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Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Romania,
'Annual Work Summary for 1961 from the [Chinese]
Embassy in Romania'

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Summary:

The Chinese Embassy in Bucharest reflects on Romania's foreign policy, Sino-Romanian relations, and domestic developments in Romania in 1961.

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Request that the Division of Soviet and European Affairs study and act [upon this report].

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs Incoming Telegram

Annual Work Summary for 1961 from the [Chinese] Embassy in Romania
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The development of international relations in 1961 was complicated. At the 1960 Moscow Conference, the truth of Marxism-Leninism achieved a significant victory, while revisionist viewpoints met a heavy loss. In Romania, revisionist ideas were retreating for a while, and Romania's attitude towards us improved somewhat. However, the Moscow Conference did not solve the fundamental problem of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, revisionism and pacifism [translator's note: *heping zhuyi*] in Romania further developed over the last year. After the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Romania's revisionist thinking flourished again. Romanian party leaders have closely followed Khrushchev's incorrect route. They made compromises with imperialism and actively participated in the factionalist activities led by Khrushchev to divide the international communist movement. However, because Romania has a different domestic condition, position, and interests from the Soviet Union, its policies were not the same as the Soviet Union's. Economic development in Romania had some progress in the past year. However, in the sector of political ideology and culture/art, the Romanian government emphasized consumerism internally, and peaceful co-existence externally. Therefore, its revisionism, humanism [translator's note: *rendao zhuyi*], and pacifism developed greatly. Now we will provide a summary of Romania's internal/external situation, Sino-Romanian relations, and our work in the past year:

I. Romanian's International Relations in 1961

In 1961 we saw a continuous development of Romanian foreign relations. In the past year, Romania established a diplomatic relationship with Brazil; decided to upgrade the legation to an embassy in Burma; sent envoys to Japan and Guinea; and recognized Syria and other newly independent countries. Except for visits between leaders in Romania and the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, Romania also received Sukarno and Kwame Nkrumah.

Between 1960-1961 Romanian foreign trade increased 50-percent compared to 1959 (according to the speech of the trade minister in the Great Assembly). From the calculation, the trading volume in 1960 was 30-percent higher than in 1959, and we estimated that it increased 11-percent in 1961. The trade volume between Romania and socialist countries did not increase much. Romanian-Soviet trade increased at most five to six percent. Romania's trade with Poland and Bulgaria increased 42 percent and 20 percent according to the Romanian plan. However, the trade volume was small before. Therefore it did not impact Romania's trade volume in general even if the plan was realized. The trade with China, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, [North] Korea, and Albania was lower than the year before. The biggest trade volume increase in 1961 was due to the trade with capitalist countries. The trade volume between Romania and France, Italy and Yugoslavia increased 30-percent, 60-percent, and 50-percent in 1961. After Romania settled its financial problem with a series of countries in recent years, France, Austria, Italy, and other countries held an industrial exhibition in Romania. People in the business sector in the United States, Britain, and West Germany also started their activities in Romania. The trade relations between Romania and Latin America and Africa developed as well. In 1961, Romania signed five-year-long-term trade agreements with Brazil and Ghana.

In 1961 the Romanian government still emphasized that peaceful co-existence was their general direction for foreign relations. They believe the most urgent problem is the problem between war and peace, but not anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.

Thus, they considered all-around disarmament as the only reliable option to solve the problem of war and peace, and put disarmament as the “problem within a problem” and “the critical problem.” Under the guidance of revisionism and pacifism, Romania enhanced its presence in the United Nations in the past year. It actively promoted its “education of pacifism among youth” and its suggestion to reach regional understandings. Inside the socialist camp, Romania joined the revisionist group which Khrushchev and others formed. To imperialist countries, Romania abandoned struggling with them and begging for peace. To nationalist governments, Romania suggested unity without principles and refused to criticize the anti-revolutionary elements of capitalist rulers in those countries.

