

September 8, 1998

Memo from Strobe Talbott to Bruce Riedel

Citation:

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Summary:

In the wake of India's nuclear tests, Strobe Talbott weighs different scenarios for a possible trip by President Clinton to South Asia.

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

Tuesday, September 8, 1998

To Bruce Riedel

From Strobe Talbott

When I'm on the horns of a dilemma (more or less a permanent condition these days), I try a matrix (sort of the intellectual equivalent of a Malox).

What do you think about the attached? Give me a call. And if you think it has any heuristic value, you might share it with Sandy and Jim.

<p style="text-align: center;">PAK. ALL THERE, INDIA NOT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Unlikely. Sharif may say the magic words to POTUS today, but Shamshad & Co. will probably plead for more time before getting down to brass tacks on other 3 issues, especially the one that's most important: restraint regime.</i> 	<p style="text-align: center;">PAK. PARTLY THERE, INDIA NOT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Likely. A messy outcome that leaves us with a dilemma. How do we best keep the process moving forward? How do we make sure that we've stuck to our — and P5's — principles? How do we make sure we don't contribute to Pakistan's cratering?</i> 	<p style="text-align: center;">NEITHER THERE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>A real possibility, since Sharif may, in the call, either stop short of the magic words on CTBT or add unacceptable conditions on sanctions relief for Kashmir.</i>
<p>1A: POTUS goes to Pak. (and Bangladesh), skips India</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Not going to India is major setback to eventual restoration of relations.</i> 	<p>2A: POTUS goes to Pak., uses trip to bring Pak. across the line, skips India</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Risky and not altogether seemly. Puts POTUS in high-stakes gamble.</i> 	<p>3A: POTUS postpones SA trip (citing inconvenient timing), invites Bangladesh PM to DC for state visit</p>
<p>1B: POTUS does full visit to Pak. (and B.), does brief stop in India</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>India gets a freebie, having done nothing on the non-pro front. Howls of protest from P5 and others, including our non-pro community.</i> 	<p>2B: POTUS does full visit to Pak., uses trip to bring Pak. across the line, does brief stop in India</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Same risk as above — with additional disadvantage of making it look as though we blinked with India too.</i> 	<p>3B: POTUS goes ahead with trip, using prospect to drive Pak. and India as far as possible before he gets there, and to bring them across the line when he's there</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>(Almost) unthinkable; massive cave on our part.</i>
<p>1C: POTUS postpones SA trip (security grounds), invites Sharif to DC for state visit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Bangladesh pays a price for sins of its neighbors.</i> <i>Query: benefit/incentive to Sharif?</i> 	<p>2C: POTUS postpones SA trip, invites Sharif to DC for working/official (not state) visit, uses visit to bring Pak. across the line</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Some risk for POTUS, as per above, but not as much as if he goes to SA.</i> <i>Helps with keeping Sharif moving in the right direction.</i> 	
	<p>2D: POTUS postpones SA trip; we work instead via continuation of current channels, perhaps with Secretary making trip to the region.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Safest for us, but more risk to Sharif.</i> 	