

April 13, 1970

Report on Yugoslav-American relations fourteen months after President Richard Nixon's assumption of office.

Citation:

"Report on Yugoslav-American relations fourteen months after President Richard Nixon's assumption of office.", April 13, 1970, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Yugoslav Archives, Fond No. 507, File. No. IX, Subject No. 109-V 1970. Translated for CWIHP by Tanja Rajic <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/111098>

Summary:

Report on Yugoslav-American relations written by a Yugoslav official representing the SFRY in Washington, D.C. Fourteen months after the beginning of President Richard Nixon's term in office the memorandum sums up general tendencies in U.S. politics in regard to Yugoslavia. Among the topics discussed are a general improvement of the relations in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural sectors as well as the SFRY's political position between the aligned countries.

Original Language:

Serbo-Croatian

Contents:

Original Scan
Translation - English

1970

13. aprila 1970. godine

POGLED NA JUGOSLOVENSKO-AMERIČKE ODOSE DANAS

Prošlo je 14 mjeseci vlade Richarda Niksona kao republikanskog predsjednika SAD. To je period koji omogućava izvjesne procjene šta je nova Administracija unijela "svoga" u bilateralne odnose, a šta je zadržala od politike ranijih vlada.

Politički i drugi interesi i Niksonove vlade za Jugoslaviju kao bilateralnog i multilateralnog partnera ostali su bazično isti kao i njegovih prethodnika.

Nezavisna međunarodna pozicija Jugoslavije /koja se ovdje najprije čita disidentskom prema SSSR-u a zatim nezavisnom/ je i dalje glavni izvor i razlog relativno značajnog interesa SAD /kao manje-više i cijelog Zapada/ za Jugoslaviju.

Socijalistički karakter jugoslovenske države je sa druge strane /uz fizičku veličinu/ glavni ograničavajući faktor u odnosima, što uostalom važi i u obratnom smislu. Dakle različita društvena fizionomija u dvije zemlje je faktor koji bazično i u prvom redu opredjeljuje odnose izmedju dvije zemlje što je normalno i neizbježno.

Kada ovo kažem ne mislim da odnosi moraju biti apriori rdjavi niti da se moraju pogoršavati ili da nema mogućnosti i prostora za njihovo razvijanje. Naprotiv. Medjutim, ono što želim reći jeste da društvena priroda radja neizbježne razlike bitisanja i ponašanja koje ne treba zataškavati niti se ponašati kao da ih nema ili kao da se nekako mogu obići, ali koje isto takonikako ne treba apriori smatrati preprekom za normalne, dobre i obostrano korisne odnose.

Ovo važi za odnose Socijalističke samoupravne Jugoslavije ne samo sa SAD nego sa svim kapitalističkim zemljama. Specifičnost je u tome što su SAD vodeća zemlja kapitalizma i kao takva glavni aktor tj. organizator borbe protiv širenja komunizma. Utoliko je priroda naših bilateralnih odnosa sa SAD delikatnija što ne mora obavezno /ali može/ da zvuči da je i njihov razvoj manje moguć.

Pošto priroda našeg društvenog bića odudara od socijalističkih država to razlike u fizionomijama društava i na ovoj strani unose veći ili manji stepen delikatnosti i organiziranih mogućnosti za bilateralnu saradnju. Ukoliko je partner veći i moćniji utoliko je delikatnost veća. Zato imamo najdelikatnije /i najteže/ odnose sa SSSR. Ne samo to nego sa toga

- 2 -

područja ima skoro otvorenih teritorijalnih pretenzija prema našoj teritoriji. Realnost sa kojom naša politika mora i te kako da računa

Za efikasnost naše vanjske politike upravo je to od najvećeg značaja da bez predrasuda utvrdimo možnosti i limite saradnje u svim pravcima.

Period na koga pokušavam baciti nešto svjetla je početak po Niksonu najavljene ere pregovora umjesto konfrontacije. Niti su pregovori dobili potpuno pravo gradjanstva niti ga je konfrontacija izgubila, ali u periodu od ovih 14 mjeseci bivalo je ponešto i od jednog i drugoga. To ima svoje refleksije i na odnose SAD - Jugoslavija. Tako ukoliko ima nečega novoga u politici SAD prema Jugoslaviji a ima, to je sastavni dio ili odraz novoga u općoj politici SAD. Ništa se nije /niti može/ ozbiljno specifično desiti u našim odnosima što ne korespondira sa općom politikom SAD ali ni našom. Moglo bi se možda reći da je Jugoslavija blaže "zapljusnuta" promjenom politike SAD nego neke druge zemlje /socijalističke, neangažovane itd./, što ne smatram ni lošim ni zabrinjavajućim.

Ova konstatacija vjerovatno traži još objašnjenja. Poznato je naime da je "politika nižeg profila" sada parola dana u SAD. Međutim najniži profil se odnosi na opreznije i manje vojno prisustvo SAD u raznim dijelovima svijeta. On istovremeno znači veće prisustvo SAD gdje god to bude moguće ekonomsko, naučno i drugo ili same ili zajedno sa partnerima. Što se tiče Jugoslavije na vojnom planu nije moglo biti "nižeg profila" tj. promjena jer ga prosto nema. Ako se može nazvati vojni plan onda bih spomenuo incident sa njihovim vojnim izaslanikom i reagiranje ambasadora Leonharta. Zatim američko smanjivanje vojnog osoblja u Beogradu. Na ekonomskom, naučnom, tehničkom, kulturnom je bilo promjena na bolje. Profil i obim odnosa Jugoslavija - SAD danas je veći nego prije godinu dana. SAD su prisutnije u Jugoslaviji i obratno i mi smo prisutniji u SAD ekonomski, kulturno, umjetnički a do neke mjere i politički.

Bilateralni tokovi

a/ Ekonomski - nalaze se posljednjih godina u stalnom porastu. Glavni oblik je trgovinska razmjena za koju se očekuje da će i ove godine znatnije porasti i da će naš izvoz prvi puta preći 100 mil. dolara. Ovdje bih samo ponovio poznato tj. da porast našega izvoza zavisi od naših sposobnosti.

Važan nov element u ekonomskim odnosima naše zemlje sa SAD i uopće sa spoljnim svijetom je osnivanje "Medjunarodne

- 3 -

investicione kompanije za Jugoslaviju". Potpuno je sigurno da će osnivanje biti faktor jačanja obostrano korisnih ekonomskih veza i sa SAD.

Kod osnivanja ove kompanije SAD su bile glavni i najuticajniji faktor. Naša spremnost na ovakav način saradnje ovdje je primljena kao za njih ugodno iznenadjenje uz oprezne interpretacije /privatne a ne javne/ da je to početak vraćanja Jugoslavije kapitalizmu. Ne vidim posebne potrebe da sa ovakvim shvatanjima posebno polemišem, ali isto tako ni da ih potpuno prećutkujemo i prelazimo preko njih potpuno indiferentno jer se to odmah ovdje protumači kao prećutno slaganje. Jasno je da će dugoročnije gledano ne polemika i debate nego naša praksa najbolje poreći današnje krive procjene i očekivanja. Ne treba ovo shvatiti kao da u SAD nema ljudi koji našu politiku zajedničkog ulaganja sa stranim privatnim kapitalom ne tumače realno tj. gledaju u njoj funkciju koja služi i jačanju socijalističkih proizvodnih snaga u našoj zemlji, ali prevladaju ova prva shvatanja.

Ne samo u odnosu na SAD nego uopće na vanjski svijet a i na naše unutrašnje potrebe ovaj kompleks zaslužuje i traži naše vrlo jasno društvene ponašanje /ekonomsko, političko i idejno/. Sigurno je da traži dubljih i preciznijih teorijskih, političkih i ekonomskih objašnjenja i praktičnih objašnjenja i rješenja, inače bojati se je da nas stihijnost ne povuče neočekivano, pa će eventualno potrebne kasnije korekcije biti teže. Važna je izuzetno javnost ovih operacija i kroz to i opća društvena kontrola.

Mi smo ovdje često pitani šta je naša politika u mješovitim ulagnjima, na koje se grane odnosi. Ima li koja grana gdje ne može biti ulaganja i slično. Nemamo i ne znamo cjelovit odgovor. Predlažem da se cijelom ovom kompleksu pokloni pažnja koju zaslužuje, a koje za sada nema dovoljno.

b/ Naučna i tehnička saradnja - i ovdje se može govoriti o širenju saradnje.

Kao što je nekada Engleska kao vodeća industrijska i trgovačka zemlja zastupala politiku laissez-faire slično danas SAD vrlo aktivno zastupaju slobodnu integraciju ljudskog znanja. Novo kao fenomen.

Niksonova administracija samo nastavlja ranije započeti posao i pojačano vrši naučnu ofanzivu, odnosno naučna saradnja je postala dosta moćno sredstvo politike SAD. To je slučaj i sa drugim razvijenim zemljama, ali je u SAD najizrazitiji iz poznatih razloga.