1. Romania believed that Leninism was outdated, and considered that Lenin’s definition of the imperialist era “could not reflect the fundamental facts in the modern times.” Thus, Romania claimed that they were against “dogmatism” and “factionalism.” Romania did not oppose modern revisionism, which is the major danger right now, and followed Khrushchev to form the revisionist group with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, and other countries. At the same time, they were increasing their factionalist activities inside the international communist movement and socialist camp. After the Moscow Conference in 1960 and before the 22nd Congress, Romania and the Soviet Union further flattered each other, and Romania actively supported Khrushchev’s incorrect international relations policies and domestic de-Stalinization policy. Under the lead of Khrushchev, Romania improved its relationship with other socialist countries. Romanian leaders concluded exchange visits with Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Polish leaders; by doing this, they planned to support each other politically and solve some economic problems. On the other hand, Romania tried to isolate China and Albania, which insisted on the truth of Marxist-Leninism. Specifically, the Romanian government used a cold attitude and imposed restrictions on the activities of Chinese and Albanians in Romania. After the 22nd Congress, Romania followed Khrushchev’s right-wing opportunism more closely and participated in the cohort of anti-China and anti-Albania. The Romanian government criticized Albania openly, ousted Albanian students, prohibited the publication of Albanian newsletters in Romania, restricted and limited the regular operation of the Albanian embassy, and stopped all cultural and economic exchange with Albania.

Since Romania and the Soviet Union were on the same page in general and Romania relied on the Soviet economy heavily, the Soviet Union had some leverage over Romania’s military and politics. Romania basically considers Soviet foreign policy to be its guideline for foreign policy. However, because Romania had a different condition, position, and national interests from the Soviet Union, it did not simply copy Soviet foreign policies. For example, Romania has a softer attitude towards the United States than the Soviet Union. On the attitude towards China and Albania, Romania was less aggressive than the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria since Romania feared a further split of the socialist camp.

Romania also has some conflicts with the Soviet Union and other East European socialist countries. For example, there is a conflict between Soviet chauvinism and Romanian nationalism, as well as a conflict between the Soviet’s tight control attempts and Romanian’s anti-control measures when it comes to Romania’s politics and economy. The conflicts between Romania and other East European countries were generally economic conflicts. Since Romania made progress in the economy, it also changed its export structure. Now Romania wants to export machinery to socialist countries. At the same time, Romania was unwilling to export agricultural products such as corn to fraternal countries since it wanted to sell agricultural products to the West in exchange for foreign currency and new technologies. Romania’s behavior caused dissatisfaction among other East European countries, especially East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Those conflicts will surely develop gradually.

2. Since Romania was afraid of intensive situations and wars, it strongly promoted the idea of peaceful co-existence with imperialist countries. Although Romania did some work to reveal imperialism by promoting national liberation movements, it did not criticize imperialist policies of war and invasion, especially American imperialism. To make compromises with imperialism, Romania emphasized peace negotiations in the

past year and planned to reach peaceful co-existence by negotiating important issues. Last April, when Khrushchev met with Kennedy; when Algeria started negotiations with France; and when the Geneva conference on the Laos issue was going to be held, Romania began to promote the victory of the "negotiation mindset." When the Soviet Union increased its pressure on the United States in July and August, Gheorghiu-Dej started to talk about the "Three-Nos World" and suggested solving the problem of West Berlin and Germany with negotiations. Romania believes that developing economic and cultural relationships with imperialist countries is the basis for peaceful co-existence. Thus, Romania tried hard to develop economic and cultural relationships with capitalist countries. The trading volume between Romania and France, Italy, Austria, and other countries increased significantly. After the signing of the cultural exchange agreement between the United States and Romania, the US sent many more people to Romania. This will expand the impact of the American lifestyle and capitalist thinking in Romania. To improve the relationship with imperialist countries, Romania provided a high reception level to people from imperialist countries. Also, Romania was willing to bow down in front of imperialist countries by sending the vice president of the Council of Ministers, Alexandru Moghioroș, to the United States and Canada for an unofficial visit. Romania did not criticize American imperialism directly but treated Republicans, not Kennedy, as the cause of American policies on launching wars and invasions.

