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Saddam and Military Corps Commanders discuss the Great Day and Great Harvest Battles, Analyze Iranian Intentions, and discuss Iranian Efforts to Capture Basra

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Summary:

This file contains a meeting between President Saddam Hussein and officials and corps commanders during the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam and his advisors discuss the Great Day and Great Harvest battles, analyze Iranian intentions, and discuss Iranian efforts to capture Basra.

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Arabic

Contents:

Transcript - Arabic

Saddam:	... درجة واحدة من التقل و فقط نعتمد على معلومات الاستخبارات! طيب نامت الاستخبارات. يعني معناه تقع بالمفاجيء. و لذلك التحليل مطلوب لكي لا نعتمد على معلومات الاستخبارات فقط.	...one degree of load and we only depend on the intelligence information! Okay, the intelligence is asleep. This means that we would fall into a surprise. As a result, analysis is needed in order to not depend merely on the intelligence information.
MV1:	سيدي الرئيس يعني اذا سمحت سيادتك اعتقد مال اليوم الاكبر.. اليوم العظيم , عفوا. الغاية غير الغاية بالحصاد الاكبر. يعني الغاية بالاولى هي دق اسفين بين البصرة و اجترأ شبه جزيرة الفاو و اقامة دويلة عليها مقرها الفاو كخطوة اولى. تتبعتها صفحة ثانية, محتمل التطوير من خلال الخرج شمالا او عملية ضرب مشتركة ايضا مثل ما يحصل الان	Mr. President! If you allow me sir, I believe that the Big Day [pauses] the Great Day [pauses] excuse me. The goal is different than the Big Harvest. The goal for the first one was to nail a divider into Al-Basra, and then to cut off the peninsula of Al-Faw and establish a small country on it and have Al-Faw as its headquarters. This is the first step, which is followed by a second stage. There is a possibility of development through Al-Kharj from the north, or a common strike similar to what is going on now.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
MV1:	نعم سيدي الرئيس بس اذا قسمت الى صفحات. سيدي الرئيس اذا ما قسمت الى صفحات, فالصفحة الاولى يعني يكون الهم وجود متكامل على شبه جزيرة الفاو	Yes sir, but if it were to be divide it into stages... Mr. President, if it were to be divided into pages, during the first stage, they would want to have a complete presence on the peninsula of Al-Faw.
Saddam:	لا يا ابو علي يعني ما كانوا صفحات. يعني هي صفحات لكن صفحات مستمرة بادامة الزمن	No Abu Ali. There were no stages. These were stages, but these were continuous stages as far as the time went on.
MV1:	نعم	Yes.
Saddam:	و هذا التوقف هو فقط لاستيعاب الدروس عبر شط العرب و توسيع القاطع لانهم هم خرقوا.. خرقوا بالحداعش و خرقوا بقاطع الفيلق السابع لكن مما قدروا في كل الاتجاهات يديمون زخم كما ينبغي. فايش صار؟ لما جاءهم رد فعلها. بدت مواضعهم يعني ... المكانات اللي وصلوا الها تسقط واحد بعد الاخر. كلما يسقط... ينطردون من موضع كلما نكون في حالة اقوى لطردهم من المواضع الاخرى	This stop is only to learn lessons through the Arab Coast and through expanding the sector, because they penetrated [pauses] they penetrated at the Eleventh and they had also penetrated the Seventh Corps' sector. However, they failed to provide momentum in all directions as they should have done. So what happened? When they got the reaction, their headquarters [pauses] the places that they had reached had started to fall one after another. Every time it falls, [pauses] every time they get kicked out of a place, we will be in a better position to kick them out from the rest of the other spots.
MV1:	سيدي الرئيس يبدو انه كان حصتهم المؤمل عليها عبر جزيرة ام الرصاص و بهذا الاتجاه. اكبر من المتحقق. من صارت القضية مع [unintelligible] مثل ما تفضلت سيادتك . يبدو جتهم	Mr. President, it appears that the portion that they had hoped for through the island of Um Al-Rasas and through this direction was bigger than what was accomplished. Once the issue started with [unintelligible] just like you said sir, they might have gotten

		advice. Okay, if your goal was Al-Basra, then why did you cross towards the Arab Coast [unintelligible] this is Al-Basra, from the region of Al-Ghmar where they had achieved [unintelligible] on the Great Day. The deployment is still consistent inside. [Unintelligible] Al-Basra is eight kilometers away from you, so why did you go to the Arab Coast? As a stage, I believe that the goal in the first one, Mr. President, was indirect. Once they realized that they could not accomplish [unintelligible] they changed direction to the final target. This one comes to the region of Al-Ghmar and strikes between the Eighth and the Eleventh and then they would leave. They did that but they were afraid to enter the fire of Al-Miqdadiyah. So what happened to them in Dijla will not happen to them again. They said, "Let's be safe." As a result, they started to march towards Jasim's line.
Saddam:	ابو علي هم دائما يعتمدون في الصفحة الاولى على المباغته. اكبر مباغته اللي صارت بيهم هو سواها الحرس الجمهوري. الحرس الجمهوري ظل احتياط زايد. حتى هناك نؤمن حالة قوية شو سويينا؟ كل الحرس الجمهوري حطيناه بالقاطع الثاني. فقالوا الربع " بلعوه للطعم" يعني لا زالوا يتوقعونا انه من هنا راح نهجم. فمن هجموا و شافوا انه الجندي اللي كانوا يقاتلوه منتبه. فعرفوا باللحظة انه المباغته راح. اذن ما بإمكانهم يستمرون لتحقيق النتيجة المرسومة. لا بد من مباغته. شنو هي هاي المباغته؟ انه هم هجموا و فشلوا لكن مدفعيتهم حشدهم	Abu Ali, in the first stage they had always depended on the surprise factor. The biggest shock they had was the one done to them by the Republican Guards. The Republican Guards are still the extra reserve. In order to secure a powerful position, what did we do? We put all of the Republican Guards in the Second sector. So they said, "They took the bait." They still expect us to attack from here. When they attacked and found out that the soldiers who were fighting were alerted, they realized that the surprising factor was gone. As a result, they could not keep up to achieve the planned outcome. There has to be a surprising factor. What is the surprise? They had attacked and failed, but their artillery and deployments
MV1:	لا زال قائم	Are still out there.
Saddam:	كله موجود بالمكان بحيث لا نستطيع ان نكتشف متى سيهجمون	Are all still on the site. Accordingly, we are not able to discover the timing of their attack.
MV1:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Saddam:	لكن الحالة العامة كانت كلها توحى لهم بانه الحرس الجمهوري كله بقاطع الفيلق الثاني. زين احنا اخذنا اجازات الخ.	But the general case was indicating that the entire Republican Guards are in the Second Corps' sector. Okay, we took vacations etc.
MV1:	و احتفلنا و هيصنا	We celebrated and we had fun.
Saddam:	يعني معناته الشغلة بعد ما كو احتمال.	This means that there is no other possibility.

		They said, "Let's take the surprise." Instead of scattering our forces let's apply a momentum on the land sector directly. Because the reconnaissance personal had died, they had to come up with new preparations if they wanted to bring people and have them cross the Arab Coast. There is a possibility to expose them through these preparations. Directly, they deployed the momentum on the Second Division. Yes.
MV1:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	سيدي اذا احنا بدنا نرجع الى معارك قديمة الحقيقة انا اعتقد يعني انه العدو الايراني كان يستهدف في معارك اليوم العظيم الفيلق السابع كأساس كاسبقية اولى في انهاء الفيلق السابع و كان الاتجاه الرئيسي هو باتجاه الفيلق السابع. شمال الفيلق السابع. و لول احنا... و كان العمل اتجاه الفيلق الثالث عمل جدي لحجز اكبر ما يمكن من القطعات. لو كان رايح الفيلق السابع ما كان تقدر نقاتل في البصرة سيدي. لان حجم القطاعات اللي كانت موجودة في الفيلق السابع و حجم الخسارة اللي كان ممكن بصير في الفيلق السابع كانت تخلينا عاجزين عن ادارة قتال من اتجاه الجنوب و من اتجاه الشرق فلذلك الحقيقة...	Sir, if we wanted to go back to old battles, I believe that the Iranian enemy was targeting the Seventh Corps during the battles of the Great Day. Basically, the first priority was to finish the Seventh Corps. The main direction was towards the Seventh Corps. To the north of the Seventh Corps. The effort towards the Third Corps in order to detain the biggest possible number of the troops was serious. If the Seventh Corps was gone, we would not have been able to fight in Al-Basra sir. The loss that was caused to the Seventh Corps and the possible loss that could have happened to the Seventh Corps could have made incompetent to manage the fight from the southern and the eastern directions. So in reality
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	يعني بتقديرات ... اعجز بكثير من الان سيدي. او اقل قدرة بكثير من الان. فكانت فكانت الخطة الاولى سيدي مال اليوم العظيم خطة طموحة. عندهم تواجد موجود في منطقة الفاو في قطاع الاختراق و الجهد الرئيسي كان شمال فيلق السابع و كان واضح انه الاتجاه الرئيسي هو هناك و اتجاه ضغط جدي و شديد اتجاه الفيلق الثالث و افضل انواع القطاعات	The estimation [pauses] is more incompetent than now sir. Or let's say a much lower ability than now. Sir, the first plan of the Great Day was very ambitious. They have limited presence in the Al-Faw area inside the penetrated sector. The main effort was towards the northern side of the Seventh Corps. It was clear that this was the main direction. There was also an extreme pressure towards the Third Corps. High quality troops
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	لابتلاء الفيلق السابع سيدي	To test the Seventh Corps sir.
Saddam:	صحيح	True.
Nizar:	و الاتجاه كان واضح	The direction was very clear.
Saddam:	هذا او لا لسحب جبهة الفيلق السابع	First, this happened in order to remove the front of the Seventh Corps.

