

## **October 1995**

### **Saddam Hussein meeting with various advisers**

#### **Citation:**

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#### **Summary:**

This file contains the following discussion regarding the Republican Guard. Saddam calls for the strengthening of the thinking and culture of the members of the Guard. They discuss the effects of the sanctions and the US military presence in the Gulf, along with the crisis of March 1995.

#### **Original Language:**

Arabic

#### **Contents:**

Transcript - Arabic

Full translation:

**Time 00:00-25:30:**

**Saddam Hussein:** Peace on you. How are you all? How are you, Ibrahim?

**Unknown Person 1:** I want to make clear, Sir, the special geographic location for the maneuvers between Al-Fath Al-Mubin's forces and Allah Akbar's forces, which separate Hamurabi Brigade and a section of the Nebuchadnezzar Forces. Keep in mind that the west area only contains Brigade 26. I demonstrated the situation to Your Excellency so that we could discuss the role of the Republican Guard, your observations and the lessons gained from Urn Al-Ma'arik Battle (Translator Comment: gulf war 1991). We found that the location of the Republican Guard Units should be near the cities in order to protect the sectors from concentrated air attacks. Everyone should also keep the fact that they are reserve units in mind. Further, each unit is responsible for protecting its assigned city. Thank you, sir.

**Unknown Person 2:** In the name of Allah, the most merciful, the most gracious. Your Excellency, first of all, I would like to say that, in the name of your men, the Republican Guard, the Commandants, the Fighters and your loyal soldiers who care about our country's reputation, our united nation and holy land, we pray for God to keep you safe because you represent Iraq, as well as the aggression and the will to achieve certain victory. You are a symbol for the Iraqis and the Republican Guard, Your Excellency....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** Thank you.

**Unknown Person 2:** May God protect you, sir. Despite all the moral considerations, there is another subject that should be brought up to you, sir. I speak to you, sir, with complete honesty. We, the Republican Guard, feel prouder day after day. We are in better shape when it comes to training and accuracy in our job. The truth is, we could not have achieved this without your accurate follow up and the supervision of our Honorable Supervisor (Translator Comment: he means Qusay). He didn't leave any place in the Republican Guard without visiting it, whether at training or during normal daily activities. We visited the soldiers, their sleeping places and the kitchens. He took a look at the fighters' conditions. This visit gave a great and unusual push to the Republican Guard. All the guards are now talking about the visit of the Honorable Qusay, and they declare it proudly in front of all people. Honestly, that is what happened, sir. By God's will, we will try to pay you back for a part of your kindness towards us. Your Excellency....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** May peace be upon you.

**Unknown Person 2:** God protect you, sir. After August's crisis...

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** Before we start with your detailed subject, I would like to widen your vision with some conditions. After viewing our life's experiences, as well as the political and military experiences, I would like to order the making of a book about this subject.

**Unknown Person 3 whispers:** It will happen through God's will.

**Saddam Hussein continues:** A book that you all agree on. This book will be about the ancient Arabian wars (Saddam pauses) that include military guidance. We should take lessons from this guidance, in addition to other things we always need. Ancient history increases our faith, especially Arabian Islamic history, which was built on

believing in God's will. We should also take lessons from the history of struggles in the world, especially their military sides. We should take objective books and not concentrate on leaders. For example, consider the Second World War. We should take a look at events done by certain characters. When you read about those characters, you gain a lot from them. We can gain a lot from the German Military Character "Rommel," the French Military Political Character "De Gaulle" and, of course, Russia. However, the situation in Russia is now different because the will of the party doesn't allow individuals to have personal glory, and their history confirms this. This is one of the Russian lessons we can gain from their national history. We should avoid quoting from propaganda books; we should only quote from books that seek the truth. We should also avoid quoting from books written by unfair authors. For example, when an English author writes about Rommel or Hitler, he will certainly miss what is between the lines. However, everything is useful to us. So, I am asking for a book to be distributed among all the Republican Guard Officers. You decide which way is better. You can split the book between two levels: the high ranks and the low ranks. However, all officers must read this book and open discussions should be held for the two levels. We can split the book and distribute it over several months. There should be a month for studying the military side, a month for studying the historical side and a month for studying the social side. I really hope that our army reaches a level of great understanding for life because the army defends the essence of our life's meaning. Therefore, it should first understand the meaning of life. It could be a general understanding and not something specific. However, in your case, every military man should know specific points that will help you understand our life. I think I said enough for you about this subject. Thanks.

