعة آخر أرقام آخر	They brought this news, they brought this report at the last day, the day we have liberated the last of
Saddam Hussein	رواطن	Rawatin
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	رواطن، آخر رواطن، اللي هي الجناح الأيمن يعني جنوب أمام فتوا تسير الجناح الأيمن لي لي جبل سير سير، ومستمرين المخطط، الخطة ما لتهم ينتقلون وراها ليوم الثاني ينتقلون مباشرة على مواضع اللواء أربع مائة وخمسة، يجولنا من الجبال لنا، خمس مائة وأربعة، من جاهم هذا التقرير ويا استشارة، استشارة أنه اوقفوا الهجوم، لأنه من	Rawatin, we have liberated Rawatin, which is the right wing, in front of Fatu, so that it will be the right wing of SirSir Mountain. They continued with their plan, they moved on the second day, they moved directly to Brigades positions, the 405 th Brigade. They came in from the right side, once they received this report, together with a consultation to stop the attack,
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	تهجمون وها القوة كلها موجودة تخلخل مواضعكم الدفاعية و[غير مسموع] وجومكم ترى، تشان يوقفون الهجوم، ويظلون موقفين الهجوم ستة أيام اليوم أنشيك وياتش أنشيك، اليوم أنشيك البارحة أنا أقترحت عليهم أنني أقترحت عليهم، جلتهم ذوق قوة صغيرة خليها تروح، تهجم وتشتبك وياهم وتشوف فمن خلال الاتصالات من خلال المحطات مالتهم من خلال القوة اللي راح تواجهها المجموعة، الصغيرة، يشوف شا قدعهم وخلي نتهمز المجموعة، [غير مسموع] راحوا شيكوا اه طلعت ها القوات كلها ما موجوده، يعني المجموعة راحت أشتبكت وجات موهيتش الرفيق محمد	because if they attack with all these forces present in the area, their defensive positions will be weakened [Inaudible] they stopped the attack for six days, and their responses were [TC: monotonous] we will check today, we will check yesterday, we will check tomorrow morning, yesterday, I have suggested to them, I myself have suggested to them, I told them why don't you dispatch a small force to attack them [TC: the Iranian Enemy] let them attack and engage, this way we will find out what fortification and the strength our enemy has at that particular location, so through communications, through their stations, we will be to determine their strength, and let this small force get defeated, [Inaudible] they went to check, this small force went out, and they discovered that there were no forces at these locations, so that group has went and engaged with

		[TC: the enemy] and returned back, is that not so Comrade Muhammad
Comrade Muhammad	أي نعم [غير مسموع] في العمق ما لجينا حتى اللواء خمسة وخمسين،	Yes Sir, [Inaudible] in the depth, we did not even found the 55 th Brigade
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	ما كو، [غير مسموع] ولذاك اليوم قرروا يسورون هجوم على المواضع، يعني بعد ستة أيام بعد ما جاء اللواء سبعة سبعين، دخل، فعلا، كان ما موجود هذا اللواء	Nothing [Inaudible] that is why they decided that day to commence attack at positions, I mean after six days after the 77 th Brigade has arrived, it is true that such Brigade was not present
Mv3	المعلومات معلومات المخابرات وأني في ذهني اليوم [غير مسموع] عندي يقين أن مصدر المخابرات اليوم	These are Intelligence information and what comes to my mind today [Inaudible] I am certain that it is the source of Intelligence
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي نعم الإبيها لوسة، أبدأ مو طبيعية	You are right, I just have a feeling that something was not right
Mv3	أو أن هذه المعلومات [غير مسموع] فهذا المصدر ما المخابرات باليقين [غير مسموع] إذا سيدي اجتهادات ضابط في المخابرات أو مجموعة ضباط، [غير مسموع] وعدم كفاءة	Or that such information [Inaudible] perhaps these information were the result of an inefficient intelligence Officer.
Saddam Hussein	لا المخابرات	No the Intelligence
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	ما تجدهتش هي	Do you think they [TC: Intelligence] did not exert sufficient efforts
Saddam Hussein	المخابرات مو شغلتها هذه،	This is not the business of Intelligence
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	مو جهة عسكرية حتى تجتهد،	It is not a military entity so that it has to comply with that
Saddam Hussein	المخابرات شغلتها تنقل المعلومات	The intelligence main duty is transfer information
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	بس	Yes that is it
Saddam Hussein	وتوصلها	And delivers them
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي نعم	That is correct, yes
Saddam Hussein	الخارجية تجي منها معلومات، الإعلام تجي معلومات، المصفاة النهائية اللي تقدم التقرير النهائي هي اللي الاستخبارات، بس هذا التقرير ما مر علي أنا اللي يعني الحديث،	We receive information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we receive information from the Ministry of Media, the final funnel which produces the final report is the Intelligence Service.

		But I did not receive such report, that one you are talking about, Comrade 'Izzat,
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	لا والله ما جاني	By God I did not receive it as well
Saddam Hussein	يعني الحديث هو دا يسرى على اللواء المظلي خمسة وخمسين، وفعلاً جايلين أن اللواء المظلي عدد وحداته أظن لو خمسة لوسته،	The talk was about the 55 th Airborne Brigade, and indeed, they said that the number of units of this Airborne Brigade is either five or six
Mv2	خمسة [غير مسموع]	Five [Inaudible]
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	سته	Six
Mv2	بس هو نظامياً خمسة، [غير مسموع]	But regularly, it is five, [Inaudible]
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	التقرير مر علي أني والرفيق محمد، وذلوك إياه، [غير مسموع]	The report came to me together with Comrade Muhammad and they have passed it over to you [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني أن لوائين من السبعة وسبعين،	So you mean two brigades from the 77 th ?
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	اللواء الثالث واللواء ال ثاني، من السبعة وسبعين، وكلها طبا بالمواع،	The Third Brigade, and the second brigade, from the 77 th , these are tied up
Saddam Hussein	جاكم الاستخبارات،	Did you receive intelligence
Mv6	سيدي المعلومات الموقف اللي شرحلنا إياه بما تفضل النائب اللي [غير مسموع]	Sir, the information about the current position was explained to us as the Deputy has stated [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	يعني اللي استغربت لأن خابرت قائد الفيلق جلت له هاش نيتكم يعني التطوير، جال والله يم الأخوان دا نذاكر على ضوء المعلومات الجديدة، مع الوصول، تعزيزات العدو، فما ردت بالتلفون أطلب تفاصيل من عنده، وهذا أمر طبيعي أن من يجي العدو يقرب كتلة لازم واحد يحصن قاعدته ليمينه قبل ما ينطلق، حتى من يرتد يرتد على قاعدة يمينه، ما يخسر كل الانجازات اللي حققها،	I was baffled, because I have spoken with the Corps Commander and told him, what is your intention with regard to progress and development, he said, " the brothers and us are evaluating the new information, we knew about enemy fortification and support" so I did not want to ask him more details on the phone. And this is normal, in that when the enemy advances a bulk of a force, one must fortify the right side of his base before he embarks, so that if he wants to retreat, he will be able to retreat to

		his right and thus avoid the loss of all achievements
Mv6	سيدي عملية البارحة [غير مسموع] موضوعية بشكل كامل يعني [غير مسموع] اللي صار وخاصة بالاستطلاع بالعمق وبعد أن [غير مسموع] هداول الجنود أثنين أنطوا معلومات [غير مسموع] عن نفس المنطقة، بالإضافة إلى استطلاع اللي صار خمسة وخمسين ايش جد راحوا بالعمق، ما لجوا ما شافوا، بالسبعة وسبعين قسم من عنده بال	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] Sir, with regard to yesterday's operation [Inaudible] especially in depth reconnaissance, [Inaudible] especially after those two soldiers have given their information, in addition to the surveillance that was already carried out, how deep the 55 th was able to advance, they went to the depth and did not see anything, with regard to the 77 th , a group of them
Saddam Hussein	إذا جايز الخمسة وخمسين في مكان آخر	Then perhaps the 55 th is located in another location
MV6	أي سيدي	Yes Sir
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri	في أشتيار سيدي الرئيس، منطقة، أشتيار بال هذا الزائدة مال البنجوين،	Yes in Shilair, Mr. President, the area of [TC: Shilair or Shitair] by Banjawin
Saddam Hussein	يعني إذا جاي بيه في مكانه صار معناها عدهم عمل في مكان آخر، ودا يخادعون، يعني بالإشارة إلى أن يشترك،	If that is the case, meaning they are in a different location, it means that they have an operation at a another location, and that they are deceiving us, I mean they could be deceiving us, making us believe that they are participating
Mv6	أني بس أخاف قد يقومون بعمل إنزال فيما يخص السميتات، يعني يقومون بعملية يعني بها الصورة،	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] I am just concerned that they will carry out an airdrop, through Helicopters, in such a manner
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي أحنا أتחסبنا عززنا المكان هذا	Yes we are anticipating that, that is why we have enhanced our fortifications
Mv6	[غير مسموع] فالحقيقة سيدي التحسب هو موضوع السد، يعني خوفاً يعني يكون [غير مسموع]	[Inaudible] Frankly Sir, we anticipate this to take place by As Sad area, [Inaudible]
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	هما بشلير ها [غير مسموع] كاذبة جالوا أنتقل من شلير على علي السير سير مال شوارطه، ولا هو قديم صار له شهر تقريباً،	They are in Bashlair, [Inaudible] and they said, they moved from Bashlair to SirSir mountains, near Shuwartah, this is old, about a month ago

