

**May 3, 1989**

**Baath Party meeting 05/03/1989 Saddam Hussein  
talks about Baath Ideology**

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**Summary:**

This file contains a meeting between Saddam and his Bath Party members: The record starts at 00:01:30. Saddam talked about Bath Party ideology and dogma. He said that Bath Party achieves all theories of religions and divine messages sent to human race. It isn't an atheist party but rather it is a monotheist party. It is a party which is parallel to religions; however it isn't a religious party. It expresses the unity of Arabs. Then he talked about Iran and the Iranian revolution which overthrown the royal regime. Me Iranian religious system is a double edged weapon that benefits and harms the Arabs at the same time but it will be harmful if the Bath party doesn't do its role. The track is blank from 00:44:40 until 00:45:05. At 00:45:06 the record is back again but this time unidentified man was speaking. He talked about Islam. He talked about the historical conflict between the Muslim eastern Arabic world and the Christian west. Then he talked about Khomeini and his ideology. The record finishes at 01:27:50. 01:27:50 to 01:30:02 the track is blank.

**Original Language:**

Arabic

**Contents:**

Transcript - Arabic

[00:00:00 to 00:01 :50]: Blank

[Saddam Hussein): Also, as comrade Tariq said, in order to find sequence in my words, I must mention again in other ways. [*Inaudible*] Iran [*Inaudible*] the page in front of us, the Shah system collapsed, its characteristics were known. As countries we had state to state relations, but that does not mean that we approve of the situation; that does not mean that he was honestly honoring his obligations toward us like we were honestly honoring our agreed-upon obligations. We were very honest in honoring all of our obligations, but the Shah was not honestly honoring all of his obligations; he always had hidden motives.

[*Inaudible*] Of course, what we are saying right now is different from what we used to generally say. However, we did used to say that to the Iranians through their ambassador. Continually, we used to, and we still believe that a known situation that does not represent a danger to the nation because of efficiency [*Inaudible*] and its inability is better than an unknown situation that might be harmful to the nation in a more capable way. This is our general theory about everyone that borders the Arab Nation; this is the correct theory.

A situation that is not hostile to the nation, no matter how corrupt, that is something that concerns the people in that nation, it is better than a hostile situation to the nation even if it achieves benefits for the people [*Inaudible*] forward in the calculations of the international advancement issue. The Arab Nation has enemies. We are not going to classify them by identifying them, we are going to classify them by their interests, whether it is revolutionary interest, a local interest, an interest that is in agreement with an international strategy that is hostile to Arabs, or an interest because it borders the Arab Nation. These interests would be just as bad as the old-fashioned ones that were hostile to the Arab Nation. Now, an advanced situation [*Inaudible*] presents correct solutions to the people, and the strategy followed is non-hostile to the nation.

[05:05]

Now, if the situation deals with the nation through the use of three strategies for each situation, then we have an extremely advanced situation. We should not save any means of [*Inaudible*]; the principles mentioned in the command memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Iranian government are the correct principles now and at any given time. If the Arab Nation can mimic these principles-not only in Iraq, but also in all of the Arabic countries, and all the nations and countries bordering the Arab Nation that would relieve it of a great burden, and it can then concentrate on building its civilization and confronting its main enemy, the Zionist entity that is in cahoots with the schemes of imperialism in the area.

Our position of not interfering with Iran's internal affairs after 1975 is completely correct. Perhaps someone might say, 'Well, our relations with Khomeini would not have been good, or perhaps our relations with him could have been better.' If policies do not take into consideration the central issues, and act on it, it becomes just like the lottery. Let us assume that the Shah destroyed this movement and the shah returned; that means that we allowed Khomeini to use Iraq as a trap against the Shah. What would logic dictate? Logic says that Iran's Shah would use the occurring situation as a clear Arabic, International, Iraqi, and Iranian excuse to make new trouble all over

again. This would cause us to turn our back on Iran, instead of concentrating on the Arab Nations. Then this situation should not fool us and make us doubt the accuracy of the central principles. But did we provide enough information regarding all of the developments in Iran, regarding [Inaudible]? The answer is, of course no. Not only we, but also the world's large nations and the Americans, did not have a clear picture of the developments in Iran with enough accuracy.

Let us return to the religious situation; let us talk about the religion of Islam. [Inaudible] In the article and writings by some comrades in some of the issues that we see, the essence of religion is based on two principles-the connection outside of earth, and the connection on earth. We will talk about the Islamic religion, the Christian religion, and the Jewish religion. This is the core of these religions.

[10:01]

[Inaudible] as religion has progressed, we see a central theme. A central theme in this

subject, or else why did Islam come after the previous two religions? God is not incapable of stating all his Islam ideas once in Judaism or even before. There are two issues; the first issue is that God said to humans: I respect progress-what is wrong with you, why are you not respecting progress?