**Unknown Person 2:** Sir, honestly, we already adopt general knowledge at the Standard Institution. We hold training courses at the Targets Command for the ranks of Captain and Major and for the Mobilizing Units and the Formation Operations Units. In addition, there is research going on at the Units and Formations Command Courses. This research reaches the level of the National Defense College studies, or the War College, and all of the Republican Guard Officers participate by researching or discussing it. Honestly, sir, we didn't overlook general knowledge; however, we also didn't concentrate on it the way you just said. However, by God's will, we will organize a program for it.

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** When you start writing the book, don't concentrate on a specific character. You should simply give an overview of the characters.

**Unknown Person 2:** Yes, sir. By God's will, we will do it.

**Saddam Hussein:** Then divide the officers into groups. After that, each group gives their conclusions after reading the book. They should also give their suggestions. If it is useful, then we can use it in our army.

**Unknown Person 2:** Use it in a practical way.

**Saddam Hussein:** Yes.

**Unknown Person 4:** (Translator Comment: his voice was unclear)

**Saddam Hussein:** I only seek general knowledge and I don't think it is hard for an officer to read one book every month because he will gain more. This also applies to the General Supervisor of the Republican Guard (Translator Comment: he means Qusay). He must read it with them. General knowledge is important for expressing your opinions and stimulating your mind to think. It also modifies how you talk and write. All of this is needed by commanders because they could face a situation where it is necessary for them to give the right impression to his soldiers and deliver a message that could increase their fighting capability by 50% in a war zone. This

percentage is not small. Even if it was 10%, 20% or 30% it would not be small. The officers need general knowledge..... Finish your speech, Lieutenant General.

**Unknown Person 2:** Yes, sir. In the previous meeting with Your Excellency, you ordered us to prepare a report about the military lessons we learned from the Um Al-Ma'arik Battle (Translator Comment: the 1991 gulf war). Honestly, it was made in haste. However, it was also made in an acceptable way. I also showed it to the Commanders. It showed how much effort you put into correcting many false understandings. There were committees formed at the Operations Command to study your tips and counseling, but it concentrated on adding your notes into 70 to 80 pages. However, our real problem now, Sir, is our officers. They don't have the sense to put any kind of effort into anything. The problem is in the manners of our officers. The old graduate officers are not like the new ones. The problem is with the fresh graduate officers. Moreover, the Staff College Dean doesn't have the paper he needs to write training lessons. Moreover, he can't delegate any trainer to go outside of the college because he doesn't have a car. I explained the situation to the Honorable Supervisor. We can't compare the skills of the Republican Guard Units before with the current ones. Your Excellency, these institutes played a great role in preparing young Commanders, Staff Institutes and Formations Command, so there must be a follow up to them. I held a meeting with the Chief of Staff where I showed them your written tips about the Um Al-Ma'arik battle. I didn't show them the original copy that you wrote. I showed them the copy from the Presidential Council, which doesn't differ from the original one. To be honest, sir, studying the duties of our officers thoroughly will allow them to be properly prepared in the future and the Honored Supervisor assured us of this. Also, transferring Brigade Commanders and Division Commanders after a period of less than two years, two years and four months and three years

affects the officers' performance and their duties.

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** I will follow up on the Military College and the Staff College, in addition to the Ministry of Defense. I will assign an officer for this subject.

**Unknown Person 2:** Concerning the Republican Guard, after America's fabricated incident....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** The meant Ministry, some sides under the sanctions....

**Unknown Person 2:** Yes, Sir.

**Saddam Hussein:** It has to apply general rules to spending, allocations, transportation, et cetera. The Training Directorate should pay more attention to the Military and Staff Colleges, as well as their number of students. Some officers are more suitable for inspecting and following up the Military and Staff Colleges than others.

**Unknown Person 2:** Sir, the Training Directorate is totally available for this subject, and the Staff College is committed to Al-Bilcr University. The Commandant of the University has four colleges under his authority: Staff, War, National Defense and Commandant Colleges. So, the subject here is not following up; rather, it is spending. The students there, who are Captains or Majors, get bonuses after joining these colleges, and this affects the development plan. However, these courses became routine courses. Honestly, the Staff College Dean...

