

May 2, 1995
**Saddam Hussein Meeting with the Revolutionary
Council**

Citation:

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Summary:

This file is a transcription of a meetin between Saddam Hussein in which they discuss Iraqi relations with various countries, UNSC sanctions, missile programs, and American elections.

Original Language:

Arabic

Contents:

Transcript - Arabic

Male 1 Peace be upon you. Hello. Did you get tired coming here?

[Inaudible, whispering with his assistant]

Comrade Tariq's wasn't in good health in the last few meetings. He's involved in a lot of the issues, questions and answers. So we avoided getting deep into the issue.

The relationship with the Security Council and how to deal with them is known; it makes it clear what needs to be done. It makes our situation in general clear.

Right now, our friends that we usually talk about like this are increasing in numbers, or they were found at a time when this description wasn't present at the Security Council. But it is clear now that years are going by, not just weeks or months. Year after year after year, what is required of them? The American plan. No embargo in the world goes on forever. There should be a certain period; five or six years are not a short period of time when it comes to people's lives. So this issue needs some serious and deep research so we can reach a certain position and act accordingly. Because this issue is taking too long.

Male 2 Sir, let me give an introduction that will help start the discussion. After the aggression and the passing of resolution 687, I personally observed the situation; it's obvious to me that the embargo issue is linked to two things. The first is political, and by that I mean the position of the United States in particular, along with Britain. I'm talking about their hostile position towards the Iraqi leadership. The United States has a hostile policy aiming to end the leadership in Iraq and to install a puppet regime, like the ones currently ruling in the gulf and in Egypt. That was the case in 1991 and hasn't changed since then. But they did reach a practical and realistic conclusion that this goal cannot be accomplished. They had hopes, plans and people that they depended upon. But the United States, and to a certain degree Britain, have a desire to change the regime. And they think that the economic embargo will give them the desired result.

The other countries that participated in the aggression, or the other important and permanent members of the Security Council in Europe and the world, didn't participate in the American goal in 1991 to 1993, they didn't show interest. They didn't participate; they weren't part of the American plans.

Male 3 Even France?

Male 2 Even France, even in 1992 France started breaking... even in the time of Socialists' rule. I remember statements made by Roland Dumas, the French Foreign Minister at the end of 1992 saying that we don't have anything against Iraq; they just need to comply with the Security Council's resolution, no more no less. There was some kind of balance at the end of the Socialists rule. But they didn't care. Same with Russia. Even China, whom we consider a friend and have good relations with, you do remember Sir, in '91 and '92, we asked to visit them several times and they always said yes and welcomed us but always said that they were busy. So they rejected a political visit in '91 and '92. In 1993 they accepted visits by the Deputy Minister, and then political visits started.

These countries didn't care whether the regime in Iraq stayed or was replaced. This

situation and the political climate saw a big change in the second half of '93, '94 and even now. We shouldn't ignore this change regardless of how we're going to deal with the Security Council and the American plan. But it is clear that a country like Russia for example, who didn't show any interest in what was going on in Iraq, is showing interest now. They're showing tangible interest and want to deal with this leadership in particular. And that also...

Male 1 Give me a cigarette

Male 2 This also includes some support for our leadership. They come and sign agreements and want to renew old relations and show support to our leadership.

French behavior in 1994 and 1995 is similar to the Russian behavior, meaning they dealt with our leadership. They met our representative, myself that is, in Paris, and decided to reopen the Interest Representation Section and started encouraging their companies to sign agreements of strategic nature with Iraq. And if President Jacques Chirac came to visit next week, this practice will be reaffirmed. Even if Jospin [French Prime Minister 4 June '97-7 May '02] came to visit, he already said that Iraq should comply with the Security

Council's resolutions, and said that the world should take notice of the progress achieved in complying with the resolutions. They asked him if the relations between Iraq and France will return to the way it was before, he said yes but under some conditions. Meaning yes, but not exactly like it used to be in the past. China is back to normal with Iraq now; they receive our representatives and politicians...