[Noise] [Inaudible] there is a very clear role: It is the role of humans in religion-not only the role of heaven in religion. So, religion was divided into two roles: the role of heaven, and the role of humans on earth. There is something connected to heaven, but this is not enough, unless humans have an effective and considerable role to carry out the work theory on earth. As much as the work theory failed on earth, religions and prophets were limited to a village, a city, or a small area. Does this mean that heaven is incapable?

No, it means that earth is incapable.

This theory about the role of heaven has a partner on earth, and this partner is the human. This partner is strong and a partner of opinion who is capable of turning it into a village or an earth. Therefore, we Arabs say that the descent of messages to the Arab land, and to the Arabic people, is not an accident but, rather, a chosen act. They alone ... it was not a solution for the situation that some Arabs had and now all of the other Arabs must receive and spread to the world. It was a matter of the right situation and rejecting a backward situation that the Arabs lived like some people try to say. Religion descended in those places because Arabs were the worst of nations [Inaudible] and it came to them to correct the bad that they were living in. It descended to them because they were more capable than others to carry the message of heaven on earth. This is how we understand this issue.

So, after this small introduction, where is the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in relation to the theory of heaven regarding the role of humans on earth? The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party establishes the entire theory of heaven regarding the role of humans on earth.

[Inaudible], it is not an infidel Party; however, it is not a religious, Salafist party as comrades have

stated. It is the Arabs' spirit, the developed spirit, the one that relies on heritage, and the one that develops according to the needs of earth [15:00], the humans' need on earth, and all other [Inaudible] even the role of humans when dealing with nature in this age.

As such, the contradiction between the Arab Socialists Ba'ath Party and the spirit of religions on earth does not exist like it does within other systems, like the systems in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and other Arab countries. So, what happened in Iran was a revolutionary stand to change the monarchy system, and the means used was revolution. But how much success must the revolution have-while reacting to a certain situation-for it to become a theoretical revolution for life, that also conforms to the theory about the previously mentioned roles of earth and heaven? This is the big question, and we think that the chances of failure are much higher than of success. And we still think that the chances of failure are much higher than of success, and we are going to briefly summarize why we think this.

However, before we move on to that topic, we ask: Does the religious phenomenon in Iran represent danger to the Arab Nation? Yes and no at the same time: It does represent danger if the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party does not perform its role. It can represent a tactical danger-danger that is classified as tactical because they are made at specific time-when it is used as an extended strategy for the large countries, against the Arab Nation. Regimes in the Arab Nation-although they do not conflict with the religious systems in general-do conflict with the religious systems in their revolutionary spirit. [Inaudible]. In the Gulf, all oil countries, Egypt, and even North Africa like Hasan al-Thani regime, it was not expected to become a situation; rather, it stirred up an already existing situation, when the comprehensive revolutionary theory of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party does not perform its role [Inaudible]. It generates a general rejection of the current situation, which is a backward system [Inaudible].

The more impact the Party has when it acts, the bigger role and responsibility that it has [Inaudible] for the big countries in the Arab nation [20:05].

When a regime is like the one in Yemen, weak and corrupt, and the people are against it, if the Party does not lead the people, Marxism will lead. Therefore, the Iranian issue, the interference caused by the international strategies of the larger countries in the region in the form of doctrines can represent the biggest danger if it is quick to oppose the goals of the Arabic revolution and bolster the image of the strategic theory that is being spread by

the Soviet Union in the region.

Politically, we can predict future conflict-and we can try our best to resolve that conflict-but when new situations arise in the region, conflict occurs sooner than we predicted. This is a new issue in politics that the Party will have to deal with; the occurrence of a situation earlier than we anticipate is unfair. It is supposed to occur after the Party built a united example-where it has already reached certain efficiencies in weapons-making and in certain international relations that are better than the current situation. So this situation was unfair because we were not prepared to solve the conflict without incurring great losses.

The religious movement, represented by Islam in Iran, was the proper method-on the page we

pointed out-to express the joint Iranian interests and joined nationality. In their fight against the shah, Iranians used their religious movement as the proper method to express their common interests and nationalism. But what happened after that page? After that page, as comrade Doctor Munir said, these religious movements always know what they do not want; but they never know what they do want. The total correct outlook on life is the one that continues to renew, while maintaining the connection to history and heritage.

The refusal position is not the proper one for the command; it is the position toward the correct stand-that is if it is a successful command. The refusal phase is the correct stand for the general public-that is when the public becomes aware of what they do not want. So, when the situation in Iran moves from the phase of expressing the Iranian nationalism-through Islam-and expressing the common Iranian nationalism [*Inaudible*], that would then move it to the specification phase.