Nizar:	سيدي كان مرسوم بذكاء.	Sir, it was cleverly planned.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	نعم.	Yes.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	صحيح نعم...	True, yes.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	هذه الخطة الاساسية	This is the basic plan.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	فهي سيدي مومرحة كانت.	Sir, it was not a stage.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	نعم	Yes.
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
Nizar:	سيدي هي يعني واضحة يعني خطة العدو الايراني واضحة و طموحة جدا و مثل ما سيادتك هسا الان وضحت انه الاتجاه الرئيسي كان شمال الفيلق السابع . قطع الطريق على الفيلق السابع كان يخلينا في موقف صعب جدا . و من المحتمل انه الفيلق السابع يروح مع ضغط شديد على الفيلق الثالث. لو رايح الفيلق السابع لكان العدو الايراني القدرة على من الجنوب و من الشرق البصرة تصبح هدف اسهل بكثير من الحالة اللي صارت الان. فهذي... و كان من الواضح انهم عندهم خطة بديلة . يعني هم نفذوا في يوم الحصاد الاكبر الخطة البديلة اللي اذا ما فشلت هذه الخطط الطموحة و هي خطة واسعة و خبيثة سيدي انهم ينفذون الخطة البديلة. احنا الحقيقة اطربنا النجاح يعني و كان نجاح كبير حقيقة في اليوم العظيم لان اه.... حتى تحرشنا شوي بالفيلق الثالث ... يمكن ناورنا بلوانين من عنده. بس هو الفيلق الثالث في يوم الحصاد الاكبر كان بموجوده بحدود تسعة و عشرين لواء. و كان هو متهيء اساسا للمعركة الاساسية . يعني اه.... بس يعني شنو سيدي هو هو هو صار نوع من المباغته كل تقدير اتنا احنا انه العدو يحتاج الى وقت اضافي اكبر للقيام بعمل رئيسي من نفس الاتجاهات مع استبعاد اتجاه الفيلق السابع. بس كنا نتصور انه يحتاج الى وقت اكبر حقيقة. لان ايضا بالرغم من انه مدير الاستخبارات انطانا	Sir, it is clear. The Iranian enemy's plan is very clear and ambitious. The situation is similar to what you expressed in regards to the main direction, which was to the north of the Seventh Corps. Cutting the road on the Seventh Corps would have put us in a very tough situation. It would be possible that the Seventh Corps would be gone along with extreme pressure on the Third Corps. If the Seventh Corps were to be gone, the Iranian enemy would have capabilities from the south and the east. Al-Basra would have been a much easier target for them than the situation right now. It was clear that they had a plan B. In the day of the Great Harvest, they had carried out plan B. This was in case of these ambitious plans failing, and by the way, it was a sneaky and a large scale plan. In case their plans were to fail, they would carryout plan B. In fact, we were so happy for the success. It was a great success on the Great Day. We had even harassed the Third Corps; possibly we had maneuvered with two brigades from there. On the day of the Great Harvest, the Third Corps had possessed approximately twenty-nine brigades. Basically, they were prepared for the major battle. But what had happened sir is that there was some kind of surprise for us. All of our estimations had indicated that the enemy would need additional time in order to carryout a major action from the same directions, along with rejecting the direction of the Seventh Corps. To be honest, we just thought that they would need more time. Despite the idea of the

		<p>Intelligence Director giving us the size of the loss, [pauses] the exaggeration that had happened in regards to the losses of the two corps, had also given us some kind of comfort that the enemy's losses were enormous. When we had calculated them in regards to the size of the deployment that was given to us by the intelligence, we found that the enemy would need more time in order to carryout an assault with the same violence, extremism, and continuity, that was conducted against the Third Corps. The first plan of the Great Day was the main plan. It was an ambitious plan and a large scale plan. The second plan was plan B. In regards to the timing, the enemy had surprised us by working faster than [pauses] during the Great Harvest than the period in which we had expected. Right now sir, what are the expected things? In my opinion, the central direction and the central concern for the enemy would still be the direction of Al-Basra, the Third Corps with all of its divisions, the northern wing of the corps, the southern wing of the Sixth Corps, and the northern direction of the Seventh Corps. This means that Al-Basra, north of it to the borders, part of the Sixth Corps, the southern part until the borders, and the northern part of the Seventh Corps would still be the center of concern. If the enemy were to carryout limited operations or missions, it would be aiming towards weakening our presence in this direction. After that, the enemy would carryout a direct action or a semi-direct action, and this could be carried out from the northern part of the Third Corps, inside of the Third Corps sector, or from the southern part of the Sixth Corps, or from the northern part of the Seventh Corps. If the enemy were to do such a thing, they would do that so that they can pull some of our deployments and troops from in front of the Third Corps, so that they can carryout an action later on in the Third Corps sector or in these directions that we had indicated. The direction stays the same. In my opinion, this is the central and the important direction to end the war. Sir, I would like to comment a little bit</p>
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		<p>about a big argument in regards to [unintelligible]. I had expressed my visions in regards to this subject to your Excellency multiple times. The defensive spot can be prepared within forty-eight hours. For a whole brigade, you would need seventy-two hours to complete. We believe that the defensive site consists of building a blockade and keeping the sites within the blockade. This is my opinion. Many of the brothers and possibly your Excellence would also have some comments about my visions. According to me, the soldier was able [pauses] in that region; the soldier was able to build a defensive site within one hour. Any soldier with a shovel can dig in that region, and in less than an hour, he would have a defensive site. He can sit in it and all of the losses that we had suffered because of our presence on the blockade, would be gone. Sir, how could the brigade be penetrated in one hour? If it was according to the methods that we had learned as military personal, the battalion would need four battles to penetrate, the brigade would need eight hours to penetrate. This is when the opening and the deployment are normal. Right now the enemy is able to penetrate any of our sites and go to the next one. It means that they could penetrate the site 1000 until they reach the site 1500. They could penetrate the site 1500 until they reach the site 2000. Why is that sir? This is because we are defending a blockade. Even if the enemy were to use one tenth of their artillery, they would concentrate all of their artillery on this blockade and kill more people than we can do by using the entire capacity of our superior artillery. We would barely achieve the same results. Let's make up a target for them and tell them, "Come on, do not shoot unless it is on this blockade". Our soldier is somewhat right. During the time, while we set up our artillery system in relation to all scenarios of the enemy's presence, within the seven, eight, or ten kilometers in front of us, there was only one, two, or three meters away from the soldier in this blockade. The soldier was able to dig and within one hour</p>
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		<p>he would have a defensive site. It is known for the cavalry, the company, and the battalion, what Mohammad had said. [Pauses] Brigadier Mohammad, in the military academy. We had worked in a mountainous region in the area of Khanaqin. He had said to me, "We started digging and they started an artillery assault by sunrise. We had dug trenches for the soldiers in the mountainous land." I do not know what we are talking about when we say that the defensive site is a completion of the blockade or anything like that. To tell you the truth, I do not get this theory at all, and I believe that this theory had great weakness. Sir, our soldier is not use to digging. We made it a habit for him to come and sit on the blockade. I have seen brigades and I have said to soldiers, "Why do you fight like that?" They would say to me, "They did not prepare the blockade for us. The bulldozers did not come and build us a blockade so that we could sit down and fight." This does not exist in any other army in the world. Once the battalions, companies, cavalries, and brigades show up, they would start digging and within two to three hours, everyone would be done with their defensive site. Regardless of the enemy's firepower, they will not be able to hit not even one percent of the soldiers, even with extreme fire. Sir, our soldier was not fighting and right now we are going to suffer. Right now when our soldier pulls back, we should give him a real defensive site and let him dig a defensive site according to [pauses]. Also, when he fights, he says to you, "There is no blockade that we can fight on." [Unintelligible] "Why do you fight like that?" They would say, "Sir, they did not make us a blockade. The bulldozer showed up and did not finish the blockade and we stayed without a defensive site." No one tried to dig. No cavalry commander, company commander, or a battalion commander had learned how to dig a defensive site. Two cavalries, one cavalry, two companies to be deployed, one company, [pauses] with one company, etc. That is what we had learned from war, but the idea of these blockades, I really have no</p>
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		<p>idea where we had gotten it from. The points that were expressed by Brigadier Mohammad are major sir. Many of the troops that we had questioned in the corps sector after we had come back, many of those people did not even see their enemy. I mean the brigade had gotten in and out and did not see an enemy, but they were destroyed because of the bombarding. Many of them did not even use their weapons because no one told the soldier anything. There was no responsibility for the sector, there was no responsibility for a barn, there was no responsibility for a fire arch. He did not even get any orders to shoot. The reason was not only because they did not know how to fire or because they did not practice shooting day and night. It was none of that, but the way of opening do not allow than to shoot. I mean that this does not allow them to fire at all. There is a depth for the battalion and the brigade. Depth fights too. The front companies, the back companies, the back battalion with its frontal and back companies [pauses] right now, as long as we keep opening the brigades on a blockade, I expect any attack to penetrate the blockade right now and move to the blockade number 500, and it will be a fight or blockade 500. Our openings violate the known opening methods in all of the world's armies. I do not know if you want me to comment on the First Corps or if you just want my comments to be in regards to</p>
Saddam:	لا روح للفيلق الاول.	No, go to the First Corps.
Nizar:	<p>لان سيادتك . سيدي فيما يخص قاطع الفيلق الاول . اضافة الى الهدف اللي العدو سيدي يدور اهدافه. و الاهداف هي علاقة سوقية كبيرة يعني الها دائما يدوروا على هدف سوقي. ما يجي اعتباطا. صحيح هو ارتبط بالبصرة و تبقى البصرة بكل الواصفات السوقية سالحة اذا ما حصل عليها تبقى هي الهدف الاساسي. بس ايضا انا الخرق في المنطقة الشمالية موقف يساعد على تحقيق اهداف سوقية جدا مهمة و لها علاقة بمسيرة الحرب بئمن جدا بسيط على ضوء الموقف الجديد اللي انخلق في</p>	<p>Sir, I am going to speak about what is related to the First Corps' sector. The enemy is looking for targets. Targets are strategically related. They are always looking for a strategic target. The target is not going to be picked randomly. It is true that Al-Basra is connected to the target and that Al-Basra would still possess all of the strategic features if they were to take it over. However, any penetration from the northern area would create a situation that would help in achieving very important strategic goals. This can influence the war scenario with a very simple price, according to the new situation that was created in the northern</p>