Male 1 Yes but we shouldn't ignore our situation. The relations will go back to normal, but we won't ignore the situation. This is what I got from the statement.

Male 3 The Chinese?

Male 1 No, the French. That's what their statement meant.

Male 2 Yes, it will be back but not like it was before, with the weapons and technology, Jospin is being wary...

Male 1 Not like this. They mean that relations will come back if the Iraqis meet the conditions.

Male 2 Yes.

Male 1 It's the same old French statements. Iraq should comply and the international community will open up.

Male 2 The DeGaulle people are more open and show more interest in Iraq because of their interests and the background of the relationship. The important thing in the French way of thinking, which is something you hear whenever you meet with high-level French officials especially from the right, they are scared of the Islamic extremism. And they consider it a threat to France.

Male 1 They're also worried about the complete American control of the Middle East.

Male 2 Yes Sir. Both things. Of course they cannot talk about the United States like they talk about extremism. They want to remain allies with the US. They're part of the Western alliance. But the French, and specially the right, think the spread of Islamic extremism in the middle east is a threat to the French national security. Because there are a lot of Arabs and Muslims in France. And those people are citizens, not refugees or...

Male 1 And also the presence of French people in the Islamic community

Male 2 Yes. They know our regime. Especially the French right, Jacque Chirac and his people, they know that we are an Islamic country and that we believe in it. But they also realize that Iraq and the Ba'th Party set a perfect example of balance between modernization and religion. They also know that our leadership cooperated with France, and when we cooperated with them, we had other alternatives, and we weren't forced.

Germany is not hostile to Iraq, but cautious. Germany is a political and economic giant in Europe, but insignificant politically outside Europe. They admit it themselves. When you discuss issues with the Germans they ask not to put pressure on them, they say they're not France or Britain.

Italy, which is currently a member in the Security Council, is not hostile towards Iraq. Their people, parties and church are sympathetic to Iraq and want relations with us. But their government is weak and not capable of taking big steps.

Same with Spain.

Iraq's position in the Third World and in the Nonaligned Nations Movement is coming back. There's a lot of sympathy and support from the likes of Indonesia and Niger, who are members in the Security Council, Malaysia and others... there's sympathy with Iraq on the Arab level...

So on the political fronts with Iraq, there are no enemies left except the United States and Britain. And also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from the Arabs...

Male 1 And Israel is one of the enemy

Male 2 Sir, we should be subjective with our analysis, away from our emotions. Israel is hesitant and stuck between two situations. Israel hates Iraq, it knows that Iraq is a serious and capable country and can achieve a balance with Israel when it gets the chance. That's the way it was in 1990, and it's one of the reasons behind the aggression against us. But Israel has other worries Mr. President. Israel right now is not a worry-free country. It is true that Israel is the strongest country in the region, on the military and political fronts. But it's not worry free. Israel has a local threat on the inside, and has a threat surrounding it. Israel is worried about Islamic expansion. Especially if gets to Egypt. It also worries about it inside the occupied territories. And Israel doesn't have the capability to deal with this new phenomenon of violent nature. That's why Israel is uncertain, should it continue the hostile policy towards Iraq like it was before 1990, or should it consider Iraq a balancing factor for this phenomenon. You can see this in their statements and articles.

The Jewish lobby close to the government in the United States is still hostile towards Iraq. They're still extreme in their ways against Iraq.

Male 1 There's continued coordination between the Jewish lobby and Israel?

Male 2 Yes there is sir, but in different shapes and colors. Among the Jewish lobby in America, some are for the Likud and some are for the Labor Party, so they're not the same color. But of course when it comes to the big issues that have to do with Israel's security and existence, they unite. But they do differ on other things. I always read the US political media and whenever we go there we see people and meet with them when ambassadors like the Jordanian or the Yemeni invite us...

So politically speaking, the whole world including the Arabs, Third World countries and the Europeans, are willing to deal with the Iraqi leadership, with the exception of the United States, Britain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. So they don't have a desire or a goal for the situation to change in Iraq.

If the embargo was lifted, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and whoever else you can think of in Europe or the world would start dealing with Iraq again.

