

June 27, 1961

**Record of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev
and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam**

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Summary:

Pham Van Dong thanks Khrushchev for the Soviet help to Vietnamese people. Khrushchev talks about politics around the world, particularly, in the socialist countries such as Albania and China. He claims that the relationship with China is improving. Khrushchev also mentions that he discussed Indian politics with Mao. He criticizes the politics of Stalin toward China.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION*

BETWEEN N. S. KHRUSHCHEV AND PHAM VAN DONG, PRIME MINISTER OF THE DRV
27 June 1961

*[handwritten at the bottom of the first page: the record of the conversation was not reviewed by N. S. Khrushchev]

Today N. S. Khrushchev received Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the DRV, in the Kremlin and had a conversation with him. A. A. Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yu. P. [SIC; V. is correct] Andropov, chief of a CPSU CC department, V. I. Likhachev, Chief of the USSR MFA YuVA [Southeast Asia] Department, and S. A. Tovmasyan, Soviet Ambassador in the DRV took part in the conversation from the Soviet side. Deputy Prime Minister Le Thanh Nghi, Minister Le Van [Giyen], and DRV Ambassador in the USSR Nguyen Van Kinh, were present at the conversation from the Vietnamese side.

After an exchange of mutual greetings Pham Van Dong passed greetings to the Soviet people and government from President Ho Chi Minh. the CC of the Vietnamese Worker's party, the government of the DRV, and the entire Vietnamese people. He expressed the deep appreciation of the Vietnamese people for the enormous aid given by the Soviet Union.

N. S. Khrushchev expressed gratitude for the high estimation of the Soviet aid and replied that the aid to peoples building socialism is our duty, the duty of Leninist Communists. The Soviet people have feelings of deep sympathy for the Vietnamese people and admire the bravery with which the Vietnamese waged the war with the French. He noted the outstanding role of Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong in the Vietnamese Revolution and in the victory over the French.

Pham Van Dong thanked N. S. Khrushchev for the high estimation of his activity and noted that the victory was achieved thanks to the organizational role of the Vietnamese Worker's Party.

N. S. Khrushchev noted the great importance of the organizing role of a Marxist Party and stressed that special importance needed to be given to the Party leadership. If Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg had not been killed in Germany then the revolution might have gone another route. If our enemies had been able to kill Lenin and decapitate our Revolution, then it is still not known how matters would have developed in our country. Personality also plays a certain role in history. The history of the development of society has its own laws and does not reckon with personalities, but nevertheless personality plays no little role in history.

Pham Van Dong told about some aspects of Soviet aid to Vietnam. He noted that the victory of the Vietnamese revolution is inextricably connected with a feeling of support and other forms of aid from the USSR and CPSU. The Soviet Union has given the DRV enormous aid during the years of the recovery period and the years of the three-year plan, and continue to give it right now, when the Vietnamese people are beginning to carry out the five-year plan. This comprehensive aid has helped Vietnam solve the main problems in the economic, cultural, and military fields, and continues to exert an ever-increasing influence on the development of the country. For example, several factories and mills built with Soviet aid have already begun to provide production. The dispatch of a scientific delegation to the USSR had exceptionally great importance. The Soviet scientists helped the Vietnamese friends draft a program of scientific research work. Great help was also given in the military field, especially in the area of training senior military staff and in state security.

The Vietnamese people and their government express deep appreciation for all this aid and thank the Soviet people.

