

July 26, 1961

**Record of a Conversation Between N. S. Khrushchev
with J. McCloy, Special Assistant to the President of
the US**

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Summary:

Khrushchev and McCloy discuss the German peace treaty, with Khrushchev praising Eisenhower's disarmament efforts and reaffirming the USSR's intent to sign the treaty regardless of US opposition. They exchange views on nuclear testing, disarmament, and verification mechanisms, with both sides recognizing the challenges of inspections and trust. The conversation ends with agreement to continue talks the following day to further explore disarmament and German settlement issues.

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Contents:

Translation - English

Record of a Conversation Between N. S. Khrushchev with J. McCloy, Special Assistant to the President of the US for Questions of Disarmament Concerning the Signing of a Peace Treaty with Germany, the Cessation of the Testing of Nuclear Weapons, and General and Complete Disarmament

26 July 1961

a The title of the document was partially used.

The conversation began at 1145.

Khrushchev asked McCloy what questions he would like to touch upon in the conversation.

b Underlined by typewriter from this point on.

McCloy I would like to talk of our impressions regarding the negotiations in Moscow. Mr. Zorin has probably already informed Mr. Khrushchev of his own impressions. I am at Mr. Khrushchev's disposal and ready to discuss any question with him. I highly value the opportunity afforded me to talk with Mr. Khrushchev and express my gratitude for the kind invitation.

Khrushchev said that he is glad to make McCloy's acquaintance and hopes to establish good relations with him.

McCloy reminds [Khrushchev] that he has already met with Khrushchev at Harriman's home and they had a brief exchange of opinions.

Khrushchev replied that then he was alone, but Harriman organized a whole detachment of representatives of business circles who attacked him, Khrushchev.

McCloy replied that Khrushchev defended his point of view then.

Khrushchev said that he regards Harriman with respect and asked that [his] best wishes be conveyed to him.

McCloy replied that he will pass on Khrushchev's wishes to Harriman with pleasure. He, McCloy, knows Harriman well, and worked with him during the War, in particular concerning the delivery of weapons to the allies. Right now Harriman is an Ambassador for Special Assignments. He is a devoted citizen of his country.

McCloy said that at the beginning of January of this year he, McCloy, left the post of President of Chase Manhattan Bank and wanted to return to private law practice. However, Kennedy asked him to join the new government. He, McCloy, declined the offer of a permanent post in the government. After this Kennedy asked whether he, McCloy, would be able to carry out individual assignments, considering his government experience and experience in matters of international law. He, McCloy, replied that if such assignments would be within his competence, he would be ready to accept them. Kennedy, who devotes great attention to questions of disarmament, asked him to study this problem and to help with his advice. McCloy thought much about how to better organize the work in the government about the important question of disarmament. He did not intend to stay long in the government and did not intend to occupy the post as the head of the new US [Arms Control] and Disarmament Agency, a bill concerning which had been introduced in Congress.

In one of his statements Mr. Khrushchev pointed out that the majority of my life has been connected with weapons, with preparations for war, but not with disarmament. I was a member of the Baruch Committee⁸², and I am interested in the question of what ought to be done with atomic energy, and how to control this new force. When Kennedy offered me the post of adviser for disarmament he thought that I combined in myself two qualities - I have experience in questions of defense and am interested in disarmament.

The first thing that I would like to stress in a conversation with Mr. Khrushchev is the deep interest and attention of both the old and the new Presidents, and not only the President, but all the people of the US who imagine the current situation, in questions of disarmament.

Khrushchev I believe in this and I think that former President Eisenhower sincerely wanted disarmament. But he did not understand that it is necessary to take into account the interests of another country, and therefore we did not agree with him.

In conversations Eisenhower said not once: let's come to agreement about disarmament, let's leave a good imprint on history, and attach our names to it. I think that his words were sincere, but evidently he could not realize his wishes.

We were ready then, and are ready right now to exert efforts toward disarmament and come to agreement with President Kennedy about disarmament. President Kennedy made a good impression on me in Vienna. Let's display willpower and statesmanship and show that progressive goats can treat the matter with understanding and not eat the cabbage entrusted to them, and come to agreement about disarmament.

McCloy I am glad that you talked about Eisenhower. I know him well and helped in his selection to the post of Supreme Commander. He is a good, honest person. Possibly he did not always completely understand the situation with disarmament. I had two discussions with Eisenhower, but I drew the impressions from these discussions that he highly respected Mr. Khrushchev.

Khrushchev I also felt and publicly said about the U-2 aircraft incident that I regarded Eisenhower with respect. The U-2 incident was Allen Dulles' affair, but Eisenhower, as President, showed chivalry and took everything on himself.

McCloy This is characteristic of Eisenhower. He could not say what he knew, what happened; he is a very simple person.

Khrushchev Besides his decency and honesty his position as President obligated him to this. It was not to his advantage to tell the American people that he did not know. The Americans would have thought: what kind of President is this if he does not know what is being done in the country[?]

McCloy This is a correct comment. Eisenhower is an instinctively open person.

Khrushchev We have much information characterizing the sincerity of Eisenhower. During the War he scrupulously kept the word he gave. The other partners did not behave like Eisenhower. I will not remind [you] of the facts, they belong to history. When they told me something bad about Eisenhower I cited the facts which explain my positive attitude toward him and have not changed my opinion right now.

McCloy I am happy for this recollection of Eisenhower, and in the event you permit it, I will pass it to him. Before my departure for Moscow Eisenhower called me and asked [me] to come to his farm on return.

Khrushchev I would pass Eisenhower my greetings and good wishes. However, after the public squabble about the U-2 affair my step could hardly be understood.

McCloy I will approach this question delicately.

When Kennedy appointed me to the post of adviser for disarmament, I promised to give him any aid in solving the problem of disarmament. I had an opportunity to see the terrible consequences of the use of modern weapons and directly participated in the development of missile weaponry, and have been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and no one can tell about greater horrors than those which I have seen with my own eyes. I understand the urgent need to eliminate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

Khrushchev Hiroshima and Nagasaki - these are child's toys in comparison with those which will be in the event of a world war in contemporary conditions. Our scientists have suggested to me that [we] create a bomb of 100 million tons of TNT, but the missile men said that they can lift this bomb. They say that it would be the cheapest bomb.

McCloy Yes, this is the most economical bomb.

Khrushchev The scientists say that test explosions need to be conducted for this. I told them that possibly the Americans will begin to make explosions and thereby help us.

McCloy The scientists always demand explosions. We have difficulties with our scientists. I mean some scientists who strive to conduct nuclear tests.

Khrushchev President Kennedy told me in Vienna about the desires of your scientists to conduct tests. I replied to him: "[If] you begin tests, we will follow you".

McCloy I would like to dwell on the question of nuclear tests. Considering the open spaces of our countries one could say that we cannot destroy one another and win a

war. I knew that the Soviet Union was a big country, but here I have become convinced of the energy and dynamism of your country. My country is also large, and has great power. With the current capabilities of weapons victory is an empty word. War would bring such suffering to the peoples which they have never endured in the entire history of humanity.

Khrushchev I agree with you. If a war begins we know that the US and USSR will survive, but as concerns "your relative", Adenauer, then he will perish in the first hour of war. France and Britain will be wiped from the face of the Earth on the first day of war.

I read your press closely and, for example, yesterday I read an article by Reston. He hinted that there will be war if we sign a peace treaty with Germany. Reston is an intelligent person, but he is not the Commander-in-Chief and does not know what war is. If someone attacks us when we sign the peace treaty or they violate the sovereignty of the GDR, then we will give a rebuff. This will be suicide for those who begin the war. I know our weapons, and I know their capabilities.

I talked recently with the British ambassador, and then read what he reported to his Prime Minister. His report did not match what was said in the conversation. If I see Macmillan I will tell him that his ambassador is incorrectly informing him. In the conversation I asked how many bombs would be needed to explode over Britain to destroy it. He said, six nuclear bombs. I replied to him that they had told me an anecdote that there were pessimists and optimists in Britain. The pessimists think that six bombs will be needed to destroy Britain, and the optimists [say] nine will be needed. The ambassador replied that he is among the pessimists.