Saddam Hussein	هي اللي يعني المعلومات إذن المنطقة المنطقة خبراء صاروا بال يعني بترويج الأخبار	The information then originates from experts within the Region, they have promoted these information
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	اللي يريدوها	The information that they want to project
Saddam Hussein	بأكثر من رأس،	Through more than one source
Mv6	سيدي الاستطلاع طبعاً ها يجيها رسمياً يعني عسكر يطلعون استخبارات، [غير مسموع]	Sir, of Course the Reconnaissance will receive that officially, [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	لا قصدي المعلومات الأولية، نعم با [غير مسموع]	No, I meant the basic preliminary information, [Inaudible]
Mv7	سيدي على موضوع الفاو، ما ممكن الاتحاد السوفيتي طائرات ناقلة دبابات	Sir, with regard to Al-Fao issue, is there a way by which the Soviet union replenish us with tank carrier
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	واين نوديهها الدبابات بالطائرات؟	Where would we keep tank carrier Aircraft?
Saddam Hussein	ما يخالف يروح يقنعهم يعني شنو تصورك يعني	No problem let him go and convince them, what is your idea anyway?
Mv7	يعني الدبابات إذا توصلت يوم [غير مسموع]	If the tanks arrive [Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	مو هي الدبابة حتى إذا تصل، من حتى إذا تيجي الطائرة وهما يضربوا الطائرة وتنزل الدبابة، إذا أرضها مو صالحة يجون يجضبوها، كتله حديد يعني ما تقدر ما هي مو مبينة للمنطقة، هي أمطار هذه داند أن المملحة القادرة خلت التحديدات على الأرض مثل ما جالها الرفيق عدنان، وأظن الأفلام حتى نفس الأفلام تنطيك صورة، إذا متابعتها. يعني البارحة شفت الجنود، حتى يعبرون من مكان إلى مكان يزليج وهذا صناديق تنك وكل ساعة جاع وجع	Even if a tank arrive, the aircraft tank carrier, they will hit the aircraft and the tank will be destroyed that way, tank is a piece of iron, the area is atrocious, with all that amount of rain, the land is not suitable, the soil is salty, and the pouring rain; all these issues have made land markings a difficult task, just as Comrade 'Adnan has said, and I believe the same films have demonstrated what is taking place, if you watched the films, you will see how difficult it is for soldiers to cross from one place to another, they are encountering immense difficulties, with all the weight they are carrying,
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	فإذا الجاع ما بتتشف ما ممكن ممكن	If the bottom area did not dry, I

		do not see how we can utilize the armored [TC: equipment]
Mv4	يدفعون ماي	They are pumping water
Saddam Hussein	يدفعون ماي، مو ماخدين موقف دفاعي موجود فرق الري، ما دا تشي هناك بلشت تدرس ايش لون صرف مية، المملحة اللي أتخذت الإجراءات وحتماً الموجودين دا يدرسون الإجراءات	They are pumping water, they are taking defensive position, we have the Irrigation unit, I was there, they are starting to review how they will be channel this water, and the soil salinity issue, and I am sure they are there right now, trying to sort this out. They are studying procedures that will solve this
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	طول نريد نستمر نجعل منها معركة جيشين لازم أكون تضحياتنا نحطها بمستوى الأهداف، وليس أقل من الأهداف، لأن اللي يطول الصبر يعني أحنا مو عدنا جيش جاعد كل شغل ما عنده بس يشتغل هو نفسه الجيش الموجود بالشمال، الموجود بالوسط، الموجود بالجنوب، التشكيل على العكس أني فرحت خاصة بالرتل دا اللي يشرف علي ماهر، خلصنا من المحرقة، ما الرتل الجنوبي، الرتل الجنوبي ستاش لواء أنخرج في هذا الرتل، ستاش لواء جليلة، مو جليلة، فا من أسمع اليوم الهجوم اللواء اثنين وعشرين باتشر هجوم اللواء اثنين وعشرين، عجة هجوم اللواء اثنين وعشرين، يعني أفرح الواقع لأن يعني معناه اللواء محافظ على قدرته القتالية إذن التضحيات أقل، جبل هجوم اللواء تسعين طلع اللواء تسعين، طلع اللواء تسعين هجوم اللواء أربع ميه وخمس ثلاثين طلع اللواء أربع ميه خمسة وثلاثين، هجوم اللواء ميه وثمانية طلع اللواء ميه وثمانين، يعني مرة واحدة، أنكرر بالهجوم، ناجح فاشل، ويخلص، فهذا معناه أن أكو اقتصاد	If we want to make this battle a successful one, we have to make sure that our sacrifices should match the achievements, they should be at the same level of achievements, and not less than achievements. This is because he who has the longer patience, we do not just have an idle Army waiting for something to do, it is the same Army we are fighting with, in the North, the one present in the middle, the one located in the south. So the formation, on the contrary, I have proposed that the Column that is commanded by 'Ali Mahir, to get rid of the problems of the inferno of Southern Column. Sixteen of our Brigades were burned in the Southern Column. The burning of sixteen brigades is not a matter to be taken lightly, this is not a trivial matter, so, when I hear today, that the 22 nd brigade have attacked, tomorrow, the 22 nd brigade will attack, some time ago, the 22 nd brigade has attacked, I really feel happy, because it means that this brigade has maintained its fighting capability throughout with less sacrifices.

		<p>Before we would here about the 90th brigade that it had attacked, we would hear that the 90th brigade has moved, we would hear the 435th Brigade has attacked, the 435th Brigade has got out, we would hear that the 180th brigade has attached, the 180th Brigade has got out. One time we hear a success, followed by failure, there is a trend here of success / failure outcomes. This means that there is rationing of our sectors, this is good planning, this is part of our plan, this battle requires patience and is different from all other battles. So we should continue doing what we are doing, whatever we take, we do not give back, and anything we capture should be behind us, we should economize with our human sacrifices, this is the most important, and even the firing Abu-'Ali, I want you to review and see how we could economize,</p>
Mv4	سيدي أكو دراسة جدوى،	Sir, there is a feasibility study
Saddam Hussein	<p>خاصة نيران القوة الجوية، لأن القوة الجوية صحيح تقتل منهم، لكن إذا ماكو استثمار ألهأ يعني ليش تلت ميه طلعه، تسوي خمسين طلعة، خمسين طلعة، إسناد قريب مع تجريد في مناطق معينة، و نستثمر النيران ما شي، أنطول،</p>	<p>Especially the Air Force Firing, because it is true that the Air Force kill many of them, but if there is no investment vision of their use, I mean why we are doing 300 sorties, why don't we do 50 sortie, do 50 sorties with close support, concentrated on specific areas, we should invest our firing in the proper locations,</p>
Mv4	<p>[غير مسموع] دراسة جدوى وترشيد، وراح يظل سيادتك ربما يعني بكرة</p>	<p>[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone] [Inaudible] feasibility study, and rationing</p>
Saddam Hussein	<p>والله أن ما شي يعني ماشي بالأعتدة، بجهد الإمكان نوفر يعني بدا يشيك تقريبا كل ثمانية وأربعين ساعة، كل اثنين وسبعين ساعة، الاعتدة،</p>	<p>By God, I think it is better to economize in munitions, I have to check munitions every forty eight hours, every seventy two hours, this way we can assess what</p>