Before we talk about that, we need to say that the Islamic method [25:00] that the

Iranians used to overthrow the corrupt monarchical system is incorrect, because the private could not lead the general-meaning that Iran did not have a comprehensive specific patriotic theory that would enable it to lead the general public. So it joined the individual theory-and used the general public- [*Inaudible*] to keep its position and to express its needs [*Inaudible*] after the end of the first obligation [*Inaudible*]. That is why, in our opinion, there were no methods of expressing general nationalism; there were methods available to express only individual nationalism.

[Noise] [*Coughing*, and lighting a match] This is why the proper stand for the command and the theory of revolutionary action-is to refuse what it does not want and to specify what it does want, not simply to refuse without any specifications [*Inaudible*]. Just as Doctor Munir explained, the appropriation phase is the positive phase that lists what is requested-not the refusal phase, which lists what is not wanted [*Inaudible*]. When we express what we want, we automatically express what we do not want.

At this time, we must mention [*Inaudible*] Abu 'Ammar. Converting the theory of the Palestine revolution to a general theory requires not using the special situation for the general rule. Usually, generalizing in a situation-that is, converting it from the specific to the general- [*Inaudible*] is a lost cause, one that does not bring results.

If you noticed-a while ago, perhaps two or three years ago-we used to think that all Iraqi people were Ba'athist. We used to address the organized Arab Socialists Ba'ath Party, and we addressed the unorganized Arab Socialists Ba'ath Party, meaning all of the Iraqi people. Was this-addressing them in such a way- [*Inaudible*] permitted and correct in 1969 and 1970? No, this was not correct, and it could have led to confusion.

[MY]: Refusal.

[Saddam Hussein] [*Inaudible*] Concentrating on giving leadership characteristics to the people-instead of the individual-and holding them responsible for those principles do not lead to the general good. To sway the general populace, you must place the individual in an effective command position. After the general specifications are clearly reached, then the public can be

given command-within the meanings we pointed out.

[30:00] The Palestine revolution is its theory for the work, and the total outlook theory [*Inaudible*]. When you step outside what is Arabic specifications, to generalize, do not make the Arabic theory the leading theory of what is general or for Islam-rather, make the general a substitute for what is specific and without getting results. For all of these reasons, comrades, the religious phenomenon that was used in Iran to express the needs of the Iranian people-that is, to reject the situation that was going on-does not represent a strategic danger to the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. However, if it were more aware and could answer the question that we pointed out, it would say only that it cannot make Iran its own experimental lab for general ideas. [*Inaudible*] If it could patriotically give the correct answer, it would turn the situation in Iran to one of being an ally of the Arabic revolution instead of an opponent.

We cannot [*Inaudible*] the void in Iran. I mean [*Inaudible*], it is more specific [*Inaudible*]; there was fulfillment of the people's needs, as comrade Doctor Munir pointed out, but the logic of the revolution would never allow us to accept the general terms that are used nowadays. We must, every now and then, express our principles in a way that is exciting to young people, to their romantic notions-so that young people are attracted to them before they ask about the theory behind them. So a young man in Morocco would ask [*Inaudible*] after he does his best in a while, he asks, who are those? They say,

'These are the Ba'athists; then he says in a month or two, 'Okay, I am with those Ba'athists [*Inaudible*] because of international and Arabic reasons, our Party was not able to express its wishes. The nationalist role is the one that can express the most [*Inaudible*] struggle against the Zionist enemy and against imperialism within Arab unity. But does that mean that we should not avoid tactical mistakes that are used to point out strategic mistakes that have a negative effect on the Arabic revolution? We have now, for example, expressed our opinion regarding whether the young people have skills [*Inaudible*] mosques, religious men [*Inaudible*]; we know that this issue is not a religious issue but rather a political one. It expresses itself, and looks for the proper circumstances to express itself in other means.

[35:00] they talked about this on [*Inaudible*]. Is it proper behavior to go to the door of the mosque and wait for a twelve- or fourteen-year-old [*Inaudible*]? This is done so that tactical issues affect the Arabic revolution negatively-by turning an intended action into a public position that is intended to conflict with the interests of the Arabic revolution [*Inaudible*]. You may see some people [*Inaudible*] and others patting [*Inaudible*] them on the back, [*Inaudible*] or shaking their head. You may say that [*Inaudible*] but fear [*Inaudible*] and say [*Inaudible*] meaning, try to limit the mistakes that contradict the physiological state of the situation that could make this conflict an adverse public situation. When we avoid this issue, then there is no danger on the Arabic revolution method that we are leading in that place-and we are hoping to generalize it to deeper levels. But the mistake whether made while calculating the time or the [*Inaudible*] is a dangerous one, as I said previously, whether or not it was made to generate feelings [*Inaudible*] Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party could not express outside Iraq as it should or as an extension for the strategies of the big countries [*Inaudible*].

