

June 17, 1982

Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products

Citation:

"Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products", June 17, 1982, Wilson Center Digital Archive, State Department FOIA release. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #6.
<https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/114251>

Summary:

A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan's nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government

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Problem Countries File

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date ⁵ 6/17/82 ₅₂₄

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. OES/N - J. DEVINE (PER YOUR REQUEST)		
2. OES/NEP - J. SALMON / F. MCGOLDRICK (PER YOUR REQUEST)		
3. ACDA/NWC - K. STRANG (FYI)		
4. INR/PMA - B. FRISA (FYI)		
5. M - LEWIS DUNN (FYI) ✓		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/DRCON UNINTEL ATTACHMENT

HERE ARE SOME INFORMAL NOTES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF SOME OF DEMARCHES MADE IN LATE 81/82 RE EXPORTS TO PROBLEM COUNTRIES ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHINA - EARLIER FULL CHRONOLOGY DONE IN INDIA, IRAQ, ISRAEL, KOREA, LIBYA, PAKISTAN, ROMANIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SYRIA. ANY ADDITIONS OR CORRECTIONS ARE WELCOME. ALL THE MATERIAL IS FROM OUR FILES AND MIGHT NOT BE COMPLETE. IF YOU HAVE SIMILAR CHRONOLOGIES, WOULD APPRECIATE GETTING A COPY. THANKS

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FROM: (Name, org symbol, Agency/Post) **TERRY JONES** OES/NEP

Room No. - Bldg. **24752**

Phone No. **24752**

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76) Prescribed by GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

ARGENTINA, page 1 ~~SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRIBUTION/NOCCON/NOINTTEL~~

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S. 24A

OES/NEP Informal Notes from Argentina File on Demarches and other Useful Cables (Chronological Order)

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State 289019, 10/29/81. Export license request. ~~4(D)~~ graphite and boral for Argentina supplied research reactor in Peru.

Vienna 14309, 12/3/81, ~~S/NE/NS/SS Roger Channel~~. Mission is not aware of detailed IAEA study regarding safeguards at Atucha I. Argentina had declared 12 locally produced fuel elements irradiated in Atucha I. IAEA is planning to evaluate facility and Argentina is next for series of detailed audits of safeguards at facilities. Mission recommends IAEA consider Atucha I for such evaluation and urges fafeguards evaluation to determine whether undeclared fuel elements may have been irradiated in Atucha I.

State 321958, 12/5/81, ~~S/NE/NS/SS~~. Info for IAEA inspector going to Argentina: we believe some substitutions may have been made whereby unsafeguarded, defective zircaloy tubes were substituted for safe-guarded tubes which had passed quality control proceduzes.

DECAPTIONED

~~4(D)~~

1.4(D)

State 338011, 12/22/81, ~~S/NE/NS/SS~~. Info for IAEA inspector going to Argentina. Inform IAEA that perhaps as many as 3000 of the 100,000 tubes may have been replaced; thorough examination of boxes appears warranted; IAEA may consider future arrangements with shippers to apply seals on such containers.

State 16486, 1/2/82, ~~S/NE/NS/SS~~ to Bonn Arg. unsafeguarded fuel fab. line. requests FRG to see if line comes under replication provision of IAEA safeguards agreement on FRG supplied fuel fab. facility.

London 1870, 1/27/82 ~~(S)~~. Argentine connection. BBC report. Embassy asks info on Nucleonics Week article on Argentine reprocessing plant.

Buenos 593, 2/1/82, ~~S/NE/NS/SS~~ Argentine connection. ref London 1870. Reprocessing plant at Ezeiza Atomic Center expected to come on line in 1982. Plant will be safeguarded while reprocessing safeguarded fuel elements. It is being constructed using wholly indigeneous technology. Rudel has no official ties with FRG.

State 27391, 2/2/82 (ref London 1870). Info on Nucleonics Week 1/14 article. Indigeneous reprocessing plant will reprocess Atucha I spent fuel, capacity of 60-70 fuel assemblies/year to separate 15-18 kg of Pu.

Buenos 847, 2/12/82 ~~(S)~~ Note from MFA on US authorization for export of nuclear grade graphite and Boral plates for construction of 10MW res. reactor for Peru: No explosive use and no retransfer assurances given.

