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Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Council of Ministers regarding Russia, France, and Arab Countries' Positions toward Sanctions

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Summary:

Contains discussions between Saddam Hussein and the Council of Ministers regarding the Russian, Chinese and French positions regarding the sanctions on Iraq.

Original Language:

Arabic

Contents:

Transcript - Arabic

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Saddam:	السلام عليكم.	Peace be upon you.
Group of people:	و عليكم السلام .	Peace be upon you too.
Saddam:	يا الله . تفضلوا . الله بالخير . حياكم الله بالخير جميعا . رفيق طارق يوجزكم عن سفرة القيسي الى موسكو و مجمل الموضوع اللي السياسي المعروف اللي يتعلق بمجلس الامن و الخطوات اللاحقة.	Oh God, welcome. Welcome to all of you. Fellow Tariq will brief you about the trip of Al-Qaisy to Moscow and the political situation in regards to the Security Council and the future steps.
Tariq:	سيدي تذكر سيادتك و	Sir, your majesty remembers
Saddam:	خلليه يقطعون لنا التبريد بارد الجو.	Let him lower down the air conditioning. It is chilly.
MV1:	نعم سيدي.	Yes sir.
Tariq:	تتذكر سيادتك و اغلب الرفاق الحاضرين بعد عودتي من نيويورك اوجزت رفاق في القيادة اللي كانوا حاضرين الاجتماع حول الموقف . الموقف كان بشكل عام في مجلس الامن اغلبية الدول الاعضاء ترى انه في حالة ان يقدم مكبوس تقرير يقول فيه ان فترة المراقبة قد بدأت و العراق يعالج موضوع الكويت بجانب ما يتعلق بما يسمى السيادة و الحدود هذا يكفي لاغلبية اعضاء المجلس للبحث بشكل جدي و مباشر في بقية الفقرة اثنين و عشرين . على اساس اذا كبوس قدم خطة اختبار و طلب خطة اتفاق اما ياخذوها بعين الاعتبار او يلبون [Unintelligible]. هذا هو الجو العام . هذا جو روسيا جو فرنسا جو الصين الباكستان البرازيل اسبانيا الخ . الى حد ما البريطانيين بنفس الاتجاه مثل اوجزت سيادتك لانه البريطانيين بعد استنطاق هالسفير انه هم يعتقدون انه هالعوامل اللي هي قطاع الاسلحة و متطلباته من بدا فترات المراقبة و فكرة الاختبار و معالجة موضوع الكويت بالنسبة الهم هذا يكفي لرفع العقوبات الاقتصادية و هذا ما يسموها او الحظر الاقتصادي . قبل ما اروح الى نيويورك	As you remember along with the rest of the fellows, after my return from New York, I had briefed fellows from the command who were in the meeting with the situation. The general atmosphere in the Security Council was that the majority of the state members believed that once Ekeus presents his report and says that the surveillance period had started and that Iraq is dealing with the situation of Kuwait in regards to what is called sovereignty and borders [pauses] for the majority of the council members, this should be enough to seriously discuss the rest of paragraph 22. This is based on Ekeus presenting an examination plan and a request for an agreement plan. They will either take this into consideration or submit [unintelligible]. This is the general atmosphere. This is the atmosphere in Russia, France, China, Pakistan, Brazil, Spain, etc. Even the British are going in the same direction. Like I had briefed you before, once the British had questioned the Ambassador, they believed that the factors of the weapons and its accessories [pauses] once the surveillance sessions start, once the testing idea starts, and once the treatment of the Kuwaiti issue



