

**October 3, 1990**

**Cable No. 1828 from Ambassador Yamada Chusei  
(Egypt) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
'Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (First Meeting: The  
Situation in the Gulf)'**

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**Summary:**

The small group session at the beginning of the meeting was suddenly, on instructions from President Hosni Mubarak, turned into a tete-a-tete meeting (only the other side's Prime Minister Atef Sedky joined him), with the situation in the Gulf the only issue raised.&nbsp;The document is a summary of its main points. (Present from the other side was Prime Minister Sedky. Interpreter: Tsuruoka Koji).

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## 電信写

国王である。自分（ム）は同機構への参加からエジプトが得るものが何もない上に、他の参加国がジョルダン及びジョルダンと異常に近い関係を有するイラク更にイエメンであるため、サウデイに対して十分な説明を行わなければ対サウデイ包囲もうとの疑念を持たせることとなる旨警告を発していた。しかしフセイン国王が余りにも執ように求めるので自分（ム）も最終的には同機構に参加したが、その結果判明したのはまさに自分（ム）の前記警告が真実であつたことである。

(4) 自分（ム）は、フセイン国王には深くきずつけられている。同国王はジョルダン国民に対しエジプトがジョルダンの立場を損つている、フセイン国王の訪米をひぼうしている、過去2年間エジプトはジョルダン経済をばう害している等の根もはもないことをささやき、自らの失政の責任を他国に押し付けんとした。

(5) このようなことを総理に述べるのは残念でならないがフセイン国王はごまかしにほん走する人間である。ナセル、サダトもフセイン国王にはくるしめられた。ナセルは余りのことに公衆の面前でフセイン国王をぶじよくした。サダトに対してはフセイン国王は、キャンプデーヴィッドの合意（CDA）間近となつた時点でロンドンから極秘りに電話を入れ、ジョルダンも参加したい旨伝えて来たことがあつた。ところがその後CDAがアラブの大勢の前で不評であると分かつると何の断りもなくロンドンからアンマンにもどり、ついでにはCDAを批判しエジプト非難に加わつた。

(6) イラクのクウェイト侵略直後、フセイン国王はサダム氏の指示により自分（ム）を訪問し、や半まで話し合つた。国王はエジプトが反イラクの立場を取らないように主張したが、自分（ム）は24時間の時間を与えることとした。すなわち、自分（ム）から、イラクのクウェイト撤兵及び正統政権の復帰の2点をサダム氏から取り付けられたら自分（ム）はイラクの面子を救うために限定的なアラブサミットを召集する用意がある旨述べたところフセイン国王は直ちにバグダッドへ向かつた。よく日の午後アンマンにもどつたフセイン国王から電話でサダム氏は限定サミットに合意した旨連絡して来たので自分（ム）から2つ問題について了解はとれたかと質したところ国王はそのような詳細は議論しなかつたと答えた。自分（ム）は議題も不明なサミットなど召集できないと述べておいた。

(7) フセイン国王は当初からサダム・フセインがクウェイトから撤兵するとは思つていながつた。全ての行動は予定通りだつたのだ。フセイン国王は、サダム氏からサウデイの油でんを入手した際には大きな分け前を受け取る約束を得ていたのである。

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2. 以上に対し総理より次のとおり述べられた。

(1) お話をうかがい本件が原則にそつて解決されるべきであるとの感を強くした。

(2) わが国の立場はイラクのクウェイト侵攻及びへい合は認められず、クウェイト正統政府が回復され、イラクにいる外国人の人質が即時に解放されねばならないというものであり、そのため国連安保理決議の完全実施を求めている。またわが国として成し得るこうけんとして、しゅうへん国援助を行うこととし、ジョルダンにも経済援助を供与する考えであるが大統領に異論ありや。

3. これに対し大統領より次の通り述べた。

(1) 自分（ム）はジョルダン国民に何等反感を有しておらず国民のためになる経済援助は支持する。

(2) 自分のジョルダン批判は専らフセイン国王に向けられたものである。

(3) フセイン国王はおだやかな物ごしで来客をてい重にもてなすのでだまされやすいが、国王の発言に真実はない。

(4) （総理より自分とブッシュ大統領との間でもフセイン国王をわれわれの側に引寄せることが望ましいとの見解の一致があつた旨しようかいしたところ）自分（ム）はジョルダンの立場を害する考えはない。フセイン国王の一かん性に欠けた対応を非難しているのみである。