[*Inaudible*] in Bahrain to lead the people, then this situation may be present in Bahrain, Saudi

Arabia, and Egypt; it could be present anywhere that our Party does not reach [*Inaudible*]. This is a summary of the thoughts that I wanted to add regarding this topic.

Should we talk about another topic?

[MY] [*Inaudible*] regarding some points [*Inaudible*] [Saddam] [*Inaudible*]

[MY] No, I was asking about that point [*Inaudible*]

[Saddam] [*Inaudible*]

[MY] Yes, I am asking about a point [*Inaudible*]

[Saddam] [*Inaudible*]

[MY] Yes [*Inaudible*]

[Saddam] [*Inaudible*]

[MY] I have a point about Yemen.

[Saddam]: [*Inaudible*] Yemen [*Inaudible*] and the brothers in Syria, of course, with the

participants that will go [*Inaudible*] this is the big problem; we do not side with the Americans or with the Soviets, but both of them are acting in a way that we cannot stop as we wish-I am not talking about the traditional and direct method, rather about expressing ourselves, meaning that we are not asked to deal with the Soviet move as if it were a direct clash, but, rather, to express ourselves more effectively-which in turn enables the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party to play its historic role effectively. When it is impossible for us to perform this role, the situation becomes very harmful; because when you clash with the Soviet strategy, it is like meeting with the American strategy [40:00].

[*Inaudible*] We are not saying that it would be shameful to allow the Party to act-it is not shameful to express our position or our intention-everyone knows who the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is [*Inaudible*]. What we are saying is that, because we have so many enemies, big and small, the chances of the Party's image being distorted-if we were to act-are very high. That is why it is better for the Party to express its own specific stand-that is more effective-instead of preventing Communism from extending to North Yemen through clashing with the Soviet Army that represents Democratic Yemen. When the Party interferes, it interferes because the situation is very bad [*Inaudible*]. We do not want the Communists because, if Communism reaches North Yemen, and if it overthrows Saudi Arabia, that would mean that Arabic unity will be postponed for a very long time-this is the very least that we have to take into consideration.

We at the command believe-and we are going to quickly go over this belief regarding the situation in Saudi Arabia-that what is going on is happening because there is expansion of two strategies

now, not just one. It is not expansion of the Soviet strategy through the formal military aggression that was carried out by Democratic Yemen-who only a few months ago was begging for help because everyone was interfering in its affairs.

There is a strong possibility that this is what the Americans wanted, so that they would have an excuse to establish military presence-and that makes Arabs confused between two issues, which defeats the unified stand as agreed upon in the Summit Conference-so that their presence is justified and [Inaudible] can [Inaudible] in their presence in the Gulf, or even in Saudi Arabia. Of course, that is in addition to demonstrating the Soviet strategy by expanding into Yemen, and consolidating south and north of Yemen based on [Inaudible] central-as such they can penetrate deep into Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's access to the sea-the main outlet-becomes blocked from all directions, [Inaudible] and under the new government; it becomes possible to utilize the large number of Yemeni people, who are already inside Saudi Arabia [Inaudible].

This is a brief analysis of the situation in Yemen-the situation that you have heard and read about.

[MY] [Inaudible]

[Saddam] [Inaudible] This is the [Inaudible] military clash between the north and the south. We wanted them to [Inaudible] they are now brave and [Inaudible] increase of [Inaudible] Iran was saying [Inaudible] in the market, Abu Dhabi [Inaudible] the large countries [Inaudible] America, and we wanted them to increase the oil price by 5 cents and they would not [Inaudible] when you combine all this [Inaudible]

[44:35 to 45:00]: Blank

[MV2] [MV2 does not have an Iraqi dialect. Audio is of poor quality] [Inaudible] especially when the West starts to talk about this subject, they make a great mistake [Inaudible] "Give to Qisr what belongs to Qisr, and give to God what belongs to God." Religion is an individual preference, not a societal preference-society belongs to the government, but religion belongs to the individual. This is indeed present in Islam. [Inaudible] There are many cases [Inaudible] in society [Inaudible] in the Muslim society; we cannot say that Islam is a connection between God and the individual, and it is none of our business. [Inaudible] although there are preaching societies throughout the whole world-[Inaudible], Africa, [Inaudible], and America-they were never able to attract many Muslims [Inaudible]. Indeed, in the 19th and 20th centuries, surveys done by the preaching societies [Inaudible] indicated that the number of Muslims converted as a result of preaching in Africa did not exceed 2,000.