		<p>starts, to them this is enough to lift the economical sanctions or that is what they call it. Before I went to New York, I had met with the Foreign Minister of Russia. We had discussed this subject. The Russian Foreign Minister had shown a Russian will to work and help Iraq to lift the sanctions. He had said, "You have to find a solution for this issue. We are willing to talk about this subject. Talk about the drafts, the action methods, and the plan that we should apply for the future stage." According to the agreement that was conducted in Russia and the general atmosphere in the Security Council, based on your instructions sir, we had prepared two drafts. Two papers. One of them is related to the sovereignty issue and the other one is related to the border issue. In regards to the border issue, the center of the Iraqi point of view that was documented on this paper, states that what was decided by the United Nations in the Resolution 838 is very unfair to Iraq and that this issue violates the principles of the international law and the principles of justice. It violates the rules of the international law, the principles of fairness and justice, and the known historical and geographical facts in regards to this case. On the other hand, a resolution was issued according to the seventh chapter. The seventh chapter is obligatory according to the charter of all states, and that goes for the concerned states or the unconcerned ones. In order to create a balance between these two factors, the injustice that was caused to Iraq and the obligatory nature of the resolutions based on the seventh chapter, Iraq does not agree. Iraq complies. According to the work rules in the</p>
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		<p>United Nations, agreement is not always necessary. What is necessary is complying. This had also represented the Russian stance when we had discussed it in Petersburg with the Russian Minister. This is also based on that the Security Council encourages, urges, and does not object any efforts in the future to deal with this situation with the consideration of both party's interests. This can be done internationally, among the Arabs, or in a dual way. These are the main elements in this paper. Speaking of the sovereignty issue, during the previous period of time, we remember the insult by the rulers of Kuwait. Iraq had accepted both resolutions 686 and 687. Iraq had complied with the resolutions and had issued what was required by the resolutions at that time. This means that Iraq can possibly confirm that again, but Kuwait and the rulers must perform their commitments towards Iraq and they must not assault the sovereignty of Iraq, the interests of Iraq, etc. These conditions go smooth with the rules of the international law and the communications between countries. When the Russians had observed the two papers, just as it was mentioned in the report of Riyadh Al-Qaosy, their advice was to make them brief and not to make any indications to the past. They had approved the issue of the borders, they had approved the idea of complying and not accepting, and they did not object the idea of discussing this subject later on. I had discussed this situation with [Kozariv']. He had no objection what so ever about the idea. He had said, "Of course the issue had escalated during the special conditions. It is very natural for you to want to deal with the situation in the</p>
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		<p>future in a dual form or any other suitable form that you might think of, and Russia does not object." We did not only ask Russia not to object, but we asked Russia to encourage the situation and to have an opinion in this matter. They appear to be closer to this idea rather than not dealing with the situation at all. This report, which I had shown to you and the fellows, shows the suffering that we are caused by countries when we try to communicate with them. They are supportive and filled with desires, but in the same sense, they have no clear vision of how to move. We had discussed this subject in Petersburg with the Minister and I had set up a curriculum for him in regards to the method that they need to move according to. A part of it was achieved in the statement that was given by Warnsov [?] in New York. This follow-up with Riyadh had helped with clearing the picture. We had said to them that there has to be a resolution project [pauses] a resolution project must be prepared along with Ekeus's report. This project must state that we do not recognize the six month period. However, if we were to be obligated, the resolution project must state that paragraph 22 is to be implemented directly at the end of the period and without any conditions. We have to keep it flexible which means that there should be a possibility that it could be implemented before. But the bottom line is that this should not exceed the period of time that was requested by Ekeus, which is six months. This must be implemented automatically and without any extra conditions. He had also explained to them the possibilities of the Americans and the westerners trying</p>
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		<p>to add more conditions from here or there. I mean, this had happened previously in regards to the procedures and the stances in which they had taken. According to the report, this is very clear, but they have a condition that in order for them to present the resolution project, they would need a paper [unintelligible]. This means that they need to have a draft so that they can tell the council members, "look this is Iraq, this is what they are ready to present." At that point, they should push towards adapting this resolution. Like you had instructed sir, we can not wait for an additional six months until the complete implementation of paragraph 22. Let us think of some steps just in case the resolution was issued and the six months are designated. Let us think of some steps that might reduce the sanctions little by little. For example, permission to export non petroleum products. I mean something other than oil. I even tried to seduce the Russians by telling them that if we were able to export an amount of oil and if the amount was worth it, not two hundred or three hundred thousand barrels, if it is worth it, for example, a million, a million and a half, or more than that, I told them that we will start paying them the debt that we owe them. The agreement was about twelve percent. In order to seduce them, we had given them a bunch of ideas. When Riyadh had presented the ideas to them in one session, they felt uncomfortable. They had said to him, "You want all of this?" After that, he had explained it more to them and had said to them, "No, we have an agreement with you that the action in September must be focused on the implementation of paragraph 22, and after that we will</p>
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		<p>work on it." It appears that they have no objections and that it is possible for them to help us. This was in regards to the Russian stance. Now in regards to the elements that [pauses] the comments that they had made about the letter were studied and your majesty had mentioned that you had thought about it. But right now, we should not go to them and say, "this is the new script." We should go to the French. We should brief them with the situation and give them the ideas that are on our minds. We should try to understand where the French are going to stand. Are they willing to present a resolution project? Are they willing to coordinate with the Russians in presenting a resolution project? Once we find out their stance, we will go once again to Moscow and tell them, "your comments were discussed by the leadership in Iraq. We consider it to be faithful and positive, and it aims to help us. We will take it into consideration when preparing the final draft. This paper is not the thing that needs to be prepared right now. We will go to New York; we will watch Ekeus present his report. You must urge Ekeus to present his report and not play with time. If the circumstances were suitable and the other parties were willing to commit to the resolution and the implementation of paragraph 22, if this was the case, we will be able to deal with the situation just as we had presented it to you and similar to what we had discussed." After he returns from Moscow, we are thinking about going to Spain sir. I am going to suggest that it will either be him or I, because it is on our way. The Spanish can possibly agree because they had previously welcomed us. We should</p>
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		also discuss it with them because Spain is the president of the Security Council. At the same time, right now, the fellow, the Foreign Minister, is on a visit to Pakistan and after that to China. He is going to show them the elements. In regards to Pakistan, I told him not to get into detail with them. I told him to show them that there is a possibility to deal with this matter if they were serious about it.
Saddam:	شئو اهمية الباكستان لا نطلع على هيك شغلة؟	What is the importance of Pakistan to be involved with such a matter?
Tariq:	سيدي فقط بشكل عام لانه احنا حكينا	Sir, it is in general because we had talked
Saddam:	لانه هذه ورقتنا احنا راح نطل نفرض بيها من حين لحظة استخدامها تصبح عديمة التأثير. من يعرف بيها كل هذا الوسط الواسع جدا من البشر	If we keep laying down our cards, once we try to use it, it will be useless. Especially when it is exposed to a large medium of people.
Tariq:	ان يقول الهم سيدي...	Sir, He would just tell them
Saddam:	و راح على العرب ما تشتغل بينما احنا الالهية اللي معلقها على العرب توازي الالهية اللي معلقين موقفنا على روسيا و الصين و الخ.	It would also be useless when it comes to the Arabs. The potential that we are hoping for from the Arabs equals the potential that we are looking for from Russia, China, etc.
Tariq:	هم لانهم اعضاء سيدي بالمجلس يعني صوتهم مهم يعني اذا يضاف الى الاصوات الاخرى يساعد و هم ايضا هذه المسألة كانوا يطرحوها . يعني انه هو فقط يقول لهم انه احنا عندنا يعني ممكن هذه المسألة تعالج بشرط انه المجلس يؤدي التزاماته تجاه العراق. و العامل اللي يتعلق بالغين اللي لحق بالعراق من قرار 838 هذا سياق داعم يعني رفاقنا يعني بدهم يشرحوه و رياض القيسي ترى شرحه بعمق بروسيا و سويتا به ورقة سيدي . ورقة بتفاصيل. طلع الروس ما عندهم اي فكرة عن الموضوع مصوتين على القرار هيك عمياوي. و تبين لنا انه الفرنسيين ايضا كذلك. يعني عندهم معلومات محدودة عن الموضوع. طبعا	Sir, they are members in the Council. Their vote is very important. If we could add their vote to the other votes, it will be helpful. They had even mentioned this issue. It is not necessary to report everything to them. We would only say that the issue can be resolved under the condition that the Security Council would carry out its commitments towards Iraq. The factor which is related to the injustice that was caused to Iraq by the Resolution of 838 is very supportive. Our fellows are going to explain it. Riyadh Al-Qaisy had presented it with details in Russia. We had made a document about it. A detailed document. We found out that Russians had no clue about the situation. They had voted on it blindly.