		munitions you have, right now, we have most of the munitions that you want, we even have more than what you require, in comparison to the times when we started the battle.
Mv4	نيرانا سيدي في الفترة الأخيرة، بدأنا [غير مسموع] مدفع مدفع، إلى أن نيجي بعد [غير مسموع] تدري سيادتكم القنبلة تجع عشر أمتار عن أهدافها	[TC: speaker is far away from the microphone], our firing Sir, in the last period, [Inaudible] one artillery gun at the time, [Inaudible] the bomb by ten meters from its target
Saddam Hussein	أبدأ يعني عشر أمتار ما تأثر ايش يجع،	No, ten meters will not affect it
Mv4	[غير مسموع] في عوامل كثير سيدي الرئيس نموذج	[Inaudible] there are many factors Mr. President
Saddam Hussein	لازم الإ خمس أمتار ياللا تقتل،	At least five meters, this way you will get a kill
Mv4	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	لازم تنتظم أمورنا، أشربون شايفكم لو يروح بيرد، أيه والله يعني أي تشنت أتمنى أن أنهيارهم يخلي التشكيلات تستمر بالزخم، عليهم،	We have to arrange our affairs, drink you tea before it gets cold, by God, how I wished, that their [TC: Iranians] collapse would motivate our formations to continue their momentum against them
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	تشانوا منهارين يمكن هو سيادة الرئيس ها القطاعات اللي جابوها وحتى اللي أستثمروها بعدين صارت ألوية هجوم	They were being destroyed, Perhaps Mr. President, these were the sectors that they brought, and have utilized later on, they used them as attacking brigades,
Saddam Hussein	بس هو [غير مسموع]	But [Inaudible]
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	لأن الحقيقة ما قاتلوا، عادة الهجوم مقابل مالنا ما قاتلوا تشتير يعني مثل ما ذكرت هادول بالفاو، واحد بالميه من القتلى	Because in reality, they have not really fought, in comparison to our fighting, they have not fought a lot, just as al-Fao example that I have cited, one percent of them have fought
Saddam Hussein	والله كلكم أبو أحمد، كلهم بالمقاييس القتال من يصيرون مقاتلين، يقتالوهم رجل برجل، يعني بندقية بندقية ما يجفون، يعني اللي بالفاو واللي بأي مكان كل التجارب تمام، بس النجزة الأولى، يعني وراها، كقوة غير	By God, all of you Abu-Ahmad, if we consider fighting criteria, man to man, a rifle to a rifle, they will not stand a chance, the ones in al-Fao and everywhere, and all experiences points to that. Just the first nudge, they fail as regular

		forces, if they confront this mighty defensive line, do not expect that they will succeed, even if they penetrated one company, they will collapse
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي ما يعرفوا أيش يسون	Yes, they will not know what to do
Saddam Hussein	والهجوم من يصير عليهم من يكون رصين ومع استمرارية من يصير تكال بالبنادق ينهزمون،	If the attack on them is powerful and continuous, and if they fighting is turned into a Rifle fight, they will be defeated.
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	من يفلوهم فله،	They will run away
Saddam Hussein	أبدأ ويتبلشون، وراها،	They have no chance, they will be defeated
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي والله اتفلسوا تفليشة هناك غير التفليشة،	Oh yes, they would really get a beating
Saddam Hussein	[غير مسموع] أحنا جات مرحلة أطلقنا صراح بعضهم من شدا نقضبهم بالأسر في بعض المعارك اللي حضرتها واجولهم ودوهم للتركمان، يدوهم، يعني يدزونهم رأساً من المعركة، يجولوا روجو،	[Inaudible] at one stage, we released some of them, we have captured some of them during recent battles that you have attended, I tell them send them over to the Turkmen, so they send them over, I mean straight from the battle field and tell them to
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	الأسرى أغلبهم تركمان، فالتقدير مال الجماعة بيدوا اللي هي هاي التشكيلات كلها من هاي المناطق، يعني تركمان وأكراد	The majority of prisoners of wars were Turkmen, so the assumption of the group, it seems that these formations of these areas were Turkmen and Kurds
Saddam Hussein	طيب ما عدهم ما عدهم قضية ويا العراق،	Alright, they do not have a quarrel with Iraq
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	أي نعم	Yes Sir
Mv6	بس سيدي ترى موقفنا [غير مسموع] موقف يعني بصورة عامة، قطاعتنا	But Sir, our position [Inaudible] in general, our sectors
Mv3	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible] [TC: speaker is far away from the microphone]
Saddam Hussein	أي واين العتاد يروح هو العتاد فعلا الآف الأطنان فالنتيجة، يطاير يرد الجاع بالجاع، يعني، الله كريم، نبدي شغلتنا، سوي عرض رفيق طارق،	Oh yes, munitions are thousands of tons, the result is weight will be a factor, God help us, let us start the presentation of Comrade Tariq. All of you are present

Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	سيدي مثل ما موجود بالمذكرة اللي عممها الرفيق حامد،	Sir just as stated in the memorandum that was produced and circulated by Comrade Hamid
Saddam Hussein	أحنا مو كنا لابسين عسكري، الإشارة مالتكم مال القيادة جاهزة، وأحنا جاهزين، ها ما نسويها اليوم،	Weren't we wearing Military Uniform, the Command Signal is ready, and we are ready, let us do it today, huh
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	شو ورا المعارك أتصير مناسبة للفرحة، هيتش،	It is good to do it especially after the battle, to celebrate the happiness, isn't that so
Saddam Hussein	بس أظن بريات،	Perhaps we should wear Berets
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	والله سيدي وري الانتصار انشاء الله، خليهم يدبرولنا ببريات،	By God Sir, after victory, it will be better, and we would look good in Berets
Saddam Hussein	والله هي إشارة خم الل الجمال	By God, with this signal, it is not the question of beauty
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	لا هي سيدي ترى	No, Sir, you see
Saddam Hussein	يعني إشارة لغير القيادة للكون	I mean it is a universal signal
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	بالنسبة إلنا الإشارة الشرف الأخير لكن بالنسبة للناس ترى بعضهم يجوز ينتقد الوضعية، [غير مسموع] احتمال	In reference to us, we will have the honor, but for the people, some may criticize this action [Inaudible]
Recording stopped at time stamp 48: 19 and resumed at 51:12	التسجيل توقف لمدة ثلاث دقائق تقريباً	[TC: Recording has stopped for approximately three minutes]
Comrade Tariq	أما إذا يُنشر القرار بالجريدة الرسمية	However, if the news is published at the official newspaper
Saddam Hussein	هو القرار أنشر،	The decree was published
All speaking	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Saddam Hussein	فإمكاننا أي واحد	So anyone can
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	بالجراند سيدي ما طلع،	It was not published Sir at the newspaper
Saddam Hussein	إذا تريدون احتفال وإلى أخره عليها لوقت آخر، أو تريدون نلبسها اعتيادية	If you want to celebrate and so on, perhaps we can postpone that to another time? Or do you want to wear it normally
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	يعني بالجراند ما طلعت سيدي، يعني الجمهور الجريدة الرسمية، قروها الموظفين	It was released in the newspaper, Sir, the public is not aware of it Sir, they have not read it at the official newspaper,
Saddam Hussein	ما طلعي بالجريدة، ليش ليش	Was it not published at the

		newspaper? Why? Why?
Mv7	[غير مسموع]	[Inaudible]
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	أي الدوائر شيء والشعب شيء آخر	Oh, yes, Directorates are one thing, and the Public is another
Saddam Hussein	[غير مسموع] الصحف اعتيادي	[Inaudible] the normal newspaper
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	هو كقانون ما كو مانع من نشرها بس إذا يصير احتفال بعد المعركة أفضل،	As a law, there is objection in publishing it, but if we celebrate after the battle, it would be better
Mv4	[غير مسموع] لازم بيريه [الجميع يضحكون]	[Inaudible] is it necessary to wear a beret? [Everybody is laughing]
Saddam Hussein	على الكتف بال من واحد يلبس الكاكي، يشيلها على الكتف، ومن يلبس مدني يشيلها على ال ايه الهدوم المدنية، كشارة قيادة،	On the shoulder, when someone wear Khaki, he keeps it on his shoulder, and when he wear civilian, he keeps it on his civilian clothes, as a command signal
Mv6	أحنا مدنيين ها ها	We are civilians ha ha ha
Saddam Hussein	كنا أحنا مدنيين وعسكريين بنفس الوقت القيادة مالها يعني من كل الصنوف ولكل صنوف ولكل [صدام يضحك] الله يرحمة نيه أبو سعد حردان، طلعا تشان يوجف سيارته من الباب الثاني من هين ايشو لجينا فرد علم ماكو شولو بالوجود شي، جولناله أبو سعد شنو هذا جال هذا العلم مال النائب القائد العام شيكو علم بالجيش ورجعة كلهن حاطهن، مسويها مرجعة أيها العرض، يعني تريد للون ما [يضحك] كرير الشيخ اللي جال جال حردان لو يضمن نسويها احتفال، مثل ما هو يخطط يموت ها الساه اللحظة، بس يريد للأحتفال ماله، أميراطوري لازم واحد ناحية يعني مال الموت لازم أميراطور، [يضحك] شجاع الله يرحمة، ضيع نفسه، ياالله يا أبو زياد	We were civilians and military at the same time, the Command has all types of varieties [Saddam is laughing] May God rest his soul, Abu-Sa'ad Hardan, one time, we went out, he would park his car at the second door, he had with him a flag that we have not seen before, and we asked him, what is that flag, he said, 'this is the flag of Deputy General Commander' it was all patches, of different colors, [Saddam laughing], Sheikh Karir said, if Hardan is certain that we will celebrate him, just as he plans, he will die right now. He just wants to celebrate like an Emperor. He was really courageous, May God Rest His Soul. He wasted himself. Alright, let us start Abu Ziad [TC: aka Comrade Tariq 'Aziz
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	سيدي مثل ما يعرفون الرفاق أثناء زيارتكم إلى موسكو، أنطرح ويا القيادة السوفياتية، موضوع علاقات مع سوريا، وكان واضح أن الجانب السوفيتي يرغب في تحسين علاقات بين العراق وسوريا، فجالت لهم أحنا	Sir, just as the Comrades know, during your visit to Moscow, the subject of relationship with Syria was brought up in meeting with the Soviets, and it was evident that the Soviet side aspires to improve relations between Iraq