This is about a country that fought a world war sir. Our war wasn't like the one with Iran. This was a world war with numerous countries participating. France, Italy, Germany by financing, Japan by financing, and others, they all took part in the war.

So the hostility is political, led by the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The other issue is the technical and legal issue. There are resolutions that were passed and agreed on. And after the end of the cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the last days for Gorbachev, things changed to where the UN resolutions are executed. Nobody talks about UN resolutions passed in the 70s, we do, meaning the Arabs, because a lot of the resolutions back then were for us, but they're never carried out. You never saw Brezhnev [Effective ruler of the USSR 1964-1982] come and say the resolutions have to be carried out, because he didn't like some of the resolutions about Afghanistan...

Male 1 One minute please before you continue. I summoned the Foreign Minister, Information Minister, Lt Gen Hussein and Lt Gen `Amir Rashid, they are present, so whenever you like

[Inaudible, people talking at the same time]

Male 2 So there are resolutions...

Male 1 The Information Minister and the Foreign Minister can contribute to the discussion...
[Inaudible]... ok

Male 2 The technical and legal aspect of the resolutions... since 1993 when I went and accepted resolution 715, it was clear to me and still is that there is unanimity between everyone, whether it's the US or Niger or France, agreeing on the resolutions that have technical and legal aspects. First, resolution 715, and second, Kuwait and the borders. They all talk about it and agree on it.

But it's different when it comes to other things like the lost properties and human rights. So the Americans and British use the Kuwaiti missing persons' issue to harm Iraq, but the others say that it can be resolved if you work on it. So if you resolve it or stay on track like the Red Cross is doing, they won't be so enthusiastic about it. But the British and US keep

using it as a tool to make us look bad. Same with the properties issue, the US and Britain use it against us while the others say it's an easy thing to resolve.

In that period, in January, March and April, there wasn't any pressure on us when it came to these things because we resolved them. And there's a high and subjective praise for resolving them. We also resolved the issue of 715. [UN Rapporteur 1991-97] Ekeus' report that was submitted on April 10th said that the monitoring is ongoing. So they have no doubts that the monitoring is ongoing.

When it comes to the technical and legal aspect, the only obstacle left that everyone is interested in; US and Britain are interested because they use it to make us look bad and keep the sanctions, and the others are interested because they are committed. So in Ekeus' report, the French point of view is the same as the British except on the political side. Meaning the French won't be any easier on us when it comes to the chemical, nuclear, missile or biological programs. Same with the Russians. The Russians are a little better. They say that they won't bring it up if nobody does. Same with the Chinese. But as long as it's brought up, they say it's important.

We have been busy with the resolution and the discussion of the resolution that we didn't get the chance to analyze the two reports submitted to the Security Council by Ekeus and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. If someone analyzes the two reports realistically and subjectively, they'll find that Iraq complied with four out of five issues. Missiles, chemicals, nuclear and monitoring. It's true they had talks with Ekeus about the missiles and the chemicals, also the head of the IAEA brought an issue mentioned in the Sunday Times about a scientist called Khidr who ran to Greece and his wife called... But all these things are insignificant and small...

Male 1 Didnt the scientist die or...

Male 2 Yes sir. These things are so small that Lt Gen `Amir Rahid met with them and resolved them in one meeting. What documents do you have, [laughs], the silliest things ever. When it comes to the chemical and missiles issues, there really isn't anything, if you read Ekeus' report; there are two ways to read it. The Americans and British read it one way because they have a hidden agenda. But if you read it subjectively, it's not a new report; it's just been updated. There used to be a series of reports and our people put them in one. Our people actually are smart and efficient. They said we wouldn't write a report, give us a subject and we'll write about it. They didn't want to fall in a trap, they didn't want to start writing a report and have them say no we don't want it, take it back. So our people said tell us what you want, meaning make a format and we'll fill it out. So our people ruined the game if there was one. So this thing needs accuracy, it has numbers and a lot of technical details. But it's not a problem. We don't have a problem with the missiles issue.