		We had also confirmed that the French's situation was the same. They had limited information about the subject. So educating people about the injustice that was caused to Iraq by the Resolution 838
Saddam:	هذا مهم جدا	This is very important.
Tariq:	مهم بدنا نسويه. الصين سيدي مهم انه ...	It is very important to do. Sir, it is also very important that China
Saddam:	ايه نتعامل و ياهم مثل الفرنسيين	Yes, let us deal with them in a similar way to how we deal with the French.
Tariq:	ايضا عناصر يعني الوزير ما عنده نص قلت له لا تاخذ نصوص و لنصوص سحبناها و انما عناصر للافكار اللي عندنا و نامل انه الجانب الصيني يؤيدنا. اذا صار عندنا هذا التاييد من الثلاثة الدائمين و ياهم اسبانيا و الاخرين راح تتشكل كتلة جيدة في المجلس لصالحنا. فالان التوقع سيدي انه اذا ما لعب اكيوس بالموعد اللي قدمه هذا الموضوع راح ينبعث يبدأ بحثه في منتصف ايلول. يعني هي المراجعة في اربعتايش. اربعتايش قد لا تكون هي التاريخ الحاسم لانه راح تبدأ المناقشة و يمكن المناقشة تستمر لاسبوع لاسبوعين و حتى كمان لاكثر من ذلك. الى ان تتكامل الصورة عندنا اذا كانت الصورة واضحة ان الالتزام سيكون واضح عند ذلك ممكن التعامل مع الورقة يعني اخر نص تتوجه به سيادتكم ممكن نقدمه في توقيت يتزامن مع صناعة القرار و صياغة القرار الخاص بتطبيق الفقرة 22. الشق الثاني من المسألة اللي هو الجانب العربي . لانه لا بد ان يكون هناك تعهد عربي باعادة النظر في الموضوع بعد ان يعالجه العراق مع مجلس الامن. يعني لما العراق يعالجه مع مجلس الامن لازم يكون هناك قبل ذلك في اطار ذلك تعهد عربي بانه هذا الموضوع ما يبقى كما هو و انما يعالج بصيغة ما من	Let us keep it in a form of specific elements. The Minister has no scripts. I had told him not to take any scripts. It is merely about some ideas that we hope will be supported by the Chinese. If we could gain approval from the three permanent ones, Spain and the others, a new mass to our favor will be formed in the Council. Unless Ekeus does not tamper with the deadline that he had given, it is expected that the situation will be discussed in mid September. The revision will be on the 14 th . The 14 th might not be the bottom line. The discussion will be initiated on that date. The discussion can possibly be extended for one week, two weeks, or perhaps more than that. It is going to continue until we have a clear picture about the situation. If their commitment is clear at that point, we can deal with the document. This means that your majesty would present the document parallel to the decision making and the resolution draft in regards to the implementation of paragraph 22. The second part of the issue would be the Arabic aspect. There has to be an Arabic promise that the situation will be reconsidered after Iraq settles the case with the Security Council. When Iraq resolve the issue with the Security Council, there has to be an Arabic promise that the situation will not be the same and that the

		<p>situation will be resolved by some form of the Arabic relations. This is what was talked about with King Al-Hasan II. After discussing it with King Al-Hasan [pauses] like I had mentioned to you sir, King Al-Hasan is convinced with the following. First, the sanctions on Iraq must be lifted. Second, the situation can not stay as it is. The region can not be protected from the Iranian threat and other threats without Iraq. Iraq has a major role in the region. The issue of the borders is unacceptable and it must be resolved dually. He is convinced with the idea of an Arabic promise and he is ready to be a participant in this promise. He said that once Iraq resolves this issue, there has to be a promise made by noble witnesses that the case will be resolved in the future. During the dialogue, I had mentioned the subject of compensations. "Can there be any normal relationships while Iraq is paying compensations to Kuwait for thirty or forty years? This is illogical." I said to him. He said "No, this is not acceptable. All these issues must be dealt with within a comprehensive settlement." Sir, this is the situation briefly.</p>
Saddam:	<p>اي استيضاح؟ اي مناقشة؟ نعم يا [Unintelligible]</p>	<p>Any questions? Any discussion? Yes [unintelligible]</p>
MV2:	<p>الاشياء اللي ترى هي ... الروس معلومة يعني [Unintelligible] اعادة تأكيد النوايا السلمية للعراق . شنو القصد من هذا. طبعاً هو لما نجي لها الطريق يعني هو النوايا السلمية واضحة فشنو التأكيد عليها؟ على كل حال هذا شيء بسيط بالنسبة الى الاشياء الاخرى</p>	<p>Things as you see [pauses] the situation is clear with the Russians. [Unintelligible] the importance of confirming the peaceful intentions of Iraq. What is the point behind that? Of course, the peaceful intentions are clear. What is up with confirmation? Any ways, this is not a big deal compared to the other things.</p>
Saddam:	<p>احنا سبق و ان مقدمين رسالة فعادة تأكيد النوايا السلمية يقصد بيها تأكيد الرسالة. يعني مو هالشكل؟</p>	<p>We had previously sent a letter. Usually, confirming the peaceful intentions means confirming the letter. Was I right?</p>

Tariq:	سيدي ما مصرين على الصياغة احنا	Sir, we are not picky about the draft.
Saddam:	اي صيغة من الصيغ.	Any form of draft.
Tariq:	يعني هم الورقة اللي اعدوها لما ناقشها رياض قالوا له هذه مسالة تخصكم انتوا يعني احنا مجرد افكار.	When Riyadh had discussed the document that they had made with them, they said, "This is your business, we just have some thoughts."
MV2:	الايمان باعادة باهداف اعادة بناء السلام و الامن الدوليين في منطقة الخليج. هاي. شنو بيغون يصير اتفاقية امنية او يصير امن جماعي؟ يعني شسو هاي يعني ؟ [Unintelligible] هاي شوية مو واضحة يعني. اعادة بناء... هل هو هناك حلف جديد في المنطقة اللي كذا؟ او هذا قصد منهم انه هو موضوع التسوية اللي تجي بالمنطقة و تشمل منطقة الخليج	Dedication to bring back the motives of rebuilding peace and international security in the Gulf region. What do they want with this? Do they want a security agreement or do they want a group security? What does this mean? [Unintelligible] This is not that clear. I mean, rebuilding? Is there going to be a new alliance in the region or do they only mean the settlement issue that is going to be applied on the region and which includes the Gulf region?
Saddam:	هاي ما تضمن هالنقطة.	This point was not included.
Tariq:	سيدي كان الاستاذ طه لا يشغل نفسه بهذا النص لانه هم . هم قالوا له احنا نقترح هاي الورقة . لما ناقشهم فيها سحبوها للورقة و قالوا لا اذن انتوا عدوا ورقة مختصرة يعني هم مو مصرين على	Sir, Mr. Taha did not bother himself very much of the script. They had said to him, "We suggest this paper." When he had discussed the paper with them, they pulled the paper and said, "No, you can prepare a brief document." This means that they did not insist on
Saddam:	يعني هم مباديء.	It is just about principles.
Tariq:	يعني هم مبادرة من عندهم . قدموا ورقة ... من قال لهم هاي احنا النا عليها ملاحظات قال طيب يعني المهم انتوا بدل ما تكتبون رسالتين اكتبوا رسالة واحدة و حطوا بيها الامور بشكل مباشر يعني	It is only an initiative from them. They had presented a paper. Once he told them that we had comments about it, they said, "Okay, instead of you writing two separate letters, write one letter and list those things directly in it."
MV2:	و الملاحظة اللي عندي في نفس الشيء يعني اذا كانت دولة اخرى طبعا عدا فرنسا و انجلترا و امريكا. الصين كعضو دائم يكون عندها علم بهذه [Unintelligible] يعني رايبم انه الصينيين عندهم نفس الراي فيما اذا العراق قدم هذه الورقة و هذه التاكيدات الي اعتراف العراق بالكويت و	The comment that I have is about the same matter. If it were another state expect France, England, or America, [pauses] China as a permanent member must have a knowledge of this [unintelligible]. I mean their opinion. Would the Chinese have the same opinion if Iraq were to present this paper and these confirmations in