[Inaudible] only 2,000 were converted, whereas [Inaudible] Catholic Japan has four or five million Christians [Inaudible], and it is a weapon-education and occupation [Inaudible] in our hand against imperialism [Inaudible]. Throughout our history-from the Islamic conquest to the present-there continues to be a clash between Europe, with its Western Christian identity, and the Arabic Nation, with its Islamic identity.

[Inaudible] There was a clash in four different fields: between Anatolia and us, between the Afranj [PH] and us in the war of the crusade, between the Afranj [PH] in Andalusia and North Africa and us, and over the expanse of the Mediterranean [Inaudible]. What was our weapon throughout this whole time? Islam was our weapon against Christians. They were not able to [Inaudible] and the commander and founder, comrade, [Inaudible] in 1943 before the Ba'ath Party [Inaudible] officially held the first conference [Inaudible] stating the elements of Arab nationalism.

[Inaudible] people may ask regarding this subject, 'What is the danger to us from the religious movement in Iran?' Before that, there was the question, 'Why did the religious movement succeed in Iran but another movement?' I believe that it succeeded because we were Muslims, and we were ready to accept the Islamic religious movement-if directed against the real enemies of the Arab Nation [Inaudible], without regard to how long the hair or the dress is [Inaudible] [laughing] [Inaudible].

[50:00] [Inaudible] [Noise] [Inaudible] that would be the real Ba'ath Party and that is why Professor Michael said that we are the real ones who are responsible [Inaudible]. What happened in Iran? Look at all the [Inaudible] that the people can express their [Inaudible]; there was nothing left but the mosque [Inaudible] whether [Inaudible] there are studies, prayers, Friday prayers, [Inaudible] evening speech, and [Inaudible] the mosque, so it became the only means available to oppose the current situation. [Inaudible] and command [noise] [Inaudible] not all revolutions in the world are planned [Inaudible] for what you want; not all revolutions are necessarily started by their leadership. Sometimes, they are started by the public, and then the commander comes along and leads [Inaudible]. I also believe-although I may be wrong: with this subject, it is possible to be right and possible to be wrong-I think that the movement in Iran was not started by Khomeini. [Inaudible] However, because of his leadership skills, he was able to lead [Inaudible]-that is what I believe. [Inaudible] However, there are some things that we should not lose sight of-especially the Khomeini situation [Inaudible]. To this day, that movement was the best religious movement ever.

Some of the slogans that have been suggested included things that were not wanted by the Iranian people-meaning, things that the Iranian people rejected. That is why that movement was against imperialism, against Zionism, against the Shah, against following the large countries, against the unjust oil agreements, and against local exploitation. But it has never shown what it actually stands for, it knows what it does not want, but it does not know what it wants.

This is a positive point, what did we do as the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party? We identified ourselves as a public movement against imperialism, against Zionism, against division, and against backwardness but that was not our slogan. However, our motto proclaims the positive side of what we want-unity, liberty, and socialism [Inaudible]. Now, the positive side of the Iranian revolution is missing; therefore, we must expect before [Inaudible] events and before we read in [Inaudible] that movement if [Inaudible] must be divided into [Inaudible], and this is what is happening right now. [Inaudible] Khomeini [Inaudible] what was left from the move is [Inaudible] movements [Inaudible]. The positive element is missing; therefore, this is [Inaudible]. How does this affect us? I think that [Inaudible] anywhere the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is present [Inaudible]

[Inaudible] if we were able to-if any movement in the world were able to [55:00]respond to the

material and political challenges [Inaudible], there would not be a chance for any other movements [Inaudible]. Kamal Ataturk and the Turkish people are the most religious Muslim people-perhaps more so than the Iranians. Kamal Ataturk came and destroyed [Inaudible] and mosques, he interpreted religion, interpreted the Qur'an, interpreted the [Inaudible], and [Inaudible] truly fought religion, but still, no one revolted against him, for a very simple reason- before calling for religion, he established independence for his people [Inaudible], he kicked out [Inaudible], he freed [Inaudible], and then he said to the Turkish people, 'I gave you your independence,' so they did not say, 'Why [Inaudible] religion?' [Inaudible].

We responded to these habits [Inaudible] [coughing] politically and financially for two reasons [Inaudible].

[MV] Yes

[MV2] [Inaudible] for example, the revolution in Iraq improved the people and so forth [Inaudible]. That is very important, but this role is [Inaudible], meaning that, if every year you give an employee an extra 20 dinars [Inaudible], he gets used to it-[Inaudible] this is not new to the employee [Inaudible], every year you give him 20 dinars. If [Inaudible] you do not give him that [Inaudible], then he considers himself as being treated unjustly [Inaudible]. [Inaudible] But, the political mission is [Inaudible] we do not [Inaudible]; indeed, we adopt it as the main principle in our society [Inaudible]. [Inaudible] At the same time, we [Inaudible] at the same time, and we raise the standards of living; where would the danger come from?

