

**March 16, 1961**

**Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic  
in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of  
Hungary**

**Citation:**

"Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary", March 16, 1961, Wilson Center Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/ca-003645/1961 5.d. Translated by József Litkei.  
<https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/113387>

**Summary:**

A report by Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth on a conversation he held with Soviet Ambassador Puzanov. Topics of discussions included the postponement of Nikita Khrushchev to Pyongyang and the problem of international recognition of South Korea.

**Original Language:**

Hungarian

**Contents:**

Translation - English

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.  
Top Secret.

90/1961

Pyongyang, 16 March 1961.

Subject: Conversation with Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the Korean question and the forthcoming visit of Comrade Khrushchev to Korea.

During my conversation with Soviet ambassador Comrade Puzanov on 15 March, I asked his opinion concerning Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea, and whether he thinks that such a visit would be timely now. At the same time, I mentioned that a visit by Comrade Khrushchev would place Korea and the Korean question into the focus of international relations, and the Korean comrades, who are inclined to push their cause excessively into the foreground, could misunderstand this and perceive it as the justification of their position.

In his answer, Comrade Puzanov told me that the visit of Comrade Khrushchev was already timely in 1959, but at that time, during his [Khrushchev's] negotiation with Comrade Kim Il Sung in Beijing, they both came to the conclusion that due to the international situation of that time (immediately after Comrade Khrushchev's visit to the USA), this would not be advisable. Comrade Khrushchev would have visited Korea last October, but this was canceled solely due to the lack of time: according to original plans, Comrade Khrushchev was scheduled to arrive back from New York at the end of September, but his trip to the US lasted longer, and after his return he was absorbed with preparing for the Moscow conference. The CPSU CC sent the KWP CC a very warm, comradely letter concerning the postponement of the visit to Korea, and upon receiving it, Comrade Kim Il Sung immediately told him (Puzanov) that he understood perfectly and also agreed with it from party-minded point of view.

During their visit to Moscow (in November 1960), the Korean party delegation visited Comrade Khrushchev, and Comrade Kim Il Sung inquired when [Khrushchev's] Korean visit could take place. In his answer, Comrade Khrushchev stated his great wish to come to Korea, but asked at the same time to examine this question at a later point in time, since due to the preparation for the Twenty-second Congress, he could not give a concrete answer at that moment.

According to Comrade Puzanov, there is no danger that the Korean comrades would present the Korean question as the central question of the international situation. He told me that during his Moscow visit in June 1960, Comrade Kim Il Sung gave Comrade Khrushchev an account of their policy towards South Korea. Comrade Khrushchev agreed with this [policy], and asked whether they [the Koreans] would want to elaborate a proposal of confederation as the Germans had done. Kim Il Sung answered positively, and the Korean comrades did the further work, and did it well in his [Puzanov's] opinion. It is apparent that the Korean comrades are now seeking to win public opinion in South Korea, and they have achieved some results in this respect. An increasing number of people support the proposals of the DPRK, and the anti-American mood is increasing as well. According to the opinion of Comrade Puzanov, the policy of the DPRK corresponds to the common policy of our camp regarding peaceful coexistence. Of course, the unification of the country requires a lot of further work, and this will not happen in the near future. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have offered, and continue to offer, serious assistance to the DPRK in making its position known and accepted. The Korean comrades well know that without this assistance they cannot achieve results; international power relations have changed so much in our favor that the governments of capitalist countries

cannot dismiss the opinion of the socialist camp. Comrade Puzanov mentioned that the Soviet foreign ministry recently instructed ambassadors working in neutral countries to inform the leaders of their host country of the position of the DPRK during their conversations with them [the host country]. This has achieved positive results in many places. The content of the DPRK government's "Memorandum," which was issued on the Korean question prior to the opening of the second half of the UN General Assembly's 15th session, was also delivered through the above-mentioned Soviet ambassadors to the governments of neutral states.

Comrade Puzanov did not rule out the possibility that, depending on how the South Korean situation evolves in the future, the DPRK might take a new position and make new proposals, which we all will support.

I informed Comrade Puzanov of my conversation with Comrade Deputy Prime Minister Kim Tae-hui during which he told me that they will not protest against the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and South Korea into the Interparliamentary Union. Comrade Puzanov said that the DPRK had already practically acknowledged South Korea at the 1954 Geneva conference, even if this fact was later somewhat withheld by the DPRK, or rather, one could observe irresolution [in this regard]. So, for example, when publishing an earlier speech Comrade Zorin gave at the UN, Korean newspapers omitted that part which concerned the two states formed on the Korean peninsula. On another occasion, upon receiving in advance a Soviet government communique supporting the proposals of the DPRK, they requested replacing the expression "two states" by "two governments."

The conversation lasted for approximately three hours, with Comrade Fendler present as interpreter.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth