

June 25, 1971

**Minutes of the Romanian Politburo Meeting
Concerning Nicolae Ceaușescu's Visit to China,
North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam**

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Summary:

These are the minutes of a meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party discussing Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu's 1971 visit to China. Ceaușescu reports on his visits to Chinese enterprises, universities, and laboratories, and acknowledges the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. The report on China is followed by comments on his subsequent visits to North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia. Finally, the discussion turns to Moscow's criticism of Ceaușescu's anti-Soviet statements during his stay in the Middle East.

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Translation - English

S T E N O G R A M

of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party's meeting of June 25, 1971

Participants:

Comrades Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Emil Bodnăras, Manea Mănescu, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Gheorghe Pans, Virgil Trofin, Ilie Verde?, Maxim Berghianu, Florian Dănălache, János Fazekas, Petre Lupu, Dumitru Popa, Dumitru Popescu, Leonte Răutu, Gheorghe Stoica, Stefan Voitec, Iosif Banc, Petre Blajovici, Miron Constantinescu, Mihai Dalea, Mihai Gere, Ion Iliescu, Ion Ioni??. Vasile Patiline, Ion Stănescu.

Comrade Andrei Stefan, first deputy of the chief of the International Section of the CC of RCP, was invited to the meeting.

The meeting began at 11.10 and ended at 14.20.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:

We have convened this meeting to inform you about what we did in these four countries of Asia and to see what the opinion of the Executive Committee is, especially because next week we will go abroad again and then it will be too late.

I think that, in general, the documents have been read - and also the toasts, and the speeches made at meetings and the communiqués. In fact, they reflect the general point of view, the positions, and the viewpoints reached by each one of us.

On our way to China we made stopovers at Novosibirsk and Omsk, where we were warmly welcomed by the comrades from the relevant regional committees.

The way we were welcomed in Beijing was especially good. First of all, at the airport we were met by practically all the party and state leaders who were able to come because the other were ill and could not leave their beds. The population also gave us a very fine reception at the airport; afterwards, in the city, we were met by hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people, however not in thick crowds - as is the custom in our country - but in an organized manner: with schools, brass bands, sport games, and dances. The reception we were given in Korea was similar. I think we have to learn something from this, since everything was in good order. It was a kind of holiday, a festive manifestation. In the squares there was written, with flags and human bodies: "Long live the Chinese-Romanian friendship", in the Chinese and Romanian languages. There were a lot of slogans about friendship, the fight against imperialism, against any kind of pressures. But correctly. Hence, it was a fine reception.

During the visit we met Mao Zedong and Lin Biao; Kang Sheng was also there. We met the mayor of the City of Peking/Beijing, who was ill, and with the vice-president, also quite old and ill. Practically, we met all the party and state leaders of China. Bringing important personalities from hospital to welcome us was intended to further mark their attention and desire for us to meet everybody, including Cian Cin [sic], who told us that although she was ill she came to the residential building where we

were staying; we found her there and she came to the reception party given by us and to the show as well.

The discussions were held with the delegation, about which I think you have already read, so there is no need for me to tell it again. From among the activists, practically all have participated, beginning with Zhou Enlai, the chief of the General Staff, Li Xiannian, who leads the government's activity, the secretary in charge with propaganda, Mao Zedong's son-in-law, Yao Wenyuan. At the first two meetings, we were the ones who spoke. We informed them about matters of substance. They asked questions, such as how is the economy managed and organized in your country; we informed them about our relationships with the socialist countries - at length, with other states, and we have emphasized some points of view regarding the strengthening of the socialist countries' unity, the relationships with the communist and workers' parties - problems which are known to you and you will also see the stenogram.

At the third meeting, it was Zhou Enlai who spoke; as to the duration, he spoke about as long as we did. They also told us about the difficulties they had had to overcome, about the fact that there had been a fight between two lines, about the fact that a dangerous frame of mind had been created, that there were a lot of the old landlords, feudals who also held executive positions, that an attitude of kowtowing to foreign countries, and a certain bourgeois mentality had appeared and the whole activity consisted in uprooting this mentality, in arranging things in such a manner that people be able to understand the revolutionary principles and become educated by work.

Of course, within the framework of this activity two lines appeared: some cadres - headed by Liu Shaoqi - wanted this state of things to be preserved; then they told us about Pin Ci-Jen [sic] and Peng Dehuai; that armed conflicts had taken place. Both in the universities and in the regions we were told that two camps had formed and even armed conflicts had occurred between them, but now - in general - things were normal again, the situation had been restored and they are now concerned with the problem of using a number of people, of cadres.

Afterwards, they very briefly - only for about ten minutes - told us about the way the talks with the Soviets were getting along, but without abusive language, level-headedly enough. They said that they did not want to revise the treaties, but only to make some corrections and establish the borders on a sure basis; that they wished to conclude, with the Soviets, a treaty of respect and non-aggression and wanted to proceed to the improvement of state relationships. Of course, the talks are not proceeding on smoothly, the Soviets do not agree. The Soviets, in their turn, say that the Chinese do not agree. But everything is level-headed enough. Of course, the Chinese said, the ideological problems cannot be solved now, it takes time to do so; as Mao Zedong said, it would take 8,000 years.

They told us that they wanted to normalize relationships with the other socialist countries as well. In actual fact, they had already sent ambassadors to all the socialist countries; they said they would send an ambassador to Mongolia, too. They said that they intended to act in the same way in the future. Everything was level-headed enough and, frankly speaking, I was surprised because I expected them to be harsher; I expected more. During the talks, Zhou Enlai several times told us that there were a number of Soviet specialists who had helped the Chinese; at the bridge at Nanking, for instance, there was the photograph of a Soviet specialist. The manager there said that the bridge had been built by the Chinese on their own, but Zhou Enlai told him that it was not true, that the design of the bridge was Soviet-made. Wherever we were, Zhou Enlai said several times: you have the mentality of a superpower and you must get rid of it. We never came across anything against the Soviets; on the contrary, we noticed some degree of reappraisal.

The discussions with Mao Zedong were general. With him it was apparent that he said the same things as the Soviets did. He said as follows: the Soviets swear at us, insult us, and - in spite of all this - they want unity with us. Well, with whom do they want unity, with those who are agents of the Americans?! We cannot unite with them; how could they unite with us? Generally speaking, the discussions were general enough, and he was not violent. From this point of view, one can see a preoccupation of theirs, in fact they emphasized it several times, with improving the state relationships, and the wish to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union at state-level. At party-level such an understanding is not possible now as we have ideological differences and they will last a long time, 8,000 years. Then I also told him: there may be problems after 8,000 years, too; the problem is, how are we going to hold these talks? They said: we do not swear at the Soviets, they swear at us; the only thing we do is say what Lenin said about social-imperialism, and if they are social-imperialists, it is not our fault. Mao Zedong said, however, that they wished to normalize the relationships at state and economy level.