	<p>يشترط أن يكون لقاء سري ولكن لم يمثل لم يحدد مندوبه، فأنى جلست للسفير السوفيتي جلست له هذا نص جواب، مو جواب، من الجانب السوري، لأنه أحنا مندوب مُحدد من قِبَل القيادة العراقية، ويُفترض أن اللي يوافق من الطرف الآخر يعني يحدد مندوبه أيضاً ومو شغله يعني صعبة جداً على حافظ الأسد أن يجول والله فلان من عدنا هو يمثلنا يعني مو</p>	<p>and Syria. So I told them we have done what is necessary to improve such relation, we have exerted efforts and there was a meeting between Comrade Tariq and 'Abd-al-Halim Khadam at your place and you know the outcome of such meeting. Also there was another meeting in the presence of Arab Officials and the outcomes of those meetings are comparable to those outcomes of the meetings that took place in Moscow. Also after the meeting that took place between your Excellency, Gorbachev and Gromiko, I have convened a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to follow-up political details pertaining to the meeting between the Leaderships. So we told them, that if you are too concerned about this subject matter, then you can take the lead and deal with it directly, I mean by saying that we have to solve our disputes with Syria, what does that mean, "settle our differences with Syria"? Mr. President has reiterated over there [TC: the Moscow meeting] in the meeting that we have assigned Comrade Tariq 'Aziz to represent us in the meetings that pertains to Syria, at the Arab level. However, the Syrians pursued a path to first convene a military meeting, then a security meeting, these details are known and were presented to Command. Last month or before that, perhaps at the end of January, the Soviet Ambassador came to me and informed that the Syrian side has agreed on convening a meeting in Moscow</p>
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		<p>between a representative of the Iraqi Leadership and a representative for the Syrian Leadership. He agreed on principle to convene such a meeting, however, he stipulated that the meeting to be in secret, however, he did not identify the Syrian Representative, so I told the Soviet Ambassador, I told him, " this is a half Answer, it is it not a full answer", that is from the Syrian Side. Because we have identified our representative from the Iraqi Leadership and the assumption is that when the other party agrees to convene the meeting, they must also agree to identify their representative, it is not a big deal or a difficult task for Hafiz al-Assad [TC: the late president of Syria] to identify his representative. It is not a difficult matter that he must execute at two stages. One stage, to give his provisional approval and the second stage to name his representative. When I went Moscow, in my way to New York, he brought up that subject with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, so I told him, I told your Ambassador in Baghdad that the Syrians gave "half answer" and I also want to tell you something else, Comrade Shevardnadze, that when we knew of this incomplete Syrian answer, we concluded that the Iranian attack is near and we linked it [TC: such answer] with Iranian attack time frame. And now, as you can see, the attack has taken place, and the Syrian regime will postpone the other</p>
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		<p>half of his answer until they see the results of this attack. We have recorded and documented that, in the log book. He said, "do not rush to judgment" there are some complexities and sensitivities to the matter. So during my presence in New York Sir, the Ambassador has informed undersecretary about the appointment from the 13th -14th, they informed when I was there, because I receive a daily brief about the situation. When I returned, I called you on the phone to update your Excellency about the matter. Because the Soviets recommended the meeting on the 13th - 14th and your Excellency have approved and to inform them of our approval, I inquired from Command representative whether there is anything new, he said no, nothing new, inform them that you are representing Command and this is the appointment, so we informed him, I summoned the Soviet Ambassador, we had two issues to discuss, this one and also Comrade Taha wanted to go to the Soviet Union to discuss other matters pertaining to economic and military cooperation and the Ambassador himself came to see me at the Soviet Expert's office in the South. So I informed him of our approval about the appointment and we also discussed the other matters. I inquired with him whether the Syrians have responded, he said, "I do not have any information". At night, the phoned my office and said that they have received a telegram from Moscow that the</p>
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		<p>Syrians have named their representative who is Faruq al-Shar', the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On this basis, we prepared to travel over there and prepare the necessary arrangements. As far as we concerned, we have compiled a file, I have already arranged the file when we had the "Arab Interests Committee", and we also arranged the Libyan file, Comrade Taha and I have arranged the file together with the Syrian file. Comrade Fadil al-Shahir has organized the files. So we were prepared and this document was prepared as a talking paper to discuss what we want from the Syrian side. In the previous meetings that took place in Moscow and in New York, they revolved primarily on the War issue. We wanted a new Syrian position with regard to the war and in return we can normalize relationship between the two countries on the basis that these are two sovereign Arab neighborly states and we absolutely categorically rejected the exploration of any issue pertaining to the party, we also reject any discussion of the issue of unity and the return to what they call the point of splitting in 1979. The same talk was repeated in the meeting that took place between Comrade 'Ali Hassan Majid and their representative. So this is the situation that we have adopted and the position of the other party.</p>
Saddam Hussein	<p>إذا المناقشة [غير مسموع] الرفيق نعيم</p>	<p>If the discussion [Inaudible] Comrade Na'im</p>

Comrade Na'im	<p>سيدي أحنأ طبعأ موافقتنا معروفة أيضاً بس ما نخفي أن هذا النظام والأعيه كنا ندرکہا لكن من الضروري أن نحذر طالما السوفيت يعني عندهم هذه الرغبة، لكن النظام السوري باقي على ذات الموقف ومستمر في معاداته وفي مؤزرتہ لي إيران ضدنا مسانדתہ لإيران ضدنا، سيدي بالفقرة الثالثة أجدھا غير عملية سيادة الرئيس، الموافقة على قرارات الجامعة العربية بشأن الحرب، قرارات الجامعة العربية بجماعتها اللي راح يُعقد مستقبلاً وغير المقبول أن نطلب من أي نظام أو أي شخص موافقة على قرارات لم تصدر بعد، فأعتقد الآن الشيء الملح هو اللي أنطلبه من النظام السوري هو إدانتہ للهجوم الإيراني الأخير، وغزوا أراضينا واحتلال أراضينا، مو مسألة أن تعجيز أو مسألة إجراج، بس هو أيضاً يعلن ويقول لكل العرب أن أنا ضد احتلال أرض عراقية، وخاصة بالهجوم الأخيرة. فنركز على إدانتہ للاحتلال الأراضي العربية العراقية. بدل هذه الفقرة، أيضاً سيادة الرئيس بالصفحة ثمانية الفقرة ثلاثة، العلاقات الاقتصادية والتجارية، أتوقع أن يطرحوا لل ما نريد نطبع علاقتنا الاقتصادية والتجارية يطرحوا موضوع دخل النفط واستئناف دخل النفط، فهذه أيضاً الرفيق طارق رايح لازم يكون الصورة من موقفنا،</p>	<p>Sir, of course, our approval is known, but we cannot hide our feeling about this conniving regime, we knew about it all along. However, we have to attend in order to accommodate the Soviet's desire. The Syrians regime is still on its same position; it continues its animosity and its support of Iran against us. I mean its support of Iran against us. On the third paragraph, I find it not to be practical Mr. President. The approval of Arab League decrees with regard to the war, the Arab League decisions in relation to its future meetings, it is not acceptable to request from any Regime or from any person, to approve decisions / decrees that has not been issued yet. So the urgent matter right now and which we ask the Syrian Regime to comply with is its denunciation of the last Iranian attack and the aggression and occupation of our land. It is not the matter that we are trying to handicap them or embarrass them, but we ask the Syrian regime also to announce and to say to all the Arabs that they are against the occupation of Iraqi soil and especially in the last attack. So we have to concentrate on the Syrian denouncing the occupation of Arab Iraqi territories, I propose that this will replace this [TC: third] paragraph. Also, Mr. President, on page eight, paragraph three, the Economic and Commercial Relation. I expect they will propose when we want to normalize our Economic and Commercial relation with them, they will propose the issue of oil</p>
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		revenues and the resumption of pumping oil. So this is a point that Comrade Tariq must take into consideration when he goes there. He has to be in the picture.
Saddam Hussein	إذا اطرحوا معاودة ضخ النفط، أحنا ال معدنا مانع، الرفيق طه مو التفاصيل بس أظن الاتجاه العام	If they propose the resumption of pumping oil, we do not have any objection. Comrade Taha, not in details, but in the general direction
Taha Yasin Ramadan	سيدي الرئيس يعني أحنا نبحت ال [غير مسموع] كأنه هناك استعداد بس كل المؤشرات بما فيه الترشيح وزير الخارجية لو هو عضو قيادة يعني واضح جداً ماكو شي جدي في شو قصد، فاروق الشرع [صوت في الخلفية] ال صيغة ال الاتفاق اللي صار ويا ليبيا واللي عرضناه بشكليه العلني والسري شفت بيه وضوح يعني دقة أكثر من هذا المشروع إذا تسمح، سيادة الرئيس، ال مال الفقرة الثالثة اللي القسم الأول اللي جال الرفيق نعيم أي وياه يعني واضح جداً ايش يجولك شنو القرار الجامعة واللي أدركها ضربة وعشرين ثلاثة، إذا هو صار الاتفاق بين الاثنين على انتهاء تحالفه مع إيران هذه يصير تحصيل حاصل، يعني أننا نطلب شيء غير [غير مسموع] الجانب الآخر مع العلاقات الاقتصادية والتجارية بصراحة أي بعكس ما أنهم يطرحون، إعادة العلاقات الاقتصادية والتجارية بما فيها فتح الأنبوب، والحدود، يعني لازم أي في رأي تُذكر بالاسم مو أنهم يطرحوها ويريدون فتح الأنبوب، هو الأنبوب الآن إذا ما ينفتح بعد ست شهور ما لازم ينفتح، يعني ماكو مبرر ولا يمكن حتى اتفاق ويا سوريا واحد شوية يدرس يعني هل مفيد أن نحط أيدينا بإيد حافظ الأسد،	Mr. President, we explore the [Inaudible] as if there is preparation, but all the indicators – which includes the nomination – of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, if he is a Command member, It is clearly evident that there is nothing serious – what does he mean – Faruk al Shar’ [TC: voice in the background] the text of the agreement that was implemented with Libya and which was presented in both of its overt and secretive format have shown more accuracy and clarity than this project, that is if you permit me to say Mr. President. I agree with the comments made by Comrade Na’im with regard to Paragraph three, first section, I mean it is absolutely clear that it is not acceptable to validate Arab League decrees which have not been issued, the 24/3 ones. If there is agreement between the two parties on ending its allegiance with Iran, then this will facts on the ground, we are not asking something [Inaudible] [TC: that is unattainable]. The other aspect with regard to the economic and Commercial relations, frankly, I oppose what they propose, the resumption of economic and commercial relation including; the opening of