Uz koristi koje za partnere donosi ovakova saradnja sigurno je da ima u njoj i rizika pa i direktnih šteta koje

- 4 -

nekad mogu biti veće od koristi. Poznati "brain drain" svakako je među prvima, zatim mješanje u unutarne poslove, itd. Međutim, mi moramo biti na čisto sa tim da to ne rade, i tako se ne ponašaju samo SAD nego i ostali uključujući i socijalističke zemlje - SSSR i druge.

U ovom odnosu ima nečega inherentnoga koje proizilazi iz "organskog sastava naučnog kapitala" te nameće neravnopravan odnos od čega se ne može potpuno izbjeći /slično kao odnos cijena sirovina i finalni proizvod/.

Međutim, kao što u robnoj razmjeni /radi inherentno neravnopravnog odnosa uslijed nerazvijenosti/ ne možemo misliti na autarhiju nego obratno, potpuno isto važi i za naučnu i tehničku saradnju i ostalu u moderno doba. A sutra to će biti još više slučaj.

Naša politika naučne i tehničke saradnje traži usavršavanja ne kao osnovna orijentacija nego kao operativno djelovanje i vjerovatno ne samo prema SAD.

Iz iskustva u ovoj saradnji sa SAD mogu reći da se treba suprotstaviti "naučnim zatvaranjima u sebe" ali isto tako i površnom, za naš interes slabo ili nedovoljno proučenom otvaranju. Uz vrlo uspjele programe ima i programa koje prihvatao reka bih skoro pod svaku cijenu. Neki od prihvaćenih programa za nas su veoma značajni i korisni dok su neki potpuno periferni. Potrebno je više naše sopstvene kritičnosti i selektivnosti. Svaki program i konkretan sporazum je uvijek rezultat dvojnih razgovora. Kao što Amerikanci normalno predlažu ono što ih više interesuje mi bismo se trebali zadržavati na onom što nas više interesuje. Zašto se ne bi održavali sastanci i savjetovanja u zemlji i na organizovanoj samoupravnoj osnovi dogovorilo o svemu onom što bi ovo područje naših veza sa vanjskim svijetom učinilo efikasnijim i razvijenijim od današnjega. Kao što je u robnoj saradnji potrebna odgovarajuća podrška državne administracije i ovo područje traži nešto slično u principu. /Proizvodjač je nosilac a država stimulira i destimulira/. Mislimo da će sa SAD ovu saradnju biti moguće proširiti na postojećim i na novim područjima. Ukoliko imamo kritičkih primjedbi na dosadanju saradnju, mislim da ih trebamo bez ustezanja iznositi Amerikancima. Pokazalo se da naše opravdane i fundirane zamjerke imaju rezultata.

Dinarski fondovi SAD u Jugoslaviji

Iznos od 5,502 miliona N.D. /ukupna sredstva SAD 6,828 minus otplaćeno do 31.XII 1969 1,326 - prema podacima SSF/, smatram vrlo velikim teretom za našu ekonomiju i uopće nepovoljnim faktorom koji ne tretiramo kako to veličina prob-

- 5 -

lema traži. Prvo što želim reći da ukoliko vrijeme prolazi i naša se ekonomija razvija sve ćemo manje imati ekonomskih argumenata za po nas lakši tretman ovih fondova od strane SAD.

Do neke mjere smo propustili, a mislim da još uvek propuštamo da više ovih fondova koristimo na postojećim sektorima /naučno-tehnička saradnja, naš izvoz, itd./. Zatim bi trebalo razmisliti i o novim sektorima korišćenja, naprimer, da njihovo korišćenje pomogne bržoj /za sada bar djelomičnoj/ konvertibilnosti dinara.

Iako je naš položaj drukčiji od položaja Indije, bilo bi korisno saznati kako Indija troši ove fondove /naprimer, u razvoju poljoprivrede, kulturno-prosvjetno područje, itd./.

Poseban indirektan sektor bi mogao biti vojni sektor.

U predstojećem periodu trošenja ovih sredstava trebalo bi svakako čvršće i raznovrsnije ugraditi u našu politiku.

Vojni odnos - može se reći da ne postoje osim protokolarno-diplomatskog dijela i beznačajnih naših vojnih kupovina u SAD. S obzirom na našu vojnu doktrinu, međunarodnu političku i ekonomsku poziciju Jugoslavije, na međunarodne odnose stanje i tendencije u njima na konkretnu politiku koja se prema našoj zemlji vodi sa Istoka i Zapada, postavlja se pitanje je li ovakvo stanje optimalno odgovara našim interesima. Ja mislim da ne odgovara. Kada ovo kažem ne mislim da treba bazično mijenjati taj sektor naše politike, ali mislim da treba učiniti izvjesne adaptacije koje bi više odgovarale današnjim tokovima i tendencijama u međunarodnim odnosima. Stanje prije više godina kada smo skoro potpuno zavisili od SAD u vojnom snabdjevanju za nas nije bilo povoljno, međjutim nije za nas danas najoptimalnije praktično odsustvo svakih radnih veza sa SAD na tom planu.

Ocjenjujem da je stanje odnosa Jugoslavija - SAD danas takvo da bi bilo moguće voditi dijalog i na ovom sektoru, da kod SAD postoji interesa i spremnosti /za razliku od ranije kada su nam prekidale izvore vojnog snabdjevanja/. Na nama je da odmjereimo stepen i intenzitet tih veza i da u njih idemo na način i do mjere za koji ocjenimo da odgovara interesima naše zemlje.

Dodajem da je bilo razmjene mišljenja Vašington - London /prije posjete druga Ribičića Londonu/ o vojnoj saradnji Jugoslavija - Engleska i da SAD to podržavaju, to su mi rekli u SD, kao što ih ne smetaju ni naše vojne nabavke u Francuskoj /ni za vrijeme De Gola/ jer je to zapadni izvor snabdjevanja.

- 6 -

Ako ocjenjujemo da je previše vojnih američkih lica u Jugoslaviji u njihovom Vojnom izaslanstvu, o tome se mogu i trebaju povesti otvoreni razgovori iznoseći naše razloge i argumente, Eventualno smanjenje ljudstva ne bi trebalo da rezultira u pogoršanju odnosa nego u njihovom poboljšanju.

Zalsužuje da se razmotri da li bi došlo u obzir indirektno korišćenje dinarskih fondova SAD za naše odbrambene svrhe.

Vize - već prilično dugo vremena stoji činjenica da se Jugoslavija otvorenije i slobodnije ponaša u svom režimu viza nego SAD što mnoge ovdašnje sagovornike prilično iznenadi kada im to kažemo. U pojednostavljenju viznog tretmana je nešto postignuto ali je sve to skromno i ne odgovara modernoj i intenzivnoj komunikaciji građana dviju zemalja koja je u stalnom porastu. Prepreka za slobodniji tretman kao što rekoх je politika vlade SAD. Ovdašnji vizni režim spada u konzervativne. Od nastanka ove države bio je vezan uz emigrantsku politiku a u novije vrijeme i uz anti-komunističku ili hladnoratovsku.

Jedan od takvih hladnoratovskih ostataka u našim bilateralnim odnosima sa SAD jeste traženje od naših građana da popunjavaju poznati upitnik. Mislim da ima razloga i smisla da se zvanično pokrene kod vlade SAD da se napusti traženje ispunjavanja tih upitnika. Znam da se mogu /i vjerovatno hoće/ pozivati na svoje postojeće zakone, ali znam da se može naći rješenje ako postoji politički interes.

Nema sumnje da bi napuštanje ove prakse pozitivno djelovalo na atmosferu u odnosima.

Iseljenici - su manji faktor u razvijanju odnosa nego što sam ja ranije lično zamišljao. Najveći njihov broj je ostao na siromašnoj društvenoj lestvici. Samo pojedinci su uspjeli da udju medju uticajnije krugove. Medju iseljenicima koji su došli posljednjih godina ima relativno dosta intelektualaca medju kojima i vrlo sposobnih i talentiranih. Nalaze lako zaposlenje. Najveći dio njih je nezainteresovan /povučen u svoj posao/ za političku aktivnost, jedan dio se aktivno i lojalno ponaša i pomaže u razvoju odnosa Jugoslavija - SAD. Najmanji dio ovih se pridružuje ekstremistima - emigrantima.

Stari iseljenici osim nešto sentimentalnih veza, nešto ostavina, i ne pružaju skoro ništa više. Zato mi izgleda da su i naše matice iseljenika u zemlji i naši konzulati u SAD u izvjesnom smislu predimenzionirani i konzulati prenaplašeno iseljenički. Rezultat koji postižu sa iseljenicima su u osnovi skromni. Druga je stvar što ih mi sami u štampi nekada prika-

- 7 -

žemo većim i značajnijim nego što jesu, i što sami sebi često puta govorimo kako je ovo ili ono značajno ne analizirajući domet toga značaja.

Nisam siguran da nam trebaju dva konzulata - Pittsburgh i Klivland, jedan od drugoga udaljeni oko 100 milja.