The main obstacle is the biological file. How did this issue progress? They themselves closed the biological file. They closed it before they found out about the complete deal for the materials. They said we see the remaining quantity, 14 or 15, Lt Gen `Amir knows the numbers, and they didn't see a problem. I know our comrades worked very hard after 1991, they worked 26 hours in a 24hour period. They erased everything. So they were concentrating their efforts on the biological issue, and it's a small program compared to the chemical, missile and nuclear programs. And the Special Committee's

capabilities turned out to be even smaller than our program. Meaning their experts and equipment and capabilities are too small to deal with the Iraqi program in such a short period of time.

So they closed it and weren't talking about it. But when they found out about the materials that we bought, they opened their eyes and...

Male 1 But they could find out about these materials faster than the other things that they discovered, because we bought them from the west...

Male 2 True Sir, but the information that came to the Special Committee didn't all come at the same time. They get some information, then a little more, and so on and so forth. So it looks like they got the information in the fall of last year. At the same time as the Kuwait issue and the crisis that happened then, Ekeus came and emphasized it.

Right now Sir, this is a meeting of the highest leadership in our country, we did actually produce biological weapons. It's not a lie to say that we worked in this field. And the materials that came here came for this purpose, not for the medical use like we told the Special Committee. So when there's proof, you are a man of law, when there's a case in a court, and there's proof, it leads to the conclusion.

So the conclusion that the Special Committee came to is correct, it's not a lie. The conclusion said that you imported a large quantity of materials that are used for medical purposes, and at the same time they are raw materials to produce biological weapons. You said it's for medical purposes, using it for medical purposes only requires kilograms not tons. Meaning that the Ministry of Health can use 200 kilograms the entire year for examinations, but it doesn't use 37 tons. We tried to tell them about mistakes that could happen, and how Health Ministers...

They see two issues sir, they see some very efficient and accurate actions from us, and they see some mistakes. But when we exaggerate the mistake, they'll say: you guys are efficient and accurate, know exactly how to work a machine, you were able to establish this big military program with little resources, nobody helped you, but you want us to believe that buying 37 tons was by mistake?

So the biological issue...

[Blank from 28:20 to 37:41]

[People talking in background away from the microphone]... celebrations and invitations...

Male 4 Now sir, there's a good...

Male 1 A national incentive to be worked in with the occasion. The issue of the position and defiance...

Male 4 [Inaudible]..., the armed, about an hour. It's complete... [Inaudible]

Male 1 It also looks like your preparation and attention to detail is better this year. Because...

Male 4 And all the media people, everything was good. We had a meeting a week ago...
[Inaudible] and we discussed the details...

Male 1 You were even having meetings two days before the march

Male 4 Yes, we were meeting with the leaders and... [Inaudible]

Male 1 We were discussing an important issue before the four comrades came in; Information Minister, Foreign Minister, Industry Minister who is the director of Military Industry Institution, and comrade 'Amin

We were discussing an important issue. We discussed it more than once, but we have to continue. It's about the understanding that we should have after the last experience with the Security Council, and how to act for our people's rights and what better steps we can take to weaken or break the embargo.

Comrade Tariq submitted a proposal concerning his understanding of the international situation and politics and an explanation of the positions of the main countries in the Council. Then we got into the technical aspect, which is necessary to have an accurate and practical political evaluation.

So now we can continue since the comrades are present, and we'll see after that what decisions we come up with.

Comrade Tariq, what's the last thing you got to on the technical side?

Male 2 Sir, about the technical aspect, I'll summarize my evaluation that I presented to you and the comrades.

Concerning the other files with the exception of Ekeus, we said that we have the missing persons file, the properties file is still active and is being worked on, in my opinion, these two issues are not a big obstacle that would prevent implementing article 22. At least not when it comes to the majority of the Security Council, like France, Russia, China and the others that don't have hidden agendas.