Our General Staff is planning several dozen bombs for Britain, that is, we assess the capabilities of Britain even higher. I do not say this for intimidation. You have your plans, we have our own. During a war I should hold the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and therefore I listen to the General Staff, and I study what strikes we should launch. It is the same situation with France. It is the same, if not worse, with Germany. The density of the population and industry is greater there. If a war against us is unleashed then Italy, Spain, and Turkey will also become likely enemies. American military bases are located on their territory. I did not name Greece, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxembourg. They are not of great importance. However, if a war begins then it will also be necessary to put the forces of these countries out of commission. This relates to all the countries surrounding us on whose territory US military bases are located.

We and you will imagine what a future war would be. I know that we will throw bombs and attract your bombs to us. I have no illusions, but we will survive, although the losses will reach tens of millions. Many of those who began the war will not survive; only ashes will be left. The US will also survive; we look at things realistically and understand this.

I don't know what President Kennedy said in his promised speech. In the press they say that he will say something sensational.

McCloy I, too, did not hear [this].

Khrushchev They expect that a mobilization will be announced and a transfer of troops. They report that supposedly 200 transport aircraft are being prepared. If this is done we will send two divisions to Germany for each of your divisions, If the US declares a general mobilization, we will think, and in the event of need will also declare a mobilization. It is in vain to test our nerves by threats. We would sooner die than bend.

We will sign a peace treaty with Germany. We would like to sign it together with you. This would be a great happiness. There is nothing that would prompt us to a war, or even to a worsening of relations. But if you do not want to sign a peace treaty, we will sign it all the same. Access to West Berlin on the basis of occupation rights will be halted. The occupation rights are being halted. There will be free access to West Berlin, but only on the basis of an agreement with the GDR.

I agree with much that President Kennedy said at the press conference a week ago. We stand for freedom of access to West Berlin, for the most real freedom of access, but it should be determined by an agreement with that country whose territory is being used, that is, by an agreement with the GDR. For example, we fly to London

across Denmark, and we have an agreement with Denmark for the overflights and landing of our aircraft. We will have to come to agreement with the US about direct air transportation. Obviously it will once again be necessary to fly across Denmark, and we will have to ask Denmark about this. This is my comment about freedom of access to West Berlin.

Now about the freedom of the population of West Berlin. I completely agree with what President Kennedy said. We are ready to guarantee this freedom with our forces, the forces of the US and USSR. Let the troops of Britain, France, the US, and the USSR guarantee the freedom of West Berlin. We can draft a special protocol on this account, sign it, and register it in the UN to give it an international status.

We are also ready to agree to neutral forces under the aegis of the UN to guarantee the freedom of West Berlin, and the independence and non-interference in its internal affairs. We do not need West Berlin, and we do not want to interfere in its internal affairs. But we do not accept Adenauer's claims that West Berlin is part of West Germany. We have an agreement with the US that West Berlin is not part of West Germany.

I do not agree with President Kennedy's statement when he spoke of a solution of the German question on the basis of the principle of self-determination. The question of the reunification of Germany should be decided between the two German states; outside interference is impermissible. Here it is not a question of self-determination, it is not a national [*natsional'nyy*] one, but a sociopolitical question which only the Germans themselves can decide. If one accepts the position of President Kennedy then this would mean that we have to liquidate the existing system in the GDR that is, to go to war in the GDR, and then tell Adenauer, come and take the GDR on a plate. Such views are a senile mind game. People of common sense cannot think this way.

We do not object to the two German states agreeing among themselves to reunification. Ulbricht has already proposed a confederation of the two states. Why not agree to this? This would lay the foundation. Your relative Adenauer does not want a confederation, work on him. I told the FRG Ambassador Kroll: if you think that you are morally and materially stronger than the GDR, why then do you fear a confederation[?] We think that the creation of a confederation is a good beginning.

President Kennedy asserted that if a peace treaty is signed then it would perpetuate the division of Germany. However, there has never been agreements between us that we will fight for the sake of the creation of a united Germany. Churchill repeatedly demanded the breakup of Germany. De Gaulle also holds the position of preserving the two German states. Please keep this between us; I am talking with him about this confidentially and cannot divulge this without his agreement.

McCloy Can I tell Kennedy about this?

Khrushchev Yes, you can. But what I said is not for the press.

I'll say more. A week ago our Ambassador Vinogradov visited De Gaulle. In the conversation De Gaulle again repeated what he had told me: "Let the two German states remain, it is not necessary to reunite Germany, we don't need a strong Germany".

President Eisenhower told us that the reunification of Germany might represent a danger. When we said to Eisenhower, why then do you arm Germany he replied: "West Germany is already our serious economic competitor. If we don't compel West Germany to arm it will become even stronger in the markets. When Germany is armed then it has less capability to compete with us in the markets".

We told Eisenhower: let's find an opportunity to come to agreement on the question of West Berlin and the German question so that the prestige of neither country suffers. The same question right now is posed to us and Kennedy. We understand and respect the prestige of our partners. Let's come to agreement about such a solution which would damage neither our nor your prestige.

We told Eisenhower: let's conclude a temporary agreement and provide paragraphs in it which would recommend that both the German states enter into contact and come to agreement between themselves about reunification. A deadline could be stipulated – about six months. If they are not able to come to agreement in this time then the countries which took part in the War against Germany should sit at a table

and sign a peace agreement with the two German states.

Why not take the first step and create a confederation, as Ulbricht proposed? This is the most reasonable solution. I have formed the impression that Eisenhower regarded this proposal with understanding and sympathy. I joked then: "It's a pity that the American Constitution does not permit Eisenhower to be President for a third term". Eisenhower then waved his hands and said that two terms was enough for him. I think the matter here was not in the desire, but in the law. And nevertheless I formed the impression that if Eisenhower's term had been extended we could have come to agreement with him.

Britain also does not want the reunification of Germany. I think that America, too, will not shout "hurrah" in this regard, but does this in support of its ally, Adenauer. Is it really necessary to fight for the self-determination of Germany when they do not want this themselves?

I think that in the end reason will prevail. De Gaulle told our ambassador: "Our rights are indisputable, and the West will stand firmly for these rights". I do not agree with De Gaulle in many respects, but I regard him with respect. He has the great burden of the past behind him which does not correspond to the international position of France. De Gaulle reminds one of an aristocrat who was rich and noble in the past. The nobility remains, but not the money. He wants to maintain the footmen and have a great carriage [*vyezd*], but pay nothing. De Gaulle said that sending a division from Algeria demonstrates firmness on the question of Berlin. Who is he scaring with this! He himself is afraid. If even 10 divisions are transferred then this will not frighten us. If a war begins it will be a nuclear war. What can be the importance of a division in such a war[?] To tell the truth, then this division is not loyal to him, and therefore he is withdrawing it from Algeria. I don't know what is better, to keep such a division in Algeria or in France, near Paris. However, this is a domestic question. But let it not scare us.

McCloy De Gaulle did not scare anyone with his step.

Khrushchev This is a game of toy soldiers, but we live in an age of nuclear missile weapons. I regard President Kennedy with respect. He frankly said, "Our forces are equal". This is an honest partnership. So let's not touch one another in tender places. They accuse us of creating the Laotian question. But to talk that way means to forget yesterday. We had only an ambassador there and had no influence.

There was a legal government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos. But the US gave weapons to Thailand, and they organized an attack. Souvanna Phouma was forced to leave for Cambodia and appeal to us for weapons. We gave him weapons. But we gave him considerably less than the US gave Thailand and to the troops opposing Souvanna Phouma. The Laotians smashed the troops armed by the Americans. Then President Kennedy came to a correct judgment - Laos should be neutral. But we stood by this opinion long ago, and if the US had not pushed Thailand against Laos there would not have been a Laotian question at all. The US invaded, but blamed everything on the Communists. There's Wall Street for you! We don't need Laos. I think that we can come to agreement. The USSR, the PRC, and the DRV have agreed to come to agreement on those positions to which we arrived during the conversation with President Kennedy. The Soviet Union, apparently like you, too, agrees for Souvanna Phouma to be the head of the government of Laos. Britain and France have also agreed and the King of Laos will evidently agree. We will not interfere in the agreement.