Ekstremni emigranti - politika vlade SAD prema ovoj kategoriji u najvećoj mjeri utiče na politiku svih vlada koje daju azil ovim teroristima i onima u LA u ZE i Austriji i Kanadi. Ovo je tipično područje hladnog /i klasnog/ rata gdje SAD vode i na kom ostale kapitalističke zemlje slijede politiku SAD. Drugim riječima, ukoliko bi došlo do promjene u politici vlade SAD prema ekstremistima, skoro je sigurno da bi većina ostalih vlada slijedila. U tom smislu gledam na ovaj problem. U protekloj godini došlo je do izvejsnog smanjenja javnih akcija protiv naših predstavništava /piketi i slično/ ali ne i podrivačko-neprijateljske aktivnosti, ona se čak u nekim pravcima povećala. Broj ekstremista u SAD je porastao, njihovi subverzivni dogovori akcije /prema zemlji/ ne opadaju, ovdje se zadržava eks-kralj i razne druge ustaško-četničko-ljotičevske grupe i pojedinci i aktivno djeluju, itd. Ranije smo običavali bivati osjetljiviji na davanje viza eks-kralju i traženje da se uslovi ulazak u SAD sa javnim neistupanjem.

Činjenica da povremeno čak i javno neki lokalni a i drugi državni funkcioner SAD drži vezu sa ovim grupama, a mi imamo potrebu da svakoga "10. travnja" ili za 29. novembar ili 1. Maja skrećemo pažnju State Departmentu, policiji i tražimo zaštitu, itd. govori da problem nije beznačajan.

Ja ne mogu prihvatiti ovdašnji, po pravilu, odgovor da su to male grupe, da ih u SAD nitko ne sluša, da nemaju uticaja u SAD, itd. Mene ne zanima mnogo koliko ove grupe ili pojedinci imaju uticaja u SAD, nego kako se njihova aktivnost reflektuje u mojoj zemlji. Ne postoje one radi SAD nego radi Jugoslavije.

Da ponovim što sam već dosta puta rekao, tj. da se slažem da ovaj problem ne treba da bude prepreka za normalne odnose sa SAD i za njihovo razvijanje, jer to ipak ne služi, ali ponavljam da se ne možemo ponašati kao da skoro problem i ne postoji. Mi se moramo u našoj politici prema SAD u ovom pogledu postaviti tako da bude jasno da bi odnosi i međusobno povjerenje bili bolji da je ova aktivnost manja, odnosno da je nema. Vrlo često, zapravo gdje god mi se ukaže prilika, tako i govorim.

Iako ne značajno, nešto kaže moj posljednji boravak u New Orleansu. Kao što znadete mi smo poslednju godinu - dvije stalno pravili pitanje radi ostataka kraljevskog konzulata

- 8 -

lata u tom gradu, u čemu smo uspjeli jer je ostataka nestalo. Ne mislim da je slučajno da me je baš New Orleans proglasio za počasnog gradjanina što su lokalne novine i televizija dobro zabilježile. Ovim hoću da kažem da postavljanje problema na odgovarajući način ne kvvari nego prije popravljiva stvari. Bar u reonu New Orleansa u nekoj mjeri stvari su promjenjene u našu korist, na štetu reacionara. Zato mislim da je dobro što je i DSIP u posljednje vrijeme u nekoliko navrata pokreno ovaj problem kod SAD ambasade.

Savjetujem da se na odgovarajući način upoznaju sva naša republička rukovodstva /i savezni organi/ i da u kontaktima sa Amerikancima zvaničnim i nezvaničnim, na neki način drže i ovu tezu u razgovorima. Jednostavno treba tražiti da se oduzme gostoprimstvo ekstremnoj djelatnosti u ime boljih odnosa Jugoslavija - SAD. Bolje je voditi da tako kažem svakodnevni dijalog na radnim nivoima nego kupiti pa izaći sa "eksplozijom" riječi. Ovo slično važi i za obavještajnu djelatnost koja je posebna tema o čemu ćemo razgovarati kada dođem u Beograd.

Prije nego završim ovaj pasus da kažem da nema razlike u ponašanju između Niksona i Džonsona prema ekstremistima. Razlika je možda jedino u tom da Niksona smatraju sebi bližeg.

Politički odnosi - su zabilježili manje evolucije nego što je možda iniciralo prvo Niksonovo pismo Titu. Ako bi ih mjerio kroz broj i nivo kontakata i uporedio sa godinom ranije ima skromnog napretka. Nije međutim nerealno očekivati da će se u predstojećem periodu to i intenzivirati /E. Richardson, Hilenbrant, eventualno Rodžers/. Što se tiče posjete Niksona ili Rodžersa postoji suzdržljivost. Iako je to tako - novo je u odnosima Jugoslavija - SAD. Prvi puta u historiji odnosa posjeta američkog predsjednika našoj zemlji stavljena je na dnevni red i to po samom američkom predsjedniku. Ovo samo po sebi je dobro i korisno za naš međunarodni položaj. Isto ustvari važi i za državnog sekretara SAD. To reflektuje, na početku pomenuti, nešto povećani interes za Jugoslaviju.

Kada će do posjete Niksona Jugoslaviji doći teško mi je reći. Ako do nje dođe to će sigurno biti u onom momentu kada Nikson ocjeni da je za SAD najkorisnija. Glavni kriterij te korisnosti biće kako i šta donosi SAD u odnosu prema SSSR-u i Kini, zatim prema IE, zatim prema neangažovanom svijetu, evropskim kretanjima, odnosima Jugoslavija - Zapad u cjelini i naravno u bilateralnim odnosima. Imajući prednje u vidu ne ocjenjujem da u dogledno vrijeme na pozornici ima dovoljno faktora koji bi posjetu učinili aktuelnom za SAD /osim ako nešto ne iznenadi/.

- 9 -

Jednostavnije je što se tiče posjete Rodžersa koja je vjerovatnija i moguća u toku ove godine. Prije par dana Rodžersov pomoćnik M. Hilenbrand je oprezno pokušao da čuje moju reakciju kako bismo mi primili eventualnu posjetu Rodžersa prije ili poslije zasjedanja NATO. To je još "zasolio" mogućom istovremenom posjetom Rodžersa Spaniji. Ovo je stari stav u politici SAD prema nama isto toliko koliko i NATO. Međutim, ona je značila nešto drugo u eri najžešćeg hladnog rata kada su i NATO preokupacije bile nešto drukčije nego sada. Sada, u maju NATO će između ostalog diskutovati o obostranom vojnom povlačenju iz Evrope /i SAD i SSSR-a/ o konferenciji evropske bezbjednosti. U suštini politički cilj ove američke teze prema nama ostao je isti ali su se dosta promjenili uslovi u kojima se želi postići.

Prije nego bih sugerirao kako da postupimo na ovaj "hint" /javio sam šta sam rekao kao ličnu reakciju/ moramo razjasniti šta od posjete očekujemo i šta njom želimo postići. Mislim da je za nas najvažniji bilateralni plan. Ako se on odvija uspješno ima refleksa i na međunarodne aspekte. Kao jedan od glavnih bilateralnih ciljeva bih postavio olakšanje trošenja dinarskih fondova SAD. Ovo vezano uz proširenje saradnje na svim područjima uključujući i vojno /u pomenutom duhu/.

Znam da ove stvari traže diskusije, analize i uzimanje preciznih stavova te savjetujem da se počnu pripremati bez obzira da li će do posjete doći prije ili kasnije. Što se nas tiče koliko mogu ocjeniti ne vidim posebnog razloga da posjetu forsiramo niti odlažemo - dobro bi nam došla. Rekao bih bolje prije nego kasnije.

Kada razmišljam o ovim posjetama i činim uporedjenja sa posjetama iz ZE vidim da SAD zaostaju što se tiče nivoa ministara vanjskih poslova, ali ne što se tiče šefova država. Ni sa istočne strane od CSR krize nema ih mnogo pogotovo ne šefova vlada i država. Najavljene posjete Engleza i Francuza su dobro došle.

U State Department-u, Beloj kući, među kongresmenima, kada razgovaram o političkom položaju Jugoslavije daleko najviše pitanja dobijam na temu naših odnosa sa SSSR-om, Kinom i Albanijom. Razumljivo zašto - služi im kao barometar ili indikator odnosa u trouglu.

Slijedeće "po redu" je pitanje da li i u kojoj mjeri jugoslovenska praksa utječe ili će utjecati na ostale socijalističke zemlje uključujući i SSSR.

Ove dvije stvari ilustruju u osnovi kako se Jugoslavija "situirala" u američke globalne planove.

- 10 -

Postoji najveći interes i osjetljivost za naše odnose sa SSSR-om gdje se svaki potez u odnosima Beograd - Moskva vrlo pažljivo prati, što ima svoje i prednosti i slabosti. Dodao bih kao prilično nov element da u zvaničnim razgovorima izjavljuju da SAD nemaju ništa protiv naših boljih odnosa sa SSSR-om. Ovo je meni i mojim saradnicima dosta puta rečeno u SD. Isto važi i u obrnutom pravcu, naime sovjetski diplomati u razgovorima sa nama najveću pažnju posvećuju našim odnosima sa SAD interesujući se za najmanje detalje.

Ustvari danas SAD najviše intrigira da ne kažem brine, naša vojna saradnja sa SSSR-om i tu smatraju da su one i Zapad "izgubili poen" jer misle da su nas gurnuli više nego što smo i mi sami želeli u zavisnost od SSSR-a.