(5) なお、あくまでもなお書きとして述べたい（BY THE WAY）が、エジプトはもはや債務は増やせないで日本の対エジプト支援はかん大な条件のものをお願いしたい。

4. 次いで総理より、サダムにクウェイトから撤兵させるには経済制裁を強化していくことが効果的と考えるがどうかと質問されたのに対し大統領は以下のとおり述べた。

(1) サダムは思い込みのきつい人間であり国際関係にも明るくない。米国と戦争をしても最終的には勝利を収めるとは合理的人間であればだれも言わない。

(2) 経済制裁を強化することは戦とうを回避することにつながるだろう。経済制裁によりサダム政権のほうかいも可能だからである。

(3) 他方、サダムは2つの致命的誤りをおかした。1つはイランとの間の戦争で得たものを全て投げ出してイランとの和平を求めたこと。2つはイランと完全な和平に至る前にクウェイトに侵攻したこと。8年間の対イラン戦争で得たものを全て失つてはクウェイトからの撤兵はサダムにとつて国内で自さつするに等し

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い。他方クウェイト占領を維持すれば多国籍軍から空爆されよう。いずれもサダムにとり困難である。

5. これに対し総理より、国連総会でのブッシュ大統領の演説に対して与えられた世界的支持を見ても国際社会は一致してサダムに反対であり、今後とも国際的圧力をにんたい強く維持して行くことが重要であり、そのため国連の役割が重要性を増している旨述べた。

6. 次いで大統領より、エジプトとしても軍事的圧力を強化するため現在既にサウデイ入りしている1個機こう師団に加え更に1機こう師団を近々サウデイに派遣する予定である旨述べた。(了)

Secret

Telegraphic Copy [blacked out]

Number R198111

Primary: First Middle East Division

October 3, 1990 [time blacked out]

Sent [from] Egypt

October 3, 1990 [time blacked out]

Arrived [at] Ministry

[to] Minister of Foreign Affairs

[from] Ambassador Yamada Chusei

Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (First Meeting: The Situation in the Gulf)

No. 1828 Secret Top Urgent [blacked out]

Outgoing Telegram No. 1826 Separate Telegram 1

The small group session at the beginning of the meeting was suddenly, on instructions from President Hosni Mubarak, turned into a tete-a-tete meeting (only the other side's Prime Minister Atef Sedky joined him), with the situation in the Gulf the only issue raised. Following is a summary of its main points. (Present from the other side was Prime Minister Sedky. Interpreter: Tsuruoka Koji).

1. At the outset the Prime Minister said that he highly appreciated the firm response of Egypt both in and outside the Arab world towards the settling of this issue. He also expressed his respect for President Mubarak's outstanding leadership. President Mubarak then said the following:

(1) Showing a firm response towards this issue is natural because the issue is one of principle. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), of which Saddam Hussein was a member, always affirmed the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Its member states never thought that he would invade Kuwait.

(2) I (Mubarak) visited Saddam Hussein one week before the invasion and asked him very clearly if he intended to invade Kuwait. Saddam clearly answered that he was only going to threaten Kuwait and was not thinking of invasion. I did not think that the head of state would lie, so I was truly surprised when I learned of the invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, Saddam has said that he did not say to Mubarak that he would not invade and that there are witnesses to it. However, as I said before, I did receive a clear answer from Saddam and the statement was one that he made in a meeting between just the two of us, so there would not be any witnesses. (The Prime Minister added that it was an act against faith in people.) Saddam pretends, and he is not telling the truth, to be a descendant of Mohammed.

(3) It is my former friend King Hussein of Jordan who worked hard to persuade me (Mubarak) to join the ACC. I (Mubarak) warned that Egypt had nothing at all to gain in joining the ACC and that, because the other participating countries were Jordan as well as Iraq and Yemen, both with extraordinarily close ties to Jordan, if he did not explain it fully to Saudi Arabia, it would raise suspicions of encircling Saudi Arabia. However, because King Hussein was so insistent, I (Mubarak) in the end joined the ACC. What became clear is that that my (Mubarak) warning was right.