[Inaudible] [Noise] [Phone ringing] [Inaudible] as stated by [Inaudible] 5, 10,200, 5,000 [Inaudible] but what [Inaudible] it is a danger [Inaudible], we must admit that indeed, in Egypt, whether [Inaudible] or not [Inaudible] we like what newspapers in the West say, whether or not they talk about it [Inaudible], there is no movement [Inaudible]; it is true and possible to be established in Egypt more than in any other place [Inaudible].

[59: 13] [Inaudible] [clearing throat noises] [Inaudible] Islam, we must know that [Inaudible] Islam, this move was done by all of the backward movements [Inaudible] that were connected with imperialism [Inaudible] because Islam [Inaudible] is a weapon in our enemy's hand that he uses [1:00:00] [Inaudible]; these are the notes if you would [Inaudible].

11:00:22 [MV3] The Iranian events are stirring many important issues-strategic, political, economic, social, and technical-that have to do with the political technical work. However, I would like to turn your attention-especially those comrades who focus on the intellectual and educational aspects-to the core issue, which is the doctrine and the civilization issue that is going on in Iran. I believe that the reason for what is going on in Iran is not because of the true roots of Islam but, rather, because of the experience that that region witnessed at the beginning of the century, especially in Iran and Turkey, the two countries that border the Arabic Nation.

In the early 1920s, in Iran and Turkey, there were two parallel experiments-the Ataturk experiment and [coughing] the [Inaudible] experiment. If the doctor allows me-and I agree with him about all of the positive analysis, with the exception of the part that concerns the method of Kamal Ataturk-I am going to talk about Ataturk and Rida Bahlawi. Ataturk came to Islamic societies that were

facing the current modern challenges with real Salafi values and traditions as well as *[Inaudible]* backward. The solutions that they presented to both societies, Iranian and Turkish, *[Inaudible]* are solutions that they copied from the European civilization with respect to clothing, way of living, and political systems and they were attached to the backward Iranian and Turkish societies. However, they also held on to a superficial and conceited nationalistic view conceited with respect to poor nations such as the Arabic Nation, Afghanistan, and others that border Iran and Turkey. At the same time these views were nationalistic, religious and deformed in comparison with the wicked European countries.

Kamal Ataturk and Rida Bahlawi *[coughing]* were not able to find a convincing solution to the Iranian people and the Turkish people for the relationship between the Turkish and Iranian nationalism with Islam. Islam-in Ataturk's and Rida Bahlawi view-was on par with backwardness, and with the bad isolated past. The Iranian nationalism that was established by Rida Bahlawi and the Turkish nationalism that was established by Ataturk-the one we described as being superficial and conceited toward other nations, yet looked down upon by Europe-is modernization. From the beginning, the doctrine by those two experiments was a clear infringement of Islam.

Islam, like any religion, is deeply rooted within the people's lives, *[Inaudible]* and these two systems were unable to provide the solution for the relationship between nationalism and religion. This was the crisis that the Iranian and the Turkish people had to live with for many years-and they expressed it in many ways *[Inaudible]*. If we are to return to the present Iranian and Turkish history, we can see many examples [01:05:00] of the ways that they expressed their disagreement *[Inaudible]*. The Turkish and Iranian experiment collapsed. The Turkish experiment that was represented by Ataturk gradually collapsed and is still collapsing. The Iranian experiment continued for a longer period, was dramatic in ways, and was dramatic when it collapsed last year.

These issues are worth re-studying-meaning the issues represented at the beginning of the 20th century mentioned by the doctor regarding religion, its connection to life and the Salafist method of dealing with religion, and the relation between religion and nationalism and copying the European life style-they are worth restudying and analyzing. However, today we are facing a *[Inaudible]* and huge problem: Does the Iranian phenomenon-or the Khomeini phenomenon-represent imminent danger to the Arabic Nation and Arabic nationalism? I believe that, generally-when it comes to doctrine and civilization-this phenomenon does not represent danger because the Arabic region in the Arabic Nation did not witness the Ataturk experiment or Rida Bahlawi.

There was not a significant or big separation between nationalism and Islam, even in the bad Arabic regimes. Indeed, there were similar bridges between nationalism and religion in more than one experiment and in more than one Arabic regime. For example, the regime in Egypt now-the al-Sadat regime-is a bad regime: it is hostile to the people and hostile to the aspirations of the Arabic Nation. However, I do not think there is a big division within the Egyptian society between Arabic nationalism, Egyptian nationalization, and Islam. There is rejection of Sadat's methods in dealing with Israel, *[Inaudible]* but five years ago, Anwar al-Sadat was a national hero in his fight with Israel, and he was credible to the people because he was an Egyptian farmer who had Islamic faith and who did not clash with others' religious beliefs. In any case, that situation had many explanations-but we cannot go into them right now.

What is most important is that, generally, the Arabic experiment did not demonstrate a clear example of the separation of nationalism from religion; they-the Arabic Nation did not face issues that were similar to what Iran and Turkey faced [*Inaudible*]. More importantly, and we conclude from this, the Khomeini phenomenon-that is, the religious revolution in Iran growing out of the particular Iranian experiment itself, it grew from the experiment of Rida Bahlawi and his son Muhammad Rida Bahlawi, it is something that does not exist in the Arabic Nation. Also, the Party provided an integral solution for the religious and nationalism relationship, and it provided the needed solution for the relationship between history and contemporary life, and between the inherited spiritual needs [*Inaudible*] and those that develop as we progress-such as socialism and others [*Inaudible*].

So doctrine and civilization issues are non-existent, which does not mean that there are

no dangers at all [1: 1 0:00]. Khomeini's phenomenon will entice political danger in the Arab region, sectarian danger, and technical dangers-because the situation in the Arabic Nation is weak generally and because there is unprecedented greed over the area. So, there are many issues that will be stirred in the region with the goal of forcing international strategies, and Khomeini's phenomenon will be the main one used. Therefore, we must think about facing this phenomenon [*Inaudible*] as part of our significant international plans. The main element in facing Khomeini's phenomenon-if used, and it will be used for destructive purposes by the forces that are hostile to the Arabic Nation-is to hold high the banner of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. What I mean by this is that, of course, as Ba'athists, we value our Party's doctrine, and we think about it daily and revise it. The glow-if that is the proper expression-and the passion that we feel are the way we express our sense of the Arabic nationalist and socialist ideals of the Ba'ath Party [*Inaudible*]. When this happens, the people will remember [*Inaudible*], they will understand its power, and they will be convinced-intellectually and emotionally-that it is the correct intellectual and [*Inaudible*] civilized solution for the challenges that they are facing. When this happens, then the religious currents that are coming [*Inaudible*] from Iran will not spread to the Arabic Nation-and to ensure that they do not spread, we must commit significant mental and intellectual efforts. This is underscored by the point that Doctor Munir has made-that, with the constant clash with imperialism, the direct and heated clash with Zionism, and the unity that we are working to establish in Syria will confront Khomeini's phenomenon that will definitely be used by powerful countries against the Arabic Nation.

In conclusion, this does not mean that the Iranian phenomenon was created by imperialist forces or that it was created by the powerful countries; rather, it is a rooted phenomenon that was a reaction to the current situation-a situation that went on for tens of years and it was expressing a need in Iranian society. The way that large countries take advantage of this issue is another subject-one that is worthy of studying someday. One last point, as stated by Doctor Munir, is that we, as analysts and writers, must not make the same mistakes-mistakes that have been made by the superficial media in the Arabic Nation, and by both the superficial, directed media in the West-and say that Khomeini's phenomenon is a successful phenomenon. Khomeini's phenomenon is successful, but only to the extent that it has to do with overthrowing the shah's regime [*Inaudible*]. It did succeed in overthrowing the Shah's regime, but, as stated by the doctor, it still did not provide a solution for the issues that the Iranian people or the region faces. It is hostile, hostile, hostile, and it refuses, refuses, refuses-but it is not the solution provided by Khomeini's

phenomenon-that is worthy of study someday, but we should not be swept up in the media and political stream [Inaudible], and our media comrades should keep that in mind when meeting with foreign media [Inaudible] and those who affect media in the Arabic Nation and the entire world [Inaudible].

[1: 15:23] Yes, it's true that Khomeini's phenomenon has been successful in overthrowing the shah's system, but what solutions does it present elsewhere? When we answer that question, we minimize the negative effects that may occur with this phenomenon in the Arabic Nation. But if there are positive effects that will be a good gain for us [Inaudible], because any solution provided by Islam is a solution that is not contrary to the Arabic Nation-because Islam is the core belief of the Arabic Nation. On the other hand, any solution or any positive resolution-that is, anyone that results from a revolutionary experiment in Third World countries and in the world-[Inaudible] is a good solution because it can interact with the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party [Inaudible], which can interact with any revolutionary moves and benefit from them. Thank you.

