

**May 22, 1989**

**Cable No. 1414, Foreign Minister [Sosuke Uno] to  
the Ambassador in China, 'The Chinese Student  
Demonstrations'**

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**Summary:**

The China Division within the Japanese Foreign Ministry reports on the declaration of martial law in Beijing and predicts what will happen next in terms of the student movement, the Chinese political leadership, and China's external relations.

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## 中国の学生デモ

平元. 5. 22.

中 国 課

## 1. 事実関係

(1) 20日の戒厳令公布により新たな局面。当局側の力による抑え込みにより事態收拾が図られる様相が濃くなったが、22日朝現在衝突には至っていない。

20日 10時より北京市中心部8区に対し戒厳令公布

21日 未明より郊外で軍と対峙中(天安門前では10万人規模の学生・市民が集結)。

夕刻、「北京市関係者のアピール」及び戒厳部隊指揮部が「北京市民に告げる書」公布。

(2) 戒厳令後丸2日経つが、軍は未だ実力行使に出ず。

〔考え得る理由〕

①現指導部として強行策は採りにくい(軍による強制排除は相当の犠牲が出、党の威信を失墜し、大衆を敵に回すこととなることを覚悟する要あり。対外的にも更にイメージダウン)。

②従って、現指導部としても、戒厳令を出したものの対応に苦慮しているというのが実情か。当面、間接的手段(注)によって学生と一般市民を分断し、学生の孤立化を図る作戦か。

(注) 21日のニュースで「一般市民の飲む牛乳が略奪された」、「天安門前広場で伝染病が広がっている」等の報道。

③あるいは、指導部内の意思決定メカニズムが正常に働いていない可能性も排除し得ない。

## 2. 今後の展望

(1) 学生デモの行方

(イ) 戒厳令は敷いたが、軍による強制排除にも踏み切れず、事態

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はこのまましばらくこう着状態が続く様相をも見せてきた。

- (ロ) しかしながら、現指導部が学生と一般市民との分断を図りつつ機を捉えて軍による学生の実力排除を行うことは十分考えられ、今後は内部で実力行使に消極的意見もあると見られている。解放軍の動向が一つのポイントとなってきたと言えよう(ここに来て軍長老の発言等が中国のテレビで報じられている)。
- (ハ) 仮に、軍の鎮圧が行われれば、事態は一応の収束を見ることにはなるが、学生・一般大衆の現指導部に対する批判・怒りは更に高まり、現指導部の基盤をも揺るがす恐れあり。また、学生デモの背景にあった問題(民主の遅れ、幹部の腐敗・不正等)は何ら解決されておらず、今後とも何らかのきっかけで再発する可能性あり。

## (2) 指導部人事

### (イ) 趙紫陽の地位

- (i) 総書記を解任された可能性が高い(17日の政治局会議?)が、確認できず(注)。その動向が何ら公式に発表されていないことは要注目。

(注)中国側要人(黄華元外交部長、康克清婦女連会長等)からは、病気である旨の回答あり。

- (ii) これまでの抑制的な対応が学生デモを増長させ、結果的に今日の事態を招いたとの責任が党内で問われたものと考えられる。
- (iii) 今後の復活の可能性は、李鵬等が退陣に追い込まれるようなことがない限り少ないと見られる(趙の人気が高まっているだけに、李鵬等にとっては火種を根絶しておきたいであろう)。しかし、戒厳令による収拾がうまく行かない場合には、趙支持者(万里、田紀雲、楊汝岱等)の巻き返しの可能性も排除できず、趙再登場もあり得る。

### (ロ) 李鵬の地位

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- (i) 学生を始めとする大衆の批判にこれだけさらされ、立場は強いはずがない。他面、李鵬を含め、ポスト鄧もにらみ、実質的な指導者となるだけの実力を備えた者は現在のところいない。当面、長老の支持を背景に李鵬が政権を維持していく可能性大。
- (ii) しかし、学生デモの収拾は容易ではなく、たとえ力によって事態を収拾し得ても、国内的のみならず、国際的にも傷ついたイメージを回復することは困難。国政運営も容易でなく、その地位は不安定なものとなろう。
- (iii) 事態が著しく悪化する場合には、党序列第3位の喬石が収拾に当たるという可能性もある。