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** What is he like?

**Unknown Person 2:** Major General Ra'd is a very distinguished officer, Sir. He had the highest grades among us while we studied at the Staff College.

**Saddam Hussein:** For the participants or the warrior officers.

**Unknown Person 2:** Sir, the Staff College Dean Abd-al-Razzaq Ya'qub was the senior teacher for those courses. He now lectures at Al-Bilcr University. I think we can consider him for the distinguished officers' list. However, he is retired now.

**Saddam Hussein:** Does Shawkat fit at the Following up Affairs Department?

**Unknown Person 2:** Yes, sir. Shawkat fits this position.

**Time 25:31-30:16:** (Translator Comment: the sound of writing on paper appears. It is probably Saddam signing a decree to assign Shawkat to the position of the Following Up affairs. However, during this period Saddam asked the attendants, "Today is the eighth day?" They replied to him by saying, "yes")

**Saddam Hussein:** Yes, Ibrahim, continue.

**Time 30:17-32:03: Ibrahim:** Sir, this is in regards to the subject of centralizing the Republican Guard after the crisis fabricated by America in late August. Then the American mass army was gathered in the Gulf Area and the Red Sea and contained 20,000 Soldiers, Aircraft Carriers and the formation of the fifth squadron in the Gulf Area, the Arab Sea and the Indian Ocean. After that, we discussed our options at the Chief of Staff's Office, especially the subject of the Iraqi regime. We specified the possible attacks and whether they were inside or outside of our lands. Also, we specified the possible ways to defend it and the attitude of the Republican Guard towards these attacks. We delivered this report to the Honorable Supervisor and received some suggestions. We agreed to change the gathering place of the Republican Guard and to use different plans from last time we faced the first and the second attacks of the fight that occurred after the year 1995. They tried to drag Iraq into the fight of.... (TC: tape stops)

**Time 32:04-32:26:** No conversation.

**Time 32:27-42:55: Ibrahim:** (tape starts in the middle of a conversation).. .after the bridge, transferring the Mechanized Division to Al-Shallalat Area and Mafraqat (TC: intersection) Al-Kayf could be allowed in a limited way. These areas are excellent for making fox holes, and they can be covered by the 2<sup>nd</sup> (AB) August Infantry Brigade. We should transfer an Infantry Brigade, as well as a Mechanized Brigade, to Kirkuk and Mawsil. We should also keep our forces in Al-'Azim area, as well as two brigades in Al-Diwaniyyah and Al-Ramadi. The commander said that Al-'Abid was in Kirkuk for a long time.

**Saddam Hussein:** How long? And what are the advantages that Al-'Abid will get when it transfers to Al-Mawsil?

**Ibrahim:** The advantages are that the troops at Al-Mawsil used the Infantry Division more than the mechanized one in Kirkuk. This means that there is no difficulty in training the division in Kirkuk. The areas of Karam, Layla' and Mihwar are more difficult.

**Saddam Hussein:** Why?

**Ibrahim:** We can't train in this area because it is a cultivated land and it has Saddam's irrigation project. Consequently, achieving good quality in training is a problem.

**Saddam Hussein:** How do you know that you won't find a cultivated area in Al-Mawsil?

**Ibrahim:** There is a problem in Al-Abid. Kirkuk's because their sectors are rugged, even if we think of the northern area. We shouldn't settle in AliAbid at Kirkuk, but in Arbyl as planned. The area there is wide and we can train in it. Also, the leader of the Allah Akbar operations will have a chance to benefit from the different troops and the infantry brigade at Al-Mawsil.

**Saddam Hussein:** Are there any avenues of approach to Kirkuk?

**Ibrahim:** We have an avenue of approach at the Zargah intersection.

**Saddam Hussein:** And the flanks? Do they need Mechanized Infantry more than Infantry Soldiers?

**Ibrahim:** The terrain won't allow this, sir, and the commanders can explain why. This direction is also hard; I visited it with Major General Jamal. We visited the First Corps and the Mechanized Corps at the Second Division. I told the Honorable Supervisor that they can't use tanks in one direction because the area there is rugged from the Al-Rabi' Area and the Jamjamal Area to the Bazid Area. It is only at Kirkuk.