As regards the problem of relationships with other states, a point we insisted upon a lot, they said: we will negotiate with each party individually, we will judge each party by the way they behave in battle, because only in battle can one see whether it is Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist; we are against conferences, and centers, and against the conferences convened by Moscow, and against a leftist conference. They were probably referring to the Albanians because the latter requested such a conference. We are against any center; we want bilateral relationships; we will have, by degrees, bilateral relationships, we will analyze each party, and we will establish relationships depending upon their position; if they do not swear at us any longer and if in battle they prove their position is Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary, anti-imperialistic, we will develop relationships.

After we came back from Vietnam, the chief of the International Section invited Comrade [Stefan] Andrei and they had four hours of talks on this problem. They said: we did not know a lot of things, but now we will concern ourselves with these principles. We are for autonomy, non-interference in internal affairs, the right of each party to decide alone on its own political line, and we will have to see, concretely, how they are going to act.

They spoke a lot about the situation in Japan, about Japanese militarism.

They did not speak almost at all about Vietnam's problems. We have put forward our considerations and, in connection with the negotiations, we said that there were favorable conditions. They never said either yes or no, which means more yes. Of course, they did not say they agreed either.

As to the problem of European security, they did not say anything. We told them what our opinion was. Eventually, they agreed to write in the communiqué that they supported our position on this problem. Afterwards, they told us that this would mean backing the Soviets. Concerning the Middle East issue, they actually do not know the first thing about it; they spoke about Israel's aggression, but we noticed that they had set up direct telephone lines with the aggressors.

In general, they were level-headed enough. The only criticism was directed at the Americans, but especially for the fact that the Americans wanted to leave the Japanese in their place in Asia. They told us that they were willing to welcome [President] Nixon, but the main issue was Taiwan.

In connection with the United Nations Organization, they thanked us for our support (this was written in the communiqué as well) and said that they wanted to go to the UN. Generally speaking, they thanked us for our lending them a helping hand with the

development of their relationships with other countries they are interested in. They also told us that up to then they had been concerned with their internal problems and could not deal with the international issues as well, but now they can deal with these issues, too.

Regarding the bilateral relationships, they agreed to develop them, but they did not want a mixed commission, saying that they did not see the necessity and the utility of such international bodies. We raised the issue of setting up a mixed commission and they said that [this should be done] only when the foreign affairs ministers and the foreign trade ministers need to meet to discuss issues. They still did not understand these international bodies, but they would get there, too.

They told us that since 1980 they had not had any links with the parties, with the socialist countries and now they had to see how they behaved. This proves that they are serious people, not like that - now we swear at each other, now we kiss and make up. It is clear that it will be difficult for them to forget the Soviets' offences.

From a bilateral viewpoint, they practically said they wished to normalize all the relationships. They also said they wanted to explore all the avenues of developing the relationships. We also discussed the problem of purchasing some raw materials from them.

They asked us about COMECON. We told them; we also told them about this integration program. We told them about the Warsaw Treaty Organization, too: how it was established, how we look upon it, and that the aim was pursued of arriving at a supranational body, at a political, economic, and military integration. We told them that we were not partial to these forms, but we wished to collaborate in the spirit of the treaty provisions and of the statute we have. They said this was a just point of view. We said that they were also guilty [for the conclusion] of this treaty since they had agreed to it; they, too, were observers at the time. We told them that maybe they wanted to come into COMECON as well; neither they nor the Vietnamese and the Koreans wanted to; the Koreans told us: there are pressures there. We told them that, according to the laws of physics, if they came, too, the pressures would disperse to some extent. They deemed our position rational, but they neither praised us nor criticized these bodies, they only registered what we said.

They criticized this craving for domination, the superpower chauvinism, and the social imperialism.

That is about all [I have to say] about the discussions.

Consequently, as regards the talks, I think they were very good and the impression they made on us was that the Chinese comrades were preoccupied with heading for a normalization of the relationships with the Socialist countries, that they thought about and were preoccupied with the normalization of the relationships with the Communist parties, but this would be a longer process and would depend upon the position of these parties as well.

In the course of a year, they sent ambassadors to practically all the Socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, and - on our departure - they told us they would send an ambassador to Mongolia, too. They had economic talks with the Socialist countries, they concluded economic agreements with them. At state level, therefore, a genuine improvement of relationships resulted. Only he who did not want to see the reality or he who was not interested in it did not notice these things. And all this did credit to the Chinese as they had taken the initiative.

Mao Zedong asked us whether we approved of table tennis. We said that it was good

and had to be continued. Then he said: in other words, you approve of it? He knew that others had criticized them [the Chinese] and wanted to know if we agreed.

Now a few impressions of ours as regards the situation in China. First of all, what impresses one from the beginning is the fact that the population is well dressed - of course, in a modest manner, which is different from town to town; if in Beijing one can see more overalls and military uniforms, in Shanghai you see silk dresses. Generally speaking, people are dressed and wear shoes. If Zhou Enlai saw a flag down, he pointed his finger at it. So, if you give them only a pair of overalls and a pair of shoes - indeed made of leather, rubber or cloth - well, it really is something. The supply is good - and this for eight hundred million people.

There is an overall mobilization of the people: from children to old people, all are mobilized, and tasks are assigned to them - to learn, to work; no one idles. Zhou Enlai said that everybody had to work, to do something, otherwise no results would be produced. There is discipline and people are hard-working everywhere. Wherever we went we were told, we received these from Romania, we thank you for your help and [they wanted us] to tell them if there were any criticisms. Everything was clean enough; we visited a number of enterprises. We visited this chemical center, which included an isoprenic-rubber plant which they themselves had built. Everything is made by us, they told us, we do not want to import anything; when we speak about our own forces, we want to make people understand that they, too, can and must do everything; formerly, the mentality had been created of waiting for everything to come from abroad. We have visited a shipyard. Five big submarines were being built there and there were other five ships built by them, not imported. I told comrade Ioan Avram: I will not approve any imports any longer; they [the Chinese] build nuclear submarines, ships. And they had another three shipyards. The ships were built on a slanted dock; in this way they used the cranes better as the ships were near one another and a crane could be used for several ships.