O našoj neangažovanoj politici u SD sa nama skoro nikada ne diskutuju ako to mi prvi ne pokrenemo i tada šturo i bez komentara. Obično nam se kratko odgovara da je politika SAD evoluirala prema neangažovanosti od vremena pokojnog Dalasa koji je vodio politiku "tko nije sa nama protiv nas je" a što danas više nije slučaj.

Ustvari SAD gledaju na neangažovanost sa "pocjepanim stavom". U mjeri u kojoj smeta sovjetskim ili kineskim pretenzijama neangažovanost je dobro došla, ali u mjeri u kojoj smeta SAD i zajedničkim interesima razvijenog Zapada nije. Pošto smeta obema supersilama, obje ju podjednako ignorišu. Uslijed, po ocjeni SAD, izmjenjenog balansa u njihovu korist - popuštanja hladnog rata, konfrontacija SAD sa neangažovanošću manje treba ili bolje rečeno više im šteti nego koristi, te neangažovanost lakše danas tolerišu. Neangažovano područje za SAD postaje područje takmičenja sa SSSR-om i Kinom kao državama što SAD i predlažu, poslije rdjavog i neuspjelog dosadašnjeg kursa vojnih paktova i vojnog intervencionizma.

Iako nam to ne govore ali misle da smo "suviše angažovani" na neangažovanom frontu, da akcija prevazilazi naše dimenzije. Smatraju slično kao i SSSR da želimo vodjstvo u neangažovanom svijetu. Medjutim, nije naša neangažovanost kao ni drugih naših partnera jedini uzrok naših političkih neslaganja sa SAD nego više od toga politika SAD.

Glavno područje /ili akutnije/ našega političkog neslaganja sa SAD stalno je međunarodno područje. To važi i za čitav niz neangažovanih zemalja koje su čak po društvenom uređenju iste odnosno slične uređenju u SAD. U SAD danas vide jasnije nego ranije da bi, naprimer, odsustvo vijetnamskog problema ne samo riješilo neke druge za SAD važnije elemente nego i olakšalo popravljjanje odnosa sa dobrim brojem neangažovanih zemalja. Jasno je da bi političko rješenje Vijetnama i BI kao dva najoštrija problema bitno suzilo prostor i našega neslaganja sa SAD.

- 11 -

Ukoliko u odnosima medju supersilama pregovori budu zauzimali važnije mjesto za očekivati je da će i neangažovanoj politici u važnom aspektu biti lakše.

Zone uticaja - Primjećujem da su zvanični u SD i van njega postali osjetljiviji i učestalo odlučnije poriču postojanje zona uticaja u IE odnosno postojanje dogovora o tim zonama. Stalno govore ako je nečega bilo to je bilo između Čerčila i Staljina ali ne i SAD, koje su protiv takve politike. Mislim da se radi o slijedećem: bez obzira da li postoji ovakav ili onakav sporazum o podjeli uticaja u IE ne izgleda vjerovatno da su Amerikanci /ili Čerčil/ prihvatili ovakvu podjelu uticaja u IE kakova danas postoji. Ne samo da već postoji predominantna uloga i utjecaj SSSR u IE, nego on taj uticaj želi dalje da proširi i da isključi SAD sa toga područja. U politici SSSR danas počinju da se jasnije naziru konture politike jedne države /SSSR - zemlje Varšavskog pakta/.

U IE je bilo nekoliko teških kriza poslije Drugog svetskog rata koje su imale za posljedicu manje ili veće jačanje hladnog rata, ubrzavale naoružanje i kvarile diplomatske i ekonomske odnose Istok - Zapad, ali nisu izazvale oružani sukob.

Poslije dvadeset godišnjeg iskustva postalo je prilično jasno da SAD neće ići u rat sa SSSR-om radi područja IE, pogotovu u ovo nuklearno doba. /Samo da podsjetim, iako su uslovi danas drukčiji da je Finska u ratu sa SSSR-om 39/40. godine ostala vojnički potpuno sama/. Ima kolega ovdje u Vašingtonu koji kažu da SAD ne bi išle u nuklearni rat ni radi Zapadne Evrope.

Medjutim, mislim da nešto naglašeniji interes za IE pokazuje Niksonova administracija od Džonsonove.

- odlazak Niksona u Rumuniju,
- izražavanje želje da se sretne sa Titom,
- izdvajanje u posljednjoj Niksonovoj poruci Kongresu IE kao odvojene geo-političke teritorije /ne trpanje u sovjetski blok/ i izjava da će SAD biti spremne da u saradnji sa IE zemljama idu toliko daleko koliko su one same spremne,
- glasnije od drugih zapadnih država ne priznavanje Brežnjevljeve doktrine.

Poznato mi je da je SSSR na sve ovo nervozno i nepovoljno reagirao, tražio objašnjenja šta to znači i stavio jasno do znanja da će "Nikson sa provokativnom politikom postići obratne efekte od onih koje očekuje", tj. jednostavno zapri-

- 12 -

jetio da od popuštanja neće biti ništa. U ovom je ambasador Dobrinjin odigrao značajnu ulogu. Čuli smo u State Department-u da je i nova administracija shvatila da ako želi pregovaranje sa SSSR-om treba da smanji ambicije prema I. Evropi te da je ocjenjeno da je po bezbjednost i interese SAD važniji dijalog sa SSSR-om i izbjegavanje rata nego IE područje. To ne znači da se ovo područje napušta nego da su mogućnosti SAD u njemu manje nego što su novi administratori mislili, odnosno da se politika prema IE mjeri /i podređuje/ odnosima sa SSSR-om. U izvještaju Nikson otvoreno govorio o legitimnim interesima SSSR-a u IE.

U prednjem svjetlu /pored neangažovane komponente i njenog po sadašnju politiku SAD više negativnog nego pozitivnog aspekta/ mislim da treba posmatrati ponašanje SAD prema nama, iako to za nas znatno manje važi nego za ostale IE zemlje.

Ipak, izjava da su SAD spremne ići na saradnju sa zemljama IE do mjere do koje su ove spremene ni za nas ne važi u cjelosti, posebno ne na političkom polju. Mislim ni za Rumune. Ova konstatacija traži oprez i neprecjenjivanje sopstvenog značaja /odnos veliki - mali/.

- Nivo političkih konsultacija i kontakata, zadržavaju i usporavaju SAD, ali ga nešto unapredjuju u odnosu na prijašnje stanje. To međjutim ne rade samo one i drug Brežnjev se dosta dugo priprema da nas posjeti.

- Razmjenu političkih visokih posjeta mi smo spremni da vršimo. SAD su ih pokrenule, ali ne žure sa njima ali i ne skidaju ih sa dnevnog reda.

- Sa druge strane, SAD podstiču ekonomsku, zatim naučnu i kulturnu i drugu saradnju. Kao što sam već rekao zainteresovane su i za vojnu. Sve to daje povoda i razloga da se zaključi da naši i politički odnosi uprkos razlika i teškoća i dosta stvari koje ih opterećuju, ili im "smetaju" kreću na bolje. Mislim da se ne radi o privremenoj nego o trajnijoj tendenciji.

Naša društvena i ekonomska reforma i SAD

Otvaranje jugoslovenskog društva prema vanjskom svijetu i njegova unutarnja demokratizacija na bazi samouprave i tržišnih odnosa u SAD se dobro prima. Na ovo djeluje više razloga poželjnih i ne. Ako uzmem samo ekonomsko područje - spoljnu trgovinu i porast ovih veza sa Zapadom na račun ostalih

- 13 -

regiona ovdje, naravno izaziva zadovoljstvo. Naša odluka o saradnji sa inostranim privatnim kapitalom takodje. Zna se da će veće izlaganje naše ekonomije svjetskoj konkurenciji davati veće šanse onima koji su više konkurentni ako ne bude političko-administrativnog dirigovanja. Dobro vide prednosti zapadne tehnologije za koju očekuju da će biti ubuduće još veća.

Slobodno ulaženje naših raznih naučnih, prosvetnih i drugih institucija /i pojedinaca/ u saradnju sa partnerima u SAD, takodje je sa razlogom dobro primljeno. Dakle, ima stvarnog i opravdanog razloga da se naša reforma i njezine posljedice dobro primaju ne samo u SAD nego i šire, jer reforma nudi bez presedana, politiku stvarne miroljubive koegzistencije političke i ekonomske.

Medjutim, kod zvaničnih od vrlo visokih pa na niže i kod nezvaničnih Amerikanaca, postoji prikriveno ili otvoreno /ne krije se to mnogo/ mišljenje i očekivanje da naša ekonomsko-društvena reforma vodi prije ili kasnije bar nekakvom kvazi-kapitalizmu ako ne potpunom. Po naš međunarodni položaj ima tu i delikatnoga jer može da stvori zablude i obmane. Naš primjer se uzima kao dokaz "teorije konvergencije" /"spajanje sistema"/. Doduše u posljednje vrijeme se manje čuje o susretanju na "pola puta" nego više o tom da socijalizam ulazi u sve dublju unutar-nju krizu a da je kapitalizam sve uspješniji - prema tome zna se tko i šta treba da se mijenja.