**Saddam Hussein:** Why didn't you submit a request?

**Ibrahim:** It is on the way, sir. We intend to, but we will use it at Zakhu Area for the mechanized troops. The area won't allow this.

**Saddam Hussein:** We have no targets at this area, and we have nothing inside the area. Our duty is defensive according to your determinations.

**Ibrahim:** The problem is the military escalation. So, we fortified this area and made it our camp.

**Saddam Hussein:** Do we have to discuss any confusing subject....

**Ibrahim:** Sir, there is a suggestion that it can work with the second method, and we have some recommendations on it, but only if you approve them. We will calmly carry it out in stages. There will be a Brigade on every stage.

**Saddam Hussein:** Thank you for finishing, Ibrahim. We can now take opinions from our Field Commanders.

**Unknown Person 5:** Al-'Abid troops are considered at Kirkuk (TC: he means that they are near Kirkuk, but not actually in the city). We will add Mechanized Troops as recommended in the second suggestion, and, as you command, the troops that are in the Command of the Second Division. I mean that the Mechanized Infantry Brigade 15, 14 and 19 should be transferred to Al-Diwaniyyah because you see that Kirkuk is better.

**Saddam Hussein:** I think I have a few thoughts based on what you said, but there are other thoughts that came to me outside of what the Chief of Staff just said.

**Time 42:56-43:36:** (Translator Comment: a very poor sound for one of the meeting's attendants. His voice wasn't clear)

**Time 43:37-01:04:33: Unknown Person 6:** The situation doesn't allow us to maneuver with armored vehicles outside the road. However, we can maneuver around the close buildings and defend limited zones that can reach 4 to 5 kilometers, and sometimes a maximum of 10 kilometers from Arbyl City. It is ok for it to stay at Kirkuk to be the Forces Command of Al-Abid and I think it will be better to substitute it with an Infantry Division. However, if I want to increase my troops in a short period, then I will use an Infantry Division with them to end the situation. We don't want to hear that the enemy has breached, widened the breach and then settled in. So, I lose the battle. I think that regrouping an Infantry Division with another Infantry Brigade will save a lot of time. So, this time we will not allow the enemy to attack us and take a break, attack us again and then take another break. I got permission from the Honorable Supervisor to follow up the enemy's movements and his attitude. So, if I see that the enemy can take our troops, which are the First and Second Corps, then I will interfere at night and launch a preemptive attack to stop him or make him retreat. Then I will order our units to retreat as soon as possible. So, if I did this....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** But first you have to get my permission.

**Unknown Person 6:** Of course, Sir.

**Saddam Hussein:** Secondly, with a little effort you can avoid your suggestion. However, if you can not find a way out and have to do it, then you must first get my permission.

**Unknown Person 6:** Whatever you command, Sir. We discussed this suggestion after what happened back in March. We have `Adnan's Command Forces at Al-Mawsil, the Chief of Staff, who was a Commandant, Baghdad's Reserve Command Forces and Al-'Abd Command's Forces. They can attack the enemy, capture some prisoners and cause them some casualties. We had an idea and we told it to the Honorable Supervisor. We discussed it seriously and we concluded that the enemy must be restrained. I told the Honorable Supervisor that if we entered one battle with our enemy and caused serious casualties, then they would never dare attack our troops again. Even if they are not restrained they will think twice before attacking us again. Recently, I noticed unusual vitality that I have never seen before from the First Corps when they patrol, ambush and interact with the enemy. They caused casualties to about 10, 15 or 20 enemy soldiers over a period of not less than 15 days in the area. The Fifth Corps is also good and their people are perfect. However, I think that their patrols are not like the First Corps' Patrols. Maybe because the nature of their location differs....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** And the Commander of the First Corps differs.

**Unknown Person 6:** We tried this Commander back in March and we honestly can say that he was calm and sober at the battle. His great army went through fierce battles and confrontations with tanks; however, he was calm and he used the weapons that we thought of. We told him to use self bursting bombs on tanks between Jamjamal city and the front edge (TC: he doesn't say what front edge).

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** And this is one of the lessons gained from Al-Qadisiyyah.

