

June 1, 1972

Summary of a Conversation between O. Darusenkov and Comrade Rodriguez

Citation:

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Summary:

O. Darusenkov writes about a meeting he had with Comrade Rodriguez. During the meeting, Darusenkov learned that Castro is uncomfortable with Nixon's recent visit to the USSR, believing that the visit's timing shifts the moral weight of the Vietnam War onto the Soviet Union. Darusenkov also explains that Soviet comrades should publicly greet Castro upon his arrival.

Credits:

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Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

[Crossed out: "To Cde. K. F. Katushev"]

[Written by hand: "CPSU CC"]

In addition to the information submitted previously, I would like to report the following:

On 31 May of this year, I had a late night meeting with Cde. Rodriguez at his invitation made in the presence of Cde. F. Castro.

Cde. Rodriguez said that he would like to personally comment on certain aspects of Cde. F. Castro's conversation with me.

I would like, he continued, for the Soviet comrades to correctly understand Fidel's current situation. He is practically uninformed about events, and makes assumptions only based on published documents and statements.

In Fidel's opinion, strategically the Soviet Union is correct in forcing Americans to sign agreements. However, from the tactical standpoint the chosen timing was not the best. In current conditions, the US gains a number of political advantages. They are able to present things in such a way that it will look as if the Soviet Union has neglected the interests of Vietnam in order to achieve beneficial agreements with the US. This way they are to some extent shifting the moral weight that rests on the Americans in Vietnam onto the USSR. All of this affects the sentiments in the third-world countries, who are, in addition to this, are very sensitive to the potential division of the world into spheres of influence between the two great powers.

Nixon's visit to Moscow and conclusion of agreements, in Fidel's opinion, could be justified if it was possible to get the Americans to resume negotiations in Paris and to subsequently withdraw from Vietnam. There should be no other outcome for Vietnam. Only victory will bring satisfaction. However, the results of this part of Moscow negotiations are unknown. This is the reason for Fidel's concern and uncertainty. This is why he refuses to make public statements. To sum it up, he fears that Nixon, this crooked political animal, this experienced schemer, succeeded in "scamming" the Soviet Union in this deal. As a result Nixon guaranteed himself a re-election into the White House, and it remains to be seen how he will start behaving after the elections.

Having touched upon the itinerary of F. Castro's visit to the USSR, Cde. Rodriguez said that the conversation about the [economy] planning issues, in his opinion, should take place in the computation center of the State Planning Agency (Russian: "GosPlan"), as this way it will be more visual and interesting.

Cde. Rodriguez asked Soviet comrades to show maximum attention to Fidel, including having the population welcome him upon his arrival, so that there is no contrast with other countries and previous visits to the USSR (he referred to the information provided by the Cuban Embassy in Moscow that in recent years welcoming of distinguished guests by the population has not been practiced).

In conclusion, Cde. Rodriguez said that he expects that conversations with Fidel will be comprehensive and serious, and will be held "on equal terms", in a statesmanlike manner. With that he reminded of Cde. F. Castro's grudge against Khrushchev who treated him like a "beloved naughty child".

/signature/
Darusenkov

O.