(4) I (Mubarak) have been deeply hurt by King Hussein. The King has been whispering

to the Jordanian people that Egypt has hurt Jordan's position, spoken ill of King Hussein's visit to the United States, hindered Jordan's economy for the past two years, and other baseless charges. He has tried to push responsibility for his own misgovernment onto another country.

(5) I am sorry to tell you such things, Prime Minister, but King Hussein is someone who goes around deceiving people. Nasser and Sadat were also tormented by King Hussein. Nasser went so far as to insult King Hussein in public. As the time for the Camp David Accords (CDA) was drawing near, King Hussein secretly telephoned Sadat from London and told him that Jordan wished to participate. But when he learned later that the CDA was unpopular with a great many Arabs, he returned without any notice from London to Amman, then at once criticized the CDA and joined in the denunciation of Egypt.

(6) Right after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein visited me (Mubarak) on instructions from Saddam. The two of us talked late into the night. The King urged me not to adopt an anti-Iraq position. I said that I (Mubarak) would give him 24 hours. That is to say, I (Mubarak) told him that if he were able to gain Saddam's agreement on two points, Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its legitimate government, then I (Mubarak) would be prepared to convene a limited Arab summit to save Iraq's face. King Hussein then went directly to Baghdad. The next afternoon I received a telephone call from King Hussein, who said that Saddam had agreed to a limited summit. I (Mubarak) then asked him if he had gained agreement on the two points. The King answered that he had not had such a detailed discussion. I (Mubarak) told him that I could not convene a summit with an unclear agenda.

(7) King Hussein from the start did not think that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait. All his actions were as planned. King Hussein received from Saddam Hussein the promise that he would get a large share when Saddam acquired Saudi oil fields.

2. The Prime Minister replied to the above in saying the following:

(1) Hearing your talk has reinforced my sense that this incident should be settled according to principle.

(2) Japan's position is that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its annexation cannot be accepted, that Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored, and that the foreign hostages in Iraq must be released immediately. Japan is calling for the complete implementation of the Security Council resolutions for that. In addition, Japan is thinking of providing economic assistance to the front-line states, including Jordan, as a contribution that we can make. Do you have any objections to that, President Mubarak?

3. The President replied to this in saying the following:

(1) I (Mubarak) have no ill feelings whatsoever towards the Jordanian people. I support economic assistance for the Jordanian people.

(2) My criticism of Jordan was directed solely towards King Hussein.

(3) King Hussein politely welcomes guests with a gentle manner, so it is easy to be deceived. There is no truth to what the King says.

(4) (The Prime Minister brought up that there was a consensus of views between him and President Bush that it would be desirable to draw the King to our side.) I do not intend to do damage to Jordan's position. I am only criticizing King Hussein's inconsistent response.

(5) By the way, because Egypt can no longer increase its debt I would like to ask generous terms for Japanese aid to Egypt.

4. The President, when asked by the Prime Minister whether or not he thought that strengthening economic sanctions would have the effect of forcing Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, said the following:

(1) Saddam has stubborn notions and little understanding of international relations. No rational person would say that he would ultimately win in a war with the United States.

(2) Strengthening economic sanctions will lead to the avoiding of fighting. That is because destroying Saddam's regime by economic sanctions is possible.

(3) Then again, Saddam committed two fatal errors. One was his giving up everything and seeking peace with Iran. The second was invading Kuwait before arriving at a complete peace with Iran. Withdrawing from Kuwait after losing everything gained in eight years of war with Iran would be tantamount to committing domestic suicide. On the other hand, Iraq will likely be bombed by the multinational force if he keeps occupying Kuwait. In either case, it will be difficult for Saddam.

5. In reply, the Prime Minister said that, in view of the worldwide support that President Bush received for his address before the United Nations General Assembly, the international community is united in its opposition to Saddam; continuing to patiently maintain international pressure is important; and, therefore, the role of the United Nations is growing in importance.

6. The President then said that, in order to increase the military pressure, Egypt plans to send in the near future another armored division to Saudi Arabia in addition to the one armored division that has already entered Saudi Arabia. (End)