

May 25, 1989

**Cable No. 8894, Foreign Minister [Sosuke Uno] to
the Ambassador in Britain et al, 'The Chinese
Student Demonstrations'**

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Summary:

The Japanese Foreign Minister sends an update on developments in Beijing to Japanese diplomatic missions across Europe, China, the United States, and Asia.

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秘 無 期 限

—中国の学生デモについて—

(1) 経緯と現状

胡耀邦前総書記の死去をキッカケに起こった中国の学生デモは、20日の戒厳令の公布と解放軍の北京近郊への進出にまで発展し、緊張の高まりの中で天安門前広場での座り込みと郊外での学生等と軍との対峙が続いているが、これまでのところ軍による武力排除の可能性は小さくなったものと見られる。こうして、今後の焦点は学生等が座り込みを続ける天安門前広場から今次デモの收拾を巡り党・政府指導者の勢力争いが行われていると見られる中南海に移ったと言え、現在も対立グループ間の攻めぎ合いが行われている模様^{であるが}、李鵬の代表とするグループが地味を固めつつあると見られる。

(2) デモの背景

(1) 民主の遅れに対する学生の不満と昨年来のインフレによる生活苦及び幹部の腐敗・不正に対する民衆の憤りが一つの力となってデモとして現れたと言えるが、その底流には鄧小平の長期「独裁」に対する民衆の根強い不満があるものと思われる。

(2) 他方、当局側は、これら学生・民衆の不満の高まりに対する現指導部の認識不足もあり、当初学生デモが一般大衆の支援を得てこれ程までに大きな盛り上がりを見せるとは予想できず、その対応が極めてま^だずかったという点も指摘し得る。

(3) 注目すべき点

(1) 趙紫陽総書記の動向

学生デモに柔軟な対応をとった趙紫陽は実権を失っている可能性が高いが、少なくとも依然として総書記としての地位にはある模様。李鵬及びこれを支持するグループが大勢を占めつつある中で趙の地位がどうなるかは今後の民主化及び改革・開放の行方を占う上で重要なポイント。趙が胡に続いて失脚するようなことがあれば、国際的にも大きなイメージ・ダウンとなり、意図せざると否とに拘らず改革・開放のスローダウンは避けられないのではないか。

(17) 党の威信の低下

今次デモが戒厳令を敷くほどまでに現指導部の予想を越えて発展した背景には、民主化運動等に対する当局の認識不足と節目節目での対応のまずさがあるが、このことは、共産党の既存の枠組みの中で今後とも民意を吸い上げていくことが果たして可能なのかという問題を提起する。このままでは党の基盤を不安定化する恐れあり。また、今次デモは鄧小平に対する民衆の不満の大きさを露呈することになったが、このことは鄧のカリスマによって困難を乗り越えていくというこれまでのやり方が通用しない時期が来ていることを示唆するものと言え、ポスト「鄧」をもにらみ、党の再生につき真剣に取り組む必要がある。

(18) 改革と開放の方針

今次デモの事態が如何なる展開を見せようと「改革と開放」という基本的方向は変わらないと思われるが、党・政府の指導力低下は否定できず。短期的にはスローダウン乃至は停滞する恐れはある。特に、投資の減少等経済交流への消極的影響はあり得る。

(19) 学生デモの精神的指導者 (必要に応じ)

今次デモは驚くほど統制のとれた極めて秩序立ったものであったが、このことはデモの背後に学生たちの「精神的な指導者」がいることを窺わせる。他方、このことは指導部からすれば、学生と民衆を分断しつつ、今次デモが一部の扇動者によって引き起こされたものであるとして、その「黒幕」を摘発し、「安定団結」を謳うことによって事態を取捨しようとする可能性あり。

2. だが、本大臣は 24日の 鼎臨外務委員会において、

「日本政府としては、現在の中国の事態と憂慮しており、引き続き推移を見守る中、「事態の円満な解決を期待している」と答弁したと云う、参考記。

(中国、米、ソ連、ASEAN)
[本電宛先] 東京、西貢、伊、韓国、香港、廣州、上海、瀋陽

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Received: May 26, 1989, 17:50:25

Draft Telegram

Primary: Director, China Division; cc: Director-General Asian Affairs Bureau, Deputy Director-General, [illegible handwriting]