We visited the university. There they made the leaders of two groups of students who had been fighting [with each other] to tell us how it all came about. They said so: we have been incited by the class enemy; he told me I was an imperialist agent, and I told him the same thing. They licked [defeated ?] their professors. We have a professor, he came from America with bourgeois conceptions, but now he is on our side; now we have understood, we have united, and we set out to work.

They took us to a few laboratories, where they have training-workshops; there they make trucks - prototypes - and machine-tools. They said that they were still experimenting, but in keeping with the concept that the students should work hands-on and thus learn. In the workshop, they said, we give the students explanations and they learn much better. The same [learning] principle was applied in electronics, in chemistry. In Beijing they have twenty-five higher-education institutes, but all of them are tied to production.

We visited a people's commune, where very good results were obtained. In general, they have a lot of irrigation systems, very simple, and I wanted to discuss with the [Chinese] comrades about our sending - to China and to Korea - a delegation to see how simple and cheap irrigation systems were made.

Comrade Gheorghe Stoica: They have the labor force, too.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: We also have labor force.

They have dug and made water storage basins and from there the water is sent where they need it. Since we have all our southern part staying under water/flooded, if we rig it up in accordance with the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean systems, we

will have water and will take a lot of land from out of the water. They generally use the ditch/bed irrigation, but in such a way that it serves as drainage as well and on a hectare they have more plants than we have.

In the people's commune we visited, they had likewise organized industrial production. First of all, they processed soybean and I thought about our comrades who had said that soybean was processed only in Japan. There were a number of beautifully-enameled ceramic caldrons there; if a caldron breaks, they make another, but if it is well made, it does not break. They turned soybean into some kind of vermicelli, similar to the melana (artificial wool) paste we make in our country. The boiled melana paste was pumped up and then it flowed down into cold water and something similar to melana fibers was obtained. Everything is very simple, the building of the plant does not last two years as it does in our country, where - in addition - we also have to call Japanese specialists over.

In the same cooperative a wide variety of juices are produced, and the residues are transformed in flour for feeding the animals - and everything takes place in a room about as large as this one. They had a bamboo-weaving workshop and seventy-two tractors. I asked them if the overhauls were also performed there. Everything, including the engine. They likewise had lathes. They had a workshop with 150 employees, which also operated as a section of an enterprise in Shanghai, where they turned out parts; also there they made small lathes, sickles, agricultural machinery, and ploughs. They said so: when we have to harvest the rice, we close the workshop and everybody goes to the fields; for this purpose, we bring people all the way from Shanghai. The same happens when they sow since they sow manually.

The commune had a total of about 3,000 hectares and 10,000 inhabitants. What is in fact the commune? They unified the administrative management with the cooperative. As a matter of fact, that is what the Koreans and the Mongols did. And they deal with all the problems.

Naturally, they have specialists, they have big brigades and small brigades, as they call them, and the results are very good. We told them that we wanted to send there a delegation to see the rice paddies and even to take rice seed. We also told the Koreans to give us rice seed and, in exchange, we would give them corn seed.

They told us that during the cultural revolution they had had difficulties, especially in industry. Even the construction of the bridge was delayed one and a half years because of the cultural revolution. We saw a tunnel in Shanghai, where they told us the same thing: the construction was delayed because of the cultural revolution. They said: we were delayed [by the cultural revolution], but it was necessary. They said that it was a problem of theirs, a problem they could not do without. Nowhere did they tell us that this was an experiment valid for others as well.

We visited the exhibition in Shanghai. They have good equipment, good machine-tools, automatic, fine. They manufactured, by their own means, 35-ton dump trucks, and the Koreans -24-ton dump trucks. They have a very good machine-building industry. They obtained good results in other fields as well.

In general, they made a very good impression on us. They have all kinds of things: electrical engineering, electronics, air-conditioning equipment etc. - everything made by them. They did not import anything and had very good things.

We visited the Beijing subway. It had started to run.

Consequently, from all we have seen and they have told us about, a very serious preoccupation with the development of their economy was apparent. It is a sure thing

that Shanghai is a developed city, but also other cities, Beijing, or towns in Manchuria, are developed. In agriculture, they have obtained exceptional results. They lay emphasis on hog and chicken farming, but to a lesser extent on cattle raising. This from an economic point of view. To tell you the truth, I did not expect this. I knew that during the cultural revolution there were many losses, nevertheless - as compared with the situation seven years ago - I have noticed a radical improvement.

In comparison with other countries, for example the Soviet Union, the supply situation in China is good. When I told [Aleksey Nikolayevich] Kosygin that they [the Chinese] were well supplied with goods, he said that it all depended on what their income was. I made a calculation and found out that their income was not smaller than the Soviets' .

They have textiles, a wide variety of cloths and fabrics. We keep going to Italy to see [the textile industry], to bring specialists from western countries [to Romania]. The things we make of cotton are repulsive. As a matter of fact, Shanghai is famous for its textiles, it is ahead of Switzerland and Italy in this respect.

From a political point of view, wherever we went they told us about the regional and provincial party committees, they introduced to us the members of the regional and provincial committees, as well as the members of the Central Committee. It is true that they have unified the activity in enterprises to some extent, they have revolutionary committees in charge of the production and of the educational activity. Moreover, they also have trade unions and youth organizations, but all of them are parts of the revolutionary committee. The secretary of the party committee is concurrently the president of the revolutionary committee. For the production sector they have a production manager but they also have sectors of ideological activity; the leadership is exerted by the secretary of the party committee. They also pay a lot of attention to both the production and the ideological work, the educational work. We told them about the management committees, about the boards of directors. Zhou Enlai asked questions about the way these committees and boards are organized. They are also preoccupied with finding the best forms. They also told us that the form with a manager was no longer adequate and that they had found this form with the secretary of the party committee managing the whole activity, but not as in other countries - including our country - where people come to both the party committee and the management committee. There they have production, ideological work, and youth compartments but everything is under the leadership of the secretary of the party committee. Actually, they do what we do in the counties. Having [in subordination] the party committee, the revolutionary committee is a kind of coordinator of the whole activity, where the party has the decisive role.

We have asked questions to get the picture right. Wherever we went, on the first plane there appeared the secretary of the party committee, who was the president of the revolutionary committee, too. Military leaders have appeared as well. They had a great many military leaders, but the latter died of old age. Their main cadres were in the army, but they were very much concerned with strengthening the party. Generally speaking, I must say that we have found out - I do not know what the opinion of the other comrades in the delegation is - a quite serious preoccupation with ensuring the leadership by the party. Everything that was said about there being no party there is no more valid. Of course, there were difficulties, but this also happened in other parts [of the world].