Vienna 1945, 2/18/82. Nuclear Fuel and Fabrication in Argentina. IAEA officials said article that 50% of Atucha I is fueled with indigeneously manufactured fuel elements did not correspond to IAEA understanding of the situation.

~~SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRIBUTION/NOCCON/NOINTTEL~~ DECAPTIONED

REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL

Argentina, Page 2

SECRET/EXDIS
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Bonn 4099, 2/24/82(S) Fuel fab facility for Embalse is not replication of German technology and is more advanced than that in FRG.

State 40556, 2/16/82, (C) to Ottawa, USIAEA. Nuclear Fuel Fab in Argentina - article from Nuclear Fuel. requests info on accuracy of artic.

State 53127, 3/1/82, S/EXDIS. Argentina/graphite. Embassy asked to provide info on FRG firm Ringsdorff Werke gmbh which may supply high purity graphite blocks to Argentina. Dept believes such transfer should take place only with appropriate safeguards.

State 54613, 3/2/82,S/EXDIS. to Bonn, Bern. Argentina Heavy Water. It appears CNEA will buy 20 T of heavy water. Rohstoff/Einfuhr, affiliated with ORDA/Hemel is involved. Addressees asked to take any action possible to prevent firms of their host nation from providing unsafeguarded heavy water to Argentina. (note ORDA/Hempel was used by CNEA earlier to purchase unsafeguarded heavy water from PRC).

Bonn 4809, 3/4/82,S/EXDIS. Argentina/Graphite. ref State53127. Rouget said FRG will block safe of high purity graphite blocks, asks about info that US firm is involved.

Ottawa 1630, 3/5/82(C) Nuclear Fuel Fab. and Use in Argentina. State 40556 requested clarification of info in Nuclear Fuel Article that Canada has transferred fuel fabrication technology and equipment to Argentina. Digangi, Extaff, said no transfer occurred. GOA manufacturing capability is indigeneous.

Bonn 5296, 3/11/82, S/EXDIS. Nuclear Export Alert. Argentina Heavy Water (ref State 54613). Rouget said he learned from Hempel that deal was only for transport of heavy water. Heavy water would not touch German soil. Foreign office could not block transaction - Rouget asked if heavy water comes from China or USSR.

State 74379, 3/20/82,S/EXDIS to Bonn. Argentina/Heavy Water. (Bonn 5296). US cannot confirm that PRC is supplying heavy water but infer it is likely because no other supplier is indicated and Hempel/ORDA has been involved before. US only has info that Argentina is purchaser and Hempel/ORDA is intermediary. No info on supplier or safeguards status. US hopes FRG can indicate to Hempel the serious problems entailed by such transactions.

Buenos Aires 2836, 3/22/82(C) Argentina Use of Soviet Enrichment Services. Press statement by Castro Madero that Arg. would use Soviet enrichment services.

Buenos 1593, 3/22/82(C) Castro Madero said Argentina is sending 100 kg of Argentine U to USSR to be enriched to 20% since they could not get such services from US because of NNPA.

State 78091, 3/24/82,S/EXDIS to Bonn. responds to Rouget's suggestion that some US firms are involved in supply of graphite and boral plates. They relate to supply for fabrication of 10 MW res. reactor Argentina is building for Peru. US has received necessary assurances from Argentina and Peru. It appears possible (State 53127) transaction may be Argentine try at lining up alternate source of supply in event graphite cannot be obtained from US supplier. IF so, USG has no objection if FRG obtains same assurances. US objects if it is for construction of natural U - Graphite moderated reactor.

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Argentina, Page 3

State 80080, 3/25/82(C) to Buenos Aires. Arge. Use of Soviet Enrichment Services (inquiry in Buenos Aires 1593). No new developments in question of US supply of 20% EU to Argentina - US cannot approve because of statutory licensing criteria.

Bern 1630, 4/16/82,S/EXDIS. Nuclear Export Alert - Argentina, Heavy Water. (State 54613 ref) . Embassy made demarche. Favre said he would have staff alert to any indication ORDA was involved in shipment of heavy water to Argentina but doubted they would develop any information. ORDA would not be required to seek GOS approval for shipments not touching Swiss territory.