N. S. Khrushchev expressed pleasure that the government of the DRV understands the importance of the fraternal aid and solidarity of the USSR. Not everyone understands the importance of Soviet aid. We helped the Albanians sincerely, but they treated us ungratefully and rudely. They accused of allegedly having some

ambitions against their country. But what could we get in Albania? Scorpions? We have enough of our own scorpions in Central Asia. We sent them specialists, offered credits, and equipment, maintained part of the army at our expense, and gave them weapons free of charge. We built many factories and mills in the country, many of them free of charge. But the leadership of Albania now declares that they are Marxist-Leninists and we are not. They say, now it is necessary to go to Albania to learn how to build Communism. But we will build Communism somehow with our own brains, without Albania. What is this Marxism-Leninism if they've shot the entire Politburo in Albania? The Prime Minister of Albania said: whoever is against us we will spit in their face and put a bullet in their foreheads. They were against us for our condemning Stalin. Have we had occasions when members of the Politburo acted against me? Yes, there have been. So, did we shoot them? This is not Party life, not democracy. When some comrades express their opinion on some questions then I have to listen to them. There was a time when seven of the 11 Politburo members were against me: Voroshilov, Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Kaganovich, several of them among the oldest Party members. Their views were harmful to the Party. So, was it necessary to execute them? The CC met and expelled them from the leadership, but some of them are still working. Molotov works in Vienna and feels well; Kaganovich is retired; Voroshilov is a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; Pervukhin is Ambassador in the GDR; Malenkov is director of a power station; Saburov is a factory director; and Bulganin is retired. But according to the views of the Albanians they needed to be shot. The Albanian Party, which calls itself Marxist—Leninist, is a gangster Party [entered above by hand: according to its actions], this is a slander on Marxism—Leninism. We cannot agree with their actions. Now they are offended that we don't help them, but there is a Russian saying: "Don't spit in the dish from which you eat", "Don't spit in the well, [you may] need to drink the water". They think that we are not Marxists, they insult us, but we should help them. If we continued to give them aid, then they will consider us fools or decide that we are afraid of them. The Albanians seized four of our submarines and other military equipment. This says that they don't need our friendship, but our pants. They are behaving like petty robbers. We haven't become poorer from this, we are creating a new fleet with atomic engines, with missiles and atomic weapons. But it turns out they need four old submarines more than our friendship. The submarines are obsolete, the engines are worn out, but friendship does not grow old. The older the friendship, the stronger, but they can't [inserted above by hand: understand] this. We are of the opinion that there are provocateurs in the Albanian leadership. They are establishing relations with Italy right now, yet even earlier the Albanian leaders told us that they regard Italy well. Many Albanians have served in the Italian [armed] forces. The minister of defense was an officer with the Italians, and Mehmet Shehu was an officer of the troops of Albanian King Zogu. So it still is not yet known who he is. Mehmet Shehu personally shot Politburo member Koci Xoxe and boasted of this. Xoxe was a worker, an old Communist. Supporters of the Soviet Union sit in prisons, both in Albania and in Yugoslavia. The Albanians assert that Stalin was right when he performed executions and it is not understood why he did not execute Gomulka. Is this Marxism-Leninism? We condemn Stalin not for performing executions in the country, they also performed executions under Lenin, but right we shot someone, but we execute bandits and murderers. But we condemn Stalin for executing Communists. The Albanians are doing the same thing. [Inserted above by hand: They are doing the same thing as before] only even stupider, like petty bandits and thieves. It's a pity the Albanian people, they pay for their idiotic leadership, but we cannot do anything. Possibly we'll choose a time and we will openly make a statement since the Albanian leaders are lying to their people, saying that they have a friendship with us. We want the Albanian people to know that they are being deceived. The record of the conversation with President Kennedy was distributed to all the fraternal Parties in the socialist and capitalist countries, and also many leaders of neutral countries: Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and others, but the Albanians did not want to receive information and broke relations between the Parties. We have nothing in common with either Nehru nor Nasser. Nehru is an anti-Communist, and Nasser is an enemy of Communism, but he listens to us for this is also both to his and our advantage. It is to his advantage because it strengthens his position in the fight against imperialism, and it is to our advantage as long as