Another aspect that deserves attention is the ideological activity. In my opinion, they took a revolutionary turn and we can really speak of a cultural revolution. They put aside - maybe too suddenly, but in my view they did the right thing - all these petty bourgeois mentalities and started again from the very beginning. All of their cultural activity (ballet, theater) was set on revolutionary bases. They said so: we do not want any bourgeois concept to get here. They showed us "The Girl with Grey Hair", a

remake done under the direction of Tchan Tchin [sic], who is an intelligent enough woman and knows what she wants. This remake was built around another concept, not as it was before. It makes salient the landlord, but also the peasant, this girl. It appropriately brings out what the landlord was, but also the peasants' determination to fight. They told us so: we want our young people to know what the landlords were, what the bourgeoisie represented. I liked it very much. I saw the other version, too. They told us that they were still improving it.

We have also seen the "The Women Detachment". Some of the comrades said that it was simplistic, but we would really like to have something similar. A very good theme dealing with the transformation of man. In general, the mentality of imperialism is faced with the new relationships, something we do not do. Our cinematography is crammed with adventure films, and the theater - with western plays. We have taken out the revolutionary plays and introduced plays without any content whatsoever. We do likewise in television, where we discuss a lot, but do not do anything. Before leaving I had a Secretariat meeting and there we decided to prepare a material for the plenary session to the effect that our propaganda was not satisfactory, that it did not correspond to the tasks of educating the youth and the people in general. I said this before going to China. What I have seen in China and Korea, however, is living proof that the conclusion we have reached is just. Consequently, from this point of view as well, it is a very serious preoccupation with educating the people in a revolutionary, communist spirit. Naturally, they criticize imperialism a lot, the Americans, the Japanese, who are "across the sea" from them, but in everything they compare the old with the new, they emphasize the efforts made to keep the fighting spirit awake. This is what they told us and what we noticed ourselves that it was their line in the field of ideological activity, based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thinking.

That is about all I have to say regarding what we saw in China and our impressions of China. As a conclusion, I consider that our visit to China was very good; from the point of view of our relationships, I could not say anything. I do not know what the other comrades believe.

Comrade Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Politically, the visit was good.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: It is clear, without any reticence whatsoever, that the issue of the relationships between our parties and our countries has been strongly brought out. In fact, this problem appeared clearly in both the communiqué and other materials.

I appreciate that also from the point of view of bilateral relationships and from the international point of view the visit was especially good. We had no intention to concern ourselves with others, we did not do so and neither did they. When we debated the issues regarding the development of the relationships between ourselves, the issues of international relationships, between countries and between parties, there was complete unity. Moreover, they emphasized the total equality between the big countries and the small countries; and also that there was no "father" party and "son" party. It is my opinion, therefore, that the visit has international importance and it will contribute towards improving the relationships between the communist parties, between the socialist countries and, in general, the situation on an international plane. I think that there are a great many things that can be used in the economy as well. In my opinion, China's experience in agriculture, machine-building, and in the light industry should be utilized on a larger scale. It [China] is also a big country, it has experience, and - as we have said in the communiqué - we will have to intensify the contacts, the political and economic ties, and to draw conclusions regarding our work. I am mainly referring to some things which we have already criticized, but in the ideological field we move with difficulty. Of course, in accordance with the spirit of our position. We have discussed this a number of times. We do not show what capitalism means any more. We have also

discussed these problems with the Propaganda Section and the Ideological Commission. Certainly, we have state relationships, but what capitalism means must be shown. Otherwise, young people will turn up who will want to leave the country, thinking that they will live better there [abroad]. Each country, in its own way, looks for solutions which will ensure an education and an armament for the people. Building socialism is not an easy matter. When a problem is raised which must be solved, they usually say, "Are we not going to provide some sort of material incentive?!" "Let's make efforts!" has disappeared, even from the thinking of some comrades in the leadership. They say, "But how much will we give as an extra?" There appear, therefore, some bourgeois concepts of appropriating something, of taking as much as possible. But we will see one another in September at the [meeting of the] Ideological Commission and then we will discuss this.

Comrade Emil Bodnăras: But what about the credit?

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: They granted us a credit of sixty million dollars, of which thirty million in goods. We will receive it in the second trimester of 1972. We have decided that [ambassador] Duma draw up some conventions for this credit. Afterwards, we will discuss the way we are to use the thirty million dollars.

Consequently, our impression [of China] is especially good from all points of view and my opinion of the way the socialist construction activity is performed in China is also good. Naturally, there are a number of things we do differently, but - by and large - they have good organization, discipline, and sound spirit. Both the leadership and all the citizens we have met showed us especial friendship. We have met millions of people, in a very open and sincere manner. That [would be all I have to say] about China.

In Korea we have also been well received both by the leadership and the population. Everything was organized, a kind of festivity, just like in China; well organized from this viewpoint.

The discussions were good. As regards the bilateral issues, we agreed to develop cooperation. I had comrade [Corneliu] Mănescu speak to a vice-president. We proposed that from the amount of twenty-seven million roubles provided for 1975 to reach an amount of over fifty million roubles.

They are interested and I think we can achieve good things. We had no problems. They also emphasize the development of industry, of agriculture. Pyongyang is completely rebuilt. Other towns, too. They work hard, there is discipline everywhere, everything is very beautiful.

We went to a few factories. We visited a chemical enterprise producing vinalon fibers, made [by the Koreans] on their own. Everything is simple and they want to develop it. They do not import goods as we do. They built the factory in a year and its capacity is thirty thousand tons per year. As raw material they utilize anthracite.

We went to the Heavy Equipment Works. There they build 6,000-ton presses. They do not import them as we do [in spite of the fact that] they do not have our machine-building industry. They, too, want - by their own forces - to make man understand that he must do, not wait. They said so: we gathered together experienced engineers and workers and had them solve the problems together.

We do not have old, experienced workers - together with engineers - solve certain problems. Otherwise nothing can be achieved. Where we involved workers as well the problems were solved. The engineer has never laid his hand on a hammer, he does not know how a machine is to be built; he knows how to make the drawings for the

machine and then sends you abroad to buy it. The Koreans build heavy machinery and equipment which we import from the USA, from Germany, machines that can process parts 22 -25 meters long. They told us: we lay emphasis on self-equipping. In point of fact, "Let's solve [problems] by our own forces.", they say; actually, it is self-equipping.

They build a lot of beautiful dwellings.