Because Romania generally shared the same view with Yugoslavia on peaceful co-existence, war and peace, and disarmament, it abandoned the struggle with Yugoslav modern revisionism. Moreover, Romania actively tried to improve the Romanian-Yugoslav relationship and enlarged the cultural and sports exchange with Yugoslavia. After the 22nd Congress, Romania further helped the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to suppress Albania. However, Romania was still cautious about Yugoslavia and also feared that a too close-Romanian-Yugoslav relationship might be treated as revisionism. Therefore, the Romanian government treated this relationship subtly. Sometimes the Romanian government treated Yugoslavia as a socialist country but sometimes did not invite the Yugoslav ambassador to socialist diplomatic events.

3. Romania provided some support to the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, Romania fears that national liberation movements might cause a world war. At the same time, because of the [relatively good] relationship between Romania and imperialist countries, Romania did not strongly support [the anti-imperialist] movement. Romania hopes that colonies can gain independence peacefully and supports the United Nations General Assembly's resolution that supported colonized people to gain independence. To nationalist countries, Romania's policy is to compromise with them. Romania only supported national capitalist leaders in those countries without the necessary criticism. On the one hand, Romania fears that criticism might lead nationalist governments to get closer to imperialist countries. On the other hand, Romania considered this problem in the framework of its economic interests: the fear that it might lose a market and raw material supply. Therefore, although Nehru was getting closer to American imperialism and serving the interest of American imperialists, Romanians still said, "We cannot say India was sold to imperialism [by Nehru]." To improve the relationship with India, Romania even tried to suppress us on the Sino-Indian border problem.

II. Sino-Romanian Relations

Over the past year, the fundamental differences between China and Romania on Marxist-Leninist issues have persisted. Our Marxist-Leninist line is directly opposed to Romania's revisionist line. Therefore, Sino-Romanian relations remain tenuous. After the Moscow Conference and before the Soviet 22nd Congress, Sino-Romanian relations slightly improved. Romania adopted a policy of resistance and blockade against us, with a strategy of relaxation publicly and restriction privately; seeking common ground while reserving differences. During this period, our embassy's news bulletin resumed publication in Romania as long as it did not affect their interests. Romanian newspapers sporadically reported on our international struggles, activities, and economic achievements. In trade and cultural negotiations, their attitude appeared more friendly on the surface, showing an understanding of the difficulties

we faced due to natural disasters. In diplomatic interactions, they maintained normal state relations. The reception of our delegations improved compared to before the Moscow Conference. It also avoided direct confrontations in contact with us (including our delegations). However, internally, Romania slandered and defamed our country to diminish our influence there. Their news reports only covered sporadic construction achievements without mentioning our correct policies or providing comprehensive introductions. At the same time, highlighted the Soviet's help to us and censored the statements of our leaders and important articles in our newspapers to suit their preferences or not publishing them at all. Politically, they downgraded their treatment of us, with the rank of party and government leaders attending our National Day and Army Day receptions being lower than in 1960.

After the 22nd Congress, Sino-Romanian relations took a downturn again. Romania became colder towards us, and the restrictions were further tightened. However, since Romania feared that the division within the socialist camp might prompt imperialist adventures and wars, they couldn't completely sever ties with us. They adopted a dual approach with overt and covert actions, balancing engagement and confrontation, and overall maintaining a cold stance. Meanwhile, they reduced the number of exchanges between China and Romania. During this period, senior leaders such as Gheorghiu-Dej and the Minister of Trade openly provoked our ambassador at one point. After our retaliations, there were no further public provocations, but our ping pong team received very low hospitality. As per tradition, I invited relevant personnel from the printing factory that printed our embassy's bulletin to visit our embassy at the end of the year, but Romania refused with an excuse. Romanians even sent covert police to monitor our embassy's activities. They also closely watched the movements of our students. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally asked us to stop publishing materials about Albania and expressed disagreement with our views at the Central Committee plenary session. However, Romania's public criticism of us has not exceeded Khrushchev's scale at the 22nd Congress. On some specific issues, they have expressed willingness to assist us, such as the printing factory signing a contract with us to ensure the timely publication of the bulletin.