We don't want to clash with you if you hold positions of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. If only the Devil didn't push you into anything like Cuba.

The question of self-determination with respect to Germany is not a subject for negotiations, and we will not take part in such negotiations. This is a German question and we are not interfering in the internal affairs of the German people. Imagine, for example, that West Germany suddenly splits apart. What, should we pick a fight with you because of this?

Right now there exist two Vietnamese states. The US has resisted elections which were to be held on the basis of the Geneva agreements two years after its conclusion. Now you speak about "free" elections with respect to Germany.

I have explained our position. We want to come to agreement with you. But I will be

frank: we will sign a peace treaty even in the event you announce that you will start a war in the event of its signing. You should understand our position. We have already declared that we will sign the treaty and have made a down payment. If we don't sign then it would be seen as a retreat, an abandonment under pressure of the Western powers.

When it was to the advantage of the US they signed a treaty with Japan without our participation. We protested and the US spat on our protest. they deprived our representatives of the rights in allied consultations in Tokyo and Washington. The US thought that they had the right to this, they had atomic bombs, and we did not. We wanted to enjoy the same rights. Now, both of us have atomic bombs, and therefore it is necessary to decide the question reasonably, without causing one another harm.

Yesterday I read an article in an American magazine about Berlin and West Germany. The article raised the question of what would happen if the US and the USSR changed places. The author of the article answered this question. He said that in the place of the USSR the US would have long eliminated the current situation in West Berlin. An American wrote this. Consequently, there are reasonable people among the Americans.

We want friendship with you. In order to do this it is necessary to eliminate the sore spot which is West Berlin, preserve the freedom and independence of the residents of West Berlin, and ensure free access for all countries, an access which would be guaranteed under the UN aegis at any level. Such a decision would immediately cleanse the atmosphere in the world. There are no other contentious questions between the USSR and the US right now, and if someone wanted to have such contentious questions then they would have to think them up. We want to trade with Wall Street. Of course you will grow rich from this trade. We recognize and accept this. That is the law of capitalism. But in this event there would be no war of nerves. I repeat, I do not see any other questions which would pit the USSR and the US against one another.

As concerns questions of ideology, then there is nothing you can do. Communists and capitalists can't be changed. In such an event they say that a leopard will change his spots. Whoever has spots thinks in his own way. However, this is not a matter for an argument and not a matter for a war. At the present time the US is the richest country. We want the same thing and even more. We intend to get this not by robbing other peoples, but through peaceful collaboration and the development of the productive forces of the country. We are, so to speak, borrowing the slogan of Wall Street: live and let others live.

We are approaching a dangerous moment right now. I say: don't scare us, we are already scared. If you scare us and make threats, then this only complicates the situation and will lead to it being difficult to solve the question without war. As I understand, you don't want war. We also don't want war. Not so long ago we sent you a memorandum on the question of West Berlin and about a German peace treaty. You sent us your reply. This correspondence is reminiscence of a game of soccer: each tries to direct the ball to the opponent's side. Right now we are preparing a strike in your direction. If we don't sit at a table and we don't sign an agreement then we will continue to drive the ball from one edge to the other. If we cannot sit at a table then we, for our part, will sign a peace treaty all the same. In this event you threaten war. If it begins then we will start to throw balls of another kind. You will sent balls to us and we will send balls to you in response.

I stress, we stand for negotiations. In your memorandum it also says that you stand for negotiations. The British are for negotiations, and the French want negotiations. It is necessary not to inflame fears, to cool down, and for everyone to sit at the negotiating table. This is the position of the Soviet government and the position of our allies.

McCloy I highly appreciate the opportunity for an open exchange of opinions. On questions of disarmament I can speak in an official capacity. As concerns West Berlin and a German peace treaty, in this event I can speak only as a private citizen of the US. I agree with you that the correspondence on these questions is reminiscent of soccer, and I would like to remain just a spectator, and not rush onto the field for the ball.

I have dealt with Germans for the majority of my life. During the First World War I fought against them in the ranks of the American Army. When the War ended I graduated law school and began to work as an attorney on Wall Street. I thought that I would not be dealing with the Germans anymore but, however strange it might seem, the biggest trial I have litigated has again pitted me against Germany. I dealt with the trial known by the name Black Tom, which arose in connection with the fact that before the War the Germans blew up ammunition which belonged to Russia in New York harbor. In the course of this trial I had to become familiar with German espionage and German intrigues. Then I had to meet with the leaders of Nazi Germany.

Then the Second World War began, and I returned to Washington. I had to again fight Germans. After the Second World War I was appointed High Commissioner in the American occupation zone of Germany. This work demanded much energy from me. I sort of played the role of a Roman proconsul and had full power over the lives and the economy of Germans. I hanged some Germans (of course, not with my hands) and some I acquitted.

Khrushchev Obviously you did not hang everyone who needed to be hanged.

McCloy Evidently it was necessary for more purging [*pochistit'*] to be done. In a word, fate has tied me to Germany. All [my] life I have had to deal with Germans. I have had occasion to be in Berlin, and I know the situation there. My son is serving in the American forces in Germany right now and is on a highway leading to Berlin. I don't want him to take part in a war.

Khrushchev May your son come home. If the Americans get it in their heads, as they say, to break through to Berlin by force, then your son will not come home at all.

I had a son who was a pilot, and he was killed during the [Great] Patriotic War. My other son is an engineer and I don't want him to take part in a war.

McCloy I well understand the seriousness of the problem we face. I understand the capabilities of the Germans. They cannot be regarded lightly. They are an emotional people and have a great capacity for exciting other peoples. As the great German Goethe said, the Germans, like Faust, have two souls: a good and an evil one. I see difficulties in solving the German problem, and nevertheless think that it is necessary to solve it. I say what I think, but I cannot speak in an official capacity. I highly appreciate the frankness of Mr. Khrushchev.

Khrushchev I understand you. Again, I cannot figure out Wall Street.

McCloy I want to say how the Americans imagine the Berlin question. Berlin does not concern the Americans as such. They ask, why fight for Berlin, which has created such difficulties in history for the East and the West. It's another matter. Berlin is a symbol of Germany, a symbol of Europe, a symbol of the goodwill of the US, the readiness of the US to keep the word it has given. We talk much about how we will defend West Berlin and our rights in West Berlin. I don't know how you think, Mr. Khrushchev, but I think that none of us would be in Berlin without mutual aid. We came to Berlin at a price of much blood. The Germans wanted the United States to enter Berlin. Eisenhower did not agree with this. He let it be known that the Russians had suffered the greatest casualties and shed the most blood. Then Eisenhower turned the troops to the south of Germany. Our troops penetrated deep into Eastern Germany, and then turned back.

Khrushchev I had this example in mind when I was speaking about Eisenhower's decency.

McCloy I know that great pressure was put on Eisenhower to accept the offer of the Germans and send American troops to Berlin.

Khrushchev I can cite one more example of Eisenhower's honesty. Malinovsky, who commanded a front in Austria, defeated the Germans, and the Germans wanted to surrender to the Americans. Stalin turned to Eisenhower about this question and Eisenhower gave an order not to take Germans prisoner, let them surrender to the Russians.

And an example of another sort. Rokossovsky was attacking in the Baltic and also defeated the Germans. The Germans went to surrender to the British. Stalin turned to Churchill in connection with this. However, Montgomery took all the Germans prisoner

who came to him. It needs to be said that recently Montgomery became enlightened, and he better understands the situation which had developed. But Eisenhower now understands the situation incorrectly. That's how it happens in life.

The chivalry of Eisenhower won me over. Stalin also respected Eisenhower.

McCloy Mr. Khrushchev says that he will sign the peace treaty in any event. Let him sign it, we know that he can do this, and I do not think that Mr. Khrushchev is right. However, I see that such a step might entail complications. I have my own point of view of the German problem, and Mr. Khrushchev might not agree with it. For a long time I have thought that the only correct solution of the German question is the reunification of the country. Any division of a country is fraught with dangers. It gives rise to irredentist sentiments, and this is especially dangerous when you are dealing with such a temperamental people as the Germans. One can draw an analogy with a cannon which is not tied down and rolls around on a ship. In a strong storm it can sink the ship.