		region. For example, before the battles of the Great Day, the sector was occupied by nineteen brigades. They were unharmed, good quality, experienced, and fully trained brigades. Seventeen brigades from them had gone to the front and they were made up for by eleven encouraged brigades. These encouraged brigades are starting to be completed, but sir, the brigades are still in a psychological status [pauses] the psychological status of these brigades is still [pauses]. In case of a limited battle happening in the sector, we might be surprised that their performance could be less than expected and we might confront with a quick stand. This could put us in conditions which would not allow us to administrate the battle as required. In order to fix this situation, we need to train these troops. The size of the present troops does not allow us to train anything but a limited number of troops. Right now, we are hoping to get battalions out of the divisions' sectors. This is not enough. According to the alliances that you had presented sir, [unintelligible].
Saddam:	احنا الاستنتاجات [unintelligible] يعني عامة وللا خاصة؟	[Unintelligible] is the analysis general or is it specific?
Nizar:	لا انا ذات الصورة اللي ممكن تصوير بيها قاطع الفيلق..	No, I am talking about the a possible image for the corps' sector
Saddam:	ما يخالف يعني احنا مو كل واحد ينطي الصورة احنا نقول له نعم. لانه انا اريد استنتاجات خاصة بمعنى استنتاجات مقيسة يعني قائمة على حجة لو منطقية لو علمية لو الاثنين مع بعض. يعني ليش يفاجئنا العدو مثلا؟ سلاحك اقل من سلاح العدو؟	No big deal. Not every time someone expresses a picture, we tell him "yes." I want specific analysis. This means measured analysis. It means that it should be established on an alibi. The alibi could be logical, scientific, or even both. For example, why does the enemy surprise us? Do you have fewer weapons than the enemy?
Nizar:	لا. وضع القطعات...	No. The position of the troops
Saddam:	كل قائد ما اقبل منه و لا انتوا تقبلون من امر و لا من قائد حجة اذا ما يؤمن العدو عليه تفوق عالية بنسبة ثلاثة الى واحد. لازم يكون واضح. يكون واضح للامرين و للقادة انه العدو اذا ما يؤمن عليه نسبة ثلاثة الى واحد ما مستعدين نقبل الا ان يكون هو جبان او هو ما يدبر	No excuses shall be accepted by me from any leader, nor will you accept any excuses from a commander. Unless the enemy secures a superiority against him with the ratio of three to one. It has to be clear to the commanders and superiors that unless the enemy outnumbers you with a three to one ratio, we will not accept anything from him

		but a confession that he is a coward or that he had failed to administrate his battle properly. Whether a failure or a coward, one of them. These are the measurements of the army. Would the enemy's army come to us and not suffer losses?
Nizar:	لا سيدي به خسائر اذا سمحت...	No sir, they have losses. If you allow me,
Saddam:	خلاص.	Then, that is it.
Nizar:	نعم	Yes.
Saddam:	احنا نحكي عسكر.	We are talking about soldiers.
Nizar:	نعم	True.
Saddam:	انا ما اقبل بعد قائد يقول لي كلام مو علمي. و احد القادة قال لي امنوا تفوق قلت له اسكت بهالمعنى بالتعليق. قلت له بلغوه الاستخبارات شو كثر اللي جوا بالمكان الفلاني. ما اقبل حكي مو صحيح. يجي قائد يقول لي سيدي كان الموضوع الفلاني و قد امن العدو تفوق بنسبة ثلاثة الى واحد من الفوج الفلاني و قام. و للا لازم يحاسب امر الفوج. لازم يحاسب امر اللواء اذا ما حاسبه هو امر الفوج.	From now on, I will not accept any illogical statement from a comrade. One of the comrades said to me, "They achieved superiority." I said to him, "Silence", or something with the same meaning during my comment. I said to him, "The intelligence had informed you with the number of people who are going to show up in that place." I will not accept any incorrect statements. Unless the commander comes to me and tells me that the enemy had secured a superiority of three to one in regards to a specific battalion. Otherwise, the battalion's commander should be judged. If the brigade's commander does not judge the battalion's commander, he must be judged himself.
Nizar:	نعم	Yes.
Saddam:	و هيك نقاتل.	And that is how we fight.
Nizar:	صحيح.	Correct.
Saddam:	فهل تدريب العدو اعلى من تدريبنا؟ هل تسليحه افضل من تسليحنا؟ هل وضعه النفسي بالقياسات احنا على مستوى قادة اما اكو مفردات هنا و هناك .. هاي مسؤوليتك انت شلون تعد الناس و تخليلهم يقاتلون. مسؤوليتي انه عوضتك ببشر. مسؤوليتي انه سلاحك ما نقص.	Is the enemy's training better than our training? Are they better armed than us? Is their psychological situation in comparison [pauses]. Everything should be wrapped together when it comes to the commanders. Your responsibility is to prepare the people for the fight. My responsibility is to provide you with the people and my job is to make sure that you will not be shorted in regards to weapons.
Nizar:	صحيح	That is true.
Saddam:	مسؤوليتي انه على مستوى التحليل و الادارة السوقية موقفي صحيح. مسؤوليتك و مسؤولية قادة الفرق و امري الالوية انه شلون يخلقون من المفردات حالة جماعية في النتيجة المطلوبة.	My responsibility requires me to be on the right side when it comes to analysis and strategic leadership. Your job and the responsibility of the rest of the divisions' leaders and the brigades' commanders, is how to use all of these pieces in order to

		create a team spirit that could achieve the wanted result.
Nizar:	نعم	Yes.
Saddam:	هذه الكل معنيين بيها. كل القادة اللي يسمعونني. حتى يعكسوها هم على مستوى القادة الاخرين و الامرين. ما نطل و الله على ... طيب ما البصرة هدف العدو. زين شو نسوي؟ و الشمال ممكن يحقق بيه منين نجيب؟ سوينا جيش قد العدو باربع مرات. جيشكم ترى قد جيش العدو باربع مرات.	Everyone needs to be concerned about this. This goes for all the leaders that could hear me. This is so they would reflect it to all leaders and commanders in every level. We can not keep [pauses] okay, Al-Basra is the enemy's target. Okay, what do we do? They could achieve something in the north. Where do we bring from? We had built an army that is four times bigger than the enemy's army. By the way, your army is four times the size of the enemy's army.
Nizar:	اكثر طبعاً سيدي.	It is even more sir.
Saddam:	يعني العدو ما يقدر يؤمن عليكم تفوق في كل مكان. لكن يقدر يسوي حشد و يؤمن تفوق على الفرقة احداعش. خلاص. احنا الوية الفرقة احداعش. احنا قلنا لها انسحبوا. جاء نائب القائد العام و صدر لهم امر و اشرف على انسحابهم هو و قائد الفيلق السابع الى ان وصلوا. ما بيها شيء. من يصير تفوق يعني فوق قدرة البشر احنا نسحبه لل... احنا نسحب القطع العسكرية ما نخليها تنتظر الا هي تتسحب انسحاب غير منظم. فمن الناحية النفسية بعد ما نريد كلام يعني لقائد يطلب شيء اضافي من القطعات الا لما يقول لي العدو بامكانه ان يؤمن تفوق عليه. يقول لي بامكانه يؤمن تفوق علي اي نقطة. هو خليله يتصرف. يحرر تشكيلات يسويها احتياطي يدر بها يمكس بحالة ايسر هذا شأنه هو كقائد. انا ما راح اقول له شلون يمكس. و لا رني ساركان الجيش و لا نائب القائد العام. انت عندك قائد انت قائد لهذه المنطقة. هل العدو بامكانه ان يؤمن تفوق عليك في فلان موضوع و في فلان موضوع و فلان موضوع و تريد معونتنا؟ قول لي نعم؟ غير هذا لا. انا ابدأ ما نقبل لانه هذه اذا قبلناها منك الان راح تنعكس على علاقتك و يا قادة الفرق. كل واحد يقول لك سيدي و الله ترى احنا وجدودنا ما ادري ايش... الخ. و هو من تنطيه مجال راح يعكسها على امري الالوية و بالتالي	The enemy is not able to secure superiority against you everywhere, but they are able to deploy troops and secure superiority against the Eleventh Division. Okay, we told them to pull out the brigades of the Eleventh Division. The Deputy of the General Chief had come in, issued the orders, and supervised the retreat. He did this with the help of the Commander of the Seventh Corps. There is nothing wrong with this. Once there is a superiority that exceeds the humans ability, we will pull [pauses] we will pull the military troops. We will not leave them waiting until they start retreating improperly. In regards to the psychological aspect, I do not want any leader to ask for anything extra for the troops, unless he tells me that the enemy is able to secure superiority against him. He needs to inform me with the point where the enemy could achieve superiority. Let him react. He can liberate formations; make them reserve, train them, or hold on to something easier. That is his job as a leader. I am no going to tell him how to hold on to things. Neither the Army Chief of Staff nor the Deputy of the General Chief would interfere in such things. You are the commander in this region. Is the enemy able to secure a superiority against you in regards to this subject, this subject, and this subject and you want our help? Say "yes". Otherwise, we will not accept it. If we were to accept this from you right now, it would reflect in a negative way on your relationships with the