State 109192, 4/23/82,S/EXDIS to Rome. Argentina/Reprocessing. Embassy requested to provide GCI with info: Italian firm is arranging to supply a fuel element chipping machine for use in the unsafeguarded reprocessing plant under construction in Argentina. The item is on the NSG list and cannot be transferred without safeguards. Transfer is inadvisable unless Argentina agrees to accept full scope safeguards and renounce PNE's.

London 9001, 4/26/82(C) Supply of EU to Argentina. UK asks for info on report USSR is to supply Argentina with 100 kg of EU at 20% enrichment.

State 116216, 4/29/82(C) Supply of EU to Argentina (to London). Inform FCO in response to London 9001 that USSR confirmed in December Argentina was seeking enrichment services. USG presumes USSR will require safeguards per NSG guidelines. Fuel is possibly for RA-6.

Rome 10283,4/28/82(S) Italians given intelligence related talking points on Argentina - arrangements of Italian supply of fuel chopping machine to Argentina. Italians said they will follow up with appropriate Italian embassies (Stoiber visit).

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Brazil, Page 1

S24B

OES/NEP Notes on Brazil (Chronological Order) RELEASED IN FULL

Bonn 18725, 9/23/81, S/EXDIS. Nuc. Reprocessing Facility at IPEN - Info given Scicouns at Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center.

State 6868, 1/11/82, S/EXDIS to Bonn. Nuclear Export Alert - Graphite. FRG Official informed that Brazil may be in the market for more than 200 MT of nuclear grade graphite - potential supplier is FRG firm C. Conrody gmbh, Nurnberg). Info requested. US hopes it would be exported under safeguards and for proper end use.

Bonn 1888, 1/27/82 S/EXDIS (ref State 6868). Brazil has not approached FRG firm to order 200 T of graphite. Such an export would require an export license and the FRG would then ensure that safeguards are in effect before issuing license.

State 109460, 4/22/82(C) Nuclear Consultations with Brazil. Dept. wishes to propose bilateral discussions of nuclear affairs with GOB during July - Sept. and would be willing to send US team.

Brasilia 3723, 5/5/82, C/LIMDIS. US- Brazil nuclear consultations. Venturi (NSC Chief) agreed that consultations should be done after Pres. Figueredo's visit.

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China - Notes from China file (chronological order)

524C

Rome 10165, 4/27/82(S) Nuclear Export Control and Intelligence Sharing Consultations (Stoiber trip). Chinese had offered heavy water to Italy and had insisted on Italian adherence to NSG guidelines.

Brussels 6095, 4/29/82 (S) Nuclear Consultations (stoiber visit). FRG laws did not permit them any means of taking legal measures against ORDA/Hempel.

London 9814, 5/4/82(C) Visit of PDAB Marshall. US is still reviewing UK proposal requesting approval for export of US design technology through Winstinghouse license abroad. UK is seeking similar authorization to that given Framatome. One option would have Framatome supply the nuclear island while UK supplies the balance of the plant.

State 126722, 5/10/82(S) Nuclear trigger list, export control and intelligence sharing discussions (stoiber trip). UK had been approached by PRC who asked if UK would be interested in purchasing LEU. PRC also had promised to contact FRG if ORDA/Hempel attempted to purchase nuclear materials from PRC without abiding by NSG guidelines.

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S24D

Notes on India - chronological order for 1982

State 309110, 11/20/81, S/EXDIS. Chinese heavy water sales to India. Demarche to Tokyo and London passing on info and asking for help to stop export.

Bonn 23442, 11/27/81, S/EXDIS. Export of Zirconium sheet to FRG for fabrication of fuel channels for TAPS. Letter of assurance from Indian Dept of Atomic Energy (ref State 306885).

Bonn 24431, 12/11/81, S/EXDIS. Nuclear export control assurances on FRG fuel channels to India (State 324721). Rouget said assurances precluded use of fuel channels for nuclear explosive device.

State 343593, 12/30/81 to Rome S/EXDIS. Info that Indian AEC is seeking equipment for one of its unsafeguarded heavy water production facilities from Italian sources. Demarche requested.

Rome 1018, 1/14/82(S/EXDIS). India/Italy (Ref State 343593). Info in reftel given MFA Energy Coordinator. He said he would alert other Italian officials and would be back to US after discussions with them. GOI finds it extremely difficult to monitor "dual use" items.