		<p>regards to Iraq recognizing Kuwait, recognizing the borders that were drawn by the United Nations, and recognizing the issues of the missing personals? These three things [unintelligible]. Are the results going to be positive? Like they had said, this paper is to be presented after making sure that a specific time was set up for the surveillance issue, which they had limited it to six months. Was the possibility of shorting this period discussed at all? The six months to three months for example. By applying these things, I believe that we are making a step forward in order to lead us to some results. It appears to me that the Russians are either mistaken in their understanding to the situation, I mean in regards to the paper and the answers that they had given to the Iraqis [pauses]. From their statement, it appears that they do not have complete knowledge of the situation. Second, the economical aspect is very important to them. In regards to the things that he had presented, I have noticed that during this period of time, [pauses] if it were possible to consider the oil application that is worked on by the General Secretary of the United Nations [unintelligible] which they had agreed on to be twelve percent. The economical aspect is more important to them than the issue of principles to save Iraq from these crises and to help us. My suggestion would be that the Chinese must be informed with this direction. We must find out to what point they would support us in this direction along with the other countries also. [Unintelligible] while the Russians believe that they are the only ones who are taking care of this case. To what point do we trust the</p>
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	<p>Russian leadership? In the past, the Russian leadership [unintelligible]. I mean they look after their own interests before anything else. Of course their interests meet with Iraq's strategically, but they have momentarily interests with the other countries, and they are not hiding that. [Unintelligible] "We take into consideration our interests in the Gulf and our interests with the engagement countries." To what point do we trust the Russians to stick with us until the end? If they were serious, I think that this would be good. Good during the current stage and the current circumstances that we are in. Within three, four, or five months, we must reach something specific. We must achieve some results. Of course, the American stance is clear. The Americans are still insisting on their stance. They repeat them in President Clinton's letters to the congress or in their media. However, there is no doubt that the international reality had changed towards our case. The Arabic stance is very important, but we are not seeing any influence. Even in the media, we see nothing. I mean from the Arabic states, nothing was issued in regards to this case and that even goes for the media. Nothing powerful nothing from the Arab League, even Egypt did not issue anything [unintelligible]. Perhaps the non-aligned would have a more powerful stance. This is my opinion and your majesty knows more than anyone else that this [unintelligible]. I believe that the route we are taking in this case and the diplomatic movement that you had instructed is a good thing. We must not stop working. The Russians have a test in the front of them and the case of [Al-Bair] is not far away. Let us see</p>
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		how they act. The Russians are not confident that Ekeus [unintelligible]
MV3:	يعني انا اعتقد يعني الى الان اشياء كثيرة الروس ما قالوا لنا عليها. هل انهم يقفون معنا مائة بالمائة؟ هل انها الثقة كاملة؟ انا اعتقد لو في دولة اخرى او دولتين او ثلاثة اعضاء في مجلس الامن و الاخذ منهم بعض الاراء و بعض الموافقات بالنسبة الى هذه الخطة شيء جيد. و هذا مطلوب الى سيادتك و الى الرفاق الاخرين [Unintelligible] انا اعتقد هذه اتجاه سليم يعني بالنسبة الى الظروف الحالية احنا ماشيين صح.	I believe that up until this point, the Russians have not told us about many things. Are they standing with us a hundred percent? Is there a complete trust? I believe that if there were another country or two or even three members in the Security Council, to take some opinions and approvals from them in regards to this plan, the situation will be very good. This is required by your majesty and the other fellows. [Unintelligible] I believe that this is the right direction and in regards to the current circumstances, we are moving in the right direction.
Saddam:	رفيق طه.	Fellow Taha
Taha:	سيادة الرئيس الحالة واضحة بتقرير القيسي. تعليق الرفيق طارق بصورة واضحة بس واضح يعني الا اكو شيء مغاير سمعنا او ... واضح الاجتهاد اللي رحنا اله و بعثنا واحد اله في الدورة السابقة انه الموقف الفرنسي هو ليس موقفهم في الدورة الي قبلها [Unintelligible] فالان نحن نطلب من روسيا ان تنسق مع فرنسا كما يظهر فرنسا مو بالموقع اللي... فهذا اذا كان صحيح شو قد يكون الموقف يخدمنا في مجلس الامن؟ لانه ما اخبي عن سيادتك روسيا انا ما عندي ثقة بيها و تبلورت من يوم اللي جوا و المبادرة اللي طرحناها [Unintelligible] يعني و الان هم يعني بوضعية انا اعتقد اسوأ من تلك الواقعية بيعهم و شرائهم و الضغط عليهم في اللحظات الاخيرة ممكن. اذا كان هم الان في الوجه يعني هل اكو سبب بالنسبة لفرنسا ليش مو متحمسة؟ في الوقت اللي هي قبل اربعة اشهر [Unintelligible] و ما عندنا هيك قضايا يعني فقط كانت تستند على القرار 715 و اعتذرت و الخطوة	Mr. President, the case is very clear in Al-Qaisy report. The presentation of fellow Tariq is also clear. However, there is one thing that was different. Our interpretation of the French stance is also clear. Their stance in the previous session was different from their stance before that. [Unintelligible] right now, we are asking Russia to coordinate with France. It appears that France is not in the position that would [pauses] if this were to be true, how would the situation benefit us in the Security Council? To be honest with you your majesty, I have no confidence in Russia. This theory had come about since the day they had come in and since the initiative that we had presented. [Unintelligible] right now, they are in a worse position than that reality. Selling them, buying them, or pressuring them is very possible at the last moments. If they were in the front right now [the Russians], is there a reason why France is not too excited? Four months ago, [unintelligible] they had no issues with that. They had only