#### (ハ) 鄧小平の引退

従来から中ソ首脳会談を花道に引退するとの噂があるが、民主化が進まないのは鄧小平の実質的長期「独裁」のためであるとの一般大衆の反感は相当強く、今次学生デモにより引退を早めざるをえない状況に追い込まれる可能性もある。(逆に、デモによって引退したとの格好にはしたくないとの観点から、しばらくは引退できないとの面もある。)

### 3. 今回の学生デモと当局の対応振りの持つ意味・影響等

#### (1) 共産党の威信の低下

国民の失望、政治不信から党の威信の低下は否めない。党が益々大衆から離れるという状況となり、真の民主化は遠退く。

#### (2) 基本路線への影響

##### (イ) 改革・開放

学生・市民とも改革・開放推進では現指導部との方向性は一致。従って、方向は基本的には変わらない。しかし、スピード・ダウン、長期的には、停滞もあり得る。

##### (ロ) 祖国の統一

台湾は非難、香港・マカオは大規模なデモ・集会で反発。それぞれ、現指導部への不信を募らせ、中台交流の促進、97年の順調な返還に向けての香港の繁栄の維持等の阻害要因ともなり得よう。

### (3) 国際的影響

#### (イ) イメージ・ダウン

これだけの混乱状態、建国後初めての北京戒厳令の実施→「不安定な国」、「民主化の遅れた国」、「権力闘争の国」とのイメージ→国際社会における健全な一員としてのイメージが崩れ、一体中国は如何なる国か？との不信感高まる。

#### (ロ) 各国との投資・貿易等の経済交流に悪影響

積極的な開放政策の推進者である趙紫陽の解任は西側各国企業に不安感を与え、経済交流が停滞する可能性あり。特に、投資は減少も有り得る。

### (4) 日中関係への影響

本邦プレス報道振り(学生に同情的)もあり、李鵬現指導部の今後の対応振り如何では、日中友好協力関係をプレイ・アップしたり、円借款等の経済協力を積極的に推進することに対する批判も出て来ることがあり得る。但し、我が方としては、本件はあくまで中国の内政問題との立場から、はねかえりはないことを期待との対応とする。

対中投資の減少等経済面での影響はあり得る。

(3)

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### **The Chinese Student Demonstrations**

May 22, 1989  
China Division

#### 1. The Facts

(1) With the declaration of martial law on the 20th, it is a new situation. The intent of the authorities to bring the situation under control by force has become clear. At present, the morning of the 22nd, however, there have been no clashes.

20th: From 10:00, martial law was declared in the eight districts of central Beijing.

21st: From before dawn, there has been a confrontation with troops on the outskirts of Beijing (there has been a gathering on the scale of 100,000 students and city residents in front of Tiananmen Square).

In the evening, there was issued an "Appeal of the Competent Authorities in Beijing" and "An Open Letter to the Residents of Beijing," issued by the command of the martial law units.

(2) Two full days have passed since the imposition of martial law, but the military still has not resorted to force.

(Conceivable Reasons)

(1) It is difficult for the leadership to adopt a policy of force. (The forced removal of the students by the military would produce a considerable number of victims, make enemies of the general public, and forfeit the Party's prestige. The leadership would have to be prepared for that. Abroad, too, they would suffer a further decline in image).

(2) Therefore, is it a fact that the present leadership is struggling with the response to its imposition of martial law? For now, are they aiming to separate by indirect means (note) the students from the average citizen and isolate them?

(Note): In the news on the 21st were such stories as "Average Citizen's Milk Stolen" and "Infectious Disease Spreading in Square in Front of Tiananmen Square."

(3) Perhaps the decision-making mechanism within the leadership is not functioning properly. We cannot exclude that possibility either.

## 2. Future Prospects

### (1) Direction of the Student Demonstrations

(a) Martial law has been imposed, but the authorities have not been able to act decisively to use the military to forcibly remove them. It seems that a situation of stalemate will continue for a while.

(b) However, it is fully imaginable that the present leadership, seeking to divide the students from general city residents, will seize an opportunity and use the military to expel the students by force. One could say that how the military, which is seen as having a reluctant view internally on the use of force, moves from this point forward is a key point (the remarks of senior figures in the military and such have been reported on Chinese television).