Najbolji, rekao bih i jedini odgovor na prednje je naša unutrašnja politika, i njeni rezultati. Ukoliko se ona uspješnije kreće proklamovanim putevima idejnim i praktičnim, nećemo imati puno ni potrebe ni razloga da demantujemo, opovrgavamo ili da se sporimo. U tom smislu moramo se čuvati od raznih pojava bilo proamerikanizma ili anti-amerikanizma /kao i pro-ili-antisovjetizma/ jer naša politika nije ni jedno ni drugo. Takve pojave ponekada zapljusnu jugoslovensko-američke odnose, kao što vjerujem zapljuskuju i druge. Ovdje to naravno registruju i čine svoje pro i kontra-liste. Medjutim što manje mogućnosti i povoda za takove spiskove to bolje za nas. Unose nejasnoće i donose štete u prvom redu nama i našim interesima. Jasnoća i preciznost i otvorenost naših stavova je apsolutno nužna jer kao mala zemlja, sa ovakvom strukturom kakova je naša, izloženi smo krivim i lažnim tumačenjima, a i stvarnom i ne zlonamjernom nerazumijevanju. Što se tiče našega unutarnjeg demokratskog razvoja ovdje ga je sve lakše braniti. Djilas i Mihajlov, na primer, su postali periferni elementi. Ovdje lakše i više mogu koristiti naše restriktivne mjere prema njima nego njihovu "političku misao". Našu poziciju stepena demokratičnosti i otvorenosti društva ovdje olakšava, naprimer, i to kada izjavljujemo da smo mi spremni na obostrano ukidanje viza ali nisu SAD. Jedan drugi detalj takodje nešto kaže: ovdje je prije izvjesnog vremena boravio jedan naš avangardni filmski režiser. Kada su ga pitali /i ponudili dobre zarade/ da li bi ostao u SAD odgo-

- 14 -

vorio im je da ne bi. Na pitanje zašto, odgovorio je da u Jugoslaviji dobro živi a ima više slobode za stvaranje nego u SAD. Ima i drugih odličnih primjera sličnih ovome, da ne govorim o tom da kada se malo detaljnije prezentira bilo kojoj ovdašnjoj publici naš razvoj, naši ciljevi i ambicije, da to ostavi utisak i teško se napada. Dosta puta imao sam priliku da to lično vidim i osjetim. Ovo spominjem samo radi toga da bih potkrijepio našu fundamentalnu tezu da je socijalistička samoupravna demokracija daleko najefikasnija brana neželjenim uticajima i drugo da bih podvukao koliko je važno naše međusobno ponašanje unutar zemlje, nedavanje povoda sumnjama u naše jedinstvo i snagu, integritet, itd.

Javljali smo vam da se stalno srećemo sa pitanjem "šta poslije Tita". Pitanje se posebno povezuje sa nacionalnim odnosima i sudbinom jugoslovenske federacije. Ove sumnje na izvjestan način ovdje podgrijevaju i sovjetski diplomati.

Kao što znadete bilo je napisa i u američkoj štampi na prednju temu. Mi smo učinili ovdje dosta prigovora na takovo pisanje. Izgleda da su nešto poduzeli jer u posljednje mjesec-dva skoro ne pišu o tome.

U posljednja tri mjeseca kako dopiru dobre vijesti iz našega ekonomskog života /proizvodnja i povećani izvoz/ to je odmah ovdje registrovano. Kada sam nedavno bio u Filadelfiji i New Orleansu oba govornika koji su me predstavljali auditorijumu i davali uvodnu riječ, spomenuli su "kao po komandi" da smo ovu godinu ekonomski počeli bolje nego i jedna evropska zemlja. Nema članaka i govora koji mogu biti jači od ovoga.

O "Leader's" razmjeni

Nije položila veliki ispit i donijela značajnijih rezultata. Nije bila ni štetna. Glavni joj je defekt što je zamišljena od strane SAD kao propagandno-informativna. To kao prilaz i politika u odnosima medju državama i narodima je usko i mora biti u osnovi sterilno. Nije ona sterilna samo sa nama nego i nekim drugim državama koje nisu socijalističke.

Od nekih naših drugova koji su po tom programu dolazili čuo sam da su zadovoljni drugi pak nisu. Svatko je ponešto zapazio pa i naučio ali je to skromnog dometa. Bilo bi dobro da Amerikanci uslove i organizaciju ovih posjeta i putovanja, promjene, postave elastičnije i slobodnije.

Oni sami su došli do zaključka da Leader's Exchange naziv ne odgovara pa ga promjeniše u International Visitors

- 15 -

Program. To je bolje ime. Mislim da bismo im mogli sugerirati da kroz ovaj program šaljemo više stručnjaka i to iz privrede i ostalih sektora nego "lidera". Da to budu radne posjete za koje bi se unaprijed dogovorilo /u skladu sa našim interesom/ sve o radnom programu. Pokušajmo posebno ovo proširiti na privredu. Moje primjedbe se svode na to da pokušamo ovu aktivnost učiniti korisnijom za nas i osloboditi je onoga što više šteti nego koristi /kada se recimo našem čovjeku dodijeli ovdje nekakav jugoslovenski politički emigrant, koji je po pravilu protiv jugoslovenskog socijalizma, kao prevodilac i pratilac i koji "usput" pokušava sitnim i neintelegentnim pitanjima da nešto obavještajno sazna. Ima drugova koje je ovo sa pravom iritiralo/.

Kada prvi put dodjem u Beograd donijeću predloge kako da postupimo.

Na kraju da kažem da ovo pismo ima za cilj da pomogne osavremenjavanju naših odnosa sa SAD. Ono ne sadrži krupnih predloga /naročito ne u smislu promjena u našoj politici/ ali neke tačke aktuelizira, neke proširuje a neke pokušava i da korigira sa ciljem da pomogne stvaranju povoljnijih i za nas korisnijih odnosa sa SAD. Ukoliko su odnosi za nas korisniji utoliko imamo više interesa da ih širimo.

VIEW OF YUGOSLAV - AMERICAN RELATIONS TODAY

Fourteen months have passed in the government of Richard Nixon as the Republican President of the USA. This is a period which allows for certain estimates concerning what the new Administration has contributed "of their own" to bilateral relations, and what it has retained from the politics of the earlier governments. Political and other interests for the Nixon government considering Yugoslavia as a bilateral and multilateral partner have remained basically the same as during the time of his predecessor. Independent international position of Yugoslavia / which here is first of all viewed as being dissident toward the USSR and then independent / continues to be the main cause and factor for the relatively meaningful interests of the USA /and more of less of the entire West/ for Yugoslavia. The socialist character of the Yugoslav state is on the other hand /in its physical greatness/ the main barrier and factor in these relations, which along with other things remains valid in the opposite sense. That is, that different social features in two countries is a factor which basically in the first instance determines the relations between these two countries which is normal and unavoidable. When I say this I do not think about that relations must be apriori bad nor that they have to worsen or that there is no possibility or room for their development. To the contrary. However, that what I wish to say is that the nature of society gives birth to unavoidable differences in actions and behavior which should not be hushed nor should we behave as if it did not exist or that we could in some way avoid them, but in the same way we should in no way apriori consider them to be an obstacle to normal, good and mutually useful relations. This applies for the relations of the socialist self managed Yugoslavia not only with the USA but also with all of the capitalist countries. The specificity is in that the USA is the leading capitalist country and as such the main actor that is, the organizer of the battle against the spread of communism. The nature of our bilateral relations with the USA are to this extent delicate which does not have to mandatory /but can/ sound that their development is less possible. Because the nature of our social being does not coincide with socialist states those differences in features of the society even on this side bring in a certain lesser or greater level of delicacy and organizational possibility for bilateral cooperation. To the extent that the partner is bigger and more powerful than to that extent the delicateness is greater. That is why we have the most delicate/ and most difficult/ relations with the USSR. Not only this but from this area there remain many open territorial claims towards our territory. A reality which our policies have to take into account. For the efficiency of our foreign politics this especially is of great meaning that without prejudice we confirm the possibilities and limits of cooperation in all directions. The period upon which we are trying to shed some light is the beginning according to Nixon the announced era from negotiations instead of confrontations. Neither did the negotiations gain completely the support of the citizens nor did the confrontation lose it, but in this period of about 14 months there was a little bit of one and the other. This has its reflections even on the relations of the USA - Yugoslavia. So if there is anything new in the policies of the USA toward Yugoslavia and there is, this is only one component or an expression of something new in the general policies of the USA. Nothing has /nor can it/ seriously specifically happen in our relations which does not correspond with the general policies of the USA or with our own. Maybe it can be said that Yugoslavia is in a more milder way "flooded" by the changes in the policies of the USA more so than some other countries /socialist, nonaligned and so forth/, which I do not consider to be bad nor troublesome. This conclusion most likely called for greater explanation. It is known that the "politics of a lower profile" are now the slogan of the day in the USA. However, the lowest profile is related to a more cautious and less militarily present USA in various parts of the world. It at the same time means a greater presence of the USA wherever it is possible economically, scientifically or in another way by themselves or with their partners. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned in the military plan it was impossible to be "of lower profile" that is, (to have) change because it simply does not exist. If we can call it a military plan then I would mention the incident with their military attaché and the reaction of Ambassador Leonhart. And following that the American reduction of military personnel in Belgrade. In the economic, scientific, technical and cultural areas there were changes for the better. The profile and the width of the relations of Yugoslavia - USA today is greater than a year ago. The USA is more present in Yugoslavia and vice versa and we are present in the USA economically, culturally, artistically and to some extent even politically.