The whole Council is unanimous when it comes to the Ekeus file. The countries that want to lift the embargo want this file to be finished. In the last two reports submitted to the Security Council by Ekeus and the IAEA it is clear that four out of five issues are done, with the exception of some small details. These issues are the chemical, missiles, nuclear and monitoring. The report about the monitoring issue is very good and doesn't have any real problems. The only thing left is the biological. We have an inquiry Sir like we mentioned before the comrades came, about the report that Ekeus wants to destroy five machines, the inquiry is from comrade Lt Gen `Amir Rashid asking if any more destruction requests in the chemical, missiles or nuclear fields are expected. But not the biological since that's a separate issue. Where is it going to reach and what destruction possibilities will come out of it? That way the comrades can see a clear picture.

Male 1 Lt Gen `Amir

Male 5 Thank you sir.

I'm going to talk about the destruction issue. There was an unresolved detail in the

destruction issue that has to do with the missiles and the nuclear programs. So you can have a clear and complete understanding.

The missile issue, there's a project called 1728 that has to do with making parts for the engines of the Hussein Missile. They've been asking about it for a long time, and we had a feeling that at the end it might be destroyed. We felt this way for a while. We were trying to defend it and find excuses to protect this project. There are 115 machines for this project Sir. Apparently we weren't 100% successful, but we were highly successful. The decision they made back then was not to do anything with 99 machines and that we can use them for whatever purpose we see fit. They said 11 machines have to be transferred to another activity other than missiles. They should be transferred from their current missiles research and development locations to other locations that can't be used for missile activity, but it is possible to use them for any other activity. And they said that five machines, two of which were destroyed by hostile bombing, should be destroyed. So this is basically a summary for the missiles issue. And to answer the question: we do not expect any more destruction issues when it comes to the missile program.

In the nuclear file, so that everything is clear, there are a number of machines that were of concern to the IAEA since 1992, we succeeded in making this issue under monitoring. But there wasn't a decision made in the sense that these machines will not be destroyed. So this issue was handled quietly, and the director of the agency, Mr. Zafarero, an Italian, said if things go normal we wouldn't ask you to destroy any of the machines. But that was oral. But as far as official decisions go, none were taken saying no machines will be destroyed. But we don't expect them to ask for the destruction of any machines in the nuclear program. If things stay the way they are, the machines will only be monitored.

On the chemical program, the things they asked us to destroy in 1992 are taken care of. So we don't expect any additional destruction orders in the chemical program.

The biological is another issue like the Deputy Prime Minister said.

And also so we can be clear, the resolution 715 and accompanying plan allow the Special Committee and the IAEA to request the destruction of any equipment when it carries out a banned activity, or if any new information surface and say that the equipment was being used in a banned activity that the Special Committee didn't know about. But we think that this is a very weak possibility.

So in short, after destroying the five machines, two of which are already damaged by the enemy bombing, we feel that there will not be any additional requests to destroy more equipment.

Thank you sir

Male 1 Lt Gen Hussein

Male 6 Thank you sir.

If we take a look at behavior of Ekeus and the Special Committee in it's current situation, we'll notice that regarding a lot of issues, they give the impression they are resolved and finished. The regime issue was resolved a long time ago, sometime back in 1992. But recently they started bringing it up again.

What I also noticed is that they deal with things gradually. What we understood from Ekeus was that as long as monitoring exists on our machines and factories, they would not be destroyed. And we rejected the monitoring for a long time then we accepted and he set

it up just the way he wants it. Currently, there are no doubts that their monitoring is working efficiently.

After our decision to accept monitoring of our factories, he started destroying, he destroyed some of the things in the chemical program, they claimed the same thing. Then they came to the missiles issue and said they need to be destroyed.

I think sir that if we give him the chance to do this to our missiles program, he won't stop there. Because they approach the destruction gradually too. They don't come to us and bring up all the issues at once then say we need to destroy all these things at once. They do it gradually. I think that they will come back to the nuclear issue. And they might come back to the missiles issue.

We've witnessed this with the missiles sir. The range that we are allowed is 150 km. So when we started working on the 150 km, they delayed us for months. Almost eight months after we finished our designs and started production, they didn't give us a decision for eight months, and then they came back and reduced the size of the missile engine. We asked why. They said you could increase the capacity of the tanks, even though this wasn't the decision. They did this on purpose.