		<p>depended on the Resolution 715. They had apologized and that was a very positive step. China comes to the mind. However, I would like to focus on France. Why did China not come? Their stance originally was not hostile, so why? We want their position to be bigger and better. Did it cross your mind [pauses] after we indicated our point of view in regards to Kuwait [pauses] we had also showed a well to conditionally accept the Resolution 815, but they did not agree. [Unintelligible]. Has it crossed your mind that if America were to insist along with some other countries on their point of views [pauses] Especially since neither France or Russia would do anything. Did you discuss the scenario that if America and Britain insisted that the surveillance would not even start in September? Is there a vision for that? There has to be one. The American influence on Ekeus is the greatest. Any gaps in his report will make their mission easier. The idea of September passing by like July did is very possible. In case of that, what would the Russian stance be like? We had exposed our cards in regards to Kuwait and other things. As a result, our influence will be weaker. When you expand the knowledge of these issues, its influence and role will diminish later. If we did not have influence [pauses] what is the next step in case of an American success, with the help of Ekeus, to cancel the surveillance or the limitation of the six months? Is their a scenario for that or not? I am afraid that what had happened previously would happen again. These questions [Tape cuts from 30:52 to 33:55]</p>
Saddam:	ما نشأت مصالح لروسيا في موضوع	Russian interests were not established

		with Kuwait in regards to the arms aspect. France had established interests with some countries, add to that other methods. The conclusion is that every time they strip us of our cards, we become weaker. However, we had accepted and committed to this policy.
Taha:	سيادة الرئيس...	Mr. President
Saddam:	<p>و كل خطوة كنا نقدم عليها لتطبيق الفقرة... القرار 687 كان يقال لنا انه هذا يسها عليكم رفع الحصار. و لكن جردونا من اسلحتناز هسا احنا لو عندنا صواريخ و عندنا كيماوي, التعامل معانا كان يختلف. يعني مين يقدر يقول هسا انه هذا لا. لا انا اقول كان يختلف. لانه هم عدد الصواريخ اللي دمروها اكثر من عدد الصواريخ اللي استخدمناها احنا بالحرب. و كل قواعدنا كانت سليمة. و حجم الكيماوي اللي كان عندنا لم نستخدم منه بالحرب و لا قطرة. كل خزينا الكبير و كان خزين كبير اكثر من خزين بعض الدول الكبرى. و المكانن اللي دمروها هي مكانن حذفت من الطاقة العراقية للعمل الانتاجي المدني. ما كانوا متساهلين ابدأ في هذا الموضوع. و الخزين من الذهب اللي كان عندنا لشراء بعض المواد كان اكبر من الخزين الان اللي موجود. اذن اريد اقول انه مع الزمن... احنا صحيح بدنا نكسب و لكن هذا الكسن ما بيه رصيد. فاعل لاغراض رفع الحصار و كله حتى هذه اللحظة هي تمنيات علينا بان نحسن من موقفنا و كأنما احنا المطلوبين. نقدم النوب عربون جديد للفقرة 22. و العربون مو بصيغة شرطية او نقول نعتذر لمجلس الامن لانه لا يقبل هذا الكلام. بصيغة التنازل. الواضح على الاقل في النتيجة ان لم يكن بالصيغ القانونية المسبقة. لاي</p>	<p>Each step that we took to implement the paragraph [pauses] the Resolution 687; they used to say to us, "This will make it easier for you to lift the sanctions." They had stripped us from our weapons. If we had missiles and chemical weapons right now, dealing with us would be different. Who can say that this is not true? I say that it would be different. The number of missiles that they had destroyed is more than the number of rockets that we had used during the war. All of our bases were still in good shape. We had not even used a drop of the chemical weapons that we had. Our reserve was huge. It was even larger than some of the reserves of some big countries. The factories that they had destroyed had eliminated some of the Iraqi energy for the civil production process. They did not take it easy at all in this subject. The gold reserve that we had to buy some commodities was larger than the reserve that we have right now. What I want to say is that [pauses] it is true that we would like to gain something. However, this gain has no balance. It is supposed to be effective to lift the sanction, but until this moment, it has been nothing but wishes for us to improve our stance. It is like we are wanted. This time we are giving a commission for the paragraph 22. The commission is not conditional nor is it an apology to the Security Council that they won't</p>

