

November 1, 1962

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
to the Soviet Mission in New York**

Citation:

"Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in New York", November 1, 1962, Wilson Center Digital Archive, AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/112652>

Summary:

Instructions to the Soviet Mission in New York on negotiations with the UN, especially on the issues of the dismantling of weapons, American bases in Turkey, lifting the blockade and the composition of the group of Security Council agents.

Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Translation - English

To the SOVIET MISSION-- COMRADES KUZNETSOV, ZORIN

First. Judging by your reports [several words deleted--ed.], the USA and several other states belonging to the Security Council may try to complicate the negotiations underway now in New York among the representatives of the USSR, Cuba, and the USA, by submitting all the issues being discussed in the course of the negotiations to the consideration of the Security Council. This is visible in the proposal by the Irish delegate, Boland, that the Security Council hear U Thant's report and pass a resolution for delegating to U Thant the task of creating a special UN mechanism for monitoring the dismantling of the special installations in Cuba. Besides this, his proposal also stipulates that the other issues of the "Cuban settlement" may also be discussed in the Security Council, although the decision on it may be postponed somewhat. All this means that the USA, along with other countries that support its policy, wants to take all these issues into its own hands in order to drag out the resolution of the issues concerning the security guarantees for Cuba, as well as the securing, by way of agreements, of the USA duties that have emerged from the exchange of messages between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy.

You should firmly object to such an attempt to replace the trilateral negotiations, in which U Thant is participating, with a submission of all the issues to the consideration of the Security Council, in which it would be impossible, given its present composition, to reach resolutions that are advantageous for us. Make a statement about this in categorical form to U Thant, Stevenson, as well as to the UN delegates of the other nations that will deal with this issue along with you. Insist on the necessity of prolonging the trilateral negotiations with U Thant's participation, and on their speedy completion by securing the results of the negotiations in a corresponding written agreement (a protocol statement).

Second. 1. On the monitoring of the dismantling and the removal of the special installations. Concerning the issue of monitoring the performance of work towards dismantling the special installations in Cuba, you should operate on the assumption that the dismantling process will be completed by 2 November, and that the dismantled materials will be removed from Cuba by 7 or 8 November, or at the very latest 10 November, if our ships arrive without hindrance in Cuban ports.

2. On the composition of the group of Security Council agents. Proceed on the assumption that for us it is acceptable that the group monitoring the fulfillment of duties to dismantle and remove the special missile installations from Cuba contain representatives from the neutral states proposed by U Thant (Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Switzerland). Also you may not object to the proposal that this group consist of eight representatives of the neutral nations belonging to the Disarmament Committee (India, Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), if such a proposal is introduced. There are also no objections to including in the group the representatives of Indonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana, as you propose.

We consider unacceptable the Americans' proposal for the creation of monitoring groups composed of the USA, the USSR, and Cuba.

3. On the monitoring of vessels bound for Cuba, after the lifting of the blockade. You should proceed from the fact that we have given our consent to the monitoring of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by the International Red Cross. It is envisaged that this monitoring will be carried out until the end of the so-called "quarantine." From this it follows that the monitoring will be short-term. Your proposal that the system for monitoring the vessels be operative for the duration, for example, of a year, is not appropriate.

4. On UN posts. In connection with the issue you proposed of monitoring certain regions of the USA and several Latin American countries with the goal of determining

whether preparations for the invasion of Cuba are underway, follow the instructions in which we expressed our positive view of U Thant's proposal concerning the "UN presence" in these countries and in Cuba.

You may approve the proposal that the composition of the UN posts for carrying out the indicated functions be similar to the composition of the groups of agents for monitoring the dismantling and removal of special missile materials from the territory of Cuba.

5. On American bases in Turkey. We agree with your opinion. You should not in any circumstance touch on this issue in your negotiations with U Thant and the USA representatives in New York, since it is the subject of direct negotiations between Moscow and Washington. On this point we are keeping you informed only for your personal edification.

6. On the concept of "offensive weaponry." We consider it inexpedient to change the formula that was used in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's messages and in the protocol draft communicated by you, namely: "weaponry which the USA government has called offensive."

Your proposal to call this weaponry "means for launching nuclear arms at an operational distance greater than (so many) kilometers" could allow the discussion of this issue to acquire an undesirable character for us, since the Americans will naturally be trying to broaden the scope of the weaponry prohibited from installations in Cuba.

Third. Concerning all the main issues relevant to the duties of the parties-- the USA, the USSR, and Cuba-- and the securing of their corresponding pledges, follow the text of the protocol statement and the instructions contained in our memoranda. Bear in mind, however, that as we have already informed you, you will be carrying out these instructions, as well as the instructions contained in the "second" point of the present telegram, only on receiving reports from us that our Cuban friends have agreed to these proposals.

A.G.

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