Tokyo 3210, 2/26/82, S/EXDIS. Possible Chinese heavy water sales to India. GOJ checked both companies mentioned and neither had been approached on subject. Nichimen Co. had been approached some time ago on heavy water to Argentina and had been told by Chinese that they would no longer try to sell heavy water through Japanese firms.

State 54584, 3/2/82(S/EXDIS) to London. GOJ okays giving FCO info in Tokyo 3210.

State 89003, 4/2/82(C) Alleged violation of US export controls. USDOC licensed export of Cyber 170/730 large scale computer system to TATA Inst. DOC has info Bhaba Atomic. Res. Center would have access to TATA computer. New export license is pending.

Vienna 4983, 4/27/82(C) Indian plans to reprocess Tarapur Nuclear Fuel. 4/27 IAEA received from Indian mission formal notification of Indian intention to begin regular weekly shipments of Tarapur spent fuel to Prefre reprocessing facility.

Vienna 5055, 4/28/82 (C) Indian Plans to Reprocess Tarapur Fuel. Shipment scheduled to begin immediately and to continue on weekly basis through June 1982.

State 125122, 5/7/82(S/EXDIS). Indian plans for reprocessing Tarapur Fuel. Demarche requested noting US views and asking for info.

State 126722, 5/10/82(S) Nuclear trigger list, export control and intelligence sharing discussion.

UK has tried to find more on possible sale of heavy water by China to India. UK had refused all domestic inquiries on supply for fuel for Tarapur.

SECRET/EXDIS

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ERIC W FLEISHER
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India, Page 2

Vienna 5570, 5/10/82,S/EXDIS. Indian plans for reprocessing Tarapur fuel. IAEA confirms facility attachment is in effect for PREFRE and has no further info on purpose of shipments.

Vienna 5718, 5/12/82(S) Indian plans to transfer Tarapur fuel. Mission has been advised that IAEA has replied to Indian notification they intend to transfer spent fuel from Tarapur to the reprocessing plant at Prefre.

New Delhi 9570, 5/17/82,S/EXDIS (ref State 128928) Indian plans for Reprocessing Tarapur Fuel. MEA Sec Gonsalves said fuel was being moved to Prefre because storage pool at Tarapur was full. GOI feels decision for reprocessing requires notification of USG but no notification is required for transportation of spent fuel for storage.

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Iraq 1982 Notes

1.4(B)

SQAE

January, Boright team of US nuclear export experts discussed Italian/Iraqi nuclear cooperation with Italians in Rome. Italians said they have ceased all nuclear cooperation with Italians in reprocessing related areas.

Paris 9901, 3/19/82(U) Report by CNRS (Committee National de Recherche Scientifique) to Mitterand cites US congressional Committee report that notes that even fueled with caramel, Osirak type reactor can produce 3.3=10kg of Pu/year.

Rome 10165, 4/27/82(S) Nuclear Consultations (Stoiber team visit). Italians said all labs have been completed in Iraq and trial operations are underway. Application for safeguards has been made to IAEA.

Iraqis had requested UF₆ facility which Italians had declines.

State 132327, 6/14/82, (S) USIAEA. Safeguards on Italian supplied labs at Tuwaitha. Requests confirmation of info in Rome 10165.

1.4(B)

State 143794, 5/26/82 to USIAEA, Rome. (Vienna 5991 ref). Possible Sale of Italian LEU to Iraq. US wishes further info on reported purchase which greatly exceeds Iraqi needs. US wants to know LEU origin and GOI approval rights and retransfer consent rights.

Vienna 6293, 5/27/82(S) Possible sale of Italian LEU to Iraq. Ref State 143794. Mission has no objection to US approaching Italians on subject.

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ISRAEL Notes

S 24E

Paris 8404, 3/9/82(C) Possible sale of a nuclear power reactor to Israel. Amigues said Mitterand told Israelis that they could discuss their specific interests with Frmatome but GOF is not ready at this time to make any commitments. It would be premature to put this before the President's External Nuclear Policy Council.

State 90188, 4/5/82(S) Demarche on possible sale of French nuclear power reactor to Israel. US views on this and on general export policy to the Middle East.

Paris 15160, 4/29/82(C) US-French nuclear discussions. PDAS Marshall had follow up discussions with CEA Ouvrieu and Quai officials Petit and Amigues (following up on February US-France bilateral in Washington). On Israel - French said question of nuclear cooperation with Israel is "on back burner".