The most advisable solution is the reunification of Germany in which the eastern borders, which were the result of the defeat of Germany in the War, would be guaranteed. After this a non-aggression pact could be signed so that the Germans could not again raise [their] heads and attack anyone. I presented these thoughts of mine in the foreword to one of the books published in the US and, as far as I know, they have encountered favorable responses both in Germany and in the US.

However, if Mr. Khrushchev wants to sign a separate treaty with the GDR and has decided to do this, then let him sign. I don't consider this a rational step, but we will not fight because of a treaty being signed. A treaty will not cure an illness, but only delay its aggravation. A treaty might be the source of subsequent difficulties

The US is seriously concerned by another question connected with the signing of the treaty. The treaty might eliminate our occupation rights in West Berlin and hand these right over to the discretion of Ulbricht, who represents at least part of those who are against whom we fought. It would be intolerable for the US to ask for charity from Ulbricht, who in the past was our enemy. Perhaps this position of the Soviet Union would not be intolerable if we signed a treaty with West Germany and said to the Russians: you have to deal with "my relative Adenauer".

Khrushchev You have already deprived us of the rights we had in Germany according to the Potsdam Agreement. You also deprived us of rights with respect to Japan. According to the Potsdam Agreement we should received industrial equipment as compensation for the damage caused by the Germans. The West refused us in this.

McCloy I don't know the exact position with respect to this question but, as far as I know, the Soviet representatives left the Allied [Control] Council. Did you receive all the reparations due you from East Germany?

Khrushchev How can East Germany compensation for all the destruction and all those casualties which our country suffered[?]

McCloy Yes, no one can compensate for the enormous losses which the Soviet Union suffered.

As I said, a situation that we will have to go to Ulbricht hat in hand and to ask him for a satisfactory solution alarms us.

Khrushchev The question nevertheless needs to be decided. When we restored relations with the FRG I reached out to Adenauer.

McCloy But in this case the situation was different. Access did not depend on Adenauer.

Khrushchev The necessity of coming to an agreement with the country whose territory you want to make use follows from international law. You are not accepting our interpretation, but we cannot accept and do not accept your interpretation. If you do not have enough reason then you will have to draw [your] weapons first. We will defend ourselves.

McCloy We want to keep the current situation. You are demanding a change and taking all the burden of the changes on yourselves. A cessation of access to West Berlin will be an initiative from your side.

There is no problem of Berlin right now. Berlin does not threaten the world/the peace [SIC - *mir*, which can mean either "world" or "peace"]. You cannot unilaterally abolish

the rights of those who fought together with you against the Germans. Our reaction to your intentions is natural and, I would say, a legitimate reaction. I am firmly convinced that the occupation rights cannot be abolished by a deal with part of the enemy. You cannot abolish the rights of those who fought side by side with you.

Khrushchev suggests interrupting the conversation and resuming it after lunch
The conversation resumed at 5 P. M.

McCloy I want to again dwell on the question of Berlin. I pointed out that it would be completely unacceptable for the President and the people of the US if the Soviet Union by a unilateral act abolished our rights which we have as a result of the joint victory by concluding a peace treaty. In such an event we would have to bow before a representative of our former enemies. This would be a deal with Ulbricht, a former enemy, who wants to interfere in the right of our access to West Berlin, in the rights of the population of West Berlin. This causes us great concern, and instinctively touches Americans, all of those who took part in the War against the Germans. This touches our honor. It is impossible to allow Ulbricht, who has created an intolerable situation for the US, to cause an aggravation of relations between the USSR and the US.

It is necessary to find a rational government solution of this problem. Mr. Khrushchev said that he is ready for negotiations, but it seems to me that he is proposing negotiations on some previously defined basis.

Khrushchev We are proposing negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty.

McCloy We favor unlimited negotiations, such negotiations when you could present your point of view and we would have the same opportunity.

Khrushchev That is exactly how we understand the negotiations.

McCloy Mr. Khrushchev, here you have mentioned six months. I think this period is insufficient. It would be incorrect to limit the negotiations and determine beforehand how they should be conducted. I think that the time for the negotiations has already come, but the negotiations should be held without any preliminary conditions. You present your point of view, we present ours, and we think how they can be brought closer.

Khrushchev We are ready to hear your opinion. We speak of negotiations, but not about a diktat. In negotiations each side should have the opportunity to present its point of view.

McCloy I had formed the impression that Mr. Khrushchev was proposing limited negotiations, negotiations on a restricted [*opredelennoy*] basis. I saw a summary of Mr. Khrushchev's conversation with President Kennedy in Vienna, although I am not sure whether all the details were covered. As I have already pointed out, it worries me that the negotiations should be conducted on a previously predetermined basis. This worries not only me, but all thinking people in the US.

Khrushchev I can answer you. Maybe you want to continue your comments, however.

McCloy I repeat what affects our rights which we received as a result of the victory over Germany worries us. It is true that 16 years have already passed from the moment the War ended, and possibly a solution can be found. However, we have rights, and they cannot be abolished other than by common agreement of all the interested parties. You cannot abolish our rights in West Berlin through a unilateral agreement with the GDR. Of course, if one of the parties abolishes the obligations then they cease to exist. However, the other parties are right to sue and demand the restoration of their rights. This is the situation in international law. It is possible, therefore, that Mr. Khrushchev mentioned the registration of the treaty in the UN. He evidently desires to give it a sacred international nature.

It is possible that all this requires further study. But I stress that we cannot be satisfied by a situation when our rights as victors are transferred to the discretion of such an unsympathetic person as Ulbricht. This is everything that I wanted to say on the question of West Berlin. I expressed my personal point of view and do not take it upon myself to say whether it coincides with the official point of view of the US.

Khrushchev I am pleased to hear your point of view. Now I will present my point of view. You have raised several questions and have answered them yourself, presenting your purely personal, subjective understanding.

For example, you don't like Ulbricht. This is your personal affair. If you don't want to, don't invite him as a guest. This is your right. You might not shake hands with him. But the matter does not concern Ulbricht, but a country. The GDR does not exist at your wish or your consent. You can do nothing with history. Whether you respect the GDR or not, this changes nothing.

I remember when I held negotiations with Eisenhower and Herter, and the question of the PRC was touched upon, that the US did not want to recognize this state. I said that is an irrational policy. You did not recognize the Soviet Union for 16 years, and now you don't want to recognize the PRC. They objected to me that the Russian Tsar did not recognize the United States for 26 years, to which I replied that the Tsar was a fool, and why repeat what fools do.

Obviously you agree with me that Roosevelt had no sympathy toward Communism and socialism, but he rose above subjective convictions and approached the question as a statesman should [*po-gosudarstvennomu*] and recognized the Soviet Union. Here is an example of statecraft, an example of a great mind. Why should I like Adenauer or Strauss or another person from the government of West Germany? But we want peace and therefore we strive to come to agreement with them.

You lost 250,000 men in the Second World War, but we lost 20 million. We think that the War needs to be concluded with a peace, good conditions need to be created so that the War is not repeated. Right now we are located on the land of the Caucasus with you, and wild customs have existed among the Caucasians, customs of blood feuds. Relatives were obligated to take revenge in blood on the family which was guilty of the death of their relative. Do we really need to be guided by such laws? If we approach it this way we have a greater right to a complete extermination of the Germans, for the balance of power has changed in our favor right now. However, this would not be a policy, but would be revenge, barbarity.

Your reasoning has no moral or legal basis. When we made the Revolution the Americans landed an assault party, as did the Japanese, French, and British. The Germans occupied Ukraine and Belorussia. How can I treat you to lunch if you are an occupier?

McCloy We were invited then by someone.

Khrushchev Who invited you? Then we give you a kick. Those who invited you were dying. One American general, who commanded the American forces which landed on our territory, published a book under the name "The American Adventure in Siberia". He characterized his activity correctly.