		<p>pipes, borders, these items must be clearly stated by name. If the pipe is not open now, it should not be opened after six month, there is no excuse, and perhaps we should be cautious in making agreement with Syria. We have evaluate whether it is beneficial to shake hand with Hafiz al-Asad, is he going to live a long life or not? So as long as the dialogue is still going on right now, and we are still in the middle of war, or before its end, I mean the pipe issue should be incorporated within the announced agreement, the pipe as well as the economic and commercial relation [Inaudible] before it becomes [Inaudible] technicians would discuss the exportation of dry apricots and wool, I mean this is not a conundrum; because historically for all intents and purpose, what is really the size of economic cooperation between us and Syria? I mean really, if it wasn't for traffic and oil, it has no weight; it has not effect on both economies. The border which encompasses ports, and oil, constitute 90% of the economic and commercial cooperation. So, in my view, we have to mention that, including and primarily that point that I mentioned. The other additional point, he stated the idea – and Abu-Ziyad always observe that – the correlation of point, I mean any deviation from any of the parties with regard to any paragraph, would extricate the other party from compliance [TC: with the agreement] – we have noticed that in our agreement with Libya – and it was included in the</p>
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		<p>wording of the text. If we rewrite the agreement, we can assess the necessity to add a clause that would allow that part of this agreement will be announced and other part will be secret. Again, we can view the Libyan agreement as an example as we have incorporated such clauses. There was a detailed program, a joint committee for follow-up, and a security committee etc, and also there has to be another text geared for the media and which will clearly make reference to the Syrian position and that it would be announced immediately once the agreement is put to effect. The announcement and a leaflet will be the signal to commence the resumption of relation and the resumption of normal relations. This will benefit us, because once the announcement of the Syrian Position about several issues is broadcasted, this will settle the matter. I believe the announcement is concise and extensive, as if [unintelligible] but I recommend that we adopt the same contexts and lesson learned from the Libyan agreement. Thank you Sir</p>
Saddam Hussein	نعم	Yes
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	<p>بالنسبة لي الفرق بين الطبيعة المحادثات التي راح تجري بعد بكرة مع السوريين بأن طبيعة المحادثات التي جرت مع الليبيين والمحادثات مع الليبيين أصلاً كانت علنية، ورسمية لأن لجنة المصالحة العربية قرار من قمة الدار البيضاء ثلاث رؤساء دول ومعاونيهم وأحنا رايجين وجاعدين على طاولة وتلفزيون فإذا التهيئة ها الشكلية ومن حيث</p>	<p>With regard to the difference in the nature of discussions with the Syrians and which will take place after tomorrow, and the discussions held with the Libyans, is that the discussions with the Libyans were overt and official. This is because the Arab Reconciliation Committee, a decree from the Casablanca Summit, three Heads of States and their deputies, and we were</p>

		<p>there sitting on one table, there were TV broadcasting, so the discussions were overt. So the preparation that is taking place for this meeting in terms of formalities and in terms of content is different from the preparations which are taking place with the Syrian side. The observation of Comrade Taha about the type of representative chosen by the Syrian side, it is true that he is a Command Member, I did not expect, and [TC: 'Izzat al-Duri is interjecting] I mean there is possibility that there will be an atmosphere of an agreement or not, I will state my opinion at a later time. That is If I wanted to or if Mr. president wished to do so, that we are to evaluate what will happen.</p> <p>However, I am not going to bring you a signed document, all what it is, is that there will be a first round of exchanging views, and if necessary, I will present a document, if he has prepared a document, it is possible that he will present it to me, God only knows. Huh, this is only a first round, an explorative round, in order to assess positions and it is not going to be an agreement.</p> <p>When we went to Libya, the talk was on the basis that Mr. President will attend. And we went, your Excellency and I have gone on the basis that we were authorized by Mr. President and the Revolutionary Command Council to conduct an agreement. And indeed, if we were not going to sign at that time, we would have been surrounded by Three Presidents and oblige us to sign.</p>
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		<p>But now, I am not going to sign and he is not going to sign anything. It is only discussions that will be attended by the Soviet side during the opening sessions, they will present a speech, then they will leave and we will remain face to face with him [TC: the Syrians side] just him and I. This is from the technical aspect. For that purpose, we did not go into details, or two document, that one will be overt and public and the other will be secretive, but we have established principles that once these principles are agreed upon, then we can see how to transform these principles into an agreement program.</p>
Saddam Hussein	الرفيق عبد الغني	Comrade 'Abd-al-Ghani
Comrade 'Abd-al-Ghani	<p>سيدي أنا الآن أنطلق في حديثي ما هو معروف يعني كليتنا حول الخبث والمراوغة اللي [غير مسموع] النظام السوري، الهم طرق، بدأ أنه أي اتفاق يتم وياه أنا أعتقد إعلانه بوضوح عن طريق أجهزة الإعلام الرسمية السورية تكون بند أول بي الحال هذا، النقطة الأخرى مسألة الترابط بين كل النقاط في حالة الاتفاق، وخاصة مسألة الحرب. يعني ايش وقعنا ويا سوريا بس مسألة الحرب أساسية، الإعلان عن هذا الموقف والموقف السوري واضح، ولو من الحرب سيدي لتشان من الأساس ال فكرة الاتفاق حتى أن دول عربية بدولة عربية أي ما أعتقد واردة في ذهني في الاتجاه هذا. النقطة الأخرى مسألة التوقيع، يعني الرفيق طارق أشار إلى أنه مو مسألة توقيع، النظام السوري نتيجة الخبث والمراوغة إذا ما يلزم بتوقيع أمام طرف ثالث في حالة الاتفاق وخاصة</p>	<p>Sir, I start in my speech here from the basis of the conniving sneaky dealings of the Syrian Regime [Inaudible]. I would say that any agreement we hold with the Syrians must be clearly announced through official Syrian and non Syrian media broadcast services. This should be the first clause in such agreement. The other point pertains the linking and correlation of all points in the event that an agreement has been reached. Especially the issue of War, I mean what would make us sit down with Syria, it is only the war issue that obliges us to sit down with them. This is the basis point, and the announcement of this position and the Syrian position is clear. If it wasn't for the War Sir, I think just the idea of an agreement between one Arab country with another Arab country has never crossed my mind. The other point, is the issue</p>