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KOREA Notes

1.4(C)

S-24G

State 31160, 2/5/82(C) Demarche to French government on S. Korean nuclear program (State 30306). Reau told US would make demarche on subject in Paris asking French not to cooperate with them in sensitive areas.

State 50533, 2/25/82 (S) US-French non-proliferation bilaterals Washington DC 2/16-17/82. During discussion, French responded to US demarche by noting that they do not have cooperation in reprocessing with Korea and have very limited breeder cooperation with them. They would be willing to reprocess fuel from a French supplied reactor, but topic has not come up in discussions with Koreans.

1.4(C)

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LIBYA Notes Page 1

RELEASED IN FULL 524H

Moscow 15541, 11/6/81(S) (ref State 292228). Scicouns met with Morozov who said USSR has agreement with Libya on fall back safeguards in event of Libyan withdrawal from the NPT.

State 325785 (S/NODIS) 12/9/81 to Helsinki, Belgrade, Madrid, Hague, Bern, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Lisbon, Tokyo info Brussels, London, Paris, Bonn, Ankara, Athens, Moscow, Niamey. Restriction on Cooperation with Libya. Demarches requested at highest appropriate levels. Libyan nuclear power program included.

Madrid 15662, 12/10/81,S/NODIS. Spain does not have nuclear cooperation with Libya and plans none. (ref State 325785)

Tokyo 22393, 12/15/81,S/NODIS. Ukawa agreed to bring document to attention of appropriate senior official.

The Hague 8517, 12/15/81,S/NODIS(Ref State 325785) Libyans have not approached Dutch to obtain nuclear technology.

State 22801, 1/28/82,S/EXDIS. Swiss Emboff Mueller discussion with PDAS Marshall. Swiss authorities had checked about exports of heavy water production plant or hot cells to Libya. Only Sulzer bros. is capable of constructing a heavy water production plant. Sulzer told GOS it had no plans to export such items to Libya. No Swiss firms specialized in the production of hot cells.

Moscow 1405, 2/3/82 (ref Brussels 1539) Soviet/Libyan Nuc. Coop. Reftel info has inaccuracies. Fuel at Tajura is 80% HEU and there is no requirement to return spent fuel.

Brussels 1906, 2/8/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuclear Coop. with Libya. Visist of Belgian PM Martens and Formin Tindemans to Washington. Embassy notes previous demarches and Belgonucleaire's attempts to be helpful (Brussels 274, 1045, 1539) and urges caution in any presentation to Martens/Tindemans.

State 46400, 2/22/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuc. Coop. with Libya. Embassy asked to make points on uranium tetrafluoride plant, Niger yellow cake sales to Libya, to continue dialogue with Beligan officials and thank them for their cooperation.

Brussels 2974, 2/26/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuc. Coop. with Libya (ref State 46400). Detailed consultation with Belgonucleaire officials. US will pose no further objection to their current level of cooperation with Libya. Belgonucleaire officials did not feel Libya is dangerous. GOB is ready to defend Belgian coop. with Libya unless USG comes up with better explanations.

Brussels 3584, 3/11/82(S/EXDIS) Belgian Nuc. Coop. with Libya. Consultation with BN. (State 62036) Reftel points made with BN. BN said they will cease UF₄ supply plan if we can prove plant presents clear and direct proliferation threat.

SECRET/NODIS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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LIBYA Page 2

Brussels 4063, 3/19/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuc. Coop. with Libya. MFA N. African Bureau head and Emboff discussed Libyan nuclear matters, Libyan yellowcake purchase from Niger, USSR supply of HEU and general nuclear cooperation with Libya.

State 78092, 3/24/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuc. Coop. with Libya. Demarche. USG opposes expansion of nuclear cooperation between Belgonucleare and Libya, specifically, the proposed sale of a uranium tetrafluoride production plant. US reasons and talking points given -- UF₄ output cannot be verified even with safeguards and it can be used to produce uranium metal for use in a plutonium production reactor.

State 63036, 3/25/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian nuc. coop. with Libya. (ref Brussels 2974) US takes into account info given in ref tel but remains strongly opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Libya.