If one speaks about Ulbricht personally, then he is no worse than me. He is a Communist and I am a Communist. You want to establish diplomatic relations with the Mongolian People's Republic right now. This is a correct decision. However, Tsedenbal is a Communist and consequently you don't fear Communists. How is Ulbricht worse compared to Tsedenbal and Khrushchev? Accordingly, your approach is subjective and it cannot be used as a basis of a decision.

Or, for example, Ayub Khan overthrew the legal government of Pakistan and declared himself President without any election. You recognized him and are friends with him. We also recognized him, although we also do not have a friendship. We have an ambassador in Pakistan.

But what is happening in South America? One general overthrows another. You recognize the first, second, third, and maybe you recognize the fourth. The people did not choose them, they are simply robbers, and simply have power in their hands.

Your best friend, the Shah of Iran, is the son of a robber who overthrew the old Shah, slaughtered his family, seized riches and power, and then declared that he given from God. If he was from God, then where do robbers come from? Such is the moral side of the matter. There are no morals here. I am telling you this in reply to your statement that you cannot recognize Ulbricht.

The American press shouts: Ulbricht does not represent his people. This is a lie. The government of Ulbricht was chosen by the most democratic means, there is a parliament in the GDR, and the government is accountable to the parliament. In a word there is everything there that other civilized peoples have.

You have your concept of democracy. I and Ulbricht have our own concept of

democracy. You say that you have two parties, but we say that you have one party, the party of Wall Street, which defends the interests of monopolistic capital. However, we recognize you. There exist countries in the world with different social and political systems. If one approaches it so that a country is not liked because it has another system in it then there will be no position of peaceful coexistence, but a position of war.

And one more consideration. Think about your argument. You say that we and you were allies, and it's not good when an ally wants to cast all responsibility off itself ensuing from the surrender of Germany, and to force you to ask permission for access from Ulbricht, with whom you fought. This is a tarnished moral. We fought together with you against the Germans in the East and in the West. You violated the Potsdam Agreement, deprived us of reparations, armed West Germany, and made it a member of a military alliance directed against the USSR and the socialist countries. What kind of morality is this?

We don't want to maintain the state of war. After the signing of the treaty you will be deprived of occupation rights in West Berlin, and the GDR will obtain full sovereignty. Then we will not bear responsibility for access to West Berlin, and it will be necessary to come to agreement on common legal foundations with the government on whose territory you want to use. You say that this is amoral. Do you want us to be in a state of war with the GDR forever?

You assert that the peace treaty can be concluded when a united Germany is created. But obviously Germany will be reunited when pigs fly.. But a pig can't fly, nor can it be taught to do so.

You are behaving like a cranky old man. Tell your nephew: I will beat you up with a cane. But we are adults and we have a good club in [our] hands, so don't think of whipping us with a cane. We will sign the peace treaty, we will sign it even in the event that you say that you'll declare war. Start a war, and we will respond to you, we have no other way out.

We don't want to impose the peace treaty, we will meet with you and discuss [it]; you will offer your proposals and we will try and find a reasonable solution. If we don't come to an agreement at this forum then we will go to another room and sign the peace treaty with those who want to have normal relations with the GDR. Whether you sign the peace treaty or not - as you like. We cannot force you. If you don't sign the peace treaty we will not be offended; if you sign, that will be good. We are not afraid of threats of war. If you are capable of going to war just because we don't want to interfere in the internal affairs of the German people then this means that you absolutely want a war. Then it is a fate you can't escape.

We boldly look fate in the eye, we have something with which to answer. We will call upon the people to defend the Motherland and they will understand us. No one will understand you.

I want to relate an anecdote from the time of Pushkin. One proud guards officer passed gas during a dance, and went out and shot himself. Of course, it is rude to pass gas, but why shoot oneself[?] The officer could have been pardoned.

We are proposing a peace treaty, but you are threatening war. We government leaders need to be guided in solving questions not by feelings, but by reason. For in the case of war this concerns hundreds of millions of casualties. What is a threat to break through by force? You strike Moscow, Leningrad, we launch a retaliatory strike on Paris, London, Bonn, New York, Rome. What is the smart one here? This is actually the last phase of a culture, of intelligence, this is the law of the jungle, or savages. Even worse, for a savage might pierce one person with a spear, but in our time one salvo will cause tens of millions of casualties.

Right now Rockefeller and President Kennedy are raising the question of building shelters. We are not building shelters, I don't know what kind of shelters need to be built to protect people from modern weapons. Your construction benefits those who supply the building materials. Does Rockefeller by chance have cement plants?

McCloy I don't know.

Khrushchev If he doesn't, then his partners evidently have cement plants, and they will get profits from this construction. But others do not benefit from this.

Churchill knows what the German FAU-2's are. But compared to current weapons FAU-2's are just an insect's bite. Why be foolish?

Some say that Khrushchev has paid too much in advance with his statements in favor of peace, that he doesn't have enough strength and will for a rebuff. Those who talk like this are deeply mistaken. I stand for peace, and as long as I am alive, I will stand for peace. But if they attack us, I will give the order to open fire. I have been given this right.

They say, let Khrushchev not miscalculate. I am addressing this warning to others. Let them not miscalculate.

We are proposing a peace and fighting for peace. We stand for peace and want to remove the fragments of the Second World War. If you understand this, Mr. McCloy, if all the American people understand this, then you will see how matters would go between us in peaceful conditions. It would be easier to come to agreement about disarmament.

This is our position. Obviously, it will be necessary to repeat it until we sign the peace treaty, until we are able to convince you of the reasonableness of our proposals. If we are successful then I will be completely compensated for my efforts.

Some American or Englishman said: better difficult negotiations than war. I agree with this. It needs to be said that you are difficult negotiating partners.

McCloy I agree with what Mr. Khrushchev said about the stupidity of thermonuclear war. I have a question, why disrupt the current situation which does not threaten war[?] You have spoken about the fragments of the Second World War. Berlin, if it is such a fragment, is thus a small fragment. The essence of the matter is the preservation of our rights in West Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev has spoken about negotiations. But if these negotiations concern the loss of our rights in West Berlin, we will not be able to digest this.

We have exchanged serious words here. Mr. Khrushchev has the right to speak such words. I can only express my reaction to the seriousness of the situation and I do not want to be immodest. Mr. Khrushchev told an anecdote about an officer. We should be careful not to commit suicide because of an oversight.

Khrushchev Don't allow such an oversight. If you attack after the signing of the peace treaty then this will be just such a blunder. If you want a war, prepare for it. We too will be prepared. We will sign the peace treaty and not capitulate before your prohibition on signing the peace treaty. Take the responsibility on yourselves. Begin the war.

McCloy The question of West Berlin is such a question which might cause large consequences. One cannot permit the luxury of the establishment of a firm course without the readiness from both sides to change course and thereby avoid a clash. Mr. Khrushchev says: I'm not afraid of anything [*mne more po koleno*, literally knee-deep in the sea]. This is dangerous. That is all that I want to say on this matter.

Khrushchev I am not speaking of being knee-deep in the sea, but of a peace treaty. The more threats from your side the greater is our determination to sign the peace treaty.

McCloy The negotiations should be broad in order to take into account not just the point of view of Mr. Khrushchev, but also of the other participants of the negotiations. I fear that it would be unwise for me to say more. Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly understands that I have no official authority on the German question, but I am concerned about the situation and would like to make a contribution to beginning a search for a reasonable solution.

You have spoken about my subjective attitude toward Ulbricht. I don't know him.

Khrushchev Your attitude toward Ulbricht tells of a disgust toward the system which he represents. The bourgeoisie also consider Lenin a bandit and German spy. I hope that you don't consider us bandits.

McCloy Of course not. I mean not a question of sympathy. Ulbricht is our former enemy, and now you are demanding that the Americans who fought against the Germans hold negotiations about their rights with Ulbricht, a former enemy.

Khrushchev This is the law, the law of civilized people who after a war are supposed to extend a hand and conclude a peace.