Bilateral Trends

a) Economic - they are in the last year in a constant growth. The main

dimension is trade for which it is expected that even for this year it will significantly rise and that our exports for the first time will grow to more than 100 million dollars. Here I would simply repeat the well known, that is, that the growth of our exports depends on our capabilities. □An important new element in economic relations of our country with the USA and in general with the outside world is the formation “of the International investment company for Yugoslavia.” It is extremely certain that this formation will be a factor in the strengthening of mutually beneficial economic ties for the USA as well. □In the formation of this company the USA was the main and most influential factor. Our readiness for this type of cooperation was accepted here as a pleasant surprise along with a cautious interpretation /private not public/ that this was the beginning of the return of Yugoslavia to capitalism. I do not see any separate needs to have special polemics concerning this type of understanding, but at the same time we should not totally ignore them and pass over them completely indifferently because that immediately is interpreted here as a silent agreement. It is clear that in the long term view neither polemics nor debate but our actions will in the best way counter today's false assessment and expectations. It is not necessary to accept that in the USA there are no people who interpret our policies on joint investment with foreign private capital in a realistic way, that is, they see in it a function which serves both the strengthening of socialist production forces in our country, but the dominant view is the first interpretation. □Not only the relations with the USA but in general with the outside world and even on our internal needs this complex demands and deserves our very clear social behavior /economic, political and even with ideas/. It for sure calls for deeper and more precise theoretical, political and economic explanations and practical explanations and solutions, otherwise to fear that the rhetoric would pull us unexpectedly (in the wrong direction), so that the eventual need later for corrections would be more difficult. The special publicity of these operations are important and through this in general social control. □We are here often asked what is our policy concerning joint investment, and to which branch does this pertain. Is there a branch where you cannot have investment and similar (questions). We do not have and we do not know the complete answer. I suggest that in a whole this complex be given attention which it deserves, and which it does not have enough of currently. □b) Scientific and technical cooperation – even here one can speak about the widening of cooperation. □As England was once the leading industrial and trade country and represented the politics of *liaise-faire* likewise today the USA very actively represents the free integration of human knowledge. As a new phenomenon. □The Nixon Administration is simply continuing earlier begun work and more intensively it is conducting a scientific offensive, that is scientific cooperation has become a very powerful tool of the policies of the USA. That is the case with other developed countries, but the USA is the most visible because of well known reasons. □Along with the benefits which are brought to the partners of this type of cooperation I am sure there are in it (this cooperation) some risks and even direct detriments which sometimes can be larger than the benefit. The well known “brain drain” is among the first, so interference in internal affairs, and so forth. However, we have to be in the clear with this and that they not do this, and the USA not only behaves like this but all others including even the socialist countries – the USSR and others. □In this relation there is something inherit which stems from “the organic composition of scientific capital” and it creates an unfair relationship from which one cannot escape totally/similar to the difference in the price of raw material and the final product./ □However, as in the trade of goods / because of the inherit unfair relations following nonalignment/ we cannot think about autarchy but something completely different, it is completely valid and for economic technical cooperation and other in the modern times. Tomorrow it would be even more such a case. □Our political scientific and technical cooperation demands the successful completion not only as a basis for the orientation but also for the operative working and most likely not only toward the USA. □From our experiences in this cooperation with the USA I can say that we should object to “the scientific closing within oneself” but also in this way even the superficial, for our interests either poor or inadequate incomplete opening. Along with very successful programs there are programs that we accept I would say almost at any cost. Some of the accepted programs are for us very important and useful while others are totally peripheral. Our own criticism and selectiveness is more needed. Every program and concrete agreement is always the result of dual discussions. As

Americans normally suggest that which interests them more we should remain at that which interests us more. Why would we not maintain the meetings and the consultations in the country and in an organized self managed basis come to an understanding concerning everything which would in this area of our relations with the outside world make them more efficient and developed from those today. As in the trade cooperation a responsible support from the state administration is necessary and this area asks for something similar in principle. /The producer is the main bearer while the state stimulates and de-stimulates./ We think that with the USA this cooperation would be possible to expand to already existing and into new areas. In the event that we have critical objections to the cooperation to date, I think that we should without hesitation raise them with the Americans. It has been shown that our justified and substantiated objections produce results. The Dinar Funds of the USA in Yugoslavia - A total of 5,502 million new dinars / the total resources of the USA 6,828 minus that which has been paid off until December 31, 1969 1,326 - according to the information from the SSF/, I believe is a great burden for our economy and is in general an unfavorable factor which we do not treat as most problems demand. First what I want to say that in so much as time passes and our economy develops we will have less economic arguments for our general treatment by these funds on the part of the USA. □To some degree we have missed an opportunity, and I believe we are still continuing to miss an opportunity to use these funds more in the established sectors/scientific-technical cooperation, our export, and so forth/. Following this we would need to consider new sectors that could be useful, for example that their usage assist the speedy /for now at least partly/ convertibility of the dinar. □Even though our position is different than position of India, it would be useful to find out how India uses these funds /for example in development of agriculture, cultural - educational areas and so forth/. □Especially the indirect sector could be the military sector□In the remaining period the spending of these resources would have to be of course stronger and more diversified built in to our policies. □Military Relations - it can be said that this does not exist except for the protocol - diplomatic part and our insignificant military buying in the USA. Given our military doctrine, international politics and the economic position of Yugoslavia, the situation of international relations and the tendency in them for concrete policies which are directed at our country by both the East and West, all ask a question whether this situation optimally favors our interests. I believe that it does not favor them. When I say this I am not thinking that we should basically change this sector of our policies, but I believe that we should do concrete adaptations which would better respond to today's trends and tendencies in international relations. The situation many years earlier when we almost entirely depended on the USA with respect to military supplies was not favorable for us, however, today is also not the most optimal when practically there is a lack of every kind of working connection with the USA in this area. □Assessing that the situation concerning relations between Yugoslavia - USA is today such that it would be possible to continue a dialogue even in this sector, and that there is an interest and readiness on the part of the USA /contrary to earlier times when they cut the sources of military supplies/. It is upon us to measure the degree and the intensity of these connections and that we enter them in a way and to the measure that we deem to respond to the interests of our country. □I add that there were exchanges of views Washington - London /before the visit of comrade Ribicic to London/ concerning military cooperation Yugoslavia - England and that the USA supported this, this was told to me in the State Department, and they also indicated they were not bothered by our military purchases in France /not even during the time of De Gaulle/ because that was a Western source of supplies. □If we assess that there are too many military American personnel in Yugoslavia in their military mission, it is possible and should be organized open discussions with them in which we lay out our reasons and arguments. The eventual reduction in personnel should not result in the worsening of relations but rather in their being made better. □It is useful to consider whether it would come into consideration the indirect use of dinar funds of the USA for our military purposes. □Visas - already for a relatively long time remains the fact that Yugoslavia is more open and free in its behavior concerning its visa regime than is the USA which surprises many of my counterparts here when I tell them this. In simplifying the visa treatment something was accomplished but this is all modest and it does not respond to modern and intensive communication of the citizens of the two