The land intended for agriculture is totally irrigated: they have a system of irrigated terraces. On these terraces one can work using machines. By means of the terraces they gained arable land and there are provisions in their program to the effect that more arable land is to be gained from the mountains. We agreed with them that they cooperate with us in agriculture and give us rice seed. They have eggs of silkworms feeding on mulberry, ricin, and oak leaves. Our people said that one could find such things only in Japan. No sooner had we asked them than they sent us some [silkworm] eggs. We do not know what happens in other countries because everybody thinks only of America, France, Germany, and Japan; they do not look in other directions. Consequently, I look upon the visit to Korea as being good from the economic, bilateral, and political points of view as well.

The way we were received in Vietnam was correct, but they have a different situation, they are at war. A sizable number of people went out in the streets. Generally speaking, my impression is that they are disorganized. Consequently, a good reception, good discussions, mainly in connection with the situation in Vietnam. We put forward our concepts and they totally agreed with them. On our way I discussed with Pham Van Dong some more and he told me a solution would be arrived at sooner than others believed.

Practically, for the last two years they have not had any bombardments. In the past, they were bombed but to a small extent. Haiphong, with the exception of the industrial and shipyard zones, has not been bombarded; only the dwellings nearby were hit. But there the losses were the biggest. The bridge was rebuilt.

With the Vietnamese we also agreed to develop cooperation. They were to meet our representatives charged with economic problems in order to conclude [agreements for] economic cooperation actions. They told us that through their agency we could get into Indochina. They, too, hoped to play a major role in Indochina. Even in the event of a reunification, Vietnam would have an important role in Indochina. From this point of view, therefore, we understood each other very well, the political issues included.

As regards the relationships between the socialist countries, they said: we have also received help from both the Soviet Union and China and we wish to receive such help in the future. They told us that they had had discussions with both the Soviets and the Chinese. They were not partial to taking part in any international conference without China. China did not want to participate in either the FSM [the World Trade Union Federation] or other international bodies; they say, why go there, to have arguments again? This shows that they do not want the divergences to become sharper. They said: if we go there now, the argument will begin again. This is, however, a rational point of view. The Vietnamese said: how can we go to an anti-imperialist conference without China?!

As to all the other issues we discussed with them, we had the same viewpoints, we had no problems with them.

They, too, have good development perspectives, but it is my impression that they have not set to work properly so far. The situation in Korea is different: there they set

themselves the task of becoming a model for the South. According to their conception, the Vietnamese must first solve the unification problem by way of war and then start rebuilding their country. In their view the idea is predominant that they should first achieve unification and afterwards the construction, while the Koreans speak of everything in comparison with the South. I have not seen any such preoccupation in the Vietnamese, but it is likely that they will arrive at such an understanding themselves. These are our impressions, we did not tell them anything in this respect. However, they told us that they were thinking about a development program for industry and the agriculture and it was in this context that we raised the issue of cooperation with them. They did not raise the issue of credits, but said that they agree to cooperate with us on a mutually- advantageous basis and I think they could achieve something as well. You have also seen the communiqué: the visit was good from a bilateral and international point of view, it was a manifestation of solidarity.

In Mongolia the reception was good and the first toasts were good, there were no problems. The communiqué issued was good. The meeting was not so good because they inserted in their speeches, although we had agreed that they should not, a remark that the imperialists wanted to divide the socialist countries, that for this purpose they were using the ideological weapon, and that the duty of socialism was to fight back with all the means available.

During the talks they told us about China, about their historical relationships with China, about the fact that Manchuria had oppressed them for three hundred years, and that China now wanted to swallow them, that Mao Zedong himself had said that Mongolia belonged to China. In fact, in 1924, the Soviet Union signed a secret agreement with Jiang Jieshi [Chang Kai-shek], where it was stated that Mongolia belonged to China. We told them that we had our history, too, that we were under the Turkish yoke, the Tsarist yoke, and the Austro-Hungarian yoke. We also told them about our gold in Moscow. We told them that as we were sure they would inform [Moscow] accordingly. Afterwards they told us about Czechoslovakia, that the imperialists had wanted to occupy it and that the five countries had saved Czechoslovakia. Then I asked him [my interlocutor]: where did you get that idea from? He told me that he knew it from the Poles. I retorted: I did not come here to listen to your lecture about Czechoslovakia, for you to give me lessons, because we know better.

Afterwards, [he spoke] about the fight against imperialism, about China - the same old story all over again.

I told them a few things about the situation in our country, I spoke to them about the bilateral relationships. They said they would think it over and then would see [what to do].

Then the meeting took place. Except for the first part, he kept speaking about the Soviet Union: when it was born, that it was the bastion of peace and so on and so forth. I told him: this question of Czechoslovakia is not in order; either we must say that we do not agree and explain how things stand to the participants or you take it out for good. Afterwards, he referred to the fact that the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which was the main guarantee of peace and security, of the whole socialist system, struggle collectively in support of European security. I told him this was inadmissible. He also referred to the fight against revisionism and left-wing dogmatism, against superpower chauvinism and against nationalism. I do not know what to say: the Chinese say that the Soviets are revisionist, the Soviets say that the Chinese are revisionists; others say that the Yugoslavs are revisionists and I do not know any longer who is [revisionist and who is not]. As regards the nationalists, some say that we are nationalist. Then I said: there are nationalists in Arabia, too; did not the Soviet Union conclude a pact with the Arabs, with the nationalists?! I cannot have an argument with the Arabs over this [issue]. He

suggested that he read only part of the speech and give the remainder in writing. Then we decided not to make speeches, but say a few words of greeting only. Very well and that was all there was to it. I think that, from this point of view, the visit was not of much use because here the Soviets cut in and required them to put in certain things there and then we arrived at the situation I told you about.

Ulan Bator has become a modern city, with more than 300,000 inhabitants. They have a population of 1,280,000 inhabitants, but now they have a very large birth-rate, of 30%. 50% of the population is below age 15. They have a lot of riches, they have a great many animals.

We came back and stopped at Moscow. We have required that, when we come back, we inform them - if they wish - about where we were and what we did where we were. We were met by Kosygin, Suslov and others from the Section; they invited us to have a meal at the airport. We succinctly informed them about this concept of the Chinese to develop the relationships with the socialist countries. After we talked about China, he wanted to say something and then I told him: hold it, I have another three [countries], I was not only to China, and I told him about the other [countries].