Nasser opposes imperialism. The question of the fight of [inserted above by hand: Nasser] against [the Egyptian] Communists is a domestic one. We cannot fight with all countries whose leaders are fighting Communism. This problem should be solved inside the countries themselves, within the peoples. I have told this directly to Nasser. In reply to my question, on whose side is he fighting, Nasser replied that he is on the side of the Arabs. But after all there is no single Arab nations. There are Arabs [who are] workers and capitalists and Arabs who are feudalists and peasants. Nasser said that he is for the Arabs in general. But this cannot be, this is question of class struggle, the second stage of the development of this struggle. Vietnam has travelled the same path in its development. At first the entire nation joined in the fight against colonialism and then, when power was won, there occurred a stratification of forces. Therefore, after victory over the French there was a concern over whether the Vietnamese people would win the victory over internal forces. This was a difficult battle of Vietnamese against Vietnamese. The same thing happened with us, the Revolution was easy, but then we fought four years, Russians against Russians, worker and peasants against capitalists and landowners. This process did not escape a single country, it also touched India and other countries, but it is a domestic question.

The Albanians assert that they have the center of Marxism-Leninism right now; we had it, but now they do. I openly say that evidently the hostile hands of other countries have a hand in all their actions. Some leaders are smarter, they are silent, but others are stupider, and they shout. But the Albanian people have to suffer. That's the situation with Albania.

We think that our relations with China are improving. But to tell the truth they are not those relations that we had five years ago. Then there was actually brotherhood, but relations were spoiled after 1958. We were not at fault in this, we demanded nothing from China and expressed our attitude toward the domestic policy of the leadership of China not vocally, but with silence. We never opposed the measures pursued by the PRC. In 1958 I flew to the PRC since [inserted above by hand: we] had received a record of a terrible conversation between our Ambassador and Mao Zedong. He spoke against our advisers. We replied that we could withdraw our advisers and after this letters were distributed to all the socialist countries with a suggestion to withdraw the Soviet advisers. Perhaps we were interested in sending advisers? Your people were accustomed to warm weather and ours to cold weather. Every Soviet person is waiting to return home, as are your people. And if we send people then it is only because that country which asked for them needs this.

In the course of the conversation Cde. Mao Zedong touched on the question of communes. What could we have replied to this [?]. We replied that the creation of communes was China's business, but we would not create communes at home. For the sake of friendship with China we could not say that we will build communes at home. This could ruin the country and throw us backward. We understood that this is a fatal thing, but we did not tell [inserted above by hand; advise] them not to do this. He is an adult himself and knows what he is doing, and he did not ask for our advice. Therefore we replied: "Go ahead, but we won't [do it] at home". [inserted above by hand: At first There was a period when] Lenin did this [inserted above by hand: tried the organization of communes, but] then he abandoned [this] and we think he was right. Lenin proposed a cooperative plan and we think that he acted correctly. You want to try and create communes, go ahead. This can be compared with how a mother teaches a child: he snatches at all objects with his hands and will not understand if he is told "it's hot", he needs to feel this himself. It's so with the communes: now they in the PRC know that [inserted above by hand: such a thing] is "hot". Yes, and there are [inserted above by hand: actually] no communes there right now, they have only the name left, one shell. But France [inserted above by hand: also] has communes, these are municipalities [inserted above by hand: administrative units]. but since it is impossible to say that De Gaulle is building socialism [inserted above by hand: is a Communist]. The concept of "commune" has its own meaning and the Chinese have invested their own meaning to this concept. Everyone in a commune is fed equally. This is a Marxist-Leninist slogan, but it needs to be used in time and before creating a material basis for its implementation. When there is food for 10 people, but about 100 mouths, then you won't feed everyone. Mao Zedong called the material incentive for labor "a vestige of bourgeois law" and

brought moral incentive to the fore. But first it is necessary to educate the people. [inserted by hand in the margin: Even] in the USSR we still do not manufacture on a moral incentive, but we combine material and moral incentives. We think this will be a long process. We have drafted the Party program in the expectation of 20 years, and we think that the combination of these two stimuli will be preserved during [inserted above by hand: this] period.