		<p>accept it. It is a waiver formula. There is neither a result nor a legal draft for any of their steps. It is missing. So what do we do? In regards to the Russians, we have no any other choices. Who would sit with us and talk to us with some dedication or sympathy other than the Russians? This has not been available until the visit of the Foreign Minister. Perhaps after the visit of the Foreign Minister, he might come up with new results or information. Even china was not willing to do so. Only the Russians had this commitment. That is why we went to the Russians and this is what you have been informed with. Right now, we have not presented anything. It is better that we do not present anything until the discussions that will take place in September. We have to urge all parties to issue something specific in September so we can have some amount of conviction. A minimum conviction that the Security Council has the intentions to implement their obligations according to their resolutions. Otherwise, we will lose all trust in the Security Council. At that point, there will not be a common language between us and the Iraqi people will have the right to search for other methods. They will have the right to behave in a way that will keep them alive. All of the other issues are listed in the document. Now we have to take care of life. How can the Iraqi person find food in order to live and not die? How can he get medical treatment so he will not die? This is included in the human rights that they are asking us to commit to right now. We should not give up this paper easily. It does not have a huge value but it still has some value in the Arabic scale and not the international</p>
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	<p>one. We must not give it up internationally. I am sure that there is something that has been prepared for it. If we give it up, we will have nothing to present on the Arabic level. The weight of our diplomacy will be less. What would we tell an Arab or a Saudi if he says, "I am ready for a fresh start, but you must resolve the issue of Kuwait"? If we have already given up everything in a free document, we will not be able to give them anything of importance. This will also apply to the Moroccan and the Bahraini. There are Arabic contacts that were initiated with us, and some of these contacts were initiated by us. We should sit and wait for the situation to develop in regards to the sovereignty issue or what is called the Kuwaiti sovereignty and the borders. I am talking about our Arabic communications. Once there is a serious transfer in the Arabic stance, I would accept a serious solution without crises. Otherwise, I cannot imagine a serious solution through the Security Council without crises. I do not have any of these illusions. We have been dealing with the Security Council and abiding by its resolutions for four years and nothing has happened! The Russians are the same, the Americans are the same, and the English are the same. The anti Iraqi group is more powerful than the pro Iraqi group. The pro Iraqi group is trapped between two scenarios; between their interests and strategic relationships with Iraq and between their momentarily interests that are controlled by many currents, motives, plots, and pressures applied by America and the American allies in the region. This goes to the Arabic world, especially the Arabic Gulf</p>
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		<p>region. According to that, I can say that the diplomatic effort that we have done is good. We must continue reminding the countries that we visit of the importance of a clear resolution next September, which will balance itself with the Iraqi action in regards to our commitment to the paragraph C in the Resolution 687. All of the weapons were destroyed. All of the materials were destroyed. All of the factories were destroyed or detained. There is a paragraph that expresses the importance of implementing paragraph 22. We will tell the Russians exactly what fellow Tariq had presented. "Your thoughts that were discussed with Al-Qaisy were treated with respect. Your stance in regards to discussing things between you and Iraq gets all of the respect from the leadership. The ultimate respect. This is evidence that there is an intention to expand the future cooperation and we are very happy with this. The political aspect of your thoughts will be taken into consideration when we find out that there is a serious and suitable atmosphere in the Security Council to perform their commitments to their resolutions in September." After that, we will have a common discussion for the future steps. The elements in fellow Taha's letter which he had discussed with the Foreign Minister should be discussed with the French. These elements should also be discussed with the Chinese. After that, we can find out who is ready to sit down with us as the Russians did to discuss the details. Through the discussion, we will form an idea about what is possible. This is a part of our public policy in the speech that we had given in August. Every time that we</p>
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		<p>get a chance to improve the Arabic stance and the discussion with the Arabic Gulf countries in regards to their common relationships with Iraq, we must not ignore these opportunities, exactly as we are doing right now. The United Arab Emirates had officially contacted us. It was the son of Sheik Zayed. He was the one who had called. He had a dialogue with fellow Barzan, according to an initiative from him. One of the princes, who is considered to be one of the old and influential members in the Saudi family, had conducted an initiation. He had called fellow Barzan, but he claimed that his contact must be classified as personal. This contact shall lead to informing king Fahad with all of the details. We had dealt with him according to that because he knows more than anyone about the atmosphere in the family. Based on our experience, no prince from the family is able to initiate a contact and talk about things that he had talked about without having a green light. Before that, the Americans had called us and said that the Saudi's had asked for their mediation. They had said that Prince Bandar had asked them to mediate in order for them to express to us their desire to have a meeting with Iraq. They had given a name from the Iraqi state among the army officers. So when they were discussing things with the Ambassador, we asked them, "Why did you choose this person?" They had said, "Because Bandar knows him and he had met with him at the time of Al-Qadisiya in some place." They had also said, "This is not a strict condition. You can nominate whoever it is that you want. This is only the desire of [pauses]". We had nominated</p>
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		<p>the person that we wanted, the nomination was welcomed, but we have not received a response yet. We had accepted the idea of meeting with the Saudi's because our policy consists of not hiding anything. We had publicly announced our willingness and desire to do that. Was the Saudi Prince's contact with Barzan an attempt to double check the word that they had received from the Americans, of course in regards to the idea that the Iraqis had accepted the idea and they are willing to discuss the dual relationship with them?</p>
Taha:	ويا السعوديين؟	With the Saudis?
Saddam:	<p>ويا السعوديين بحيث خللوا امير اخر يتصل ببرزان لتشغيل الخط او انه هذا الاتصال الثاني هو ممكن ان يكون بديل للفكرة الاولى بعد ما جاهم اسم المرشح و...؟ يعني يعني ما تدري. لساعها هي هاي حايسة. تحليلي العام قل هذا الموضوع تتذكرون يعني في اجتماع سابق. قلت لكم انو الامريكان ما راح يتراجعون عن موقفهم و يتركون حلفائهم بالمنطقة متورطين في علاقة سيئة الى اخر لحظة مع العراق. راح يحاولون ايضا بشتى الطرق ينطون فرصة لحلفائهم ان يبحثوا موضوعهم مع العراق و هذا بحد ذاته را يسهل للامريكان مهمة الخطوة اللاحقة في مجلس الامن. يعني سواء ما ينجم عنه من نتائج او ما ينجم عنه من اجواء. احنا بالنسبة لنا احسن جو مريح هو ان نبحث هذه الموضوعات مع عرب الخليج تحديدا. مباشرة و من غير وسطاء و من غير شيء. و اهم ما ينبغي البحث و اياهم السعوديين. هذا موضوع من زمان يعني محلله للرفيق طارق و برزان دخل و ايانا في صيغة و بعثنا برسالة عن طريق سباعوي الى قائد المنطقة الشرقية و قال انه يعني انا</p>	<p>Yes with the Saudis. They had made another prince call Barzan to keep the line busy. The second call might be a substitute to the first idea since they had gotten the name of the nominee. We do not know. The situation is still cooking. My general assumption would be, you remember what I said to you in a previous meeting? I told you that the Americans will not back down from their stance and leave their allies in the region trapped in bad relationships to the last moment with Iraq. They will try with all means to give their allies a chance to discuss their situation with Iraq. This alone could make the American mission easier in regards to the next step at the Security Council. This applies to the results and the atmospheres that could be created. The most comfortable scenario for us is to particularly discuss these issues with the Gulf Arabs. We must do it directly without any mediators or anything else. The Saudis are the most important party whom we should discuss things with. I have given fellow Tariq permission to do so for a long time. Barzan had developed a draft with us. We had sent</p>