		Divisions Commanders. Everyone will start to whine about something. Once you give them room, they will reflect it on the Brigades Commanders. As a result, you will find even the simple soldier telling you, "Our reserve is not enough." As a result to this, the soldier would feel like he has an excuse to retreat improperly, retreat without orders, or not to fight as he should.
Nizar:	إذا سمحت سيدي.	If you allow me sir.
Saddam:	نعم	Yes.
Nizar:	احنا الحقيقة يعني مو العدد غير كافي او غيره. سيدي الوضع بالنسبة الى القطعات يعني الان اكمل [unintelligible] يصير بشكل متدارك يعني ما تجيب قطعة و اكو مجال لتدريبها. احنا هذه القطعات المستبسلة لو اكو مجال او يعطى مجال لتدريبها لو تعطى مجال ثلاث الى اربع اشهر لتدريب كل فوج شهر او شهر و نص سيدي يصير وضعنا افضل بكثير. بس هذه القطعات من التقت الى هذا الوضع اللي جت بيه الى ان اخذت موضع. اتى الى كل قاطع فرقة فوج تقريبا فوج زائد اذا نقدر نطلع لاغراض التدريب. تلاحظ سيدي شلون؟ هذه	In reality, it is not about whether the number is not enough or something else. Sir, the situation in regards to the troops right now [unintelligible] it should be conducted cautiously. This means that no troops should be brought while there a chance for training them. If these brave troops were to be given room for training [pauses] if they were to be given three to four months to be trained, our position will be much better. Sir, each battalion needs a month or a month and a half to be trained. Take a look at the situation of these troops since they met until the time they took their positions. Each division's sector had received a battalion; an extra battalion. If we can pull them out for training [pauses]. Can you see how it works sir? This
Saddam:	يا سيدي اذا تقدر تطلع اكثر من فوج طلع.	Sir, if you can pull more than one battalion, go ahead.
Nizar:	ما الوضع هسا سيدي الوضع ايضا راح يجي بالحكي اذا سمحت لي سيدي. الحالة الجديدة اللي صارت سيدي شنو هي؟ هو الاتفاق اللي صار بين فئات التخريب كلها من ناحية و بين العدو الايراني...	The situation right now sir [pauses] if you allow me sir, every thing will be explained throughout the presentation. Sir, what is the new situation that had developed? It is the agreement that was conducted between all of the devastating groups on one side and the Iranian enemy.
Saddam:	شو كثر عدد بالله كل فئات التخريب؟ شو كثر عدد المسلحين بيها؟	What is the number of all of these devastating groups? How many gunmen do they have?
Nizar:	سيدي بغض النظر عن عدد المسلحين بالنسبة....	Sir, regardless of the gunmen numbers,
Saddam:	كم مرة امنوا تفوق عليك في الموضوع هذا؟	How many times had they achieved superiority against you?
Nizar:	المخربين ما يؤمنوا تفوق علينا الا على الربايا اللي يهاجموها.	The devastators do not have superiority against us with the exception of these hills that they attack.

Saddam:	هي الربايا شو كثر	How many hills are there?
Nizar:	الربية من خمستا عش الى عشرين....	There are fifteen to twenty hills.
Saddam:	و تسترجعها بس بشرط يؤمنون عليها تفوق فوق طاقتها.	You will regain it back, but under the condition that they would secure superiority that would exceed its capacity.
Nizar:	اذا تسمح لي سيدي. فهل هذا الاتفاق سيدي اللي صار يعني بين المخربين كلهم بهاالجهة و بين المخربين و بين	If you allow me sir. Sir, does this agreement that was conducted between all of the devastators on one side and
Saddam:	استاذ نزار هالمخربين و هالاتفاق اللي صار... باكر لو نزت الهم بحاروزة و نقول لهم تعالوا يجون كلهم و يعوفون بعضهم	Mr. Nizar, in regards to these devastators and the treaty that was conducted, tomorrow if we were to throw them a bone and tell them to come on, they would all come in because they know each other.
Nizar:	ما راح نقول لهم تعالوا سيدي...	We will not tell them to come in sir.
Saddam:	[unintelligible] البرزان اللي ابوهم و هو كان وحده و تفلش. من شالت ايران ايدها عنه راح مثل فص الملح.	[Unintelligible] Al-Barazan, who was their father, he was alone. Once Iran left their hands off of him, he dissolved just like the salt does in the water.
Nizar:	صحيح.	That is true.
Saddam:	المخربين هيء ربعك نبههم دربهيم. يعني لا تظل قاعد ... روح انت اضرب المخربين. مو تقول لي يعني نص مدربين ... نعم انا اقول لكم كل قادة الفيالق بدون استثناء . كلكم كل واحد امام قاطعه يفكر يتعرض للعدو	In regards to the devastators, prepare your people, warn them, and train them. Do not keep sitting down. Go out and hit the devastators. Do not tell me that they are half trained! I am saying this to all of the Corps' Commanders without any exceptions. Every one of you, along with their sector, needs to be thinking of how to confront the enemy.
Nizar:	صحيح.	True.
Saddam:	و راح تشوفون اذا تتعرضوا مرتين تشوفون العدو شلون ينفرط مثل السبحة امامكم. كونوا على ثقة انه هسا لو ولحد بنص حيل و يضرب العدو ضربة وحدة. فلا يلحق يضرب مواقع العدو و يسقطها واحد تلو الاخر. بالخامس و بالاول و بالتاني و بالرابع يعني و بالاول الخاص. خمس فيالق الان بفوجين ممكن يحصلون نتائج بفرق ما ممكن يحصلوها بظروف اخرى. بس بيدوا. بس بالحيل اريد اجمع عليك المدفعية و اضربك و اخذك. لو افاجاك و اخذ الموضع الفلاني. جربوا مرة واحدة مثل ما جربنا بالفيلق الاول و ظل مزعول عليه و ما صار مرضي عنه الا ليين اجا و اشتغل ويا جواد. و للا يظل يدغر بيه . ليش طبقت امر صدام حسين الطريقة بدون ما ترجع لي؟ هيك اكو عقد	If you were to confront twice, you would realize how the enemy will break in the front of you, just like a necklace. Be confident that if one of you, even with half of the capacity, goes out and strikes the enemy once, he will not even have time to strike the enemy's headquarters and capture them one after another. Use the Fifth, the First, the Second, the Fourth, and even the Special Forces first. I am talking about five corps. Right now with two battalions, you could be able to achieve results that they would not be able to achieve with divisions in different circumstances. Just start; that is how it is. I want to gather my artillery against you, strike you, and take over. Surprise them and take over the headquarters. Just try it one time, just like we did with the First Corps. The Corps had upset people and it stayed that way until it

		came and started working with Jawad. Otherwise, they would have kept on screwing with them. Why did you apply the order of Saddam Hussein without checking back with me? That is how people have issues. What do you think, I can't see it? I see it! He is screwing with Nizar. Even his requests, he will not approve for him. Is that true Nizar or not?
Nizar	نعم سيدي	Yes sir!
Saddam:	بشرفك العسكري؟	Swear on your military honor?
Nizar:	بلى سيدي صحيح. بس انا ما ادري انه هو ليش بده يسويها يعني انا اتصور....	True, that is correct sir, but I have no idea why he would be doing something like that. I am thinking
Saddam:	لا ادري ليش يسويها. لانه انا شوف بالف عين. يا ابن الحلال ملتهي... خللينا نضرب العدو و قلنا له للرجال يا نزار [unintelligible] ما ادري شنو كم فوج و الحرس الخاص. عبالك محتلين ارض ابوه يعني هيك معقدين ما اقدر اشتغل ويا هم و الا اقدر اسلمهم اربع جداي يسرحون بيها. ما تتذكر هذيك؟ ما قام بعد يقول لك قف يا نزار بعد متوليهم طف. مو؟ ترى الان و وضعهم لا ... الان وضعهم اسوأ من ذلك الوضع و كون على ثقة.	No, I know why he is doing it. Look, I can see with one thousand eyes. Son, he is distracted. Let's strike the enemy. We told him and the men, "Nizar, [unintelligible]". I have no idea how many battalions or how many special guards. They are occupying the land of his father. I can't work with people who have issues. I can't even trust them with four sheep to take them to the mountains. Do you not remember that one? Did he not stand up and tell you, "Get up Nizar", right? Their situation now is not [pauses]. Their situation now is worse than that one, and I want for you to trust me on this one.
Nizar:	سيدي هسا القطعات....	Sir, the troops right now are
Saddam:	و عارفهم انا و ما اخطأت بتقدير عدوي. انا ما قابل لكم فرد يوم. بالثالث شكل بالسابع شكل بالسادس شكل لكن بهاي المكانات كلهم تقدرن تضربوهم بلواء واحد يكفي ان تاخذون بيه اهداف.	I know them, and I did not make a mistake in estimating my enemy. I am not talking to you about one day. You can form something with the Third Corps or even the Seventh. Form the Sixth Corps. In these spots, you can hit them all with one brigade and it should be enough to take over some targets.
Nizar:	حجم القطاعات اللي قدامي سيدي شوية العدو متهيء لعمل و مهيء قطاعاته ... اه يقدر بلوائين الى ثلاثة يقدر يقوم بعمل بحجم من هالنوع. بحجم من هذا النوع سيدي. في الاتجاه اللي يريد. الشيء المزعج سيدي شنو؟ انه هو مسرب	Sir, in regards to the size of the troops that are in the front of me, the enemy is prepared for some action and they had prepared their troops. With two to three brigades, the enemy is able to carryout an action with this kind. With this size sir, in the direction that they want. Now what is the annoying thing sir? It is
Saddam:	يعني يقوم بعمل نتفاجأ بيه احنا؟	Does this mean that the enemy would carryout an action that would surprise us?
Nizar:	و الله سيدي ما نتفاجأ بيه هسا احنا ما متفاجئين ...	Sir, we will not be surprised. Right now we are not surprised.