		<p>of signature, Comrade Tariq has made reference that it is not the matter of signing. As a result of its conniving and treacherous dealings, if the Syrian Regime is not obligated to sign in front of a third party, that is in the even of reaching an agreement and especially with regard to the War position, they will not be obligated to comply with any agreement in any way shape or form. The Syrians generally, and particularly the Syrian Regime are know for such practice, [TC: treacherous dealings]. Regardless of agreements about the war issue or any other issue, there is a point about the Arab League – and we have to emphasize that Sir – we have to insist on only an Arab League Framework, and the framework of one Arab country to its counterpart, and I have another suggestion, that is in the event that the Syrian Regime did not agree to state a new position in which it denounces the Persian aggression against Iraq – and I do not think this will happen anyway – we should also expose and scandalize the Syrian side for not adopting such position. This could be done in the manner that your Excellency and Comrade at the Command level see fit. Even the issue of Syrian blackmail of Arab Gulf States and others, this also should completely stop, because every time the Syrians promise that and turn around and break their promise in the manner that you are familiar with. In the two events Sir, if the Syrians agree and announce, this will be beneficial to us in terms of the</p>
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		<p>War, and if they did not agree, this also is beneficial because he will be scandalized in front of all Arab Countries and also in front of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I see our signing and the signing of a representative of the Syrian Regime in front of a third party and holding it accountable with it, especially the issue of War, I think this will guarantee its compliance, because the Syrian Regime is evasive and always dodge any held agreements as we have witnessed. Last point Sir, I believe the Syrians acceptance makes pay attention to what goes on Hafiz al-Assad's mind with regard the harming of Iraq. This is what I believe Sir, Pardon me, Thank you.</p>
Saddam Hussein	رفيق سعدون،	Comrade Sa'dun
Comrade Sa'dun	<p>سيادة الرئيس الحقيقة أنني كان عندي يعني رأي أن تُناقش أصل الفكرة في حينها وثبتت رأي بهذا الموضوع ولكن اللي شعرتة من الرفيق طارق، والآن من خلال المناقشات يعني أن أصبح قرار في اللقاء في الجانب السوري، خاصة بعد ما أتحدد الموعد، من قبل السوفيت، والتزامنا بيه أيضاً لذلك تأكد ملاحظاتي بشكل خاص بالنسبة للفقرة ثلاثة، فعلاً أتفضل بيه الرفيق نعيم غير منطقي أن نلزم أي جانب أن يلتزم بأي قرار أو بالقرار اللي راح يتخذ في كلا التاريخ، ولكن أقترح لو يكون العبارة الموافق على قرارات الجامعة العربية بشأن الحرب ما هي ضرورية، تُبقى وعدم القيام بفعاليات ونشاطات تتناقض مع أي قرار يؤخذ بالأغلبية الجامعة، هذا مدخل يدفعنا حتى في المستقبل بما يتعلق بقرار الجامعة وشدوذ النظام السوري</p>	<p>Mr. President, In reality, I had doubt about even discussing the idea from the onset and I have documented my opinion in that regard, however, what I have felt from Comrade Tariq, and after this discussion here, I think there is already a decision to meet with the Syrians especially after the dates have been set by the Soviets and our compliance with such commitment. Therefore, my observation will be presented with regard to paragraph three, it is true what Comrade Na'im has stated, that it is not logical to hold any party to comply with any decree or any future decrees of both dates, however, I suggest that the sentence that reads, "approval of Arab League decrees with regard to the war" this is important, and to add "and ceasing any activities that</p>

		<p>contradicts with any decisions taken by the majority of the [TC: Arab] League". This will benefit us in the future in terms of the League's decision and the awkwardness of the Syrian / Libyan Regime and any other Regime in the future, in terms of fate related issues that affect the Arab Nation. I am not really optimistic that we will reach an agreement with them. However, perhaps we are not going to lose once we have our secret meeting with them, but as for the announced meeting, that Comrade Ghani, I believe that we will lose from such a meeting. They will benefit from such meeting, because right now, the Syrian Regime has been isolated for a long time from the Arab circle in general and the Arab People circle in particular. Whether the people in Syria, our people in Iraq and in particular the Arab People as a whole. The Syrian Regime is isolated and is criticized especially after the Iraq Iran war that started six years ago and its position was and clearly still a strange one. The Regime is isolated, of course when a meeting with the Syrian Regime is announced and discussions take place in Moscow or in other place, they will benefit, whether we agreed or did not agree,</p>
Comrade Tariq 'Aziz	هو اللي طلب [غير مسموع]	It was the one who [Inaudible]
Comrade Sa'dun	هو يحسب حساب إيران طبعاً يحسب حساب إيران في ما إذا اتفاهق راح يخسر إيران ولكن أحنأ إذا صار اللقاء علني، إذا اتفقنا أو لم نتفق، أيضاً راح يفيدده بالموضوع، [صوت]	[Inaudible] he is factoring in Iran's calculation, he accounts for Iran, that is if it agrees, then it will lose Iran, however, if the meeting is announced, and regardless of whether we agree or

		<p>not, the Syrian Regime will benefit for this. [TC: Voice in the background], frankly, I wanted to question the main idea, but what I sensed, and what I understood is that, this is not possible because this matter – apparently has been agreed upon already – or appointment with the Syrians in Moscow. I question the whole idea from the onset. I do not believe it will serve our interests in the long run. Perhaps it will expel some of the evil deeds with regard to our war with Iran, I mean expelling some of the [unintelligible] or perhaps it will rescue the Syrian position or rescuing Hafiz al-Asad himself after he tangled himself in dirt especially after the war. Despite his harmful position that has damaged the Arab Nation, these were blatant harmful positions against the Arab World, and against other Non-Arab Countries. I believe if we weigh in the profit and loss, I think the Syrian Regime has profited from this matter. Absolutely, they have profited more than us. At least he would be perceived as good deed doers in front of his people and in front of Arab People. I mean he will profit from this matter in the sense that he had a point view with regard to the Iran Iraq war but then when Iran had occupied Iraqi territories, it decided to meet in order to agree with Iraq against Iran, I mean this will benefit it a great deal. However, once the war ends with our victory and Hafiz al-Asad's position remains the same, he will be harmed, he would be perceived as the odd</p>
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		one, he will in strange position, his traitor status will be very obvious. In Reality, I do not want to go into details in the matter, because originally, we agree that we [Inaudible] these were my comments with regard to paragraph three, thank you Sir
Saddam Hussein	الرفيق محمد،	Comrade Muhammad
Comrade Muhammad	<p>سيدي الحقيقة أني يعني اللي أجول جرح حافظ الأسد ونظام حافظ الأسد يعني بالنسبة لنا يعني ما اعتقد يجي يوم من الأيام أحنا ننسى ها الجرح، لا أحنا ولا شعبنا، لكن أكو بعض الحالات يمكن والظروف اللي تطلب على الأقل جهد إمكاننا أن نجمد مثل هذا الأنظمة بي صيغ وباشكال متعددة حتى على الأقل نتجنب شروره اللي ها الآن دا تمد النظام ال النظام الإيراني بمعدات وأسلحة ودعم بصورة مباشرة وبصورة غير مباشرة، فأني اللي أعتقد أن تجميد هذا النظام جهد الإمكان يعني بي على الأقل في هذا المرحلة يعني بيه مصلحة أي لأجل أن على الأقل يعني يصير صورة واضحة لكل ال الناس على المستوى العربي وعلى المستوى الدولي مع الملاحظات اللي ذكرها الحقيقة الرفيق طه والرفيق نعيم يعني معها وأني أيد أن تكون ها اللقاءات واني ما أعتقد أحنا خسرانيين بيها يعني ما يجي فد يوم من الأيام أحنا ننسى حافظ الأسد وموقف حافظ الأسد والظرف اللي أحنا الآن صار لنا تقريباً ست سنوات دا نقاتل ودا ننزف وهما يمدون يعني الآن برصاص حافظ الأسد أبناء شعبنا دا يستشهدون، فهذه الحالة على الأقل هم على المستوى الدولي وهم على المستوى العربي والداخلي ونعتبره كأى دولة من الدول اللي موجودة</p>	<p>Sir, Frankly, the wound that Hafiz al-Asad has inflicted upon us, I do not think that there will be a day that we forget such wound, not us and nor will our people, however, sometimes the situation necessitates that we do our level best in containing / freezing those regimes in various ways in order to at least avoid the venom that originates from them, as they support the Iranian regime with weaponry and munitions in a direct and indirect manner. So I believe by freezing such a regime as much as possible, I think will – at least at this stage – benefit us, at the picture will clearer for everybody at the Arab and International level, bearing in mind the comments stated by Comrade Taha and Comrade Na'im. I agree with them to conduct these meetings and I do not think that we will lose from such meetings. I mean, I do not think the day will come that we will forget Hafiz al-Asad and the position of Hafiz al-Asad and the situation that we are in right now, we have been here fore six years, we have been bleeding and they support, I mean right now, it is through Hafiz al-Asad's bullets that our sons becoming Martyrs, in this situation. These meetings will at least be highlighted at the</p>