**Unknown Person 6:** So was using helicopters on the gap between the Second Division and Division 57. It was a wide gap. He caused great casualties among the enemy. Anyway, what really draws our attention is the ability to maneuver and surprise whoever shows up at Al-'Abid Forces Command in Kirkuk. I would like to say that this will be in the final stages of the enemy's attack on Kirkuk. I and the Commander visited this area until we got to Jamjamal. After that, we walked from Lylan until we reached Qadir Karam City. We figured out that there is no way for our units to fight in it, except for the roads. The Commander of Al-'Abid and I walked the area again. We sent the First and Second Scouts, and then we determined the more rugged areas. Still, like I said before, we can use them until we get to the Lylan Area freely. My armor can move freely to the Amandar Area, which is 4 to 5 kilometers towards the Taqtaq Area. Frankly speaking, we have some future thoughts for retrieving the Diwan Al-Habib Area of our beloved country. Al-'Abid Forces Command will be suitable for Al-Mawsil, and they will achieve more than if they were at Kirkuk because having missions move towards Al-Sulaymaniyyah increases the chance of terminating targets with Al-Fath Al-Mubin Forces that are moving towards Al-Sulaymaniyyah. Anyway, we need an Infantry Division for the rough lands in the Eastern Area and as we go North and Northeast. The final decision is for Your Excellency. You are our first and last teacher.

Saddam Hussein: Thank you, Al-Fath Al-Mubin.

Unknown Person 7: The current allotment will serve the Armored Troops. Also, Brigade 43 and the Mechanized Infantry could serve us at Al-'Arid near the end of Kirkuk. They could be used to protect Al-Duz Area. This means that all of the stages are far from the Kirkuk Area in case of enemy attacks. Also, if a Brigade stays, then it

stays at the Kirkuk Area and Al-Fath Al-Mubin Brigade will stay at Al-'Arid Area. This means protecting the flank, which will prevent threatening Kirkuk from Al-Duz's direction or the Kifry direction. The Mechanized and Armored Troops will also be at the same area as well as the Armored Brigade. It will regroup with the Command coming from Al-Mawsil. This means at least two Armored Brigades, or one Mechanized Infantry Brigade, will be towards Kirkuk.

The area, Dear Sir, is progressing. Since our victory, the 1991 Rebellion stopped. I can use three for the Jamjamal Area to Al-Sulaymaniyyah. I can use the Mechanized Brigade for it in small areas. We can use it for subunits or in road maneuvers, but we can't use it for Armored Troops, or in Maneuvering. Sir, I don't think that there is a way for Armored Troops to get started. The area of...

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** You mean more than one battery on the road?

**Unknown Person 7:** May God protect you, sir. Yes.

**Saddam Hussein:** You mean that the flanks are moving around at some place?

**Unknown Person 7:** Yes, sir. Maybe Al-'Abid's troops might have a chance to maneuver towards Al-Mawsil and Dyar Bala, as well as other acceptable routes within Al-'Alal's direction and the troops going to Al-Diwaniyyah. Currently, we don't have any forces moving towards Al-Diwaniyyah. There will be a Brigade there that will stand either as the front line or as the front watch for the Republican Guard. I think this distribution, considering the current circumstances, is the right one .....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** the Brigade that is near Al-Diwaniyyah? How far is it between Al-Diwaniyyah and Line 32?

(TC: Another person starts speaking but his voice was unclear)

**Saddam Hussein:** Where exactly do you want this Brigade?

**Unknown Person 7:** In the Fourth Corps.

**Saddam Hussein:** South of Al-Khadrah?

**Unknown Person 7:** Yes, sir.

**Saddam Hussein:** This is considered bypassing.....

**Unknown Person 7:** Yes, sir. They could be planning for something.

**Saddam Hussein:** Yes. Planning something out of nothing.

**Unknown Person 7:** We should first discuss if there is something difficult at this point, as they receive all their information from the media. However, coming together at Al-Kut area could allow us to move forward toward Al-Diwaniyyah. At the same time, we don't have any forces at Al-Samawah, Al-Nasiriyyah and South of the Line. Further, there are no Republican Guard Troops in this direction. Consequently, we thought of making a Republican Guard Base that can be used as their eye for this camp. Thank you, sir.