Saddam:	العمل بالشمال نتفاجأنا بيه.	We were surprised by the action up north.
Nizar:	لا سيدي.	No sir
Saddam:	اي عمل بالشمال نتفاجأ به.	Any action up north would surprise us.
Nizar:	لا ما نتفاجأ به. احنا ما نتوقع نتفاجأ به اطلاقا بس بالنسبة الي هسا الان. اللوانين اعتبرها مثل العمل المهم. على حجم و و حجم القطعات الموجود عندي و قسم من نوعياتها و عدم اكمال تدريباتها اللي موجودة اعتبره مهم هسا. ثانيا سيدي هسا المخربين و عناصر الحرس الخميني المتسربين في مناطق معينة من الواضح انهم راح يتعاونون و يضربون طرق الواصلات و يحتلون بعض العوارض اللي ما موجود بيها اي من القطعات خلف القطعات الموجودة بالجبهة. و انا احدها بشكل واضح ... الاتجاهات هادي اللي تصير بيها (الشريط ينقطع من 31:46 الى 31:54) قد تصل الى الف زائد. الف الى الفين من هالحجوم هذه	No, it will not surprise us. We do not expect ourselves to be surprised at all. According to the current status, I consider the two brigades to be a very important mission. In regards to the size of my troops, its quality, and the shortage of its training, I would consider that to be very important too. Secondly sir, right now the devastators and the elements of the Kumauni Guards, who had snuck into certain areas. [Pauses] It is very clear that they would collaborate with each other, hit the transportation routes, and occupy some of the blockades that do not have any troops behind the troops who are present at the front. I will specify them in a clear form. [Pauses] These are the directions that could develop. [Tape cuts from 31:46 to 31:54] It could reach a thousand plus, a thousand to two thousand of these sizes.
Saddam:	شو وقت ما يؤمن عليك العدو تفوق و قطاعاتك تقاثل فوق طاقتها اذا انسحبت و انطت الارض العرقية ما راح...	When the enemy achieves superiority against you, and when your troops are fighting above their capacity, if you were to retreat and give up the Iraqi land, I will not
Nizar:	ان شاء الله ما راح نسويها سيدي . احنا ان شاء الله ما نسويها.	If God wills, we would never do that sir. If God will, we will never do it.
Saddam:	من كل هذا انتوا شو تريدون منين نجيب لكم	According to all of this, what do you guys want? Where do you want me to bring things for you?
Nizar:	ما اريد شيء بس اعرض لكم الموقف سيدي. انا ما اريد شيء	I do not want anything. I am just presenting the situation to you sir. I do not want anything.
Saddam:	الموقف لا مو تعرض لي اياه . شلون تعرض لي اياه؟	No do not present the situation to me. How do you present it to me?
Nizar:	انا قلت بدي اعرض لك الموقف مال الفيلق الاول	I told you that I was going to present the situation of the First Corps to you.
Saddam:	يا نزار	Nizar.
Nizar:	نعم	Yes.
Saddam:	انا هالشكل . كل قائد يؤمن عليه العدو تفوق و احنا ما ندري بيه اللي يقدر يسويه يسويه كوطني عراقي اما الشيء اللي فوق الطاقات فهو معذور عليه.	This is me saying that any leader whom the enemy would achieve superiority against them, while we do not know about it, he should do whatever he can as a patriot Iraqi. But when it comes to things beyond his capacity, he will be excused for that one.
Nizar:	نعم سيدي صحيح.	Yes sir, that is right.

Saddam:	<p>اما كل حالة ما بيها تفوق و ينسحبون من ارضهم ما اقبل اي عذر بما في ذلك تقول لي اللي جوهم جدد. ابدأ. اللي صار) بدمقردن) سواء طلع مرة ثانية بعد ما مسموح بيه. هو يدري راح يصير عليه هجوم و العدو ما سوى تفوق عليه. احنا ما نطل نداري بالبشر لانه هذا ترى مو كل البشر تر تشتغل بالهيك ياول و اخ و فلان و شاربك اكو ناس ما تعرف هاي الشغلات. فضل شوكت. اريد كل قائد يلغي الحجة يصير عسكري. بعثيين و قضايا انسانية خلليها على صفحة. القضايا الانسانية في تطبيق الامر العسكري. تقول له انت امر عندك هالقد هذه اسلحتك هذه تجهيزاتك هذا اكلك هذا شريك. العدو في اسوأ حالة. قاتله. النسبة القياسية حتى يؤمن تفوق هي ثلاثة الى واحد. و النموذجية بالارض الجبلية ثلاثة الى واحد والله يقدر يزح القطعات. تمام و لا لا؟</p>	<p>But every case where there is no superiority and they go and they retreat from their own land, I will not accept any excuse, and that includes you telling me that whoever came were new. I will never accept that! Whatever had happened in Dumaqridamin, it will not be allowed again! He knew that he was going to be under attack and that they enemy did not achieve any superiority against him. We are not going to sit here and baby-sit people! Not all people do things in this manner. They do not care about a brother, a friend, or a mustache. There are such people who do not believe in these things. I want every leader to cancel the excuse and become a soldier. Ba'this and human issues, leave them alone! You would tell him, "You are a Commander, this is how much weapons that you have, these are your preparations, this is your food, and this is your drink. They enemy is in his worst situation. Fight him!" The scale for superiority has to be a three to one ratio. Three to one ratio is ideal for mountainous land. Under such circumstances, they would barely be able to push our troops. True or not?</p>
MV1:	اكثر	More
Saddam:	لا احنا ثلاثة الى واحد ... ما نريد اكثر.	No, three to one. We do not want more.
MV1:	المنطقة الجبلية ليها خصوصية	Mountainous region has a special situation.
Saddam:	<p>لا احنا نزي بالارض الجبلية ثلاثة الى واحد. هذه الروحانية انا اريدها حتى لما اسد امامكم هنا الباب امامك و امام قائد الفيلق الرابع و قائد الفيلق الثاني و قائد الفيلق الخامس و الفيلق الاول الخاص. حتى خلاص ... نتفق انه هناك اذن انه الهدف استراتيجي. اذا صار تحول بنوايا العدو راح نقدر نستنتج او نعرف و حتى ما نكون و ياكم قريبين.</p>	<p>No, a three to one ratio is good enough for mountainous land. I want you to preserve this spirit, so that when I shut this door in the front of you, the Commander of the Fourth Corps, the Commander of the Second Corps, the Commander of the Fifth, and the Commander of the First Corps Special Forces, we would agree that this is the strategic goal. If there were any changes in regards to the enemy's intentions, we will evaluate the situation and get to know the circumstances so we will not be too close to you.</p>
Nizar:	صحيح	True
Saddam:	<p>لانه من ننطي مجال بيها للمناقشة انا اعرفكم شلون تتعاملون و يا القادة و انا مرة لمحت انه ما ظلت ال يعني اه العسكرية بدها تتمحي بيناتكم بسبب</p>	<p>If we were to give you room to discuss this, I know how you deal with the Commanders. I have noticed that once. I noticed that the military spirit is vanishing among you, and this is because of the human relationships</p>

		<p>that were built by the war circumstances. So instead of it working in the positive direction, sometimes it is becoming more active towards the negative direction. This means that the commander and the leader feel safe from judgment. "Oh I have this guy to cover for me." This is not good in the military life! This is not proper! Right now, I am being clear to all Corps Leaders that I had counted. If the enemy does not achieve superiority against you, do not speak and say, "We want military troops". I would never accept or allow of this, and we will not even have one soldier to give to him. Whatever we approve would be okay. Right now, according to our information and our analysis, we must go to another place. The Fifth and the First Corps should never sit back. They have to go out and go to the enemy. The enemy is sitting there without devastators. Go out and confront the enemy. You would say to us, "We want helicopter force to maneuver for us." We would say, "Yes we will maneuver for you." You want National Defense Battalions? They are here and they are Peshmerga, just like them, and they will go against the Peshmerga. Instead of sitting around until they come to you on the hill and achieve superiority with a ratio of five to one on an isolated hill, go after him, according to the intelligence information. Right now, we had connected everything with one person. This person is Ali Hasan Al-Majid. All of the state's authorities and their private agencies are connected to him. There will be no more lack of information. You will not have to go back and forth to Baghdad anymore. All of the information is out there. He can also move the National Defense Battalions for you. Go to the enemy and strike him. Wherever they tell you he is at, they tell you that they enemy is in this village, go to the enemy and hit him in that village. Depend on God. Yes Sabir?</p>
Sabir:	<p>سيدي اذا تسمح سيادتكم . ايجاز عن امكانيات و قدرة العدو و نواياه بكل قواطع العمليات حتى نسهل على السادة قادة الفيالق الايجاز عن قواطعهم.</p>	<p>Sir, if you allow me, I have a brief summary about the capabilities and the intentions of the enemy in all of the operation sectors, so it will be easy for the gentlemen, the Corps Commanders, to give a summary about their</p>