		international scene and at the Arab internal scene, and we should regard Syria as any other country from the countries. However, we should not forget the wound inflicted upon us by Hafiz al-Asad. I see that Comrade Tariq would rely upon God and proceed with this matter utilizing the amended text, I do support the view of Comrade Taha about the issue of the pipe and the other matters. This should be clear and we should deal with the Syrian side on this basis as any other Arab Country. This is the my comment
Saddam Hussein	الرفيق طه	Comrade Taha
Comrade Taha Yasin Ramadan	سيادة الرئيس بس تعقيب لي ذكره أبو زياد، أني أعرف ال اللقاء سري بس أحنا تعودنا دائماً ألتقي مع الجانب السوري على الأقل ها ها [غير مسموع] علينا أن نحسب كأن اللقاء علني، يعني في الوقت اللي يشوفون مفيد قريب أو بعيد لتسريب موضوع اللقاء يسربوه بما فيه يخدمهم ولذلك يعني أبدأ ما أجد أميز في الصيغة اللي نروح بيها في اللقاء السري وفي اللقاء العلني لأنني أتوقع في الوقت اللي يخدمهم هم يعلنو عن هذا ويسربوه وصارت عدنا سيدي الرئيس يُذكر لقاء على مستوى قيادي وأنفق في الاجتماع أن يكون هذا سري وصار نشرات حسب هواهم اللي يريدوه يكتبوه يوزعوه، بالنص، بيه أحنا جايلين وبي ما جايلين، طبعاً أحنا ما صارت نفذ أرشيف، فهذا الموضوع يعني طبيعة صيغة الورقة اللي نعددها، احتمال من خلال المباحثات والجانب السوفيتي موجود يُطرح كل من الطرفين يُقدم ما لديهم مكتوباً للجانب	Sir just a follow on with what Abu-Ziyad had stated. I know that the meeting is in secret, but we are used to, I always meet with the Syrian side, at least [Inaudible], we have to do our calculation as if the meeting is overt, I mean the time which they will regard as beneficial, to leak the content of the meeting, they will leak it in order serve their own interests. That is why, I cannot differentiate between both texts, the announced and the secret one. This is because I expect that they will leak the news at the time of their liking, when they believe that it will benefit them. This has happened before, and Mr. President remembers this, there was a Leadership agreement and it was also agreed in the meeting that such agreement to be secret, but we witnessed their announcement, they do as they please, they have leaked the agreement text. They have even announced things that

		<p>we have stated and things that we have not stated. Of course [Inaudible]. So this matter, I mean the text of the document that we are preparing, it is possible that during the discussions and in the presence of the Soviet side, both parties would propose all their requests to the Soviet side or they would exchange such requests with each other, for example, the Syrian side would say "I do not have anything in writing that would obligates me to do anything for Iraq, just we had in Libya, in Morocco, we would say, here it is, here is our document, that is why I suggested that the document contains more details as if it is ready to be signed. I know and aware that you are not going to sign, and I know Faruq al-Shar' will take a decision on this matter, I am totally convinced about that. But it is important to cover this aspect in such a manner, that takes us back to the issue of linking the dots and stating them, and the immediate attention to the issue of border pipeline. For four month, Fakhry Qadurin is going back and forth discussing, also Zayid Malimu, is holding discussions, we do not want to give them the chance to take advantage of the situation. The Syrian side is in need to influence the Iranian side or to keep it on its side to some degree, together with making the Syrian people and others feel that it has lines that should not be crossed with Iraq, I believe that Syria is in need of such approach. So the most important issues for us is the war, the following issues 1, 2, 3, even</p>
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		<p>the missiles are to be returned, we did not give Qaddafi the opportunity to take advantage of that situation. So in my view, the text that we will present, will be a general one, if the situation calls that we have to have something in writing to present, we should present it. There is no big deal about that, if the situation was not suitable, then everything remains the same without any change.</p> <p>Thank you Sir</p>
Saddam Hussein	رفيق عزت	Comrade 'Izzat
Comrade 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri	<p>سيادة الرئيس ال أنا أيد ال النقاط المذكورة بالورقة اللي بموجب عن سير اللقاء بسوريا، ولكن تعليقا على الملاحظات الرفيق طارق، أيدها أنه ال أحنا نوافق أو رضينا ال اللقاء ويا السوريين، أني أعتقد من منطلق إسقاط المبررات لدى السوريين عند أصدقائنا، يعني سواء من العرب أو الاتحاد السوفيتي أو أي صديق آخر إله علاقة في هذا الموضوع، وليس طمعا في الاتفاق مع سوريا، أو مع النظام وليس مع سوريا مع النظام السوري أني ما أعتقد نلتقي وياهم ويصير اتفاق وياهم إلا في حالة واحدة إلا في حالة تؤكد حافظ الأسد من أن النظام الإيراني سينهار بعد شهر، أو بعد شهرين، وتنتهي الحرب بانتصار العراق، يالا حافظ الأسد يقلم على أيش خطوة، مو إلا حافظ الأسد الآن من هذا الموقع يغير بيتز إيران وبيتز ال الأنظمة العربية وبيتز حتى الاتحاد السوفيتي وبيتز كل الدنيا، ال وتاجر ممتاز بال بال هيتش حسابات ال لذلك أني أرى مثل ما جال الرفيق طارق، ألقاء هذا ماراح يجيب شيء أي شيء جديد، أحنا خلال السنة الماضية ثلاث لقاء</p>	<p>Mr. President, I support the points stated in the document, pertaining to the meeting with the Syrians, I would like though to comment on Comrade Tariq's comments, I support them, but I think that the impetus for accepting to meet with the Syrians is driven by our desire to abort their excuses presented to our friends; whether Arabs or the Soviet Union or any other friend that is concerned with this matter. The meeting was not driven by a desire to hold and agreement with the Syrians or with the Regime, not Syria but with the Syrian Regime. I do not believe that we should meet with them, and to agree with them unless, unless in one condition, unless Hafiz al-Asad realize that the Iranian regime will collapse after one month or after two months and the war will end with the victory of Iraq, only at that time that Hafiz al-Asad will take such step. Currently, Hafiz al-Asad is enjoying his position, he is blackmailing Iran, he blackmails Arab Regimes, and he blackmails the Soviet Union, and blackmails the whole world. He is</p>

		<p>great merchant in such calculations that is why; I believe – just as Comrade Tariq has said – this meeting will not produce anything new. We had three meetings with the Syrians last year, and they know our opinions. So I am certain that they will tell their representative go and see whether the Iraqis will bring anything new to the table compared to the past. Comrade Tariq will discuss the issue of uniting the party, the unity of the country, [Inaudible], he will explain to them as he did the last time. Also, just as Comrade ‘Ali have explained to ‘Ali Dubah, our point of view, and the meeting will end. So [TC: coughing in the background] this meeting whether announced or secretive, Iran will use it, pardon me, Syria will use it to its advantage. The first objective that Syria will achieve as a result of this meeting whether announced or secretive, is that it will blackmail Iran, it will tell Iran, “ the Arabs and the Soviet Union are pressuring me, and the whole world is pressuring me in order to come to an agreement with Iraq, and we are standing by your side, we sacrifice with you and we will not agree with the Iraqis, but we just want to pay those who are pressuring us”, yes [TC: someone is interjecting] to silence those who are pressuring us, we need to expose Iraqi even more in front of those who are pressuring us they [TC: the Syrians] are Saboteurs, how come they will agree with us and we are in a state of War with Iran in such depth and magnitude. How come?</p>
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		<p>What changed Hafiz al-Asad? What has changed the people of Hafiz al-Asad? His clan? His group? For six years and they are fighting us directly, not in an indirect manner. They have fought us directly and in front of the Iraqi People, and in front of the Syrian people, the entire sons of the Syrian people, and the entire sons of the Iraqi people knows and sense the true nature of this regime. The entire sons of this glorified Arab Nation know what is happening. So what we have to work in such a manner to demonstrate that the Syrians are bartering this case, we have to limit the possible opportunities in order to prevent them from benefiting from this matter. We have to win friends who might for good intentions or bad intentions promote such meeting, those who have been working on this meeting.</p>
Saddam Hussein	الرفيق مزبان	Comrade Mazban
Comrade Mazban	<p>سيدي ما يتعلق بال المطروح أمامنا أنا دا أنا ناقش حافظ الأسد، يعني في الحقيقة دا اللي هو حافظ الأسد، لون نسير ويا [غير مسموع] بس شخصياً أني نفسياً ما أتقبله، مو بس أني باعتقادي كل العراقيين ما يتقبلوه لكن أنا ناقش مبدأ [صوت في الخلفية] لأ لا كل العراقيين أني أي يعني كل العراقيين ما يتقبلوه لأنه من موقف الللا قومي الخياني باتجاه العراق، بس من حيث المبدأ أن أحنا لا بد أن نشغل على فضحه أكثر أمام أصدقائه، وخاصة الاتحاد السوفيتي، يعني أحنا ند نعرب أن الاتحاد السوفيتي يعني واجفين إلى جانب السوريين بشكل وإلى جانب حافظ</p>	<p>Sir, with regard to what is presented in front of us, I want to discuss Hafiz al-Asad. In reality, Hafiz al-Asad [Inaudible] but personally, I cannot stand him. Not only I, but also the Iraqis would feel the same way. They do not stand him. But I want to discuss the principle here. [TC: Voice in the background interjecting] No, no, I said all Iraqis, I mean all Iraqis do not stand him, do not like him, because of his treacherous anti – National position toward Iraq. But on principle, we must work on exposing and scandalizing him even more in front of his friends, and especially the Soviet Union.</p>