**Unknown Person 6:** Sir, if you think that it is suitable for us to go to Al-Diwaniyyah, then we all hope that we can have forces at the Middle of the Euphrates. Anyway, we should head north of Al-Diwaniyyah and north of Line 32 by 4 or 5 kilometers so that we can secure Al-Najaf and Karbala' Areas. There we can face fighters from outside of those areas who are fighting inside of them and not just their inhabitants. I saw with my own eyes, back at the 1991 Rebellion, vehicles from Iran on Al-Kut road. On Al-Kut road, Sheikh Sad (TC: means I saw Sheik Sa'd, but he doesn't say "I saw"), on Al-Hay road, Al-Fujar, 'Afijj, Diwaniyyah, Najaf and Karbala. I saw a lot of vehicles until we claimed this road. So, I think that it will be suitable for the Republican Guard to settle close to the north of Al-Diwaniyyah City and Line 32 because they will be between Al-Najaf and Karbala Cities. That way they can keep the enemy from receiving support and keep strangers from getting involved, especially Al-Nasiriyyah and Al-Samawah. I think that Al-Samawah is better than Al-

Nasiriyyah and Al-Hay areas because they have a lot of Iranians and some other areas at Al-Hur. So, this line, because Kut, Al-Najaf and Karbala have 38... (He breaks) if it stays there or leaves... (He breaks again) we have Brigade 15 at Al-Musayir Rahim for the new openness (TC: openness means tactics), Brigade 14 will be at Al-Hadaba Al-Habbaniyyah for the proposed openness, which is to take the shape of a circle (TC: surround) from Al-Mawsil down to Kirkuk, then to Ba'qubah, then to Al-Kut, then south to Al-Najaf, then west to Al-Musayar and Al-Hadabah, as well as Brigade 26 at Al-Ramadi. Through this, we can make our way into the heart of Iraq and have bases in every direction. Consequently, we can maneuver in all directions and protect the biggest cities in this area. The final decision is for you, sir.

**Saddam Hussein:** You concentrated on accumulation and...

**Unknown Person 6 interrupts:** Sir, we don't mean combining troops here, but we thought of adding some troops that were already there. For example, Al-Kut. I mean one more Armored Division plus one more Brigade plus.....

**Saddam Hussein interrupts:** You mean that the Armored Division is not only for Al-Kut. You mean that this force is settled at this place until the right time to move to another place.

**Unknown Person 6:** Yes, sir.

**Saddam Hussein:** Anyway, we should all agree on some concepts and make our position clear. As for aggregation, we should avoid moving the troops in large groups. If we have to amass our forces, then we must move fewer troops than expected in the front. You shouldn't consider aggregation because of the threat from air attacks. The threat of air attacks will not come as mass attacks. It will come from ordinary weapons, such as using bombs to attack halls. If there is a sudden attack on great numbers of troops, then there will be special procedures for every case. Also, it can strike machinery or equipment, so we have to deal with every case separately. However, sometimes the enemy attacks at a certain area and hits many vehicles or many..... (TC: Saddam stops here)

I consider this the traditional air attack; amassing this way leaves the troops with gaps between them. So, we get out of our bases when a crisis happens so we won't give our enemy an easy target. The main principle of the Republican Guard is not scattering over wide areas. However, it should be distributed in a way that could easily be used as a group. It should also be able to regroup quickly so that they can fight as a whole. Also, the principal of agglomeration is regrouping within 10 to 20 days or a month, even if we distribute it throughout Iraq. The principle of agglomeration is a very old one; it means dispersing our brigades and maintaining its ability to regroup as a whole. The Republican Guard is the reserve of the General Commander. So, we must not build it on one concept. If we build it on one concept by distributing our troops as a way of managing battles, considering the size and methods of regrouping, and then we face something else, we will be in a bad situation.

For example, what will happen if we build the Republican Guard's concept around the idea of national security and then face air and land attacks? We should build it around the concept of national security and include the possibility of air attacks. I would like to bring to your attention that Air Defense can work in a narrow area, but at the same time, it can concentrate on wide areas. for instance, if we settle a Brigade everywhere, then we can't back it with Air Defense the way we could back a Division. There will be air support, etc. I noticed that you have some points of view about managing the battle in case of air attacks only (The tape ends in the middle of his sentence).

**Time 01:04:34-01:15:23:** No conversation. (End of tape)