countries which are constantly expanding. The obstacles for the free treatment as I said before are the policies of the government of the USA. The current visa regime falls into a conservative (category). The very beginning of this state was tied to emigrant politics and in recent times along with this either anti-communism or cold war. □One of these cold war remainders in our bilateral relations with the USA is the demand by our citizens to fill out the known questionnaire. I believe there are reasons and logic in publicly launching with the government of the USA an initiative that they abandon asking the filling out of these questionnaires. I know that they can /and they likely will/ call upon a refer to their existing laws, but I know that a solution can be found if there is a political interest. □There is no doubt that the abandonment of this practice would positively affect the atmosphere and relations. □Emigrants - are a minor factor in evolving relations less than I originally believed. The greatest number of them remains in the poor social categories. Only individuals have succeeded to enter the more influential circles. Among the emigrants who arrived over the past 2 years are a number of relatively significant intellectuals among who are some very capable and talented ones. They find work easily. The majority of them are not interested /they are pulled toward their jobs/ for political activeness, one part actively and loyally behaves and assists in development of relations of Yugoslavia - USA. The smallest group of these embraces the extremists - the emigrants. □Older emigrants except for something that sentimentally ties them, some perhaps property left behind, and they do not offer anything else. That is why to me it seems that our clubs of emigrants in the country and our consulates in the USA in is specific way have pre-dimentionalized and the consulates stresses too much the emigrant aspect. The result which they achieved with the emigrants are in general modest. It is another thing that we ourselves show them to be in the press to be greater and more meaningful than they are, and what we often say to ourselves either this or that is meaningful without really analyzing the reach of this significance. □I am not sure that we need two consulates - Pittsburgh and Cleveland, one is about 100 miles from the other. □Extreme emigrants - the policies of the government of the USA towards this category in the greatest manner influences the politics of all governments which give asylum to these terrorists and to those in Latin America and in Western Europe and Austria as well as Canada. This is a typical territory of the cold /and class/ war where the USA lead and upon who the other capitalist countries follow the politics of the USA. In other words, if it would come to a change in the policies of the government of the USA toward the extremists then almost certainly that the majority of other governments would follow their example. In this regard, I see this problem. In the past year it has come to certain reduction in public actions directed against our representatives /pickets and the similar/ but not to the provocative - enemy activities, in some directions these have even increased. The number of extremists in the USA has grown, their subversive agreements of action /toward our country/ are not falling off, here there are gatherings around the ex-king and a variety of other Ustashi-Chetnik-Ljotic groups and individuals who are active, and so forth. Earlier we had promised to be more sensitive in giving visas to the ex-king (groups) and the demands that the entries into the USA be conditioned with no public activities. □The fact is that sometimes even publicly some local and other state functionaries from the USA maintain connections with these groups, and we then have the need that every "10th of April" or for 29th of November or 1st of May that we have to warn the State Department, police and ask for protection, and so forth, all this speaks to the problem and indicates that it is not meaningless. □I cannot accept the current, according to regulations, response that these are small groups that in the USA nobody listens to them that they have no influence in the USA and so forth. I am not concerned that much over how much these groups or individuals have influence in the USA, but rather how their activities are reflected in my country. They exist not because of the USA but because of Yugoslavia. □To repeat that which I have many times said, that is, that I agree that this problem should not become an obstacle for normal relations with the USA and for their evolvement, because that is not deserved, but I repeat that we cannot behave as if the problems almost do not exist. We have to in our policy toward the USA in this regard placed ourselves so that things are clear that our mutual confidence and relations would be better if there were less activities such as these, that is if they did not exist at all. Very often whenever I get the opportunity this is also how I speak. □Even though it is not important, my last visit to New Orleans says

something. As you know the last year - two we have constantly raised the issue concerning the continued existence of the kingdom's consulate in this city, in which we succeeded because the remainder have disappeared. I do not believe that it is by chance that I was declared right in New Orleans an honorary citizen which the local newspapers and televisions well covered. With this I want to say that by raising the problem in a responsible way this is not ruined but rather fixes things. At least in the area of New Orleans to some extent things have been changed in our favor, and to the detriment of the reactionaries. That is why I believe that it is good that the [DSIP] in the last period of time and for several times had tried to raise this problem with the USA Embassy. I advise that in a responsible way that all of our republic leadership be made aware /and federal organs/ and that in their contacts with their American officials and private individuals, that they maintain this theme in their conversations. Basically we should demand that hospitality be taken away from extremist activities in the name of better relations between Yugoslavia - USA. It is better to lead if I can say this in this way everyday dialogue at the working levels than to gather and leave with an "explosion" of words. This similarly is valid for the intelligence activities which is a separate theme about which we will discuss when I come to Belgrade. Before I finish this paragraph I should say that there is no difference in behavior between Nixon and Johnson toward extremists. The difference is maybe only in that they view Nixon to be closer to them. Political relations - in these it has been noted less of an evolution than maybe was initiated at first by Nixon's letter to Tito. If I was to measure them through number and level of contacts and compared them with the earlier year there would only be modest progress. However, it is not unrealistic to expect that they would in the upcoming period become intensified (E. Richardson, Hillenbrand, eventually Rodgers). Concerning a possible visit by Nixon or Rodgers they remain reserved. Even though this is as it is - it is new in the relations of Yugoslavia - USA. For the first time in the history of relations an American President has visited our country and it was placed on the daily schedule and that by the American President himself. This by itself is good and useful for our international position and the same remains true for the State Secretary of the USA. This is reflected in the already mentioned somewhat increased interest in Yugoslavia. How it will come to a visit of Nixon to Yugoslavia it is difficult for me to say. If it comes to this then for sure it would be in the moments when Nixon believes it is the most useful for the USA. The main criteria of this usefulness will be what and how does the USA contribute in the relations with the USSR and China, following this eastern Europe, and following that toward the nonaligned world, European actions, that is Yugoslavia - the West as a whole and of course their bilateral relations. Having this in view I do not believe that in the near future on the stage that there are enough factors which would make the visit actual for the USA (only if there are no surprises). It is more simple as for the visit of Rodgers which is more likely and possible to occur over this year. A few days ago Rodger's assistant M. Hillenbrand very cautiously attempted to hear my reaction how we would eventually receive a visit by Rodgers before or after the NATO meeting. This was "salted" with the possibility of a visit of Rodgers to Spain at the same time. This is an old point in the policies of the USA toward us as well as to the same extent toward NATO. However, this meant something else in the era of the most intensive cold war period when the preoccupations of NATO were somewhat different than now. Now, in May NATO will among other things discuss the mutual military withdrawal from Europe /of the USA and the USSR/ about a conference of European security. In general the political goal of this American theme toward us remains the same but the conditions have greatly changed under which they are trying to achieve them. Before I would suggest how we should react to this "hint" /I announced what I had said as my personal reaction/ we have to make clear what we expect from this visit and what we desire to achieve. I think that for us the bilateral plan is the most important. If it evolves successfully there will be a reflex in the international aspects. As one of the main bilateral goals I would put the easing of the usage of the dinar funds of the USA. This would be tied to the widening of cooperation in all areas including in the military /in the mentioned spirit/. I know that these things demand discussion, analysis and the assumption of precise positions so I advise that the preparations for this begin regardless of whether the visit will be realized sooner or later. As far as we are concerned as far as I can tell I do not see a separate reason to force the visit nor to postpone it - it would be welcome to us. And I would say

better sooner rather than later. □When I think about these visits and I compare them with the visits from western Europe I see that the USA is lagging behind as to the level of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but not when it comes to the heads of state. Not even from the eastern side from the Czechoslovak Republic crisis there has not been many trips by the Chief of State or government. The announced visits by the English and the French are welcome. □In the State Department, White House and among congressmen when we discuss the political position of Yugoslavia – the most questions I receive comes from our relations with the USSR, China and Albania. It is understandable why – because this serves them as a barometer or an indicator of triangular relations. □The next “in line” is the question does and to what extent the Yugoslav experience influence or will it influence other socialist countries including the USSR. □These two things illustrate in whole how Yugoslavia “is situated” in American global plans. □The greatest interest exists as well as sensitivity concerning our relations with the USSR where every move in relations of Belgrade – Moscow is very carefully followed, which has its advantages and weaknesses. I would add as a relatively new element that in public conversations they state that the USA has nothing against our better relations with the USSR. This for me and my coworkers has been said many times in the State Department. This also is true in the other direction, that is Soviet diplomats in conversations with us devote the most attention to our relations with the USA and they are interested in the most minute details. □In fact today the USA is mostly intrigued not to say worried, by our military cooperation with the USSR and it considers that they and the West “have lost a point” because they think that they pushed us more than we ourselves wanted toward dependency on the USSR. □About our nonaligned politics in the State Department they almost never discuss this if we ourselves do not first initiate a discussion and in return we often get very short answers without commentary. Normally they briefly respond that the policies of the USA evolve concerning the nonaligned from the time of the late Dallas who led the policy “who is not with us is against us” and for today this is no longer the case. □In fact the USA sees the nonaligned with a “torn policy.” To the extent that it troubles the Soviet or the Chinese pretensions then nonalignment is welcome, but to the extent that they interfere with the USA and the joint interests of the West then they are not. Because it bothers both superpowers, both equally ignore it. Along the way according to the estimate of the USA the changed balance to their benefit – the easing of the Cold War, the confrontation of the USA with the nonaligned is less needed or better said creates more harm than good, so that they more easily tolerate the nonaligned today. The nonaligned area for the USA is becoming an area of competition with USSR and China as states which the USA suggests, following faulty and unsuccessful up until now courses of action of military pacts and military intervention. □Even though they do not say this to us but they think that we are “too involved” on the nonaligned front, and that our actions are overcoming our dimensions. Similarly they see this like the USSR that we in fact desire leadership in the nonaligned world. However, our nonalignment nor that of our partners is not the only cause of our political disagreements with the USA but more than this it is the politics of the USA. □The main area /or more acutely/ of our political lack of agreement with the USA constantly is in the international area. This is also valid for a whole list of nonaligned countries who even by their social organization have similar organization to that of the USA. In the USA today they see more clearly than before that for example, with the exclusion of the Vietnam problem not only will they be able to solve some other for the USA more important elements but that it would also ease the fixing of relations with a great number of nonaligned countries. It is clear that a political solution for Vietnam and the Near East as the two sharpest problems would in a great way narrow the area of our disagreement with the USA. □To the extent that in the relations between the superpowers negotiations take up a more important place then it can be expected that the nonaligned policies in important areas will be eased. □Zones of Influence – I notice that officials in the State Department and outside of it are becoming sensitive and more often more decisively deny that there exist zones of influence in Eastern Europe, that is that there exists an agreement about these zones. They constantly say if there was something then that was between Churchill and Stalin but not with the USA, which is against this type of policy. I think it has something to do with the following: regardless of whether it exists – this type of different agreement concerning the division of influence in Eastern Europe it does not