This does not depend on my desire, I am for a moral incentive, but if it is introduced [inserted above by hand: right now] then the workers will eat everything, they will eat me, but they themselves will not gain weight.

The subjective and objective cannot be mixed. This step would be theoretically correct, but subjective, since there objective factors have not been created [inserted above by hand: in the PRC] for accomplishing [inserted above by hand: the Communist slogan since] the productive forces are [inserted above by hand: poorly] developed, manual labor predominates, people live badly, and are poorly dressed. Everyone understands that one cannot declare “take as many pants as you want” when there is one pair of pants for [every] 10 people. First of all it is necessary to sew these pants, at least one pair per person. Perhaps Communism can be established arbitrarily? At the end of [his] life Stalin also wanted to establish Communism arbitrarily. He said: we will double the workers’ wages. This [inserted above by hand: will be] Communism. It means, in his opinion, if you give a worker 1000 rubles instead of 500 rubles then Communism [inserted above by hand: will come]. a cleaning woman instead of 100 rubles – 200 this is Communism. He did not understand the situation, was disengaged from life, and did not know how the people lived. He ate himself as much as he wanted and thought that everyone could do this. No one supported Stalin at a [inserted above by hand: Politburo] meeting, everyone was silent, and he understood that he was speaking nonsense.

When Zasyad’ko was talking with Zhou Enlai he asked him what happened with the Chinese chickens. Zhou Enlai frankly said that they ate all the chickens. During our times of collectivization when the peasants went to the collective farms they liquidated everything they could, thinking this is mine, and that is the collective farm’s. It also happened in China. When the peasants went to a commune where everything was in common they killed the chickens, ate the pigs, and arrived there reduced to poverty [*razdetye*]. But there was nothing in the communes, that’s how it turned out, that it was a dangerous step. We understood this and did everything that we could. We said to them: create communes, but we won’t. The Chinese are smart [inserted above by hand: they] understood that we didn’t approve this. What kind of friends would we be to the Chinese if I had said: [inserted above by hand: this is a good thing], do it, but we ourselves [inserted above by hand: we won’t start to do this at home]. The Chinese friends could accuse us of provocation, saying, [we] pushed, but we themselves didn’t do it. We told them honestly: we won’t – it’s a precipice, it’s – a pit, we don’t want to fall into it. We acted honestly, but they were offended by us. Others praised them, but did not follow their example themselves.

Mao Zedong said that he would send his ministers to production for a period of three months. It was also so among us [inserted above by hand: but long ago] Lenin carried logs, we ourselves worked in the mines, but this was long ago. Why sent a minister to a lathe now, he will only break it, but a worker [inserted above by hand: on this lathe] will do better. This is playing proletariat. Previously they carried earth in baskets, like in China right now, but now there are excavators which take out 9,000 cubic meters of earth in an hour. Maybe this is correct for China, there is nothing anti-Marxist in it. But at different stages of building socialism countries solve these problems in different ways.

Mao decided to build small blast furnaces such as [inserted above by hand: we] had done 300 years ago, back under Peter the 1st. We can’t return to that time. Why should we build “samovars”? Where do you put this steel? It’s now another age, high-quality steel is needed. Do it if you want, but we won’t. It is true that now the Chinese have stopped building such small blast furnaces. If we had gone this route then it would have shown that we don’t understand elementary things in the field of economics.

[inserted above by hand: In a conversation with me a while back] Cde. Mao Zedong boastfully declared [said] that he knew where the rice goes [inserted above by hand:

there is much of it in China]. I [inserted above by hand: told him] that the Chinese [inserted above by hand: surely] don't need to ask us for advisers to decide what to do with surplus rice. Even we in the USSR do not have surpluses. On the contrary we are striving to create surpluses. This is the main problem of humanity. For the problems of food, shoes, clothing are the main ones for people. Didn't China already solve these problems in 1958? Possibly, [inserted above by hand: an incorrect solution] prompted the Chinese to create communes [inserted above by hand: and that] conditions were already ripe for Communist consumption. We are not utopians and know that in the development of Communism the main thing is production, but they know how to deal with consumption from its first day. One cannot switch to a Communist means of consumption without creating a Communist means of production. These are two interconnected phenomena and one process should create the conditions for the other. If one begins Communism with consumption then this will be consumer Communism or poverty. For we say [inserted above by hand: know] conditions are already ripe for primitive Communism, but these are half-savage. Communism needs to be built scientifically. We have passed through capitalism, through the development of science and technology, through the preparation of a socialist revolution, the birth of the working class, and the creation of a revolutionary party. The entire sum of these factors should mature for the development of a Communist society. That is why we could not switch to Communist consumption.

In the area of foreign policy we differed on questions of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese declared that the American imperialists are a paper tiger. Is it really so? No, it is not. We would very much like for it to be so, but this tiger has strong claws and fangs and we do not need to be distracted from reality. The way out is in peaceful coexistence, which is not begging for peace, but a condition to avoid war. During the days of the Brest Peace Trotsky tossed out a harmful slogan "neither peace, nor war". Lenin condemned this slogan and offered his own: peaceful coexistence, contacts, and economic and cultural ties with other countries. Does Marxism-Leninism expect to achieve the triumphs of its teaching through war? Such an understanding of Marxism-Leninism is incorrect. We are against war, we are convinced that our ideas are pure and progressive. Ideas themselves do not conquer, the working class and the parties of this class are fighting for them. The fight for the victory of Communism on a worldwide scale is a fight inside each country, within each people. Therefore the slogan, "a world without wars, a world without weapons" is only possible under Communism, but it is correct because it is attractive to all peoples of the world. At one time Marx and Engels advanced the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!". Was this slogan correct? Yes, it was. It is true there were wars after this, but this did not mean that the slogan was wrong. It meant only that it was necessary to fight for the implementation of this slogan. The same with the slogan "a world without wars, a world without weapons". It is necessary to fight for it, to create the conditions for its implementation. Only Communism can create such conditions, but Cde. Mao Zedong offered such a slogan: "The wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West". This is not a class slogan, this means that one continent conquers another, the imperialists frighten their peoples with this slogan, saying the yellow race is threatening the white race, whites unite! What is Marxist here? The Americans, the French, the Germans scare [inserted above by hand: us and others] with the Chinese. Therefore Mao Zedong's slogan is incorrect. He is playing into the hands of the imperialists. It is natural we cannot support this slogan.

[Inserted above by hand: Take] another [Chinese] slogan, "let all flowers bloom". Is this really Marxist? Every peasant knows that there are beneficial flowers and harmful flowers. He destroys the harmful ones and tends the beneficial ones. When Mao Zedong asked us about our attitude toward this slogan I softened the answer, saying that possibly we do not understand, possibly it sounds somewhat different to Chinese, but we don't understand it. This slogan is incorrect, but we never opposed it anywhere in the press. We thought that the Chinese will look into this question themselves. Why would you be offended by us? They also had other slogans, for example the slogan "to stand on two legs". Perhaps it is also understandable for the Chinese, but we do not understand it. We always stand on two legs, but if there is one leg, then it is necessary to get a crutch. If we put this slogan before our people they would be surprised. One more slogan "three banners: the general line, the great leap forward, people's commune". We don't recognize great leaps in economics, [inserted