		sectors.
Saddam:	تفضل استاذ.	Go ahead sir.
Sabir:	<p>بدءا بقاطع الفيلق الخامس. العدو اه قاطع الفيلق الخامس هو الفرقة اربعة و ستين المتألفة من اربع الوية فقط . الاربع الوية مفتوحة لاغراض دفاعية و حماوية في القاطع . عنده ثلاث افواج فقط محررة لغرض اعادة التنظيم و لوائين غير نظاميين منتشرة بعموم القاطع منسقة مع عمليات التخريب و الجزء الاعظم في منطقة حياة اللي نفذ عليها الفيلق عملية تعرضية اخيرة. ما عندنا معلومات عن وجود نوايا تعرضية غير العمل المحدود و بالتحديد بتجاه القسم المتبقي من عارضة غردقوا اللي اقترحت على سيادتكم بالاجتماع السابق ان يدرس موضوع اللواء ستة و تسعين الموجود بالراقم الف و تسعمائة و اربعة و سبعين لكونه معزول</p>	<p>I am going to start with the sector of the Fifth Corps. The Fifth Corps sector consists of the Sixty-fourth Division, which includes only four brigades. The four brigades are deployed for defensive and protective purposes in the sector. He has only three liberated battalions for the purpose of reorganizing and two unofficial brigades that are scattered in the entire sector to coordinate in regards to the devastating operations. The greater part is in the region of Hiyah and that is where the corps had conducted their latest confrontational operation. We do not have information about any confrontational intentions other than limited action, especially towards the part that is left from the blockade of Ghardaqa. Sir, I had suggested to you in the previous meeting that a study should be conducted in regards to the situation of the Ninety-sixth Brigade, which is present in the sector of 1974, since it is very isolated.</p>
Saddam:	و طلبنا ان تدرس اما بالسحب او بالتعزيز.	We had requested the situation to be studied and to carryout either a retreat or a reinforcement.
Sabir:	او بالتعزيز.	Or by reinforcing it.
MV2:	هاي صارت سيدي.	This had happened sir.
Saddam:	نعم؟	What?
MV2:	<p>صارت. اولاً انا كنت يم اللواء طالع يوم واحد و ثلاثين و تناقشنا بهذا الموضوع قبل ما رايح لجنة مشتركة للعمليات و الفيلق. و موجود بيها تقرير و ايضا زيارة للاخ قائد الفيلق الخامس و تناقشنا فيها هذا الموضوع تفصيليا و قررنا بقاء هذا اللواء في نفس المنطقة و تعزيره بلواء المغاوير للفيلق الخامس اللي وصل ايضا يوم ثلاثين على واحد و ثلاثين و هنالك بعض الامور في اعادة ترتيب القطعات مثل ما كانت عليها سابقا في السنة الماضية و حتى بعض العوارض ثبتنا ما هي القطعات اللي راح تكون بيها. لانه هاي المنطقة اللي اشار الها مدير الاستخبارات هي منطقة مهمة جدا. بقاء اللواء هو افضل مما يبديل اللواء ثمان و</p>	<p>It happened. First, I was with the brigade, I went out on the 31st and we talked about this subject. Before that, there was a common committee for operations and the corps, and they had a report. A visit was also conducted by the Commander of the Fifth Corps. We discussed the situation in details, and we had decided to keep the brigade in the same region and to reinforce it with a Special Force Brigade of the Fifth Corps, which had also arrived between the 30th and the 31st. There were also some issues in regards to organizing the troops in the same way that they were last year. We had also confirmed what kind of troops are going to be stationed in some of these blockades. This region that was indicated by the Intelligence Director is a very important area. Keeping the brigade out there is much</p>

		better than switching the Ninety-eighth Brigade for many considerations. We came up with this method and there is a detailed report with Mr. Army Chief of Staff.
Saddam:	خلص اللي انتوا توافقون عليه هو ماشي. بس قتلوا وضع اللواء يحتاج له طرح مدير الاستخبارات و انا حتى اسهل لكم قلت لكم اما تسحبوا او تعززوا. يعني شوف الحاليتين فخلص عززتوه خالص اذن نبقي. نعم.	Okay, whatever you guys approve should be okay. You had mentioned that the situation of the brigade needs feedback from the Intelligence Director. To make it easier for you, I had told you that you have the option of retreating or reinforcement. Check out both cases so that if you chose the reinforcement, then it is okay, keep it out there. Yes.
MV3:	بالنسبة سيدي الى قاطع الفرقة الاول. هناك ثلاث فرق نظامية. الفرقة ثلاثة و عشرين قوات خاصة بسراداش. ثلاثين في منطقة بانا و ثمانية و عشرين في المنطقة المقابلة الى منجوين في منطقة ماريوان. القطعات المحررة من القطعات النظامية هي فقط فوجين الى ثلاثة و اما القطعات غير النظامية فموجود لواء واحد محرر و منتشر....	Sir, according to the sector of the First Division, there are three official divisions. The Twenty-third Division Special Forces in Saradash, the Thirtieth Division in the region of Bana, and the Twenty-eighth Division in the region across from Manjaween, in the region of Mariwan. The liberated troops from the official troops are only two to three battalions. In regards to the unofficial troops, there is only one deployed liberated brigade.
Saddam:	احسب حسابك شلون نروح على سراداش. هيك احسب حسابك.	Make your calculations on how we are going to go to Saradash. Right? Make your calculations that way.
MV3:	ايه حسابات سيدي بس	Yes calculations, yes sir but
Saddam:	انت احسب حسابك. احسب حسابك. [unintelligible] هو بالمقابل ما قدامنا شعب؟ هيك حسابك. الجيش اللي ما يبقى يتعرض الى اخر لحظة لا يمكن ان يكون جيش مقاتل. و القيادة اللي ما تكون عندها روحية تعرض الى اخر لحظة من الحرب ايضا ما تكون قيادة مقاتلة بحق. يعني جيشنا بامكانه ان يكون هالشكل جيشنا به مفردات من ارواح ما يمكن و لا اكو مفردات بالعالم مثل المقاتل العراقي. بس خللينا نعه اعداد حقيقي. نعم.	You make your calculations. Make your calculations [unintelligible]. Don't we have people on the other side of us? This is how your calculations should be. Any army that will not keep confronting until the last moment cannot be called a fighting army. The leadership that does not have a confrontational spirit to the last moment of the war, will also not be considered a true fighting leadership. Our army is capable of being this way. Our army has one of the most incredible features. No one in the world has the features of the Iraqi fighter. Let's just prepare them in a real way. Yes.
MV3:	فسيدي قطعات العدو في قاطع الفيلق الاول منتشرة لاغراض حماوية و دفاعية ما عدا الثلاث افواج النظامية و اللواء الغير نظامي و اللي هو ما مجموع بمكان و انما منتشر بكل قاطع الفيلق الاول.	Sir, the enemy's troops in the sector of the First Corps are deployed for defensive and protective purposes except the three official battalions and the one unofficial battalion. They are not gathered in one spot, they are scattered all over the sector of the First Corps.
Saddam:	مجاهدي خلق ينسق وياهم	He should coordinate with Mujahidee Khalq

		[unintelligible] yes.
MV3:	<p>سبق ان وردتنا معلومات بان وجود نويا تعرضية محدودة تجاه قاطع بنجوين الا ان العدو ارجأ تنفيذ العمل للظروف المناخية التي مرت بالفترة الاخيرة. قاطع الفيلق الثاني العدو في قاطع الفيلق الثاني عنده بحدود اربع فرق نظامية هي الفرقة واحد وثمانين بمنطقة قصر شيرين منطقة سرب الزهار و الفرقة ثمانية و خمسين في منطقة نفط صدام و المقابلة الى نفط صدام. و الاربعين سراب في قاطع مندلي و لواء الخمسة و خمسين مظلي موجود في منطقة سومار. للعدو بحدود اربع افواج نظاميو محررة منها ستة الى سبع افواج موجودة حاليا تتدرب و تمارس على عملية الهجوم على منطقة الراقم اربعمائة و ستة و خمسين. منطقة الازانات. نويا العدو باتجاه هذا المكان الذي هو بمنطقة الازانات و بالتحديد الراقم رقم اربعمائة و ستة و خمسين لا زالت قائمة و هناك اشارة انه محتمل ان ينفذون خلال اثنين و سبعين ساعة من الان. مثل ما قلت قوة العدو ما تزيد عن سبعة افواج التي راح تتعرض على هذا المكان. بالمناسبة سيدي احنا بالمديرية من نحسب موضوع القطعات النظامية بقواطع الفيالق التي تتطرق لها تقريبا ما نعبر لها ذلك الاهتمام او مرات نروح اكثر من هذا و نزلها من الحساب و للتوضيح اكثر سيدي من شهر و جاي رئاسة الجمهورية و على راسها خامنئي و المستشارين الموجودين زاروا كل القطعات النظامية و بدهم يؤكدون عليهم بالقيام بعمليات محدودة في قواطع الفيالق. بس لحد الان ما نفذوها يتحججون ان القطعات العراقية في مواضعها قوية و يعني يطلبون ان يسمحوا لهم فترة الى ان يحين الوقت ان يؤمنون مباغته على احد القواطع. في منطقة عمليات الفيالق الاول الخاص. المسؤول عن القاطع هو قطعات نظامية التي هي الفرقة اربعة و ثمانين و التي تتالف من خمس افواج تقريبا. و اللواء السبعة و ثلاثين مسؤوليتها هي</p>	<p>Previously, we had received information that the enemy has limited confrontational intentions towards the sector of Manjaween, but the enemy had delayed carrying out the action because of the weather conditions that had occurred in the last period of time. In regards to the Second Corps sector. In the Second Corps sector, the enemy has approximately four official divisions. They are the Eighty-first Division in the region of Shereen Palace, in the region of Sirb Al-Zahar, the Fifty-eight Division in the region of Naft Saddam across from Naft Saddam, the Fortieth Mirage Division in the sector of Mandali, and the Fifty-fifth Parachute Brigade in the region of Sumar. The enemy has approximately four official liberated battalions. There are six to seven battalions that are currently being trained on how to attack the region number 465, the region of Al-Azanat. The enemy has intentions towards this place in the region of Al-Azanat. To be specific, the area number 465. There is a sign that they might conduct some type of action within the coming seventy-two hours. As I has stated before, the enemy's force does not exceed seven battalions which are going to carryout the confrontation against this place. By the way sir, in the directorate, when we calculate the official troops in the corps sectors that I had mentioned, we almost do not give it a lot of attention, and sometimes we even drop it from our calculations. Let me be clearer sir. In the last month until now, the Republic Presidency headed by Khamenai' and his advisors, they had visited all of the official troops and they had confirmed that they would conduct limited operations in the corps sectors. Until now, they had carried out nothing. They make excuses that the stationed Iraqi troops are strong and they always ask them to allow them to wait for awhile until the time comes and they can cause a surprise against one of the sectors. In the operation region of the Special Forces First Corps, the responsible for the sector are official troops. They are the Eighty-fourth Division, which consists of</p>