Brussels 4476, 3/29/82,S/EXDIS (ref State 87092) Demarche. Belgian Nuclear Cooperation with Libya. Demarche made on 3/29 per ref tel. Belgonucleare believes it is acting in accordance with international rules in supplying UF₄ plant. BEN believes other countries are ready to step in to take BN's place. BN f-els it is best company for inside presence in Libya. Embassy asks guidance on lack of applicability of INFCIRC 153 to UF₄ plants.

Brussels 4765, 4/3/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian-Libya Nuc. Coop. Belgian government has reviewed info given by US in State 78092 and is not prepared to block supply of uranium tetrafluoride plant to Libya.

Brussels 5165, 4/9/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuclear Coop. with Libya. (ref Brussels 4765 and previous). Belgian position on non-proliferation. BN and GOB are convinced their nuclear cooperation with Libya is not dangerous and have promised US intelligence on uranium tetra fluoride plant. They have also promised to go slow on the plant.

State 103495, 4/17/82,S/EXDIS. Belgium/Libya. Since GOB has decided not to block Belgonucleare plant to supply uranium tetrafluoride plant to Libya, Dept. is considering virtue of USG making more persuasive representation at higher level

Brussels 5513, 4/20/82,S/EXDIS 4/20/82 S/EXDIS. Belgonucleare team has returned from Tripoli without initialling agreement to build uranium tetrafluoride plant. BN told Libya they would consult with other countries to see no sensitive technology is involved. First bid will not be submitted until sometime in July.

Rome 10165, 4/27/82(S) Nuclear consultations (Stoiber team visit). Italian/Libyan nuclear coop. with Libya was dead according to Italians.

SECRET/EXDIS

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LIBYA Page 3

Brussels 6095, 4/29/82(S) Nuclear Consultations (Stoiber team visit). reports discussions in Bonn. US passed on info on possible involvement of FRG firm in Libyan program.
Brussels 6141, 4/30/82(S) Stoiber Team visit and discussions in Brussels. Repeated US views on Libyan Nuc. Coop.

Brussels 6335, 5/5/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian-Libyan Nuc. Coop. Belgonucleare's report of activities in Libya in first quarter of year. Conceptual study document mentions:

- U metal and UO₃, UF₄ production lab for El Fatah Univ.
- projected industrial pilot plant for yellowcake conversion to UF₄
- BN letter of commitment of 3/29-30.

Brussels 6336, 5/5/82,S/EXDIS. Belgian Nuc. Coop. with Libya. Nuclear Fuel has article saying US is pressuring Belgium to end Nuclear cooperation with Libya. Text of article is transmitted.

State 143779, 5/26/82,S/EXDIS. Libyan Nuclear Program. to Belgrade. Background and talking points for embassy to develop dialogue with GOY on Libyan nuclear program.

State 158881, 6/9/82,S/EXDIS. (ref State 325785) Response to Netherlands Diplomatic Note on Nuclear Cooperation with Libya. USG answers questions in GON note.

Brussels 8085, 6/12/82 S/EXDIS. Belgian-Libyan Nuclear Coop. (ref State 157393). Amb. Price went into Belgian government to request GOB to withdraw authorization for sale of UF₄ plant to Libya. Non-Paper left with MFA, Roelants who said they will review US points. Price requests further info to counter Belgian arguments.

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PAKISTAN Notes Page 1

1.4(C)

S241.

Bern 4786, 11/16/81, S/EXDIS. Pakistan is losing interest in Switzerland as a source of nuclear related products. VAT has fired its commercial director as a result of VAT-Swiss government discussions.

London 23721, 12/2/81, S/EXDIS. Sale of Coaxial Cable to Pakistan. No Pakistani application has been received. It is possible that Singapore firm is involved - if it is acting as an intermediary, nothing can be done. UK needs more info.

Stockholm 12/11/81, S/EXDIS. Sale of coaxial cable to Pak. Such cables are normally produced in Sweden. GOS cannot act to prevent exports without further details.

State 332571, 12/17/81, S/EXDIS to Cairo. Sale of coaxial cable to Pakistan (which can be used for instrumenting test of nuclear explosive device). mentioned trading firm in Singapore asks confirmation that buyer is Egyptian.

State 332572, 12/17/81, S/EXDIS to London. Sale of Coaxial Cable to Pakistan. Embassy is authorized to provide info on Patterson Sima and Co. They have been approached by Pak firm which had tried to obtain cable from US firm. US firm refused them when they did not provide name of end user.