It was Kosygin who began, saying that the visit was public, that people discussed, interpreted, saying that from this viewpoint they would tell us their opinion. He thinks that the fact that in China there was no discussion about the community of socialist countries damaged the community of socialist countries; that there, in Comrade Ceaușescu's speech, an appeal was made for the unity of small and medium countries and what kind of unity can exist with Saudi Arabia, where there are slaves. Afterwards, in Comrade Ceaușescu's speech, references were made to superpowers and superpower chauvinism. In fact, Zhou Enlai said this, not me. But did the Soviet Union threaten somebody, did the Soviet Union threaten you, after all, 70% of the Soviet Union's trade is with the socialist countries. That there nothing was said about helping the COMECON countries, only China's 200-million help was mentioned; in fact, what means 200 million for the Soviet Union and Romania!. Then, he said, you talked about the superpowers; after all, Romania borders only with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; that means, therefore, that only the Soviet Union threatens Romania. Maybe the United States of America threatens you, but not the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which is an umbrella [organization] and so on. Maybe China threatens you, but this thing should have been said. Afterwards, you talked about the cultural revolution. The cultural revolution has its international part, too, and he took a booklet out of his pocket: look, by accepting the cultural revolution you accepted the anti-Soviet position, anti-so-and-so, anti- so-and-so. Look, while you were there

they issued a poster - and he takes a poster out of his pocket. But we have always striven to improve our relationships with Romania, we are in the COMECON etc.

Suslov also cut in and resumed this idea that the visit had the effect of worsening the divergences and it was directed against the socialist countries.

After they were finished, I started: I am amazed at the way comrades Kosygin and Suslov have approached the issues and we reject such an interpretation. If the Soviet comrades have some issues to discuss, they must discuss them with us because we did not discuss the issue of big and small countries in China, but set it forth several times, including on the 50th anniversary of the party's foundation; it is a reality that there are small countries, middle countries, powers, and superpowers. And in connection with the superpowers, was it not comrade Brezhnev who said - at the 24th Congress [of the CPSU] - that the Soviet Union was a superpower? But China is a superpower, too. The Chinese did not say that they were a superpower; Zhou Enlai says that he will never conduct a superpower policy. Consequently, there are superpowers, big, middle, and small countries. Then Kosygin says: about Romania I do not even say that it is a middle country, for fear of hurting you. Then I told him that Romania was a small country and as regards Saudi Arabia - that there was

slavery there, but there was exploitation in other countries as well. Marx and Engels spoke a lot about the exploitation of labor force. Then, if we decided not to collaborate with the countries where there was exploitation, we should not collaborate with many of countries. It is all the same to me if there labor force is sold for life, and elsewhere it is sold by the day, it still remains exploitation. If you wanted to discuss this problem with us, you could discuss it with us, not wait to connect it with our visit to China. Then I told him that we did not go there to discuss about others. He said: we negotiate directly with China, not through go- betweens; I do not mean Romania. Then I told him: rest assured that we spoke about you only a little; we were busy dealing with our relationships, not yours. You said that this poster had been published, but why did articles directed against China appear in "Izvestija" and "Krasnaja Zvezda" ? Why did you publish this brochure and made a review of it? Why did the Romanian- speaking and Chinese-speaking radio stations transmit two anti-Chinese conferences? We told you and the Chinese comrades that an end must be put to your swearing at each other. Then he says: look what the Chinese say - that capitalism is being restored in our country! Start talking to the Chinese for a change.

We think that, generally speaking, such vituperation must stop. You surely have your bilateral problems, but what we are concerned with here is the fact that there must exist unity between the socialist countries, and what is detrimental to the unity is just this continual mutual condemnation. When I spoke about doing away with differences, they said: but we have good relations with all the socialist countries. As if the whole world did not know. I said to myself, if you only knew what the Koreans said! I told them, we did not go there to tell them about COMECON when nobody wants to hear about COMECON. We spoke there and said words of appreciation about the Soviet Union. Says he: only two passages! Practically, they had nothing to tell us.

I told him that the fact surprises me that he links this issue with economic relationships. I told him, I have more experience in politics, but how can others interpret the fact that, in connection with this visit, you question economic relationships, the commercial relationships etc. I understand, I cannot make interpretations, but others may understand something else. After all, we wanted to inform you in a comradely manner, for we could have informed you through the agency of our ambassadors. Either he understood or he did not, but suddenly he jumped up and said: what did you say, what issues did you want to raise through the embassy?! I told him, we cannot accept the kind of discussion and affirmations you made here; on the contrary, we think that the visit served the unity of the socialist countries. This is our position and, of course, we will inform the Executive Committee and the Central Committee about your position. And, in connection with this, he said: what, you will inform both the Central Committee and via the embassy?! We said just as between friends; we told you all this just because between us there are good, friendly relationships; we told you so that you may know our opinions, too. Why we thanked the Chinese, well, because 200 million means something for us; for the Soviet Union it is little, true; but they gave us a credit, gave us help and we thanked them. If tomorrow you also give us a credit, we will thank you as well.

Such was the spirit of the discussions. To wind up, we said that we wanted to develop relationships. Kosygin took the floor again, saying that - in his opinion - the discussions had been useful. I also told him that we, too, thought the discussions had been useful.

In addition, we said that the discussions have to be held in a different spirit, starting from trust, mutual respect and then it will possible to draw good conclusions, that we appreciate the discussions as being useful and that we wish to develop the relationships. Of course, the discussions are useful, but they would have been more useful if they had been held in a different spirit. With that we concluded, stood up, and left.

The ambassadors of the countries we had visited were also present, we said goodbye

to them, and left.

This is, so to say, the "thread" of the visit.

Of course, it is clear that the visit had a big international echo - in both the capitalist countries and the communist parties, including those in the capitalist world. - and the echo was positive. And the appreciations of the representatives of many socialist countries in the sense that this visit will perhaps help diminish the divergences, are not to the Soviets' liking.

They realized that our favourable opinions about China would exert a good influence. They have this position and that is why they tried to raise the issues in the way they raised them. They prepared Tsedenbal as well, maybe some others, too. It seems, however, that things in their country have also evolved gradually because four days before they had let us know that they would have us stay and we would go to the villa, but in the end Kosygin and the others came to the airport. Maybe they also have different discussions and opinions and they had reached the conclusion that it was better to go on this way, to test their force. This means that they are still prisoners of the old policy, that they are more willing to try to reach an understanding with the United States and with others than with China. They are not afraid that the Chinese will attack them - in fact the Chinese told us that they did not have such intentions - but they fear that the Chinese influence in the world will increase.

When Kosygin said that Romania negotiated with the Americans, that it practice a broader policy than theirs, I told him: I could not say we carry on a broader policy; you meet the Americans at the SALT discussions, you are co-presidents at Geneva so that one cannot say that others are ahead of you.

When I told them that the Chinese had raised the issue of Japanese militarism, Kosygin said: in fact, the Chinese develop wide economic relation-ships with Japan and in this way they support Japanese militarism. But they did not say as much as a single word about their having sold Siberia to the Japanese.

