

July 29, 1953

**Telegram from Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry
regarding a Meeting with Mao Zedong**

Citation:

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Summary:

Telegram from Kuznetsov to MID regarding his meeting with Mao on 28 July 1953, during which Mao talked about the steps which had led to and now, had to be taken following the signing of the armistice.

Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

From BEIJING From Kuznetsov

To MID USSR URGENT

Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Zorin, Podtserob

[reporting a meeting of July 28]

After listening to the greetings of the CC CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP. Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach an armistice not only by force of military reasons but also by force of political and economic reasons. In military matters the last year has shown that the enemy is not only not in a condition to advance on land but is also not able firmly to hold and defend the line of the front. The Chinese troops had begun not only to conduct a positional war but also to break through the front.

Among the political causes that forced the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao noted the military contradictions in the camp of the imperialists and the significant activation of world social opinion, which is speaking out against the war in Korea.

Concerning economic causes, Mao stated that in the first two years of the war the American monopolists amassed colossal profits in military orders and deliveries, but with the end of the negotiations for an armistice, and also as a result of the strengthening of the movement to end the war in Korea, their profits began to fall sharply.

Having returned to the military side of the matter, Mao noted that from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year in order to occupy more favorable borders along the Changan river. Further movement to the south would risk stretching out the flanks in the west and east shore of Korea. In this case the danger of landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean troops would grow significantly.

Touching on further steps after the signing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the government of the PRC has a number of questions about which it would like to consult with the government of the USSR. By approximately 10 August, we will prepare a proposed plan of measures about which it is necessary to consult with the Soviet government.

Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting.

KUZNETSOV