Telegram Section: 1 [signed] 2 [signed]

Drafted: May 25, 1989

Drafter: Kohara []; Telephone number: 2426

From: The Foreign Minister

To: Ambassadors in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Soviet Union, United States, Republic of Korea, China, ASEAN, NY, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Guangzhou, [and] Shenyang

Subject: The Chinese Student Demonstrations

Primary: Asian Affairs, China

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1. Our side continues to watch this matter with great interest. A summary of the current situation, background, and noteworthy points (as of the 25th) is as follows. Please refer as appropriate to this information in discussions with government officials and members of the diplomatic corps in your country of assignment.

[attachment follows]

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(1) Background and Current Situation

China's student demonstrations, which started with the death of former general secretary Hu Yaobang, grew with the imposition of martial law on the 20th and the advance of the People's Liberation Army to the outskirts of Beijing. Amid growing tensions, the sit-in in the square in front of Tiananmen Square and the confrontation on the outskirts of the city between students and others against troops continue, but so far the possibility of armed suppression by the military is seen as having diminished. Thus, one can say that the focus has shifted from the square in front of Tiananmen Square, where students and others are continuing their sit-in, to Zhongnanhai, where there is seen taking place a power struggle among party and government leaders over bringing the demonstrations under control. It seems that opposing groups are still attacking one another, but the group represented by Li Peng is seen as consolidating its position.

(2) Background to the Demonstrations

(a) One can say that student dissatisfaction regarding lagging democratization and popular anger against the hardships due to inflation since last year and cadre corruption and injustice became a force and appeared as demonstrations, but their undercurrent is thought to be the popular and deep-rooted dissatisfaction regarding Deng Xiaoping's longstanding "dictatorship."

(b) On the other hand, there was a lack of understanding on the part of the present leadership in regard to the growth in this student and popular dissatisfaction. The authorities were unable to anticipate that the initial student demonstrations would gain the support of the common people and show such a great upsurge. One can point as well to their terribly inept response to it.

(3) Noteworthy Points

(a) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's Moves

Zhao Ziyang, who adopted a flexible response to the student demonstrations, has probably lost his authority but seems, at least, still to be in the position of general secretary. With Li Peng and the group supporting him gaining dominance, what happens to Zhao's position will be a major point in predicting the direction that democratization and reform and opening will take. Should Zhao follow Hu in falling from power, there will be major damage internationally as well to the leadership's image and, whether by intention or not, a slowdown in opening and reform may be unavoidable.

(b) Decline in Party's Prestige

Behind these demonstrations developing beyond the anticipation of the present leadership, to the point of their imposing martial law, is the lack of recognition on the part of the authorities regarding the democratization movement and such, as well as the ineptness of their response at each critical juncture. This raises the question of whether it will really be possible for the Communist Party within its existing framework to absorb the will of the people. At this rate, there is concern that the Party's foundation will grow increasingly unstable. Also, these demonstrations have exposed the magnitude of popular dissatisfaction in regard to Deng Xiaoping. One can say that this demonstrates that the time has come when Deng's way until now of overcoming difficulties by his charisma no longer applies. With an eye on what comes after Deng, there will be a need to seriously undertake the party's revitalization.

(c) Policy of Reform and Opening

No matter how these demonstrations develop, the basic direction of "reform and opening" is unlikely to change, but there is no denying that party and government leadership will deteriorate. The worry is that in the short term it will slow down or stagnate. In particular, such negative effects on economic exchanges as reduced investment would not be at all surprising.

(d) Spiritual Leaders of the Student Demonstrations

These demonstrations have been surprisingly controlled and extremely orderly. This suggests the existence of "spiritual leaders" of the students behind the demonstrations. On the other hand, from the leadership's point of view, in dividing the students and the people, they may seek to bring the situation under control by presenting these demonstrations as caused by a few instigators, exposing those "behind-the-scene masterminds," and calling for "stability and unity."

[Handwritten paragraph] 2. Furthermore, for your reference, I gave answers on the 24th in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Diet House of Representatives to the effect that, "The Government of Japan is concerned about the present situation in China and will continue to monitor the situation" and "We look forward to an amicable settlement of the situation."

(Cable addresses) China, United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, ASEAN, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, NY
(End)