		the commander of the eastern region a letter through Sab'awi. He had said that letter had arrived and there was no objection to it. I believe that if there were no objection, the letter will be discussed positively. However, we have not heard anything directly.
MV4:	[Unintelligible] عندهم بعض الاشارات الجادة	[Unintelligible] they had some serious signs.
Saddam:	ما متابع انا هذا. ما متابع. طلع تصريح سيء جدا من وزير الخارجية السعودي و ردينا عليه بقسوة اكثر من قسوته. او بمستوى تستحق قسوته.	I have not followed up with that. I am not following that. There was a very bad statement made by the Saudi Foreign Minister. We had responded to him with more harshness than his. Or let's say, we had responded in a manner that equals his harshness.
MV4:	المصريين سيادة الرئيس يعني ما كو شيء يعني	Mr. President, there was nothing from Egypt. I mean
Saddam:	المصريين احنا كل اشارة تصدر من اي دولة ترى ما نخليها تفوت. برقيات السفراء نوبات تحيني بصيغة انه قبلت فلان و حكى فلان ارد اعلق اقول له قول لفلان فلان شي و فلان شي و فلان شي. يعني ما نخلي اشارة تفوت من غير ما نتحرك عليها. القطريين سبق ان قالوا لسفيرنا انه موضوع حل موضوع الكويت و الخ يعني موضوعات الكويت. قلنا لهم انتوا شنو تصوركم للحل و شنو التزاماتكم اتجاه الحل؟ هم ايضا جاوبناهم و استدعيت السفير و مليت عليه الصورة و اخذها و راح و هم ما جاني جواب منهم.	Speaking of the Egyptians, we should not ignore any signs sent from any country. The Ambassadors' telegraphs sometimes come to me stating that someone said this, someone accepts that. I reply to them, "Say to this guy this and to that guy that". We must not let any sign go by without reacting to it. The Qatari had previously discussed with our Ambassador the resolution of Kuwait's issue in addition to the rest of the issues with Kuwait. We had said to them, "What is your vision of the solution? What are your commitments towards any solution?" We had responded to them. I had summoned the Ambassador and I had filled him in on the situation. He took the ideas and we have not heard anything from them yet.
MV4:	ما يقولون هذا الكويت.	They did not say that Kuwait
Saddam:	فاي دول عدا السعودية تخلق جو لكن ما تقدر تلتزم بشيء يفرض على الكويتيين و يلعب دور مع الامريكان مثل السعودية.	Any other countries beside Saudi Arabia can create an atmosphere. However, no one could commit themselves to obligate Kuwait to do anything or play a role with the Americans other than Saudi Arabia.

Taha:	هذا صحيح.	That is true.
Saddam:	اتصلتانا نواصلها مع المحيط العربي و اتصالاتنا الدبلوماسية بالاطار اللي شرحناه الان و اللي شرح سابقا مستمر بيها. و لكن هذه الورقة علينا ان لا نستعجل بيها. لانه ان قدمناها في المحيط الدولي من غير مقابل واضح امامنا فستسقط هذه الورقة في المحيط العربي.	We must continue our communications with the Arabic surroundings within the frame that we had discussed now and in the past. We should not rush this paper. If we were to present it to the international community without something in return, this paper will be worthless in the Arabic surrounding.
MV5:	Sorry.	Sorry.
Saddam:	ما يعود الها تاثير. فاذا هذا التصور ما عليه اعتراض حتى دبلوماسيتنا تصاغ بهذا الاتجاه فالرفيق طارق يحضر في ايلول القادم من غير ان نقدم اي ورقة. و انما يدفع بما يقدم من مطالعة سياسية و قانونية باتجاه ان يطبق مجلس الامن التزاماته بموجب القرارات و يصبح واضح. بما في ذلك اي صيغة من صيغ ما يسمى [Unintelligible] مع تسفيه عدم اهميتها بعد ان طبقت اللجنة الخاصة فعلا الرقابة و ثبتتها و تيقنت من عدم وجود اي شيء من الاسلحة و ما شابه ذلك مما تدعي بيه و لكن اذا ما صارت ضرورية يفضل ان تكون على اقل زمن. و اذا لم يكن بالامكان اقل زمن فعلى الاقل بزمانهم يصير التزام بانه هو نهاية الاقل نهاية النفق. النفق اللي يفضي بصورة اكيدة الى تطبيق الفقرة 22.	It will not have any influence. There is no objection to this and our diplomacy is run in this direction. Fellow Tariq will attend next September without presenting any documents. He will argue the political and the legal aspects and push towards a commitment by the Security Council in regards to their resolutions. This includes any drafts that they call [unintelligible] along with expressing the unimportant aspect of it. Especially after the committee had actually applied the surveillance and confirmed it. They had made sure that there are no weapons that they were claiming. However, if they were to insist on it, it would be preferred to be as short as possible. If it was not possible to have the shortest period of time possible, there has to be a commitment that this will be the end of the horizon. The end of the tunnel. The tunnel that would surely lead to the implementation of paragraph 22.
Taha:	هو ستة اشهر.	It is six months.
Saddam:	بهاي الفترة. عاد اللي عنده حركة من الدول العربية و غير ذلك يعني اي تطور في مجلس الامن يساعد على تطور الموقف العربي. اي تطور في الموقف العربي يدفع الى تطور في مجلس الامن. ليس هناك اسغناء عن اي حال ببديل المقابل. و انما يعني ندفع	Yes, during this time. Any movement from the Arabic States or from others [pauses] what I mean is that any improvement in the Security Council will be helpful to improve the Arabic stance. Any improvement in the Arabic stance will push towards an improvement in the Security Council.

		There is no giving up on neither side. We must push in both directions. Fellow Tariq.
Tariq:	سيدي الاتصال الامريكي بينا يعني اتصال بندر من خلال الامريكان اله مغزى. يعني مهم امريكي	Sir, the American contact with us [pauses] I mean the call from Bandar through the Americans has a motive behind it. It is important for the Americans
Saddam:	الا اذا كان ينطوي على لعبة استخبارية خاصة.	Unless it was all about a special intelligence game.
Tariq:	محتمل. بس هو بندر يعني هو يقدر يتصل بنزار مباشرة يعرفه على الصعيد الشخصي لين هم كانوا	Possible. However, Bandar could have called Nizar directly. He knows him personally. They used to be
Saddam:	لا هم السعوديين السعوديين لا يستطيعون و الامريكان رايدون ان يوضحوا ان الاتصال السعودي ما يقدر يتم الا من خلالنا. كلاهما متفق ان يشعر العراق بانهم في موقف واحد حتى العراق لا يتوهم انه السعوديين اتصلوا من غير استشارة الامريكان او ان الامريكان بادروا من غير استشارة السعوديين فهذه مفهومة. و احنا ما كان عندنا وهم في انه بامكان السعوديين ان يتصلون قبل ان يستشيرون اعمامهم الامريكان.	No the Saudi [pauses] the Saudis are incapable. The Americans want to let us know that the Saudi contact could not have been initiated without them. They both agree that Iraq must get the feeling that both of them adopt the same stance. They did that so Iraq does not get the idea that the Saudis had called without the consultation of the Americans or that the Americans had initiated something without the consultation of the Saudis. This is understood. We have no doubt that the Saudis are incapable of making a contact before consulting with their American uncles.
Tariq:	هذا واضح سيدي. الجانب الاخر في الصورة. لما كنا في تموز في نيويورك تدري احنا صار نقدر	This is very clear sir. The other side of the picture [pauses]. As you know, when we were in New York, we had become capable of
Saddam:	لكن السعوديين في باطنيتهم المعروفة بعد ما اخذوا الموافقة العراقية على اجراء الاتصال و صار عندهم واضح , لا تستبعد انهم يجرون اتصال اخر ليوحون و كانما هم لايمرون من القنوات... القناة الامريكية. لكن بالنسبة لنا واضح و بالنسبة للعالم كلهم واضح. احنا اي اتصال يجروه يعني تتفاعل و اياه و ندفع باتجاه تطويره. يعني احنا قبلنا.... يعني احنا قلنا لهم للامريكان انه نوافق على الاتصال بالسعودية.	However, the Saudis are known with their internal mentality. They had gotten the Iraqi approval to proceed with the contact and it was confirmed to them, so do not dismiss the idea that they might initiate another contact to indicate that they are not using channels. The American channel. This is very clear to us and to the world. We must react and develop any contact made by them. We had accepted it. We had told the