I think, therefore, that the visit took place in good conditions - except for these minuses in Mongolia and the discussions with the Soviets - but our main objective was the visit to China, Korea, and Vietnam. I feel that [the visit] had better results than we had initially expected. We now have our own impressions and are aware of what is going on there.

From an international point of view, the visit was beneficial. Irrespective of anything the Soviets and others may try to say, the visit will be favorable for the development of relationships between the socialist countries, between the communist and workers' parties, which will be something positive. This is how I size up the situation.

Now a few impressions about our embassies. Except for the ambassador in Beijing, the other ambassadors are weak, incapable, people who disinform about the situation in the relevant country, beginning with the preparations here. They kept sending one telegram after another complaining that they had nothing to eat, that they had to bring everything from home. They insisted on meat being brought to Beijing; to Korea, too. But this is another issue. An end must be put to this state of affairs, there must be order and discipline as regards our Party Economy. Both in China and in Korea. The staff of the embassy called [George] Macovescu in and told him that there was nothing there. I did not go there, but Lenutza [Elena] and the other comrades went to the shop and found that there was everything there. Korea's production of eggs is two billion per year and in 1975 it will amount to three billion. Only in 1975 will we be able to produce two billion eggs. [The Koreans] eat 80 kg of fish per inhabitant and per year, therefore there is no point in complaining that one has

nothing to eat in such a country. Even in Mongolia, the land of meat, they brought meat from Beijing. In Hanoi there was the same situation. There was food there, food products were provided. The persons belonging to the embassy staff do not know the real situation, neither the ones in Hanoi nor the ones in Korea and the ones in Mongolia. Let us change them and send them to work in production. They should not stay abroad more than eight years and then they should work in production, otherwise they will become detached from reality.

In addition, I would mention that our apparatus is undisciplined. I am discontented with the behavior of our comrades in the delegation; they were refractory and did not help the delegation. In fact, I told them that, but they put their hands in their pockets or locked themselves in their rooms, they did not act, they did not make any effort. It is true that comrade [Ion Gheorghe] Maurer was ill; but, frankly speaking, he exaggerated, too, because he practically did not go anywhere and this made a bad impression. It is true that he was ill and this was not easy. But to stay locked in your room, not to go out anywhere, is also bad. I am referring to the other comrades, who are young and should have been preoccupied as there were a lot of problems there; everyone entered his room and waited to be woken up, to be invited.

As regards the preparation of materials, I had [only] the two counselors since [Ion] Iliescu practically did not work as he should have. I had the two counselors - Dobrescu and Mitea. Only [Stefan] Andrei and [George] Macovescu worked to draw up the communiqué.

I am saying all this only to keep in mind the fact that we must learn our lesson [from all that had happened].

By and large, a situation was created as if everybody was going on a trip; in addition, there was this attitude towards Asia; since we left home, we were repeatedly told that we must guard be wary of everything. Hence this attitude of staying indoors, in one's room, because it is warm or for some reason or other. That is why they [the embassy staff] brought even water from Bucharest, they took water from Beijing for Mongolia, where there is a mountainous region and the water is clean. Accordingly, we discussed this when we still were in Beijing because they [the embassy staff] wanted to send one more plane; however, they went shopping to Beijing. But this belongs to another group of problems, related to the Party Economy, the Party Chancellor's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the International Section [of the CC of the RCP].

We found this kind of disinformation elsewhere as well, but here [in China] ignoring the realities in the country in which they conducted their activity was more pregnant and [moreover] there were no contacts whatsoever with the leadership and the apparatus in the country in question and that is why the results were bad. Besides Beijing, where [ambassador] Duma performed well -

he was known everywhere, in point of fact he was the only ambassador who maintained contacts in the period of the cultural revolution and Zhou Enlai mentioned this fact several times; he was also known by officials in Shanghai and Nanking.

Lack of discipline as regards security, including in the case of pilots. Although I had established with them not to make stopovers anywhere any longer, to fly directly from Ulan Bator to Moscow, and to make up a list so that in the presidential plane only the strictly required number of persons may travel, in Ulan Bator it was found out that in fact people and baggage were taken out of the plane and in their place baggage for 14 people, among which items of furniture as well, and including baggage [belonging to ambassador] Duma were loaded. I asked Stoica what was happening, but he did not know. I give you an order not take either people or baggage [in the plane] any more, but - in spite of all this - you load the plane with two tons. This is also valid for the security people, as if they were rich men; they do not

work industriously, they do not do their duty, there is a lack of discipline. We discussed about that in the plane, too, but here I wanted to say only that.

We will have to think about it in this respect, too. This means that people went there to buy furniture; this means that we give [them] too much hard currency. Now it is my wish that we decide to forbid bringing things from abroad. This has already become a problem; everybody struggles to stay as long as possible [abroad] to buy the devil knows what incredible things there. We must issue a decision or a decree regarding bringing things from abroad, just like the Yugoslavs did five years ago. You do not find such a situation either in the Soviet Union or in China or anywhere else for that matter. In addition, [the staff of] all the embassies in the countries around China go shopping to Beijing. I have learned that even the staff of our embassy in Moscow go shopping to Beijing. Maybe the same thing happens elsewhere. This is disorder. I do not want to inform [you] further on this [issue] any longer as we will discuss it in more detail and decide what steps should be taken.

I have eventually learned that [our staff in] Ulan Bator brought meat from Beijing. Whatever for?

Comrade Ion Florescu: For Ulan Bator we brought only 60 kg of lamb and chicken [intended] for the plane.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: We will discuss it because you do not disgrace yourself, you disgrace the homeland, the people. Hence, beside the results there are also these [unpleasant] things, mainly taking into account the fact that Asians are very open. The fact that we were so open with both the population and the children was noticed. What conclusion will they reach? These are boyars, revisionists who have become bourgeois, and want to bring along everything from home.

When there was an opportunity to buy something, they all rushed into the shops. Well, these are other things.

Consequently, except for these minuses of ours, in the other respects I think that - generally speaking - things went well.

If you have any questions, comrades?

Comrade Manea Mănescu: There are no questions, that is the way things are.

Comrade Miron Constantinescu: The visit has found a worldwide echo.