above by hand: because] we have a planned, socialist economy. It is true, we have great leaps in the economy, that is, big opportunities appear which according to plan [inserted above by hand: were coordinated]. But this only says that we are still unable to plan [inserted above by hand: well]. [inserted above by hand: A big leap] is not a law, not a blessing, [inserted above by hand: after which] After a big leap they usually fall. An economy should be developed proportionally. A failure in one sector entails a failure in another, since all sectors are interdependent. Therefore planning questions are fundamental. But the Chinese are approving a plan for a year in the second half of this same year, which means an unplanned economy. They have three plans: a big, medium, and small one, that is, in practice there is no plan. There can only be one plan: two or three plans don't happen. We assume two figures: a maximum and a minimum, for we cannot plan precisely, we cannot foresee everything. But this is a shortcoming, and not a blessing. [inserted above by hand: For example,] for the seven-year plan we planned an increase of the production of steel to 91-96 million tons [inserted above by hand: a year]. Right now we are heading for an overfulfillment of the maximum figure and have corrected it to 98-100 million tons. But a total of two and a half years have passed. It means we still are not able to plan well. Obviously, we will have inaccuracies in the plan in the future. In the Party program we provide for smelting 240 million tons of steel in 1980. But this figure is approximate, practice will correct it.. It is possible that chemistry will develop so that an opportunity appears to replace steel in some sectors. Then we will need less steel, but we cannot foresee the development of science 20 years [ahead]. Nevertheless, we have a planned economy.

Why were the Chinese offended? After all, we might have different views on individual questions. This even happens inside the Party. But the Party is one thing. Our CC removed Molotov and Kaganovich from managerial bodies, for unity is necessary on Party questions. Relations between countries is another question. It is necessary to display greater patience here. The Chinese are offended by us about the communes, but they themselves are [inserted above by hand: actually] eliminating them, and have given them another meaning [*soderzhanie*]. Liu Shaoqi told us about this, and they are already writing about this in the newspapers. They are no longer communes right now, but [inserted above by hand: something like] collective farms. The Chinese have criticized us for not creating "small metallurgy", but they themselves write nothing about this right now. They say that they have taken down the stoves, the metal is lying around, is not good for anything, and requires smelting. I also explained to Mao Zedong our attitude toward India. India is a bourgeois country. Nehru is a bourgeois leader. We go together on several questions, but our goals are different. Nehru knows this, but it is to our advantage not to hand India over to the mercy of the imperialists. India spoke out against China when the PRC had difficulties in Tibet. Nehru wanted Tibet not to be part of China. But, after all, Mao Zedong is responsible for the difficulties that have arisen in Tibet, he is to blame for this. How did he permit the ruin of Tibet, and allow Tibet to rise up against the Chinese? Mao Zedong justified this by [saying] that the central government in Tibet had little strength. But why did this happen? It was necessary to keep the necessary number of troops there and not allow an uprising. But when this happened it was used by the imperialists. Nehru could not support the Chinese, otherwise he would be a Communist, but in fact he is an enemy of Communism. Why are they offended by us? We had difficulties in Hungary. In truth, we, Stalin, were at fault, for conditions were created there favorable for use [entered above by hand: which the imperialists could use for the creation] of difficulties. The imperialists made use of this. We moved our troops, although we knew that all the bourgeois countries would oppose us. We knew that Nehru would oppose us, he could not fail to, but however [entered above by hand: we did not retreat] moved our troops. We decided that they would make a fuss, they made a fuss, but meanwhile we crushed the counterrevolution. You know what a fuss was made. Nehru spoke against us. We also spoke against him, but lightly, for appearances sake, since he is not the main enemy. The main enemies are the US, Britain, and France. As well as in Tibet. It is not Nehru, but the US which represented the main danger. Mao Zedong was offended, and organized a conflict on the border. [inserted above by hand: The border] dispute has dragged on for several centuries, but [inserted above by hand: because of it] neither the Chinese emperors nor the rajas have yet fought, but the Communists have begun to fight. Did this ease

the situation of the Communists in India? Was this to the advantage of the progressive forces in India? What position could we take? We could only express regret about this conflict and a hope that a cease-fire would soon occur. This was the only correct way. If we had made a [inserted above by hand: critical] statement directed against India, then a bigger gift from us to imperialism could not be expected. We knew that Eisenhower had promised support to Nehru [inserted above by hand: in a conflict with China].