seem possible and likely that the Americans /or Churchill/ accepted the type of division of influences in Eastern Europe which exist today. Not only have the role and the influence of the USSR become predominant in Eastern Europe, but it desires to spread this influence and to completely exclude the USA from this region. In the policies of the USSR today begins to more clearly follow the contours of politics of one state /USSR - the countries of the Warsaw pact/. □In Eastern Europe there were a number of major crises following the Second World War which had as consequences more or less the strengthening of the Cold War, the hastening of armament and disrupting diplomatic and economic relations of East - West, but they did not provoke armed conflict. □Following 20 years of experience it has become relatively clear that the USA will not enter into a war with USSR because of the territory of Eastern Europe, especially in this nuclear age. /Allow me to remind you, even though the conditions today are different that Finland in the war with USSR in 1939/1940 remained militarily completely alone/. There are colleagues here in Washington who say that the USA will not go into the nuclear war even for Western Europe. □However, I believe that the Nixon Administration is showing somewhat more interest in Eastern Europe more than Johnson's. -□Nixon's trip to Romania□The expressed wish to meet with Tito,-□The separation in Nixon's last message to Congress of Eastern Europe as a geopolitical territory /not pushing it in the Soviet block/ and that statement that the USA would be prepared in cooperation with the Eastern European countries to go far if they themselves were ready, -□More vocally than other Western states the non-recognition of the Breznev doctrine. □I am familiar with the fact that the USSR is very nervous about all of this and have reacted inadequately, they have asked what is the meaning of all this and have made it well known that "Nixon with his provocative policies will achieve contrary results than those he desires," that is, they are simply threatened that they will not give in at all. Ambassador Dobrinjinin had an important role in all of this. We heard in the State Department that the new Administration has understood that if it wants to negotiate with the USSR they have to ease their ambitions toward Eastern Europe and that it is assessed with respect to the security and interests of the USA that dialogue with USSR is more important and as is avoiding a war than the Eastern European region. This does not mean that this region is being abandoned but that the possibilities of the USA in it are less than the new Administration believes, that is, that the policies towards Eastern Europe are measured /and are compared/ to the relations with the USSR. In the report Nixon openly speaks about the legitimate interest of the USSR in Eastern Europe. □In further light /along with the nonaligned component and its current policies the USA sees it more negatively than positively/ I believe that it is necessary to observe the behavior of USA toward us, even though that this for us means significantly less than it does for the rest of the Eastern European countries. □Nonetheless, the statement that the USA is ready to move toward cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe to the degree that they themselves are ready also does not pertain to us in its whole, especially not in the political field. I also do not believe it pertains to Romania. This conclusion demands caution and not to overestimate one's own importance /the relationship between the big - small/. -□The level of political consultations and contacts, are being held up and delayed by USA, but they are somewhat advancing them in relationship to the previous situation. This however they are not the only ones who are doing, comrade Breznev also has been preparing for a long time to visit us. -□The exchange of political high ranking visits we are prepared to complete. USA has begun, but they are not in a hurry to complete them but they are also not taking them off from the daily agenda. -□On the other hand, the USA is gaining economic, followed by scientific and cultural and other cooperation. As I already said they are also interested in the area of the military. All this gives reason and cause to conclude that even our political relations despite differences and difficulties and many things that strain them, or "disturb" them are moving toward the better. I believe that this is not a temporary but rather a long term tendency. Our social and economic reforms and the USA□The opening of Yugoslav society toward the outside world and its internal democratization on the basis of self management and market relations have been well received in the USA. Many factors both desired and undesired influence this. If I take only the economic area - foreign trade and the growth in our ties with the West at the expense of all regions here, of course it evokes satisfaction. Our decision concerning cooperation with international private capital likewise /does the same/. It

is known that the exposure of our economy to greater global competition will give greater chances to those who are more competitive if there are no political - administrative interferences. They see very well the advantage of Western technology which they believe in the future will be even more convincing. □The free investment of our various scientific, educational and other institutions /and individuals/ in cooperation with our partners in the USA, likewise with good reason was well received. So, there are real and proven reasons that our reform and its consequences are well received not only in the USA but wider, because reform offers without precedent, the policies of a real peace loving coexistence both politically and economically. □However, among high officials and lower as well as average Americans, there exists hidden or open /they do not hide it that much/ beliefs and expectations that our economic - social reforms will lead either sooner or later towards some type of quasi capitalism if not total. Because of our international position this can be delicate because it can create illusions and misimpressions. Our example is being used as proof of the "theory of convergence" /"the joining of systems"/. To be honest in this last period of time there is less talk about meeting on "half of the journey" and more about the fact that socialism is entering even deeper internal crises and that capitalism is increasingly more successful - and because of this it is known what and who should change. □The best, I would say and only response to these mischaracterizations are our internal policies, and their results. To the extent that they increasingly with success move in the expressed directions underpinned by ideas and practicality, we will not have much need nor reason to denounce, renounce or to argue. In this view we have to be careful and cautious about the development of various expressions either pro-Americanism or anti-Americanism /like pro or anti Sovietism/ because our policies are not one nor the other. These types of developments sometimes overwhelm Yugoslav - American relations as I believe they overwhelm others as well. This here of course is registered and they create their own pro and contra list. However, the less possibility and reasons for these lists the better it is for us. They bring in uncertainty and they in the first instance do damage to us and our interests. Clarity and precision and the openness of our policies is absolutely necessary because as a small country with this type of structure that we have, we are confronted by false and dishonest interpretations, and by real and not ill intended misunderstandings. As for our internal democratic developments here it is increasingly easier to defend them. Djilas and Mihajlov, for example have become peripheral elements. Here it is easier and more useful to use our restrictive measures against them than to hear their "political thoughts." Our position concerning increased level of democratization and openness of our society has eased here, for example, when we announce that we are prepared for the dual ending of visas but the USA is not. One other detail also says something: here not too long ago visited one of our vanguard film directors. When they asked him /and they offered him a good income/ if he would stay in the USA he responded to them that he would not. When they asked him why, he answered that he lives well in Yugoslavia and that he has greater freedom for creating than he would have in the USA. There are other examples similar to this, not to speak about the fact that when you present something with a little more detail to whatever public here our development, our goals and our ambitions, that this leaves an impression and is difficult to attack it. Many times I have had the opportunity to see this and to feel it myself. I mention this only so that I could cover our fundamental theme that socialist self management democracy is by far the most effective dam against undesired influences and something else that I want to underline and that is how important our behavior between ourselves within our country and how important this is, not to long ago this created suspicion and cast doubt on our unity and our might, integrity and so forth. □We have informed you that we are constantly meeting with the question "what after Tito." This question especially is being linked to national relations and to the fate of the Yugoslav federation. These doubts in certain way are being heated by Soviet diplomats. □As you know there were articles even in American press on the last theme. We have done a great deal here to object to this type of writing. It seems as if they have undertaken some things because in the last month - 2 almost nothing is being written about this. □In the last 3 months as good news from our economic life arrives /production and increased exports/ that is immediately registered here. When I was recently in Philadelphia and New Orleans both speakers that introduced me in the

auditoriums and gave the opening remarks, mentioned almost as if "by command" that we in this year have economically began better than any other European country. There are no articles or speeches that could be stronger than this. About Leader's Exchanges—This has not passed the great test and it has not brought about significant results. It has not been damaging either. Its main defect as it is thought up on the part of the USA as a part of their propaganda - information (program). This as an approach and policy in relations between states and peoples is very narrow and should be in the main sterile. It is not only sterile only for us but also for some other states that are not socialists. —From some of our comrades who came in this program I heard that they were satisfied while others were not. Everyone noted something and learned something but all of this to a very modest degree. It would be good if the Americans would condition and organize these visits and trips, with some changes, that would create greater elasticity and freedom. —They themselves came to the conclusion that the leader's exchange title is not appropriate and they have changed it to International Visitors Program. This is a better name. I think that we could suggest that through this program we send more experts especially from the economy and other sectors rather than "leaders." That these become working visits for which there would be an agreement ahead of time /in line with our interests/ all with the working program. We should attempt to especially widen this to include the economy. My objections come to that we should attempt to make this activity more useful for us and that we should free it from that which creates more damage than usefulness /when let's say this is awarded to our individual some Yugoslav political emigrant, who is by nature against Yugoslav socialism, acts as an interpreter and guide and who "along the way" through small and unintelligent questions attempts to learn something in the intelligence category, there are comrades who were rightly irritated by this/. —When I first come back to Belgrade I will bring with me a proposal as to how we should proceed. —In the end allow me to say that this letter has a goal to assist to bring to date our relations with the USA. It does not contain any major suggestions /especially not in the context of change in our policies/ but some points are highlighted, some are widened and some it attempts to correct with the goal that it assist in creating better and for us more useful relations with the USA. In so much that these relations for us are more useful than the greater interest we will have in widening them.