Comrade Emil Bodnăras: Comrade Ceaușescu's account of the visit fully confirms the feelings that we, the ones who followed the progress of the visit, got, and we were exceptionally well informed and we thank the delegation for having informed us so well, by both telephone conversations and press news and images - strong feelings and impressions we formed about the very special success of this visit and its importance from all points of view, as regards both our bilateral relationships with the countries that had been visited - and I have in view the fact that the main objective was

China, Korea, and Vietnam - and from the viewpoint of international policy, with respect to both the issues connected with the world socialist system and the issues linked with the interests of the development of the international communist and workers' movement, the relationships with the parties and their focusing on the great reality China represents after the cultural revolution, and its direction [of development]. All these aspects were brought out (this was perhaps

the cause of the Soviet comrades' displeasure) by the way our delegation presented them in speeches, rendering homage in this way to the industriousness of a people, the industriousness of a party that has the honor of building socialism in a country with eight hundred million inhabitants.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: I spoke about the successes obtained in the difficult internal conditions of the cultural revolution; I did not say that the cultural revolution was good.

Comrade Emil Bodnăras: All the movement, all the parties - this is what we have found out - all the socialist countries, including those which - in official manifestations - faithfully follow the directives of the leading center, not to mention the big echo in the international press, on the radio, in the whole world. And I think we can assert that this interest did not become exhausted. The official communiqués, including the one in Mongolia, are documents of special political value because each of them - beginning with China, Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia - once more made salient the position that we defend consistently in building the relationships between the socialist countries, the communist parties, the relationships in the world, a position of principle in the development of the whole revolutionary process, documents which are a strong contribution to the triumph of this line of thinking.

We note with deep satisfaction the serious arguments of the Chinese comrades, registered by our delegation, concerning the recognizance of the fact that the functioning of a leading center in the communist and workers' movement is impossible; this is a big gain for the communist movement, against those who want to revive this [concept], including by military force.

Comrade János Fazekas: Let us agree.

Comrade Paul Niculescu-Mizil: I also want to say a couple of words in addition to what comrade Emil Bodnăras said. It is also my opinion that we must highly appreciate the activity conducted by comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu in his quality as chief of the delegation since this [visit] is a specially important moment in the political activity of our party and state. Romania's relationships with China, but not only Romania's, but also those of the Romanian Communist Party with the Chinese Communist Party, have a great importance for our country, for our people. I think that these relationships and the way the visit took place have a general importance not only for the interests of the Romanian people. True, we went to China and the other countries in Asia for the interests of the Romanian people, but the visit has an importance that goes beyond this boundary since it was a manifestation of the fact that the Secretary General has asserted, with maximum clarity, the position of our party as regards overcoming difficulties in the communist movement, in the relationships between the socialist countries. It was the first time that the Chinese people had actually become aware of the fact that the idea of the unity of all the communist and workers' parties existed. I have only wanted to emphasize this aspect.

In my opinion, the force of our foreign policy, which was confirmed on the occasion of the visit, consists in its very consistency and principality; it is not a policy based on circumstance, but it is a just policy, a policy of principle, and any of us can go any time to both Beijing and Moscow, Tirana, Belgrade, looking in the eyes of his interlocutor, without hiding anything, for it is not a conjectural policy, but a policy of principle.

I would also emphasize that the fact seems positive to me that we visited four countries of Asia, even taking into account what happened in Mongolia, because this brings out our wish to develop the relationships with all the countries, that we feel that differences of opinions can exist, but they should not hinder the development of the relationships. It was a practical manifestation, and we can say any time - look, we

went to five countries.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: Yes, in actual fact we went to five countries.

Let this be a special communiqué, a commentary.

Comrade Paul Niculescu-Mizil: [Regarding] the way the discussions in Moscow took place, I think our manner of responding was good. We cannot accept a misconstrual of the results of the visit in any form whatsoever.

Our delegation did not go to China for the purpose of militating against the interests of other socialist countries. No document displays this. I think we can express this view.

Personally, I had in Berlin the opportunity of noticing the echo of our delegation's visit to the countries in Asia, especially to China. I must tell you that not only did no one find fault with it, but a great many delegations present at the congress in Berlin inquired about the visit and expressed - clearly and openly - their viewpoint, which underlined the importance of the visit not only for Romania, but also for the communist and workers' movement.

For this reason, I agree with comrade Bodnăras' proposal that we deem this event as having a special importance.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: I was of the opinion, however, that we ought to make a public statement.

Comrade Emil Bodnăras: Let us give it on behalf of the Executive Committee. And do this at the first plenary meeting of the Central Committee. I would propose that, at the first opportunity, comrade Ceaușescu give elements of this visit. I would also propose that the main results of the visit be disseminated within the framework of the party hierarchy so that they can be informed [about them], so that they come to know [them].

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: I think it is good to proceed as follows: first of all, on the basis of the information here, to make - more synthetically - a statement addressed to the socialist countries and a number of communist parties, excluding the last part about the visit to the Soviet Union. Let us inform, therefore, the socialist countries and the communist parties. Secondly, somewhat in the spirit of our discussion here, to inform the Central Committee and the party senior staff. I think there is no point in giving them the stenograms. Let us inform the party senior staff, right in the party organizations.

Comrade Gheorghe Stoica: [The information] may have the form of an presentation to the Great National Assembly, the highest forum of the country.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: I thought about it, too, but in this context, namely the position of the Soviet Union, it would be ostentatious.

First of all, we should do this at the plenary meeting. But we will see about that.

On the way, I expressed the opinion that perhaps it would be better to publish a collection of impressions.

Comrade Miron Constantinescu: A book.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: That is right. We are now contemplating publishing something about all the meetings, all the documents, the visits to all the enterprises, everywhere. Only this could make up a book. Let us also make a presentation of impressions and some historical aspects.

Comrade Gheorghe Stoica: However, a presentation at the Great National Assembly would be welcome.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: If we did that, we would have to make a presentation of the international situation. Then we would have to say I am going on a visit to Finland. There also was [Gustav] Heinemann's visit etc.

Comrade Paul Niculescu-Mizil: (reads the communiqué on the meeting of the Executive Committee).

Comrade Miron Constantinescu: Maybe the solidarity with the Vietnamese people should be emphasized.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: Let us say at the same time that it is a manifestation of the international solidarity in the struggle against imperialism.

Agreed?

(All the comrades agree).

Comrade Gheorghe Pans: There is a proposal to the effect that, a few days after comrade Ceaușescu's return from the visit to Finland, to convene the Grand National Assembly for 7 July through 9. I would like to tell you about what is proposed for inclusion in the agenda (reads the agenda).

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: But then the harvesting campaign will be in full swing. What about postponing it for the period about 15 August through August 23?

There is one more problem. There are a few delegations here, among which a delegation of the national liberation movement from Mozambique. I am thinking about proposing the establishment of a kind of semi-recognition relationships with these movements, just for strengthening their authority, in accordance with our position of supporting those forces, those movements which operate in certain territories.

Do you agree?

(all the comrades agree).

If there are no more problems, this meeting is adjourned.

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