Our Party and our country had a significant influence among the Romanian masses in the past. Since the Bucharest Conference and until after the 22nd Congress, due to the one-sided indoctrination by the Romanian leadership, some people, not knowing the facts, believed in biased information and doubted us, while others lacked understanding of us and had doubts about Romania's stance. Some people disagreed with the Romanian leadership's actions and clearly sided with us, and this number has been increasing due to the Romanian leadership's negative actions. Among those our students interacted with, many went from doubt to wanting to know the truth, from understanding the truth to agreeing with our views, and disagreeing with the Romanian leadership's following of Khrushchev.

III. Some Thoughts on Romania's Foreign Policies

1. Because Romania's views are essentially aligned with Khrushchev's, its foreign policy is primarily based on Soviet foreign policy. However, in practice, Romania prioritizes its national interests. Therefore, while being generally in line with the Soviet Union, there are some minor differences. For example, Romania fears that exposing American imperialism would affect its developing relations with the U.S., hinder obtaining new technology from the U.S., and undermine its efforts to earn foreign currency (in recent years, many self-funded American tourists have visited Romania). As a result, Romania's attitude toward the U.S. is softer than that of the Soviet Union. Internally, there are contradictions and public discontent. On the issue of anti-Stalinism, Romania has not made public resolutions. Parks, streets named after Stalin, and statues of Stalin in Bucharest remain unchanged, and they have not expelled the Albanian ambassador. Considering the potential impact of a Sino-Romanian relationship breakdown on Romania, they have taken a slightly different approach toward Albania. On one hand, they adopt cold, blockade, and restrictive measures, but on the other hand, they leave some room for maneuver. Certain practices differ from other Eastern European countries.

2. In foreign relations, Romania emphasizes peaceful coexistence and abandons international class struggle, primarily due to its national interests. Romania aims to quickly build socialism and improve people's living standards, which requires a

peaceful environment. Therefore, disregarding the overall interests of the international communist movement, Romania seeks unprincipled peaceful coexistence with imperialist and capitalist systems. It does not firmly oppose imperialism and does not resolutely support the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist activities of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

3. Romania's expression on major international issues is usually later [than other countries], and its attitude is generally not prominent. It cooperates with Soviet foreign policy to a certain extent. At the same time, it also leaves some space for future changes. No matter how the current situation develops or how changeable it is, Romania can maneuver its foreign policy according to the needs of its own country.

IV. The Political and Economic Situation in Romania in 1961:

In 1961, Romania made new achievements in socialist construction. The speed of industrial development is faster than in other Eastern European countries. In 1961, Romania paid particular attention to agricultural production. Its agricultural production and the socialist transformation of agriculture got improved.

In 1961, Romania exceeded the industrial production plan by 3% (4.2%). (The original plan was to increase by 13.5% in 1960.) Over the past year, Romania has mainly focused on producing steel, electric power, mining, petroleum, chemical, and other industrial sectors. The output value of steel and machine manufacturing increased by 20% compared to 1960. The original planned production of 2.1 million tons of steel will actually produce 2.117 (2.127) million tons, with an increase of 14% in the power and mining industries, and an 18% increase in the petroleum and chemical industries. In terms of industrial management methods, the authority has been relaxed to some extent, and various state economic committees have been established. [By implanting those reforms], it will be more convenient to adjust the contradiction between local and central enterprises and better supervise the production of central state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, it leads to the development of local industries to supplement the needs central enterprises cannot meet. Currently, several states in Romania have organized some repairing, construction materials, food factories, and other industries. These developments can be beneficial to giving full play to local enthusiasm, making full use of local resources, and better meeting the needs of the people.