McCloy This is not the matter. You insist that we hand over the question of the preservation of our rights to the hands of Ulbricht. Mr. Khrushchev can sign a treaty, of course, but I repeat that the question of the elimination of our rights is a serious question. The question of the rights of two million residents of West Berlin is also serious.

Khrushchev Ulbricht is the President of the sovereign country of the GDR. He occupies the same position as Adenauer. Whether we like Adenauer or not we have to reckon with him and the fact that he is the Chancellor. But if one approaches him as a German then the West Germans fought against us just like the East [Germans].

McCloy I didn't say that you should approach Adenauer to get your rights.

Khrushchev If, let's say, our aircraft fly across FRG territory then we should have to come to agreement about this with Adenauer. Right now we have a direct rail link with Paris. We asked permission from the FRG and they permitted us passage; if they prohibit us, we will halt passage across FRG territory.

McCloy We have a firm position on West Berlin, acquired at the price of common efforts and casualties. A unilateral abolition of the rights ought to be averted since it will lead to complications. I don't know what the decision should be, but I think it ought to be found.

I know that Mr. Khrushchev will sign the peace treaty and it is impossible to dismiss such a step with threats, just as it is impossible to dissuade the US from a decision which has been made.

Khrushchev We are not intimidating you. The decision on whether there will be a war or not is in your hands.

McCloy The terrible consequences of a war demand that we preserve [our] freedom of action and have some alternatives to get out of the situation. I don't like the current trend of events. Public opinion in the US forms slowly. But when it has formed it is hard to change and control.

Khrushchev The Russians have the same quality. If they are dragged into a war, then they will not end it until they finish off the enemy.

McCloy I noted that the Americans and Russians have common features of character.

Khrushchev Yes, they have good features of character. We won't pit one people against the other.

McCloy President Kennedy is displaying cool-headedness and good sense in the current crisis. But he is a bold and decisive person, and threats will not stop him if he sees a danger for the United States. I want to say again that it is necessary to do something different instead of threats and a mobilization of forces against one another. I am convinced that Mr. Khrushchev, like President Kennedy, will exhibit statesmanship and resourcefulness to avoid a crisis.

Khrushchev We will do everything so that there is no war. But you should understand our position. Here you say that we fought together and won the War. We don't threaten you and we don't want to threaten. We are not challenging either you or your allies. However, you have an incorrect idea of the Berlin question.

You say: we fought and, let's say, won a watch as booty. [We] would have to come to you and get in [your] pocket to take this watch from you. But West Berlin is not a thing. It is territory and the people who live in it. Therefore it is incorrect to say that if you conquered Berlin then it is yours. It is not yours and not ours. As a result of historical development West Berlin has become a little island in a socialist country, in the GDR, and your occupation rights are preserved in this little island so long as the state of war is maintained. When the state of war is ended, when a peace treaty is concluded, then your rights disappear [*otpadut*]. That is why you want us to not sign the peace treaty for the sake of the preservation of your rights. That is the root of the question.

Let's agree on what you want. Do you want freedom of access to West Berlin and freedom for the residents of West Berlin? We are ready to come to agreement with you. We will consider what you propose on the matter.

McCloy [SIC, should be Khrushchev] You know that there are 11,000 of your troops in West Berlin. These troops do not worry us. I told President Kennedy: if you want, send 100,000 troops there. If you want to fight, this will be to our advantage. Your troops

will end up in a pocket and be destroyed. President Kennedy understands such a situation.

Please pass to President Kennedy: I understand that you should spare each other's prestige. Let's come to agreement on a rational solution, without infringement of prestige, but on the basis of the conclusion of a peace treaty. If you want, we can conduct an unofficial exchange of opinions. However, if you don't want to rise above the level of Adenauer, then there will be no agreement. Right now you reflect not the American position, but the position of Adenauer. You don't need Berlin, but Adenauer wants to seize it with your hands.

It is obvious that we have already talked about the question of West Berlin sufficiently and now [we] might switch to the question of disarmament if, of course, you want to disarm.

As Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I ask you to understand our position and to give President Kennedy correct advice. I think that so far President Kennedy is conducting polemics with restraint. He is leaving the door open for negotiations. We value this and we ourselves are making proposals which lead to negotiations. If President Kennedy has any proposals we would be ready to receive them. If you desire this then [we] could confidentially exchange opinions about such proposals. This is all that I wanted to say about the question of Berlin, and now let's switch to the question of disarmament.

McCloy I just began with the question of disarmament, but then we switched to the German question. I want to convince Mr. Khrushchev of my desire and the desire of my country to avoid an arms race and to approach a solution of the problem of disarmament practically. It seems to me that the best example of this desire is the recent television appeal of Eisenhower before leaving the post of President. We are in the hands of scientists and academics who are engaged in the creation of new kinds of weapons. He said that it necessary to put an end to this, change course, and direct energies toward more productive goals. I accepted the post in Washington not to wage a propaganda battle or to maneuver in the UN and other international organizations. I hoped that I would be able to make my contribution in order to direct [my] forces toward more reasonable goals.

The first question with which I would like to deal with is the question of the testing of nuclear weapons. After Kennedy came to power a date was set for the resumption of the negotiations in Geneva. We had little time, and I had to work strenuously to achieve a change in the US position and to improve it. I had to exert influence on the military and members of the US Atomic Energy Commission. We hoped that the Soviet Union would accept our new proposals, and were disappointed when the discussion in Geneva took a negative direction. The Soviet Union offered its new proposal about a "troika" and insisted on an insignificant number of inspections with which we, understandably, could not agree. I reckoned that an agreement between us about a cessation of nuclear tests would be the first, although not the best, but nevertheless the first step in the area of disarmament. For our part we have tried to work out a complete text of a treaty in order to come to an agreement. We convinced many of our allies to agree to our position. Now I see that nothing has resulted in Geneva.

At the present time the Soviet Union thinks that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests needs to be tied to the general question of disarmament, in spite of the fact that separate negotiations on the question of testing resulted from a request by the Soviet Union. We know how tough is the current position of the Soviet Union. We have received information from Dean, our representative in Geneva, that the possibility of an agreement is being put off for an indefinite time until negotiations on complete disarmament.

As a result of such a course of events many in the US say right now that testing needs to be resumed. The question of West Berlin worsens the situation even further. This makes my work and the work of Mr. Zorin even more difficult.

There is no special enthusiasm in the US in favor of a resumption of testing. Except for fanatics, the majority oppose a resumption of testing. Of course, there are such people, including scientists, who think that if we do not begin testing then everything will perish. Some scientists say: to not conduct tests means to delay scientific work.

We don't know whether the Soviet Union is conducting tests or not. Some think that you are conducting tests. It is known that large explosions have taken place in the Soviet Union. However, we do not know whether these explosions are conventional or nuclear. We are not conducting tests in the US since we cannot keep them a secret. Therefore people wonder, if one side tests and the other doesn't, perhaps an advantage for one side will develop.

Others discuss the question of what kind of new bombs need to be developed. They talk about fusion bombs [*bomba sinteza*], bombs which would kill people but not damage things of value. [Translator's note: this however seems to be a description of a neutron bomb]

Khrushchev Why is property needed when people will be killed [?] I don't understand and don't see the sense in such bombs.

McCloy This is correct.

Khrushchev An excessively mercantile approach to war. We say: there's no use crying over spilled milk.

McCloy Among us they talk of a fusion bomb, a deadly weapons which does not destroy things of value. This has some connection with missiles.

Khrushchev We know about this, and have read [it] in newspapers. Such a weapon does not interest us. When they kill us, they can use our pants.

McCloy In any event, debates are going on in the US about whether nuclear testing ought to be resumed and who will gain from it. We cannot tolerate the current situation for long without having confidence that the Soviet Union will not conduct tests. If the Soviet Union conducts nuclear tests and we don't, then the Soviet Union might gain. If both sides do not conduct tests, then the balance is preserved. If both our sides resume testing then in such an event the outcome is unclear. The question arises, will the Soviet Union catch up to or pass us[?]. President Kennedy is dealing with this question.