11:16:27 IISaddaml [Inaudible] some of it is in agreement about the conflict [Inaudible] in Yemen. In Yemen, however, this remains an exciting subject to research; it is supposed to have detailed research regarding this issue-the general guidance of the Party. Guidance in results, but in [Inaudible], the research does not require all of these details that we are looking into-[Inaudible] it would be requested if they had the ability to research each issue objectively. Before we spend a few moments on this topic, there was an issue about the Party that was brought to my attention [Inaudible] -by a few comrades and by comrade Doctor Munir-regarding the issue of "reliance," which leads to brief relationships between leadership members in the Party and between the members of the Party. [Inaudible] When we ask a Party leader about his opinion on any issue, he responds, "We have not yet received an answer yet." This response is unhealthy and lacking in command. The general political stand of the Party is known to all, [Inaudible] and the intellectual course of the Party is known to all. The head of the Ansar group is the commander of the Ansar group; the head of the Members group is the commander of the Members group, and so forth until we reach the command. Suppose you do not receive an answer: What do you say? Do you say, 'I did not receive an answer'? No, you say, 'Let us analyze.' You say, 'I think that such and such subject includes the following issues,' and you talk, [Inaudible] you discuss, you move, you ask for opinions, you offer your opinion, [Inaudible] and you show effort. This is not contrary to the Party; [Inaudible] this happens in all cells of the Party. [Inaudible] Reliance is extremely important within the Party; if there is no progression in the daily actions of the Party, and then it becomes administrative and traditional. The motto says, "Bring the tradition of the Party to the government, not the opposite." If we do not practice this motto [Inaudible], it means that we are following [Inaudible] without understanding and without action. [01 :20:00]

In the government [Inaudible], but in the Party [Inaudible] administrative relation; their relation is a revolutionary relationship that is based on mutual responsibility-which is based on group work and democratic spirit. Therefore, it is very dangerous to respond with, "We have not yet received an answer"-when we are asked a question. Let us say that one of the comrades in Anbar sees someone- [Inaudible] someone in front of the Party's office in Anbar-hold up a banner that is hostile toward the Party [Inaudible]. He goes and asks his supervisor, his supervisor goes and asks his supervisor, and his supervisor asks headquarters, "What do we do?" - this would be a very dangerous situation. It is very painful to find this behavior among the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.

In 1969, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party was stronger than ever. In 1969, if the Party saw someone holding a hostile banner, the Party would rip it up, hit the person [Inaudible], fight with the person, and [Inaudible]. The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party-and all [Inaudible] parties-need initiative to deal with the most dangerous situations [Inaudible]. Anytime that you witness a situation-one in which you believe that the command is responsible for-you must take an initial step that does not contradict the general view of the Party [Inaudible].

Today, we are [Inaudible] about these 5,000 [Inaudible], the 5,000 [Inaudible] that are opposed-in their economy, policies, intellect, and intentions-to the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, and [Inaudible], meaning the [Inaudible] in the Anbar and [Inaudible] demonstration [Inaudible], meaning the office in the Anbar tells us what to do? No, the office must confront [Inaudible] this demonstration, and if it attacked with knives then the party must open fire and kill 100, 200, 300; after that, they inform the command that they did everything [Inaudible]; there are, indeed, some situations where [Inaudible] there are general situations [Inaudible], but not specific ones [Inaudible]. Let us say that a demonstration takes place in al-Najaf [Inaudible], and that there is an order that Najaf security forces should not attack it [Inaudible] the people must crush it [Inaudible] led by the party [Inaudible] and annihilate the demonstration [Inaudible], and everywhere [Inaudible]. [Inaudible] first action is beneficial, the second action is very beneficial, and the third action is the most beneficial [Inaudible].

This is a follow-up to the "reliance" issue. The command always warns against this, but implementing it is not always successful [Inaudible]-and giving the Party enough freedom to express itself by taking the initiative [Inaudible] [01 :25 :00]. As I said, if a Party leader were asked by our comrades, 'Comrade, what is the situation in Iran?' -and if he were to respond, 'We have not yet received an answer '-You follow up, you talk, you analyze, you speak, you direct them, and you listen to them; [Inaudible] we do not keep on waiting for an answer. What if there is no answer received? As such, [Inaudible] the aggressive forces [Inaudible]. The general psychological situation consists of vocabularies [Inaudible]; if used correctly; they will generate the correct psychological and strategic situation. If used incorrectly, it will develop the wrong psychological and strategic situation [Inaudible].

[Inaudible] Officers and comrades in 1979 [Inaudible] when [Inaudible] did not [Inaudible] military order but [Inaudible] this spirituality is no longer present in the Party [Inaudible]. You are expected to [Inaudible] the Party [Inaudible] this all the time. [Inaudible] Those who do not take the initiative are not worthy of the [Inaudible] honor. [Inaudible] You are not giving up a right; you are giving up a duty or you are not performing a duty.

[1:27:50] [End of Audio].