In terms of agriculture, in June, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party discussed agricultural issues. At the end of the year, a collective peasant meeting was held. The tasks proposed by the Central Plenary Session are to use multiple crops, improve soil, strengthen water conservancy and agricultural mechanization, and develop diversified operations. In terms of agricultural socialization, Romania proposed to merge small farms into large farms (1,500 to 2,500 households in the plains and 1,000 to 1,500 in the hilly areas). At the same time, attention was also paid to strengthening the leadership of agriculture. The agricultural technologies that Romania obviously followed our agricultural eight-character constitution, such as improved seeds, deep plowing, reasonable dense planting, the use of fertilization, water conservancy, and field management. Due to the emphasis on agriculture, the agricultural production situation is good. The average corn yield per hectare was 1,700 kg in 1961 and it was 1,550 kilograms in 1960. Total grain production may exceed what it was in 1960. Romania's focus on agricultural production aims to meet firstly the country's growing demand for agricultural and livestock products, and secondly, to meet the needs of the fraternal countries in Eastern Europe. The socialist transformation of agriculture has developed rapidly. Currently, the number of farmers participating in collective farms has reached two million. Among them, 867,000 households joined collective farms in the last one point five years. Socialist agriculture (state farms, collective farms, and collective farming societies) owns more than 90% of the country's arable land, and collective farmland accounts for 67% of collective arable land. The collectivization of agriculture over the past year and a half has been characterized by the transition of a large number of co-cultivation cooperatives to collective farms. Among the 867,000 households mentioned above participating in collective farms, 770,000 were former members of co-cultivation cooperatives. The Romanian Party Central Committee had planned to complete collectivization in 1965. This goal seemed possible.

Regarding economic development, Romania still does not take "treating self-reliance as the focus and seeking foreign aid as a supplement" as the policy of economic growth. Instead, it focuses on expanding import and export trade. [Romania's economy] was based on its dependence on the Soviet Union, including importing raw materials, exporting final products, importing large-scale precision machinery, and exporting general machinery. In fact, the Romanian industry can be said as a processing factory for the Soviet Union to some degree. Therefore its economic foundation is fragile and unstable. Another problem in Romanian industrial construction is a one-sided emphasis on the role of materials while ignoring human initiative. In the industrial aspect, Romanians focus on new technologies, and in agriculture, it unilaterally emphasizes mechanization but ignores the socialist ideological education of employees. Therefore, although the technical level [among Romanian workers] is not low, labor productivity is not high. Enterprise management is not democratic; engineers and technicians have dominant power, while workers have no rights. The conflicts between the leader and workers are very prominent, and the employees' sense of ownership cannot be established. The employer-employee relationship traps workers, and thus the problem of low productivity is common; The emphasis on material rewards hinders the adoption of new technologies. Romanian engineers and technicians do not want to use the automatic loom machine we provided because they will receive a higher production quota if the labor productivity increases. Then the possibility of obtaining excessive bonuses will shrink. The collectivization of agriculture in mountainous areas has not been solved, nor is Romania trying to solve it. There is a lack of collective wealth education for collective farmers, so the conflicts between the individual and the collective are severe. Some places even compromised with farmers' spontaneous forces and allowed a household responsibility system.

With the development of the economy, Romanian cultural and educational aspects also achieved great development. The seven-year compulsory education has been implemented nationwide one year ahead of schedule. There has been a significant increase in the number of students enrolled. Full-time university students increased by 25% since 1960 [, and the number of students increased] to 70,000. Part-time education has also developed greatly. 100,000 employees participated in the evening high school. In literary creation, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the party's founding, Romanian created some artworks that reflect the revolutionary history and propagate patriotism.

People's living standards have improved, and the country has built 35,000 housing units, an increase of 17% from 1960. At the same time, Romania achieved a 16% increase in real wages over 1959.

Romania's main political activity in 1961 focused on the propaganda of the Moscow Statement (according to their understanding). Romania used the election of the Grand National Assembly, The publicity and the propaganda of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, The praise of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the Roman Workers' Party for being consistently correct to consolidate the position of the leadership group headed by Gheorghiu-Dej. In terms of government reorganization, a group of officials who were more resolutely following Khrushchev's line was promoted; at the same time, the government fired some officials who did not follow their general lines. However, considering the length of time at the Central Plenary Session from the end of November to the beginning of December 1961 and the fact that the plenary session did not make a public resolution on the issue of anti-Stalinism, and they were less aggressive in their attitude of Albania, it is possible that a certain degree of disagreement exists within the Romanian Party. But in general, Romania's current position in the country is relatively stable.