I want to find a way which would convince you that both our sides will not conduct tests. It is necessary to eliminate this question. I don't know how to do this; we have made attempts in this respect, but they have not yet led to satisfactory results.

They think that there is a possibility of detecting all explosions in the atmosphere and underwater. However, with current devices it does not seem possible to detect all explosion underground, in outer space, or on the other side of Venus. It is possible that [we] ought to come to agreement about those explosions which are being detected right now, and then develop reliable means of monitoring other explosions and extend the treaty to them. After tests in Nevada it is clear to us that it is impossible to detect explosions underground. There exists a theory of decoupling, a theory that it is possible to covertly conduct large explosions in an underground cavity. However, this is theoretically impossible.

Khrushchev It is practically impossible. In the past I worked as a miner and have an idea in this respect.

McCloy They say that one can make such cavities in salt mines.

Khrushchev All the same, these are small excavations.

McCloy I wonder what simple agreement acceptable to the Soviet Union could be concluded in the area of halting nuclear tests so as, as they say, to have the first sign in the matter of disarmament. I don't think that countries will resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

I didn't expect that the Berlin question would take so much time.

Khrushchev The rotten tooth always hurts more.

McCloy The main thing that worries me right now is how to convince one another that we will not conduct nuclear tests. As I said, the tests are not being conducted in the US. We could show you our test ranges where nuclear test have been conducted. However, I don't think that this would be very useful. In such an event you might say that we began preparing tests the day after your departure. In any event, if we could create the confidence in one another that we will not conduct tests then this would improve the overall atmosphere. It is possible a gentlemen's agreement ought to be concluded about abandoning testing in the atmosphere. I would like to find a method

with the aid of which [we] could preserve what has been agreed at the Geneva talks; right now it is obviously impossible to achieve complete agreement. Frankly speaking, the state of affairs in Geneva worries me.

Great pressure is being exerted on President Kennedy, and evidently on you, too, for nuclear tests to be resumed. As I have already said, I am inclined to the thought of concluding an agreement which would prohibit nuclear tests in the atmosphere and underwater. But I don't know whether such an agreement would satisfy you. I am searching for a solution which would not require the creation of an entire network of monitoring posts and full-scale inspection. The Soviet Union displays great sensitivity on the question of monitoring. In any event, an agreement between us on testing would be valuable in itself. This is everything that I wanted to say on the question of nuclear tests. On the question of general disarmament I would like to inform you about an exchange of opinions with Mr. Zorin. However, I feel guilty that I have taken so much time from you. Maybe I can continue our exchange of opinions with Mr. Zorin.

Khrushchev Some words on the question of tests. I declare that we are completely clean, our conscience is clear, we are not conducting secret tests. It is also impossible to keep such things a secret among us. This would become known not today, but tomorrow.. We value our name and trust in us, and will do nothing to undermine this trust.

Strong pressure is being put on me in favor of conducting nuclear tests. Many scientific discoveries and inventions have accumulated, and the designers want to test them. Right now this pressure has especially intensified in connection with the Berlin question and the threat of the Western powers to go to war with us if we conclude the peace treaty with the GDR. I have been able to counter this for the time being, but when you threaten war, then you aid those forces which want to take from me the agreement to conduct tests. The defense of our Motherland is dearer to me than public opinion, which might condemn us if we resume nuclear tests. But this is a question of the future. Let's see how things go.

Now about an agreement. I think that we will not be able to come to agreement in Geneva. After all you will not agree what would be included in the "troika", but we won't agree without a "troika". We don't want to allow espionage on the territory of the Soviet Union. But there will be such espionage if the inspection groups roam throughout the entire country. To agree to this means to give what the General Staff of the US [SIC] has long sought. Such desires have been expressed in the proposals about flying around the territory, in a U-2 flight. But an inspection according to an agreement about a cessation of tests would provide even greater opportunities.

The history with the Congo has taught us much. We cannot trust Hammarskjold or any other person who would consider himself a master in our country and use this in the interests of the Western powers, but there is no way we could react to this.

At one time we agreed to sign an agreement on a prohibition on testing. Then you refused, although everything was prepared. Right now we have not agreed and we will not sign a treaty. We went for this then because we trusted you more, thinking that you wanted to achieve an agreement on disarmament. Many years of negotiation have passed and we see that you are playing with us, but you don't actually want an agreement.

A prohibition on nuclear tests doesn't solve the problem of war and peace. The stockpiling of nuclear weapons continues. Your ally, De Gaulle, is continuing nuclear tests. Other countries might also follow De Gaulle. What is the sense then in an agreement?

We don't know whether the US will conduct tests of nuclear weapons, but we know that De Gaulle is conducting nuclear tests and is conducting [them] in your interests.

McCloy No, that is not so.

Khrushchev De Gaulle conducts tests as your ally, and his weapons are in your favor.

McCloy We have just the main difficulty with France on this question. We don't give De Gaulle information about nuclear weapons. The French nuclear tests have no significance.

Khrushchev I don't know. De Gaulle has not informed me.

McCloy He also has not informed us.

Khrushchev I don't know this.

McCloy De Gaulle is as far from us on this question as you are. De Gaulle is asking us for information about nuclear weapons. We refused him this information and this is causing difficulties in relations with France. You might not believe this, but it is a fact. De Gaulle is a difficult person, and possibly the best means of stopping De Gaulle is to come to agreement about halting tests, and then great pressure will be put on him.

Khrushchev Information of such a sort leaks to us; however, we don't know how reliable it is.

McCloy I can assure you that we do not exchange information about nuclear weapons with De Gaulle; our relations with him are aggravated because of this.

Khrushchev I believe you. I don't have the right to express disbelief, but I can doubt.

McCloy I have formed the impression that the Soviet Union wanted an agreement before the resumption of negotiations in Geneva. However, after the resumption of negotiations it changed its position. Such an impression was formed in our representative Dean after meeting with Tsarapkin.

I would like to address a delicate question. I think that the changes in your position were caused by Chinese pressure; otherwise it is hard for me to explain the reasons for the change of your position. Possibly the Chinese want their country to become a nuclear power and are asking that an agreement be postponed until this time. We have heard that the PRC might explode a nuclear bomb in a year or two. I don't want to get any information from you, but I am saying what I have heard.

Khrushchev I will tell you frankly that there is no pressure. We have delicate relations existing between the socialist countries and they all jealously guard their sovereignty. Neither we nor the PRC or the other socialist countries allow interference in our internal affairs. I don't know when the PRC will be ready for explosions, when they create a nuclear bomb, and explode it. The PRC scrupulously does not allow itself to put pressure on us, either directly or indirectly.

If you want to know my opinion about the reasons for the changes to our position, then it is the Congo. We won't seek an agreement without a "troika", inasmuch as a cessation of nuclear testing should be tied to general disarmament. De Gaulle is not listening to us right now. We will sign an agreement, and other countries will not listen to us. It is easy for them to give a reason: you have already created your own ability to produce nuclear weapons, and we should have the same abilities. De Gaulle declares that first he will create a nuclear weapon, and then halt nuclear tests.

The situation would fundamentally change if we came to agreement about general and complete disarmament. Then all countries would be in the same situation.

If the PRC solves the scientific difficulties then it will conduct nuclear tests. I would do this in Mao Zedong's place. Actually, such a huge country, and without a nuclear weapon, while others have a nuclear weapon. If we were in such a position then, I repeat, we would have exploded [one], and no one could have prohibited us [from doing so].

Let's exchange opinions on disarmament. We stand for the most complete monitoring if there is an agreement on general and complete disarmament. In this case we will remove the sentence about a "troika". If then you demanded a "troika" we would be against this. We would like to know everything, and then there should be no forbidden territory, no veto, and all the factories and scientific institutions should be open to unconditional inspection.

McCloy There are difficulties in the question of monitoring. You mean complete monitoring at the end of the process of disarmament?

Khrushchev No, in the process of disarmament. This is a completely different position. One cannot disarm, and then monitor. This would put those who actually want to disarm in a difficult position. There would be conditions to deceive those who are striving for disarmament.