(c) Even should a military suppression take place, although we would probably see something of a return to normal, the criticism and anger of students and the general public towards the present leadership would grow. There is a concern that it would even shake the foundations of the present leadership. Also, the problems behind the student demonstrations (such as lagging democratization and cadre corruption and impropriety) would in no way be settled. There is the possibility of their breaking out again in the future due to some impetus.

### (2) The Leadership

#### (a) Position of Zhao Ziyang

(i) He has probably been dismissed from his position as secretary general (perhaps at the Politburo meeting of the 17th?), but this cannot be confirmed. (See note.) It has to be noted that such a move has in no way whatsoever been announced publicly.

(Note) Key persons on the Chinese side (such as former foreign minister Huang Hua and All-China Women's Federation President Kang Keqing) have responded to our questions in saying that he has been ill.

(ii) It can be imagined that there is questioning within the Party as to its responsibility for, in effect, having brought on today's situation by making the student demonstrations worse with their repressive response.

(iii) There seems little chance of a returning the situation to its previous state so long as Li Peng and others are not driven to step down (with Zhao's increasing popularity, Li Peng and others likely want to stamp out the fire). However, in the event that the situation is not brought under control by martial law, we cannot exclude the possibility of a rally by Zhao supporters (such as Wan Li, Tian Jiyun, and Yang Rudai). A Zhao comeback, too, is possible.

#### (b) Li Peng's Position

(i) Exposed to so much criticism from the masses, including students, his position cannot be strong. On the other hand, with the post-Deng era in sight, there is no one at this point, including Li Peng, capable of becoming a real leader. For the time being, Li Peng is likely to stay in power with the backing of the elders.

(ii) However, bringing the student demonstrations under control will not be easy. Even if he brought the situation under control by force, restoring the leadership's damaged image would be difficult, and not only domestically but internationally as well. Running the government would not be easy, and his position would be unstable.

(iii) Should the situation turn markedly worse, then there is also the possibility of Qiao Shi, ranked third in the Party, taking charge of the situation.

#### (c) Deng Xiaoping's Retirement

There have long been rumors that he would mark the end of his career with the Chinese-Soviet summit and then retire. However, there is considerable resentment among the general public that the lack of progress in democratization is due to what has, in effect, been Deng Xiaoping's long "dictatorship." The current student demonstrations may drive him to a situation of having to retire early. (Conversely, not

wishing to give the impression of having retired due to the demonstrations, there is also the aspect of his being not being able to retire for a while.)

### 3. Significance, Effect of the Present Student Demonstrations and the Response of the Authorities

#### (1) Decline in Communist Party's Prestige

The decline in the party's prestige on account of the people's disappointment and their distrust of politics is undeniable. The situation is one of the party growing increasingly distant from the public and true democratization receding into the distance.

#### (2) Effect on the Basic Line

##### (a) Reform and Opening

The drive of students and city residents alike for reform and opening is consistent with the direction of the present leadership. Consequently, there will basically be no change in direction. However, there is the possibility of its slowing and, in the long term, stagnating.

##### (b) Unification of the Fatherland

Taiwan is making criticisms and Hong Kong and Macao are making their opposition known with large-scale demonstrations and gatherings. The situation is exacerbating distrust in each one in regard to the present leadership. It may become a hindrance to maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity for its smooth reversion in 1997.

#### (3) International Influence

##### (a) Decline in Image

With so much chaos and the imposition of martial law in Beijing for the first time since the country's founding, the result is images of "an unstable country," "a country behind in democratization," and "a country of power struggles," leading to the collapse of its image as a healthy member of international society and a growing sense of distrust as to what kind of country China really is.

##### (b) Adverse Effect on Investment, Trade and Other Economic Exchanges with Other Countries

The dismissal of Zhao Ziyang, an active promoter of China's opening policy, has made companies from Western countries uneasy. There is the possibility of economic exchanges stagnating. In particular, investments would likely decline.

#### (4) Effect on Relations between Japan and China

There is also the reporting of the Japanese press (which is sympathetic to the students). Depending on how Li Peng and the present leadership responds to the situation, criticism is likely to emerge against playing up the friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and China or actively promoting yen loans and other economic cooperation. As for our side, however, from the position that this issue remains to the end China's domestic affair, we expect that there will be no repercussions.

Such economic effects as a decline in investment in China are likely.

(End)