Romania continued to promote its revisionism, emphasizing material stimulation internally and peaceful coexistence externally. Bourgeois hedonistic and pacifist ideas have grown tremendously. When the political situation became tense, Romania expressed its fear. Humanitarian and pacifist views among literary and art circles are also prominent. Recently, Romania made a film describing the terrible weapon with the sound of the heartbeat as the music and without a single dialogue in the whole film: "A bomb was stolen." Romania tried to promote this film greatly and shamelessly said that the theme of this film is the struggle for peace.

As mentioned above, Romania has serious problems with mass ideology and economic construction. However, due to the fact that some achievements have been made in economic construction, citizens in the whole country have become arrogant, believing that their principles and policies are correct and perfect.

V. The Implementation of Central Committee Policies Over the Last Year and Some Experiences from Our Work:

What happened in 1961 fully proved that the guidelines and policies formulated by the Central Committee based on the development and estimation of the international situation and the international communist movement were correct. Implementing the central government's policies is the guarantee of making no or fewer mistakes in maintaining solidarity and friendship with the station country. After the Moscow Conference, we basically implemented the policy of adhering to unity [of socialist countries], upholding principles, and doing more diplomatic work. We tried to seek common ground while reserving differences with the host country and tried to do our work for solidarity steadily.

After the 22nd National Congress, we basically adopted a twenty-four words approach, raised the four flags, and opposed the four doctrines. Therefore, our work has had certain achievements in the past year.

Over the past year, we have stepped up investigation and research works to implement the central policies [from the central government] better. In the negotiation of foreign affairs such as culture and trade, we carried out the policy of unity-struggle-unity, which the central government put forward. We not only firmly stated our position, but also maintained unity [among socialist countries]. In diplomatic activities, we paid special attention to the higher level of the government, and we strengthened the ties with the foreign ministry and relevant business departments of the station country; We insisted on handling affairs in a legit way, and all banquets were conducted through the Department of the protocol in the Foreign Ministry. When we held banquets for diplomats in Romania, we invited related Romanian officials too; We used the practice of the country where we were stationed. At the same time, we maintained a normal relationship with all parties and carried out normal activities; After some visits, I made a certain degree of contact with the lower level of the government and people, and learned about them. We changed the newsletter's content according to the new situation after the Moscow Conference and strived for the normal publication of the newsletter. In external contacts, we paid attention to seeking common ground while reserving differences and did not take the initiative to provoke disputes. At the same time, we treated different people separately. In terms of diplomatic etiquette, we have been more thoughtful. Under normal conditions, we accepted all invitations sent by fraternal countries but also paid attention to equality in diplomacy. After the 22nd National Congress, we paid attention to the political situation during diplomatic activities to determine our attitude. Strengthen the preparatory work in advance, prepare for the bad situation and strive for the good situation. Therefore, when going out for diplomatic activities, everyone's thinking is clearer; their actions are more consistent.

However, there are still some problems in implementing central policies in the past year.

1. In-depth research on the situation in the station country is not enough. The background of the station country is still unclear. We paid more attention to Romania's foreign relations but did little research on its internal affairs. Therefore, we are not very sure about Romania's internal issues.
2. There is still one-sidedness in our thinking, especially before the 22nd National Congress; when we see differences, we ignore common ground; and when we see common points, we ignore key differences. Therefore, sometimes there is impatience and biased anger; For example, some comrades did not comprehend the other side's political hint in their farewell meeting and thus did not correctly express our views.
3. We still have not put enough effort into both raising the banner of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement and actively promoting our official position. Generally speaking, our theoretical level is not high enough, and the combination of theory and practice is poor. We are not good at flexibly grasping strategy according

to the specific situation. Some comrades are concerned about contacting foreign countries, are afraid of making mistakes, or are reluctant to talk about issues [with other diplomats]. The mindset to prepare things in advance and forecast possible changes according to the situation has not been trained enough.