		<p>approximately five battalions. The Thirty-seventh Brigade is responsible for the northern area of Mahrat region. The enemy considers Humrain sector to be very important and gives it a lot of priority. The enemy believes that we are waiting for the chance to regain Humrain region. As a result, they are holding it with a force of guards that does not exceed one division. In the First Corps Special Force sector, the enemy does not even have one liberated or reserve battalion. As known, in the sector of the Fourth Corps, the enemy has three official divisions. They are the Twenty-first Division, the Seventy-seventh Division, and the Sixteenth Division. Out of these three divisions, there are three brigades. I am sorry, two brigades. There were three, but one of them is being held. Two liberated brigades that continue to train. The enemy gave great importance to the sector or the region of Al-Zubaidat. To be specific, it is the sector number 151. The troops of the two brigades are also on alert in order to carryout action towards this sector. Until now, they did nothing because they make up excuses of the readiness of our troops in this sector. As you know sir, through one of our reports, in regards to the Fourth Corps sector, the enemy wants to conduct reconnaissance operations, which are to be organized [unintelligible]. We had also indicated in the report that the motive behind this continuous effort with helicopters is to switch our attention to this sector. The Sixth Corps operation sector [pauses] there is one division in the Sixth Corps operation sector. It consists of guards who are spread from Lisan A'ajradah to the north [pauses]. Right now in Majnoon region, there is one guard brigade and two official battalions. We have no available evidence for the existence of confrontational intentions in the Sixth Corps sector, and not even in Majnoon region. In regards to the east of Al-Basra sector, the Ninety-second Armored Division occupies the sector or it is responsible for the sector starting from the region of Majnoon until Makhfar Zaid. The enemy in the penetrated sector is continuing</p>
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		his engineering defensive activities consistently. They control this place with a force of guards that is approximately five divisions. This force consists of approximately twenty thousand fighters. The majority of the fighters in this sector are from Al-Mahdi Corps. Lately, they named it the Additional Exceptional stage.
	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
MV3:	<p>هم سيدي مو اعلنوا عن فترة لغرض تطوع الايرانيين الى فيلق المهدي. خلصت الفترة فطلعوا لهم انه هذه مرحلة استثنائية لغرض اكمال تطوع مائة الف شخص. المرحلة الاولى اشتركوا بالمعارك اللي اشار اليها السيد قائد الفيلق الثالث اللي هي معركة يوم ثلاثة و عشرين و معركة ثمانية و عشرين. و انطوا خسائر كبيرة منهم. قوة الضربة اللي موجودة في قاطع شرق البصرة و بالتحديد منطقة الاحواز - زيزفول لحد الان ما تجاوزت الخمسين الف اذا مو اقل من هذا العدد. الفعاليات الامامية في هذا القطاع تشير الى انه العدو تحول الى اه اه الدفاع الوقي على اقل تقدير. ايضا مثل ما اشار السيد قائد الفيلق الثالث ظهرت فعاليات تجلب الانتباه و هي عبارة عن حركة ارتال مستمرة في اوقات حساسة قبل الضياء الاخير و ليلا ترافقها عمليات او محادثات لاسلكية عل اساس انه العدو عنده نية تعرض. احنا نعتقد ايضا مثل ما اشرنا بتقاريرنا .. التقريرين الاخيرة انه هذه الفعاليات هي جزء من المخادعة الا انه تحسبا من انهم يستخدمون المخادعة لغرض المخادعة و ينفذون عمل حقيقي فبوقتها اوصينا انه تكون القطاعات في هذا القطاع منتبهة فقط. احنا مع الفيلق الثالث نجري تنسيق مستمر يومي تقريبا و ما يقل عن عشرين مرة يوميا ليعني معرفة المتغيرات السريعة في هذا القاطع. العدو ايضا مثل ما اشرنا بتقاريرنا ما عنده الامكانية ان يستأنف تعرضه الواسع بزخم الهجمات الواسعة اللي نفذت سابقا و اللي تلي معارك اليوم العظيم و الحصاد الاكبر لكون الامكانية</p>	<p>Sir, they had made an announcement about a period of time to allow Iranians to volunteer and join Al-Mahdi Corps. The time was over, so they announced to them that this would be an exceptional stage to complete the volunteering process of a hundred thousand people. The first stage. They had participated in the battles that were indicated by Mr. Commander of the Third Corps. This consists of the battle on the 23rd and the battle on the 28th. They had suffered a lot of losses. The strike force that was in the sector east of Al-Basra, to be more specific, the region of Al-Ahwaz Zizfol. Until now, they could not exceed fifty thousand and the actual number could be less than this. The activities at the front of this sector indicates that the enemy had changed the strategy into a momentarily defense. Similar to what was indicated by Mr. Commander of the Third Corps, some activities that would catch the attention had appeared. They consist of constant movement of motorized convoys in critical timings, right before the sunset and at night. It has been associated with operations or wireless calls based on that the enemy has an intention to confront. We believe the same as what we had expressed in our reports. [Pauses] I am talking about the last two reports. We believe that these activities are part of a trick, but we have to be cautious that they might use a trick to deceive us and carryout a real action. At that time, we had recommended that the troops in that sector were to be merely alert. We conduct a consistent coordination with the Third Corps. It is on a daily bases and it is not less than twenty times a day. We do this to recognize the quick variables in this sector. Exactly like we had indicated in our reports, the enemy does not possess the</p>

		<p>capability of resuming their large scale attack with the same momentum of the large scale attacks that were carried out previously, right after the battles of the Great Day and the Great Harvest, because their capability is first limited and because the strike troops or the strike force has not yet reached the required level of training. Accordingly, do not believe that the enemy would give up any part of the strike force in order to carryout a limited operation outside of the sector. Based on this information and let us be specific and say that we do not believe that the enemy would carryout any action in April outside of this sector, and if the enemy were to conduct a confrontational operation, they will not carryout a large scale operation. They might carryout an operation in order to regain the part between the line 500 and [unintelligible]. Our current reports state that there is no change of direction for the current strike, which is located between the southern of the Eight Division and the region of Abu Floose. The enemy's concern [pauses]. The enemy has not been concerned yet about anything outside of this sector. We had received a lot of information from many agencies stating that the enemy has intentions in the region of Al-Faw, the region of A'badan, and the region of Al-Hor. Despite all of that, we were not able to get any confirmation for this information. In the current status, we do not support this information. The Seventh Corps sector. The enemy's force in the Seventh Corps sector consists of two guard divisions in the eastern and the western part of Al-Faw sector. There are two other divisions to defend the region of the Arab Coast, I mean outside Al-Faw sector. We do not have any information that would indicated that the enemy has serious confrontational intentions in this sector. Thank you sir!</p>
MV4:	<p>سيدي من الاشياء العظيمة اللي علمتنا اياها انه نضع نفسنا احيانا موضع العدو و نشوف شنو الدروس المستخلصة بالنسبة لاي معركة نخوضها كما لو كنا نحن العدو. و الواقع لو كنا سابقين بتنفيذ</p>	<p>Sir, one of the great things that you had taught us, is that sometimes you have to put yourself in your enemy's shoes and figure out the lessons that you can learn in regards to any battle we participate in. To behave just like the enemy would. In fact, if we</p>

		would have paid attention to this instruction, many things would have changed after the battle of the Great Day. The enemy had felt that attacking two fronts would cause them to lose for example; the command and the control, and that could lead to scattering the firearms, especially when it comes to crossing over a water blockade. When you lose the surprising factor, fighting against Iraqis is not an easy task. After avoiding all of these obstacles, I must add another element to all of this. This consists of us becoming use to the idea that after each attack, the enemy takes a break that would sometimes last for two months, three months, and it could stretch for a year, then they will resume their attack. According to the enemy's point of view, repeating a large scale attack within a short period of time would represent one aspect of the surprise, and that is what had actually happened. Right now, we agree that the dangerous strategic goal for the enemy is the city of Al-Basra. Al-Basra directly and Al-Basra indirectly, or by crossing once again through [unintelligible] to the Seventh Corps and choosing the divisions, starting with the Thirty-second Division, Eleventh Division, Fifth Division, Eight Division, Twenty-eighth Division, Forty-first Division, and ending with the Thirty-first Division. This is inside Al-Qarna and Majnoon. There is no serious target that would tip the strategic scale other than this important city. Its importance does not only come from the number of its population, but also from its geographic location and its status in the hearts of the Iraqis, where sometimes it exceeds the capital. It is important because it represents the connection to the Arabic Gulf land and the ability of Iran
Saddam:	العاصمة [unintelligible]	The capital [unintelligible]
MV4:	هاذي العراقيين يحبون البصرة سيدي يعني...	Sir, Iraqi people love Al-Basra.
Saddam:	يعني شلون	How come?
MV4:	يعني مدينة ربما نتيجة	It is the city, perhaps because
Saddam:	البصرة تصير اهم من بغداد؟	Al-Basra is more important than Baghdad?
MV4:	مو اهم يعني اكثر قربا للقلب.	Not important, it is just closer to the heart.
Saddam:	لا مو اكثر. انا اقول لك قائد الدولة	No, it is not closer! As the leader of the Iraqi