So I think that they'll come back, and they might come back to the big machines. The big machines are not just for nuclear. Some of them never worked for nuclear purposes at all. But they think that the size of the machines means that they're for nuclear purposes. So I think that when we allow them to destroy the special machines, they'll come back for something else. The regime is shut down, and the missile program is almost shut down too. Ekeus is never confident enough, he promises a lot of things. We were all hoping not to have to destroy anything in Iraq after starting their monitoring. We thought it would be enough for them that the monitoring is active, that they destroyed weapons and that they would think monitoring is enough to see anything else we try to produce.

This is why I say we should start trouble with them. From my observation of the world, I think the world doesn't pay much attention. They don't care that Iraq have been suffering for five or six years, people are suffering and can't get food. But the second we start a problem, the whole world pays attention again and takes action.

The embargo started because we occupied Kuwait. We withdrew from Kuwait, we recognized Kuwait, we destroyed factories, and we destroyed weapons. I just don't have any confidence in Ekeus to close the missiles file. And even if he did, he'll just come back to other issues. Some of which are here in front of us.

So I think that we shouldn't accept, we should talk with Ekeus and the permanent members, talk honestly and show how Ekeus is lying. We'll tell them how he prepared for the monitoring and we accepted, so why is he now going back and destroying our weapons and equipment.

So like comrade `Amir said, there's no doubt that he might destroy our factories again. The nuclear program wasn't in just one or two factories. So he can come back to us and even say that water factories can be used for nuclear purposes. He could say that electricity has to do with the nuclear program.

So I don't think this is right, they will stay.... And that's my conclusion from working with Ekeus, we noticed he doesn't talk about the problems all at once to save time and make things easier on us and let us admit and accept some things. He brings up a small problem, we admit to it and fix it, and he comes back and brings up something else. Then he goes and submits his report to the Council saying it's not complete and some things are still

unresolved. He brought this up in all his meetings and reports, that some things are still unresolved with Iraq. What are these things? I talked with the Russian ambassador and he said the regime issue is the main thing. I said you think this is an issue?

Male 2 Sir, I don't think they are serious. And this will lead to destruction of other locations as well as the destruction of other members/groups. Sir, this will lead to trouble. We need to make sure we prompt international opinion as well as the government, and announce that Ekeus is not clean. By Ekeus we mean the United States, we have to make it known that Ekeus is acting on their behalf We are loosing time. Any view we have or decisions we try to make are not taken into consideration at all. I, personally as a citizen, feel if we accept Kuwait, even though it's part of Iraq, they will be pleased. Even though, I personally don't think that. So, what if we accept Kuwait, what if we destroy the weapons. What if we destroy the factories, nothing has value anymore. The program is especially hindering our position.

The items on article 22 in not enforceable. Unless there is change in the international politic, or the UN politics or in the US... It is then possible that within a short period if France or Russia... then article 22 will not be enforced. My personal opinion is that they are far from enforcing article 22. Even if they begin Sir, they will start in such a special way that they will not lift the sanctions unless we accept their conditions. The issue of the North and the issue of Iraq is an amazing issue. We are not allowed to enter the North, we are not allowed to rule the North, and he insists that he places the orders and he purchases and distributes and he receives the payments/monies. I think we need to point out that Ekeus is a liar, the US is lying to us and we are ready to rely on ourselves. I'm not afraid of the US launching one rocket or 10 rockets at us. We are people who built and created, Sir, he sends daily telegraphs and his actions are ridiculing and demeaning. They wanted to see a doctor who was defeated without an official approval. They wanted to visit and check on him. But he's an Iraqi citizen, why should they check? Sir, the situation is becoming ridiculous.

Male 1 Foreign Affairs Minister

Male 3 Thank you Sir. Whatever is in the final report, they falsified the results in it. Sir, I think the entire job from the beginning to the end, however scientific it may be, is a political decision. The special commission is part of the formation of a political "compass", they destroy what they can, they blow up what they can, they facilitate and pressure... these are all means of a political agenda. What actually happened was a favor, Mr. President, but previously it was political.