		<p>I mean we have to express that the Soviets are standing firm next to the Syrians and Hafiz al-Asad. So perhaps Comrade Tariq can speak with them about the Syrians treacherous disloyal position, this way we can expose Hafiz al-Asad and win friends to our side, I believe that this is a necessity and required. We have to contain the Syrians at the present time especially pertaining to our war. As for the event that we did not have any war, by God, even if Hafiz al-Assad himself came to knock on our doors, I do not think that anyone will salute him. On principle, I see that we enter into discussion with them in a manner that we can contain them and then to pursue at the present time to win friends over to Iraq. And even myself, from my own point of view, that even if we meet [TC: with the Syrians] and we agreed, I for one, as soon as the war is over, I will be the first one to turn against this agreement [TC: everybody is laughing including the speaker] I say this and I am not afraid. I mean really, I meant what I said, because they [TC: the Syrians], no not really, Sir, what I want to say, I mean, anything in Iraq, I mean Khomeni bears responsibility for what we are going through, Hafiz al-Assad and Qaddafi bears double responsibility for what we are going through. This is what I believe. The actions Hafiz al-Assad and Qaddafi toward us is really unprecedented, no one has acted against an Arab people in that manner historically, Thank you</p>
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Saddam Hussein	رفيق سمير	Comrade Samir
Comrade Samir	<p>شكراً سيدي، سيدي أتذكر مرة كنا بمكتب بغداد نناقش موضوع ال يعني تقييم المنشقين اللي عادوا إلى الحزب وبعدين وجهة نظر الحزبيين بينهم، فجلتلهم رفاق يجب أن يصير واضح للكل، ويصير واضح كذلك بي عدم الربط مابين المنشقين اللي دا نجري التعامل معاهم، بالعراق، عن اللي قد يترائل للبعض، أن السوريين والأخرين بشق، السوريين حافظ الأسد ومجموعته هم ليس منشقين عن الحزب وإنما هما أصلاً مجموعة بشرية لا تنتمي إلى الأمة عرفاً ولا فكراً، فعليه يُفترض أن يكون النضال لمستوى النضال اللي يستهدف إنهاء الوجود الصهيوني في الأمة العربية، حافظ الأسد عملية سيدي كلما ما يفكر من الاقتراب من العراق يفكر ليس على أساس التعايش بقدر ما يفكر تطوير الاتفاق باتجاه أن ينهين لصالح الاتجاه اللي هو يمثلته يعني عادته اتجاه قائم، أحنا في وضع أرجوا أن لا دائماً يعني إيش ونفسي يعني أقترح أن من نناقش موضوع أنه الظروف الحرب تمضي علينا مواقف، ويجب أن يعني أكون بيها نوع من المرونة إلى الحد اللي يعني يمكن في يوم من الأيام نجعد أو للأخرة يقيموها ربما وليس هم خاضعين لنفس الظروف اللي أحنا [غير مسموع] باعتقادي هو أمامه شيين أما يستهدف إسقاط الحجج والضغوط اللي تطرح عليه من قبل أو العرب أو الدول الصديقة وكذلك يستفيد من في وضعة في لبنان، باتجاه أن يعني يبتز من الإيرانيين موقف لصالح وجوده اللي دا يتقاطع مع الوجود الإيراني، النقطة الأخرى هو يفكر كذلك بتطوير الموقف</p>	<p>Thank you Sir, I recall one time we were at the Baghdad Office discussing the subject of evaluating dissenters who were readmitted to Party ranks, and the opinion of Party ranks toward them. So I told them, "Comrade, we have to set the record straight for everybody, and to clarify the issue of not linking those dissenters who we are dealing with them in Iraq and those who are Syrian. The Syrian Hafiz al-Assad and his clan, are not dissenters from the party however they are a human group that does not belong to the [TC: Arab] Nation, not in terms of thought or legitimacy. So the assumption is that the struggle has to be at such a high level that guarantees the end of Zionist presence through the Arab World. Every time Hafiz al-Assad thinks of approaching Iraq, his thoughts are not driven by the idea of Coexistence as much as the thought of developing the agreement in the direction that benefits his interests. We are in a position, I hope that we are not always – I mean myself suggest – that when we discuss the war, the war dictates many events and we have to have flexibility, perhaps in the future others will evaluate what we are going now, even though they have not been through to what we have been through. I believe He [TC: Hafiz al-Assad] has to options, either to drop down the excuses and pressures that are imposed on him from the Arabs or friendly countries, likewise, he will benefit from that</p>

		<p>[TC: the possible agreement with Iraq] in his position in Lebanon, i.e. he will blackmail the Iranians for his benefit. The other point that he pursues developing this situation to his favor. I mean, perhaps, before 79 he had a position, but by 1979, he lobbied hard in order to enter into a dialogue with us. He [TC: Hafiz al-Assad] was very open at that time. Some of our party members were under the illusion that he is truthful in his statements and that there were new positions that we must adopt. Then 1979 came in and he continued his conspiratorial as he wanted to take advantage of the situation in the interior, that he can shape events for his favor and which enable him to hold an agreement. He still pursues these conspiratorial actions against us. So the issue of holding an agreement with them; let us assume that we enter into an agreement with them, and I believe that this is highly unlikely, also we must not forget two issues, which is, what are the byproducts [excretions] that would emerge after the war is over and the position of Hafiz al-Assad. The other thing is that, for how much are we going to profit [benefit] from this agreement, is he that influential? Yes he is influential in terms of shaping events, but is he that powerful to the extent that if we withdrew that proposal that we will encounter different situation, I mean in terms of the war? Naturally, we all hope, Sir, you are the first one to hope that the meeting with</p>
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		Hafiz al-Assad has to be bloody. I mean we have to chop his head, it is not [Inaudible]. We are at the forefront of advancement in the Arab Nation, No Ba'thist, no Iraqi, no Arab who is faithful and dedicated would think any other way other than that. Of course. So I believe secrecy is very important with regard to this meeting. This is better than being announced meeting because if we announced it, he will benefit from that and not us. Thank you Sir.
Saddam Hussein	الرقيق حسن	Comrade Hassan
Comrade Hassan	<p>سيدي اللي يتابع تصريحات فاروق الشرع بمناسبة مختلفة، يلاحظ بأنه ما تختلف عن تصريحات رافسانجاني، من شأن الحرب بشأن العراق، يعني لو ما تقرأ الفقرات هذا هذا هو فاروق الشرع هو جزء من النظام السوري ويعكس سياسة النظام السوري ويعكس المؤسسة السياسية في سوريا، أنا أعتقد ماكو اثنين في العراق وليس على صعيد القيادة وإنما في العراق يختلفون بأن حافظ الأسد إنسان خائن وعميل وترك جرح عميق في نفوس العراقيين ومن غير المعقول بعد ست سنوات بالحرب راح ينقلب إلى إنسان يعني يقف موقف بجانب العراق وينسحب من كل المواقف أو يتبرأ من كل المواقف السابقة. حافظ الأسد يعني معروف إنسان ثعلب وإنسان، [انتهى التسجيل في التوقيت 1:39:06]</p>	<p>Sir, anyone who follows up with the announcements of Faruq al-Shar' in various occasion, he would realize that they do not differ from Rafsanjani's announcements, with regard to the war, with regard to Iraq, this is the feeling we get when we read excerpts from Faruq al-Shar's statements, he is part of this Syrian Regime, and reflects the policies of that Regime. It reflects the political establishment in Syria, I believe that there are no two people in Iraq – I am not talking at the leadership level but at through out Iraq – who disagree that Hafiz al-Assad is a traitor, disloyal agent and have left a deep wound in the souls of Iraqis, and it is not realistic that after six years at war, that he will have a change of heart and become a human who can stand by Iraq and withdraw from all previous positions or distance himself from all previous positions. Hafiz al-Assad is known, he is a cunning fox and a human for</p> <p>[Recording ended at 1:39:06]</p>

[END OF RECORDING]