		<p>Americans that we agree on contacting Saudi Arabia. We had talked about that with the Americans. When the Saudis had contacted us without the Americans, we had initiated a dialogue with them. Barzan had told him, "If you insist that you are here only to observe my point of view and take it back to the family to come up with a stance, [pauses]" The guy was happy with what he had heard from Barzan. We had briefed Barzan with our desire to have a communication and our will to give Fahad a document in regards to the Kuwaiti sovereignty. This can be possible under the condition that Kuwait must show clear commitment towards our national rights and the injustice that was applied on Iraq. Anyway, he was very happy with the proposal similar to happiness of the son of Sheik Zayed with this logic. Of course the Saudis are ill people, old people, and they are the kind of people that stay up all night and sleep all day. Do not expect them to act the same way we do. When they get news, do not expect them to hold an immediate meeting like we do with our fellows to take the proper procedure. They need some time and we have to be patient.</p>
Tariq:	<p>سيدي في تموز يعني في المناقشات التي اجريناها ويا اعضاء مجلس الامن و كنا نسالهم يعني بشكل مباشر و الروس....</p>	<p>Sir, during the dialogues that we had conducted with the members of the Security Council in July, we used to ask them directly along with the Russians</p>
Saddam:	<p>لذلك انا قلت للرفيق طارق لا تكثر لي توسيع نطاق الاطلاع بالعناصر لانه هم راح تخف عند العرب. ذولا ما تدري الباكستانيين شو يحكون. يعني انا اخاف من ذولا بلدان العالم الثالث بطريقة كلامهم. يجوا يقولون العراقيين راح يقدمون ورقة و بيها الاعتراف بالحدود و الاعتراف بالسيادة الخ. يقول</p>	<p>That is why I had asked fellow Tariq not to expand the knowledge with these elements because this will reduce its efficiency among the Arabs. You do not know what the Pakistanis might say. I am afraid from these Third World Countries when it comes to the way they speak. They might say, "The Iraqis are going to present a</p>

		document which will include their recognition towards the borders and the sovereignty." As a result, the Saudis would say, "Why should we commit to this?" Despite all of that, I am confident that the Saudis do not wish us to present this document through the Security Council.
Taha:	نعم.	Yes.
Saddam:	<p>يتمنون يعني انهم يحافظون على قدر من ماء وجوههم عندما تأتي هذه الحالة من خلالهم امام شعبيهم و امامنا و امام العرب و المسلمين. يعني هم فاتوا فوثة غلط كبيرة. فعلى الاقل حتى يقولوا لهم احنا يعني لما تاكدنا بانه العراق يحترم سيادة الكويت و الخ من امور فاصبح ليس هناك مسوغ لاستمرار حالة العداء و الموقف مع العراق. يعني هذه يحتاجوها السعوديين و هم يعني اغبياء اذا يخللونها تقوت. لانه اذا دخلت من مجلس الامن بافترض و تطور موقف مجلس الامن هم راح يبقون في حالة ... في اسوأ حالة.</p>	<p>They would like to preserve their dignity by having a solution coming through them. They want to keep their dignity in front of their people, us, the Arabs, and the Muslims. They had entered from the wrong entrance. Bottom line, they would like to say, "When we had gotten the confirmation that Iraq respects the sovereignty of Kuwait etc, there is no reason for the hostility to continue towards Iraq." Saudis need this one and they would be stupid to let it slide. If this were to go through the Security Council and develop out there, they will be in a worse situation.</p>
	(مجموعة تقاطع)	[Group interrupt]
Tariq:	<p>سيدي هذه الاشارات ترى بيها فائدة ان تخوف السعودية و تخليلها تستعجل لانه السعودية احنا دزينا لهم الخبر و ناموا عليه فترة طويلة و السعودية هم من النوع اذا ما تشوف الامور يعني راح تفلت من ايدها</p>	<p>Sir, these indications are useful because it will scare Saudi Arabia and make them hurry up. We had sent the news to the Saudis. They had slept on it for a long time and that is because the Saudis are the type that will not react unless the situation starts to slide away from their hands.</p>
	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Tariq:	<p>ردت اقول سيدي على موضوع السعودية في نيويورك كانت الاسئلة تطرح انه طيب الامريكان اخروا اكيوس اكيوس تاخر لانه المفروض من بداية هذه السنة يقدم تقريره و اخروه. وعد بتموز و بتموز قالوا بايلول. بايلول ممكن يتاخر اسبوعين شهر افرض العراقيين يصيرون و يطولون بالهم عليه وراها لازم يقدم</p>	<p>Sir, I want to say something in regards to Saudi Arabia. In New York, there were questions about what if the Americans were to delay Ekeus? He was supposed to present his report at the beginning of the year and they had delayed him. He promised to have it ready in July but when July came, they said September. In September, the report might get delayed for two</p>



	<p>weeks or for a month. Let's assume that the Iraqis will have patient. After that he must present a report. He must present a report. If they were to refuse that, the Security Council must discuss its commitments towards Iraq. What will happen? At that point, Iraq can simply say, "Stop right there! I will not deal with the Security Council or with Ekeus." In that case, what can the Security Council do to Iraq? At that point, Ekeus will not be able to come to the council and say that Iraq had violated the cease fire like he used to do in the past. In the past, when we refused something, he used to go to the Council, issue a statement, and say that this is a violation of the cease fire. Now, they cannot say that. America will face a problem. They will either have to submit and the decision will be taken despite of them, or they will behave individually towards Iraq and that will cause them crisis. They would face crisis in more than one place. So what are they going to do? Are they going to go to war with Iraq and bombard Iraq like they did in the past? How will...</p>
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[END OF RECORDING]