		state, I am telling you that Al-Basra is not closer to my heart.
MV4:	يعني ربما سيدي نسمع من بعض الناس نتيجة ما عانته المدينة	Sir, we hear that from some of the people and perhaps it is because of the suffering that was caused to the city.
Saddam:	لا من نحكي لازم نحكي حكي متوازن . ما نحكي حكي مال عواطف يعني محلية [unintelligible] شاعرية. من نحكي شنو البصرة اقرب على قلوب العراقيين من بغداد. يعني شلون اكو اقرب من العاصمة في هنغاريا على قلب اي هنغاري؟ او من العاصمة للاتحاد السوفييتي على قلب اي مواطن سوفييتي؟ شلون؟	No, when we speak, we have to balance our words. We do not speak emotionally. It is not local poetry. When we speak [unintelligible]. What do you mean by Al-Basra is closer to the Iraqi people's hearts than Baghdad? There is nothing closer to the heart of a Hungarian man than the capital of Hungary. Is there anything closer to the heart of any Soviet citizen than the capital of the Soviet Union? How?
MV4:	سيدي لنقل بعض العراقيين ربما بسبب ما عانته يعني الحقيقة من قصف...	Sir, lets say it is the point of view of some Iraqis. Perhaps it is because of what it had suffered in regards to bombarding
Saddam:	[Unintelligible]	[Unintelligible]
MV4:	على كل حال سيدي. اسف لهذه الملاحظة. الشيء المهم...	Anyhow sir, I apologize for this comment. The important thing is
Saddam:	انا اقول لك لو البصرة سقطت سنقاتل و بغداد لو وصلوا الي باب القصر الجمهوري سنقاتل و نعيدهم الى الحدود.	I am telling you that if Al-Basra were to fall, we will fight, and if they were to reach the gate of the Republican Palace in Baghdad, we will fight them and push them back to the borders.
MV4:	هذا شيء حكيم.	This is a wise thing.
Saddam:	الشيء مال انه و الله البصرة من ياخذوها قامت القيامة. ما تقوم القيامة. ما ياخذوها لكن ما تقوم القيامة حتى لو اخذوها.	But the theory if they were to take over Al-Basra, it would be the end of the world; it will not be the end of the world. Even if they were to take it, it would not be the end of the world, even if they were to take it.
MV4:	لا احنا مو سيدي العفو اسف يمكن هناك سوء في التعبير. مو من حيث اهميتها انه اذا اخذوها... اذا اخذوها نضل نقاتل عنها لكن ما راح نلقي السلاح اذا اخذوها و لا راح يروح العراقي اذا اخذوها و لا راح تروح الثورة اذا اخذوها. هذا شيء مؤكد و هذا ينطبق على اي جزء من اجزاء العراق. لانه كثير من البلدان و صلت اعدائها الى عاصمتها و اخترقتها. و لكن ما القت السلاح و قدرت ان تستعيد قوتها و ان تطرد العدو و احنا بالعكس الان احنا المنتصرين. اذا كان معيار النصر هو ان نمنع العدو من تحقيق هدفه و من توجيه ضربة شديدة الى قوته البشرية و	No sir, excuse me. There might be a misunderstanding of my expressions. I am not talking about its importance in case they take it. If they were to take it, we will fight for it and we are not going to drop our weapons, if they were to take it. The Iraqi man is not going to vanish if they were to take it. The revolution will not be gone if they were to take it. This is a sure thing and it applies on any part of Iraq. Many countries had their enemies reaching their capital or even penetrated, but they did not abandon their weapons and they were able to regain their strength and kick out their enemy. On the contrary, right now we are victorious. If the determinant of the victory is that we have to prevent the enemy from

		accomplishing their goal and directing an extreme strike to their human and material power, this means that the results of the latest battles had consisted of a sure victory. In regards to the battles of the year, which include the battle of Al-Faw, [pauses]. Despite the idea that the enemy had gained a small part of our land. Mr. President, when I said the word "important", I did not mean
Saddam:	خذ راحتك خذ راحتك.	Relax, relax
MV4:	<p>انه يعني من نفقدها راح نخسر الكثير. نعم نخسر جزء من بلدنا بس مو راح نخسر قوتنا لاسترجاع هذه الجزء. عودة الى بدء... موضوع الثلاثة الحقيقة اللي اريد اعرضها على سيادتكم. اولاً هذا التكدس في منطقة العمليات الان. مهما كانت اجراءاتنا في بناء الواضع الدفاعية و التحصينات فزيادة الكثافة البشرية بهذا الحجم لابد و ان تخلي خسائرنا مستمرة. لذلك لا بد من حل يعني. هل نقوم احنا باخذ زمام المبادرة من العدو و انه نقوم بعمليات هجوم ام هل انه نقوم بتريق بعض المواضع لاغراض التدريب و للتقليل من الخسائر و لاعطاء المزيد من الراحة للمقاتلين العراقيين؟ الشيء الثاني. هناك ظاهرة الهروب من بعض القطعات و لا سيما اثناء التنقل و اللي بعضها حول للسيد نائب القائد العام و اخذ اجراءات بصدد تنفيذ بعض الاحكام بحق البعض من النموذج السيء. و لكن هناك مازالوا هناك في بغداد و يمرون في المدن العراقية الاخرى عدد من الهاربين من الجيش. يعني نرجوا بمساعدة الحزب و الجهات المسؤولة انه نتوصل الهم الى حل. و هم يبلغ العدد الان اربعة و عشرين الف و تسعمائة و اثنين و خمسين من الفترة من 86/12/1 و لغاية 87/3/28 موزعين على الفيالق. الاول ثلاثة الاف و مائتين و ثمنعاش. الاول الخاص اربعمائة و سبعة و اربعين. الثاني خمسة الاف و اربعمائة و عشرة. الثالث ثمانمائة و اثنين و ثمانين. الرابع سبعمائة و خمستعاش. الخامس الف و تسعة و ثلاثين. السادس تسعمائة و اثنين</p>	<p>I did not mean that once we lose it we will be losing a lot. Yes we will lose a part of our country, but we will not lose our will to regain this part. Let me go back [pauses] there are three things that I would like to present to your Excellency. First, this gathering in the region of operations right now [pauses] regardless of our procedures in building the Defense Headquarters and the reinforcement, increasing the human density would have to keep our losses continuous. As a result, we have to find a solution. Do we take over the initiation process from the enemy and carryout assault operations, or do we designate some headquarters for training in order to reduce the lose and to give the Iraqi fighters more time to rest? The second thing. There is a phenomenal of deserting some formations, especially during mobilization processes. Some of these cases were forwarded to the Deputy of the General Chief. He had taken procedures in regards to carrying out some rulings against some of the people who represent the bad idol, but they are still out there in Baghdad. A number of army deserters are passing through other Iraqi cities. We hope that we can find a solution for them with the help of the party and the official parties. Their number right now is twenty-four thousand, nine hundred and fifty-two, in the period from the 1st of December 86' until the 20th of March 87'. They are distributed among the corps. The First Corps, three thousand, two hundred and eighteen deserters. The First Corps Special Forces, four hundred and forty-seven deserters. The Second Corps, five thousand, four hundred and ten deserters. The Third Corps, eight hundred and eighty-two deserters. The Fourth Corps,</p>

		<p>seven hundred and fifteen deserters. The Fifth Corps, one thousand and thirty-nine deserters. The Sixth Corps, nine hundred and fifty-two deserters. The Seventh Corps, four thousand, one hundred and seventy-four deserters. The command of the Naval Force, five hundred and fifty-five deserters. The total is seventeen thousand, four hundred and fifty-two deserters. Add to them the Third Corps, which consists of seven thousand and five hundred deserters from all formations that had enrolled in it. As a result, the total is twenty-four thousand, nine hundred and fifty-two deserters. This represents a large percentage from the support that we were going to receive in order to reinforce our forces. There are two points that I would like to present to your Excellency, hoping for guidance. In regards to the procedures against the slackers are known, there has not been any changes on the decision of the political leadership headed by your Excellency to pardon the deserters, except what was issued lately in regards to a special case in Al-Hor. However, right now these people need to be arrested in whatever way that it takes. This includes the elements that were coming to us from the Internal Security Forces and have not joined yet. So they had entered the stage of desertion. This means that the designated period of time for them to join their units is over and that they had entered the stage of desertion.</p>
Saddam:	<p>ما تحتاجوهم انتوا عندكم معينين غيرهم. كافي اما هم اكو قانون يحاسبهم و الحزب بده ينشط في هذا المجال. من عنده ملاحظات اخرى؟ نعم [unintelligible]</p>	<p>You do not need them. You have other people than them. That is enough, but when it comes to them, there is a law that will judge them and I think that the party will be active in this issue. Who has other comments? Yes [Unintelligible]</p>
MV5:	<p>سيدي تحيات من الفيلق الاول الخاص الى سيادتكم...</p>	<p>Sir, the First Corps Special Forces would like to send their greetings to your Excellency.</p>
Saddam:	<p>و عليكم السلام.</p>	<p>In peace be upon them too.</p>
MV5:	<p>الحقيقة انه هذا الفيلق اللي هم فعلا شباب بالعمر بس هم ترى شباب و الله بالفعل و العمل و قلبهم شباب. فالواقع سيدي...</p>	<p>In fact, this corps that consists of men who are old age wise, it consists also of the same men who are young in their doings and sayings, and their hearts are filled with you. So,</p>
Saddam:	<p>اذا قلبهم شباب لازم نزوجهم.</p>	<p>If their hearts are filled with youth, then you</p>

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		must get them married.
	(الكل يضحك)	[Everyone laughs]
MV5:	يعني انا هم قلت لهم سيدي. قلت لهم "اذا بيكم حيل ترى وراها ان شاء الله اكو زواج"	I told them that sir. I told them, "If you guys think you have enough energy, there is going to be marriage after this, if God wills."
Saddam:	ان شاء الله	If God wills.
MV5:	الشغلة سيدي الحقيقة راح استنتج منها نقطة مهمة... كتبت لسيادة... مو لسيادتكم الى السيد رئيس اركان الجيش السابق. على سرية مغاوير الى مقر الفيلق و سرية مغاوير الى مقر كل فرقة. جانني الجواب " لم تحصل الموافقة" حقيقة ورا فترة من الزمن [...]	The thing sir is that I would like to express a very important point. I had written to your Excellency. I am sorry, not to your Excellency, I had written to the former Army Chief of Staff. It was in regards to a special force company for each corps headquarters and a special force company to each division headquarters. I received an answer of, "approval was not granted". Awhile after that [...]

[END OF RECORDING]