McCloy We should decide the question of how the fulfillment of obligations in the process of disarmament are verified, and how to find out that nuclear bombs are not being hidden and that the agreed levels are being observed. It is necessary to know what is being destroyed, but also the armament which is left with the countries. You

are asserting that we are seeking conditions for espionage.

Khrushchev Or intelligence. There are difficulties in semantics here. We are practical people. The question which we are discussing concerns the security of the country. We want to have confidence that the disarmament obligations are being honestly performed. We don't want to choose targets for bombing.

McCloy We are not seeking espionage, but want to know what levels of armed forces the countries have, whether we are safe, and would it be safe to destroy war materials. We want to have confidence that the agreed levels are being observed, and that matters concerning the implementation of disarmament are going smoothly. However, we should be confident not only at the end of complete disarmament, but in the course of its implementation, but with a "troika" we can be deprived of such an ability.

Khrushchev We are not proposing a "troika" in the process of disarmament. Inspection should be implemented without a veto.

McCloy This is an interesting statement. I should think about it. The transition period worries us. if [I] draw an analogy, we want the dog to be cleaned of fleas so that we know that other fleas will not appear on it.

Khrushchev I understand your concept. We are in favor of catching the fleas and counting them.

McCloy As I have already said, my main problem is the question of monitoring in the process of disarmament. It is necessary to find a method to make sure of the absence of a violation of the general principle, namely: so that countries are in an equal position and no one gains an advantage. We can argue about the stages of disarmament, but what I said is the main thing.

In addition, it is necessary to create a system for the impartial resolution of disputes between countries. We cannot rely on a "troika" in the question of securing our interests. You spoke of the Congo. We are dissatisfied with the situation in the Congo and dissatisfied with Hammarskjöld. But nevertheless it is necessary to have someone who could make decisions in complex questions without the influence of the selfish interests of countries.

I would like to cite an example of that situation which existed on our western borders. You evidently also had new borders where possibly the same situation existed. There were no sheriffs there, but the population had many guns. Disputes, brawls, and murders developed between the owners of cattle and the cowboys and the population suffered in the process. Finally, the people got together, hired sheriffs, and appointed judges. The judges made different decisions, but the people understood that it was better to have a decision with which someone disagreed than carrying weapons on themselves all the time.

At some stage there should be something like this in relations between countries. It is better to make a decision favorable or not to one side or another than to have weapons. I am an attorney, possibly my instinct as an attorney leads me to the thought that arbitration between countries is better than fighting, better than an individual's actions and lawlessness. I have encountered disputes about the decisions of a court which did not satisfy the parties, but all the same it is better than lawlessness. We should arrive at such a means of a peaceful resolution of disputes, although this would create difficulties for countries. The countries should sacrifice part of their sovereignty to avoid the horrors of war.

Now about the "troika" in the question about the cessation of nuclear tests. I have begun to wonder whether Mr. Khrushchev is aware that we have agreed with the Soviet Union that parity of the sides should be observed in the control commission. The question right now is about the executive administrative bodies which would ensure inspections are rapidly carried out when a phenomenon like a nuclear explosion is observed. However, this phenomenon would be determined by instruments, and not by an administrative body. I nevertheless think that your proposal about a "troika" was a step back, in spite of the irritation with which you speaking, that it is impossible to have an impartial administrator in the field of monitoring or in the area of the command of international armed forces.

Progress is necessary to avoid the disasters of war. Strict monitoring is needed in the process of disarmament. If the initial level is "a" and the weapons are reduced by a

quantity “b”, then how can one find out the remaining level if we don’t know the initial level[?] The question of inspection and verification is a complex question. It is broader than simply an inspection of the bombs being destroyed and the armed forces. Verification is needed of what the countries had left. Accordingly, a complex inspection system is necessary. I take nuclear bombs as an example. How can one know how many bombs were left if do not verify their quantity at the beginning of disarmament[?]

Khrushchev But how to find out how many bombs a country has and how many they have hidden? This is impossible to do.

McCloy That is exactly the problem.

Khrushchev If one destroys all the means of delivering a nuclear weapon to a target – missiles, launch pads, aircraft, bases, etc. then the bombs will not have significance. They might not interest us.

McCloy One can destroy aircraft, submarines, and missiles, but one can hide some means of delivering nuclear weapons and build, for example, launch pads in a forest or rocky mountains and hide missiles in them. How can one detect such a weapon? I have already told Mr. Zorin that after a country is disarmed one nuclear bomb will have enormous importance. We have a saying: “In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king”. It is necessary to solve the problem of monitoring so that one hidden bomb does not decide the whole matter.

Or, let’s say, an example with the destruction of factories to produce nuclear weapons. Let’s say, we agree to destroy three factories, and three new ones are created in other places instead of the three destroyed ones. I think that the inspection should not be limited. The Soviet Union should be interested in this the same as the United States. You speak of espionage and obtaining military information. We don’t want this, but want effective monitoring which would track not only what is being destroyed, but also those weapons which remain. We have already exchanged opinions with Mr. Zorin in this regard.

I feel guilty that I have taken away Mr. Khrushchev’s whole day. It is already late now, and we have a little left to say.

Khrushchev We can continue the exchange of opinions today [or] we can resume it tomorrow. I have enough energy to stand for our Motherland. I am pleased to talk with you. You are a reasonable person, although also from Wall Street. We could meet tomorrow after breakfast and talk another two or three hours. You might leave for the airfield from here and fly to Moscow.

McCloy Two or three hours is a lot for a conversation.

Khrushchev As they say, an appetite comes during eating. However, I want to again stress so that you correctly understand me. when the question arises of general and complete disarmament, then there cannot be a veto, there cannot be a “troika”. An inspection should be complete. In such an event we want to know ourselves what is being done among you, and recognize the same right for you.

McCloy There is the question of how to begin the program of disarmament.

Khrushchev We will continue the discussion tomorrow. I will tell you of our understanding of this question. I want to say only one thing right now – if you sincerely want to disarm then we and you will come to agreement. I do not see obstacles to an agreement without a veto and without a “troika”. We will not tolerate a veto ourselves. When there are no weapons, there is also no espionage.

McCloy But in the course of disarmament there are weapons, and the dog, so to speak, has fleas. The problem of monitoring in the course of disarmament is a complex problem and a way needs to be found to solve it. I want you to understand me. This concerns the security of our countries.

Khrushchev Yes, this is a complex question. I will present my views. We and you seem to have the same desire: to ensure the security of our countries. The difference is that I do not want to attack you and I state this, but you say: if thee Soviet Union signs the peace treaty with the GDR we will show it the club. You act like robbers. I am allowing [myself] a liberty here, but with good intentions.

McCloy You need not apologize.

Khrushchev The Poles have a good name for war – robbery. It accurately expresses

the essence of war - the one who attacks is the robber. When you threaten us this is a robber's threat. So it is in Polish.

McCloy We have already discussed this question with you.

There were misunderstandings between me and Mr. Zorin with respect to what are the goals of our negotiations. I want to say to Mr. Khrushchev that, for our part, we understand these negotiations as a continuation of the exchange of opinions between Gromyko and Stevenson, the goal of which is to determine a forum for subsequent multilateral negotiations on disarmament. I received such instructions from my government, and Stevenson has the same understanding of the goals of the negotiations.

Mr. Zorin wants us to discuss the details of specific plans concerning disarmament. I am not ready for this. In spite of the differences, I nevertheless think that an exchange of opinions would be useful and, in any event, it has allowed me to compile a clearer idea and to gain experience. I have already expanded my instructions, bearing in mind Mr. Khrushchev's statement of 6 May that one who strives to limit the negotiations to procedural questions alone takes on himself the responsibility for the fruitlessness of the negotiations. We have touched on the substance of the questions of disarmament in the course of the negotiations with Mr. Zorin.

Khrushchev suggested interrupting the conversation at this and resuming it on the morning of 27 July.

The conversation ended at 8 P. M.

Present at the conversation from the American side was interpreter Akalovsky.
Present from our side were: Cdes. V. A. Zorin, I. G. Usachev, and V. M. Sukhodrev.

Recorded by I. Usachev and V. Sukhodrev.

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