As much as they hurt us and as many options as we gave them... now they need to come to a conclusion or decision, no details just a straight answer. As they win and hurt us, they limited themselves to a specific program. Now, it is hard to say that they want to come up with a complete new program. And then ask us Iraqis to go by the new program. Therefore, Sir, I think we need to completely finish the current program we've used in the past years and we will guide each other to finalize it. It is necessary to have a confrontation with them. This will be political or with Saddam. Some say they will drag this and not resolve it until the US presidential elections. And the Iraqi issue will be now put on hold without a resolution. None of the candidates can handle lifting the sanctions

on Iraq if the current President is against it. For example if he declares that he does not oppose the lifting of the sanctions the others will be pressured into the same position. What this means Sir, the sanctions issue in Iraq is according to whether or not it is advantageous to the United States.

So the embargo on Iraq will turn into an issue of interests for the parties in the United states. I got a telex from Mr. Nizar about this a while ago. The Qatari Foreign Minister also mentioned it. That they don't want to conclude this until the elections time, and then after that they won't allow any action to be taken.

How accurate is this? I don't think it's necessarily that accurate but it gives us an idea, if they delay the confrontation at the end of what's left of our relationship with them, it benefits them.

So that's why I'm going back to the Special Committee issue, as an entity steered by politics, it doesn't have much left. But the way we worked with them in the past is not useful. Meaning we call Ekeus, he comes and sends teams, then Lt. Gen `Amir and our brothers work really hard and have a scientific debate with him. During his last visit to Baghdad, comrade Tariq asked him some specific questions. When I heard his answers I thought to myself that if presented the same answers to the security Council then article 22 would be ready for implementation. I'm sure comrade Tariq told you about it. They were specific questions. Is there anything harmful? He said no. Is there anything threatening peace? He said no. Is the main goal of 687 accomplished? He said yes. If he says this at the Security Council then we'll be where we want to be. But he won't say it. Because his agenda is political. He was supposed to come, he sent a message saying it's a long flight and it makes him tired, he said if there isn't anything new then there's no reason for him to come.

So I think we need to change some of our policy on dealing with Ekeus. And maybe we should have the French sign an agreement to pressure Ekeus just like they sign oil agreements with us, and it would serve us better if Chirac wins in France. They are permanently represented in the Committee sir.

When a French scientist comes and... by the way the French were the ones that started a few problems in the biological issues. The French did. They started the doubts. So just like they signed contracts for oil worth billions, we should sit down with them and have an actual agreement. We'll ask them: how many representatives do you have in the biological Special Committee? And how many in missiles? And so on. And we agree on joint action. We should make their people tell Ekeus about some things, this issue is over; you don't have the right to...

The Russian Ambassador in Baghdad gave me an example, he told me about a story that we didn't hear about. About the 150 km missiles. The missile flies for 70 seconds. The fuel burns for 70 seconds, which take the missile to 150 km. The Americans told Ekeus that there are two extra seconds. They said that the 150 km missiles that the Iraqis designed should have a 68 second flight, not 70 seconds. So there are two extra seconds, which is a very big issue. And Ekeus got ready to bring this up. The Russian General Staff told Ekeus; what are you talking about? These extra two seconds are necessary in any missile to counter weather and wind changes. That made the Americans back down. They didn't bring it up. I thought it was brought up, so I asked Lt Gen `Amir and he said that it wasn't. The Russian said it was just between us, they didn't bring it up. So we should try with anyone that can do something. And they did promise Mr. Tariq

previously, and they did OK for a while, but they didn't work with us the whole way. So if they seriously work with us on this, the political struggle would ease up a little. We'll get rid of the knife in our back known as the Special Committee. The political struggle would be a lot less intense.

We tried our methods for a long time, so now we need to find another way to deal with Ekeus and the Special Committee, otherwise they're going to put more political effort into it because the technical excuses are few...

[Blank from 1:05:37 until the end of the audio cut]