Does this mean that we are taking conciliatory positions? No, It does not mean [this]. When China entered into conflict with the US because of Taiwan we wrote Eisenhower such a sharp letter that he returned it sent it back. We declared that an attack on China will be viewed as an attack on the Soviet Union. I repeated these same words to Eisenhower during the [summit] meeting in the US. Such statement [inserted above by hand: of ours] was correct, like a statement against India would have been incorrect. Such a statement [inserted above by hand with regard to India] would only rally together forces in a struggle against us. The Chinese were offended by us, however we think that they [we] were right. In my conversation with Kennedy I told him that the PRC's struggle for the liberation of Taiwan is a bloody matter for China and we are on its side in this struggle. Taiwan will be Chinese sooner or later. India is another matter. Such are our differences with China. Our relations have become better just now. We would like for them to improve further and, for our part, we are doing everything to do this.

When President Ho Chi Minh came to us it turned out that we have the same aspirations: both we and he wanted us to meet with the Chinese [inserted above by hand: for a discussion of all questions]. We sent a corresponding proposal to the PRC, but they [inserted above by hand: actually] did not want to meet [inserted above by hand: and they even committed tactlessness]. In 1958 Mao Zedong made a faux pas I flew to Peking [inserted above by hand: for a meeting. Right now] Den Xiaoping has been sent to us. [inserted above by hand: Of course] we respect him, but he is not Mao Zedong and cannot decide questions. Thus a formal delegation was [inserted above by hand: sent]. A discussion did not develop here and we were not fault in this. We openly declared that China is sick with megalomania. The leaders of some Communist Parties have said that Mao wants to be the fifth after Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. We hold to another opinion. [inserted above by hand: By the way] after the death of Stalin we adopted a decision according to which monuments are not to be set up during the life of a leader. The main recognition of the activity of a leader is not during his life, but after his death. [Translator's note: in both the instances above the word "vozhd'" was crossed out and the handwritten word "rukovoditel' ", a far less laudatory word, was inserted] Not a single monument to Lenin was erected during [his] life, just like Marx and Engels. Right now we are erecting a monument to Marx and Engels, and will unveil it for our congress. [inserted above by hand: We have also recently erected a monument to Lenin]. Stalin erected monuments to himself during [his] life. After his death we did not erect a single monument to him. We are not taking down the old ones, but we are not putting up new ones, but we are erecting [inserted above by hand: five] to Marx and Lenin. We could make a decision and erect 10 monuments to each member of the Presidium but it would be irrational. Let the people talk about our work themselves. We think that Mao Zedong is in a hurry, and this is harmful. Patience is necessary, history will judge, it will inexorably say who is right. This verdict is taking shape right now. We support the Declaration adopted by the Communist Parties. It is true that the Chinese say that this is their Declaration, but we say it is ours, but this is good. If two big Parties think that this is their Declaration then it means it is collective [*obshchaya*], but this is the main thing. We will approve this Declaration at our Congress. We will give you a draft of our program to read, it reflects our position. We will eagerly listen to your advice and comments, for even smart people are insured against stupidities. One need not think that the leadership does not commit stupidities. Stalin was not stupid, but a very intelligent and talented person, but he did so many dumb things. If he had listened to others then he would not have done such dumb things. But he considered himself the "fourth", and this was harmful. Enver Hoxha now considers himself the "sixth", and possibly even the "fifth", arguing with Mao Zedong. We behave modestly and are the blacksmiths of the development of Communism. We will work well, the people support us, and [if we work] poorly, they will kick us out. They support us for the time

being and we are satisfied.

[inserted after the text by hand: A. I. Glukhov, attaché of the Translation Bureau of the USSR MFA, recorded the conversation].

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27 June 1961

[inserted by hand at the end: N. S. Khrushchev looking at the clock, saying that it was getting close to lunch and it seems he has "eaten" the time allotted for the visit of Cde. Pham Van Dong to Cde. Brezhnev. The conversation was interrupted here.]