4. We did not do a good job of asking for instructions in advance and reporting after the event [to the central government]. We need to ask for instructions from the central government in a timely manner and report the situation to the central government in a timely manner as well.

Some Experiences:

The development of Sino-Romania relations will continue to be complicated. It depends on the future development of the international situation, Romania's foreign policy, and especially on the development of Sino-Soviet relations. It is estimated that for a long time to come, Romania will continue to follow Khrushchev and stick to the wrong line. They will still adopt a detached and unstable attitude and generally a colder attitude toward us. We should raise the four flags and oppose the four doctrines. After more than a year of practice. We have the following experiences on how to do a good job of enhancing the friendship between China and Romania:

1. Earnestly study Mao Zedong Thought, continuously improve the level of Marxism-Leninism, and earnestly study the central policies. The current struggle is sharp and complex, but it is still a contradiction among the people; therefore [the struggle between China and Romania] must serve as a part of the struggle against the enemy. We need to hold the policy of unity and struggle at the same time, and the purpose of struggle is to achieve new unity. Only by repeatedly studying the central policies and thoroughly understanding Mao Zedong Thoughts can we correctly implement the central policies, thus achieving the goal of uniting the host country against the enemy.

2. We need to promote investigation and research greatly. Only by clarifying each specific situation and each specific person can we treat them differently according to different situations and objects. Only in this way can we correctly and flexibly implement the central principles and policies. Since the host country implemented a restriction policy towards us, we should find out the possibility of conducting normal propaganda activities in the station country. By doing that, we can effectively break through the station country's restrictions and expand our country's influence.

3. Before engaging in foreign activities, we must be fully prepared, and not fight unprepared battles. Only in this way can we be in a position of eternal invincibility. We need always to produce experience and learn from it. Thus, we can continuously improve our work and expertise.

4. We should work out a set of rules for maintaining solidarity and friendship with fraternal countries under new circumstances. We need to oppose two things. One is to consider other countries as fraternal countries, therefore, we fail to see our boundaries. Another thing is to confuse the differences between state relations and ideological viewpoints. At present, we should pay attention to seeking common ground while keeping our differences, and not forcing other countries to agree with us. We should support and recognize what is right in the station country and oppose what is wrong. We need to study the strategy and leave space for countermeasures. We need to show a clear attitude and treat different objects differently. To people who are malicious towards us, we will respond according to their attitude with caution. When they attack us verbally, we will respond with a firm counterattack. If people are suspicious of us but wish to set up contact with us, we can give appropriate explanations according to the central government's instructions. If people are unwilling or afraid to contact us, we will not take the initiative to talk to them. By doing so, we can avoid further suspicion from the station country. For people who have a good attitude towards us, we should keep our contact with them at an appropriate frequency while trying to protect them. When we address some issues in normal diplomatic activities, we should talk in the name of individuals [but not in the name of the state] to distinguish differences between state relations and [personal] ideological viewpoints.

Since we need to avoid other diplomats' attacks, it is necessary to hold the core idea

of the Declaration of the Moscow conference. Meanwhile, we must fully understand the station country's international practices, laws and regulations related to diplomatic activities. Business communication and negotiation should also be conducted in accordance with diplomatic procedures.

5. We must adhere to collective leadership and comply with the mass line. We need to Strengthen organizational discipline and strengthen the bureaucratic reporting system. Those measures are guarantees for unifying thinking, enhancing internal unity, improving our work, implementing the central policies, and avoiding major mistakes or making fewer mistakes.

6. We need to strengthen the cooperation between diplomats and translators. When we have diplomatic missions, they should prepare in advance and forecast the situation. Translators should assist diplomats in observing the situation and improving their situational awareness. In order to do a good job in translation, we must constantly improve the political, policy and cultural levels of translation. Diplomats also have to work hard to learn foreign languages.

[Chinese] Embassy in Romania
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