London 1669, 1/25/82, S/EXDIS. UK FCO inquires about US efforts to control Turkish nuclear use exports to Pakistan.

London 3919, 2/22/82, S/EXDIS. Pak. Nuc. Program. Control of Exports of Fabricated Shapes. Briefing by FCO on UK plans to make demarches requesting cooperation to prohibit export of metal hemispheres judged to be useful only in manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. They asked for US views on demarches.

State 50572, 2/25/82(C) to Islamabad, Madrid. Chasma NPP. Dept requests info on whether Sener plans to bid on construction of Chasma NPP.

Islamabad 3035, 3/2/82(C) to State, Madrid. Plans for Chasma NPP. Info from Sener. Project is at a very preliminary stage. Sener hopes to bid on major role as engineering supervisor. Actual construction would be beyond capabilities of this relatively small firm unless it could participate with a US, FRG or French firm as a partner.

London 4619, S/ROGER CHANNEL 3/2/82. Control of exports of fabricated Shapes. FCO plans demarches and asks if US will make demarche on subject to Japan.

State 56575, 3/3/82, S/ROGER CHANNEL. Control of Exports of Fabricated Shapes. US is willing to approach GOJ when HMG notifies USG of decision to proceed.

Madrid 2379, 3/4/82(C) Follow up on plans for Chasma NPP. Emb. told by Sener official in Madrid that design studies will not be finished till 8/82. Sener would welcome working with US firm to construct plant.

SECRET/EXDIS/ROGER CHANNEL

PAKISTAN Page 2

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London 5255, 3/9/82,S/ROGER CHANNEL Info in State 56575 is passed to FCO. GON officials have informed PM who want to prosecute company. FCO does not favor legal actions. UK will make demarches to Paris, Brussels, Rome, Bern, Vienna, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Bonn.

State 64321, 3/11/82(C) to Madrid on Chasma NPP. Info and guidance for further discussions with Sener or GOS officials on Chasma NPP. Info on Pak. nuclear program, legal considerations, and need to restrict any nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.

State 53676, 3/12/82,S/EXDIS. Background materials on nuclear matters on Sec 129, 123 of NNPA.

London 5849, 3/16/82,S/EXDIS. Sale of coaxial Cable to Pakistn. (London 2248) described cable. Exports to Italy and Spain were approved March 5 when no relationship to Pakistan was found.

Tokyo 4739, 3/19/82,S/EXDIS. Purchase of Japanese origin equipment by Pakistan. Points in State 49542 reviewed with Tanabe, - vaccumm coating equipment - Sunimoto claims to have no interest in such equipment and none are aware of such a translaction. - Western Trading Co, air handling equipment(provides compoenents for Dailin for use in making window coolers - legitimate business)1 They ask if there were special features or performance characteristics that would distinguish these from those used in enrichment plants. official

Rome 11959, 3/19/82(C) Upcoming Pak bids for NPP. MFA said he would advise GOI officials but was not aware of any Pak approach.

London 7147, 3/31/82(S/EXDIS) Pak. Sale of Coaxial Cables. FCO asks if they should make demarche to Italian and Spanish governments to point out sensitivity of international trade in coaxial cables (ref London 5849).

Islamabad 5184, 4/6/82, Follow up on Chasma NPP Project. Design studies by Sener have not progressed well or quickly.

State 96573, 4/10/82(C) to Madrid. Plans for Chasma NPP. Follow up to Islamabad 5184, 3035. Embassy asked to make discrett inquiries with Sener and other Spanish licensee of GE/Westinghouse to see what they are considering. We are interested in views of GOS on possible nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and on conditions that would apply.

Rome 10283, 4/28/82 (S) Italians given intelligence related talking points promised during SToiber nuclear consultations. Points on Italian supply of fuel chopping machine to Argentina, Steel spheres for Pakistan given to Italians who said they would alert their embassies.

Brussels 6095, 4/29/82(S) Nuclear Consultations with FRG (Stoiber team visit). Pakistan-UF₆ plant. FRG prosecutor is filing criminal charges against firm but had not considered safeguards question at this time. They will look into it after resolution of case.

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State 118552, 5/1/82,S/NODIS. Turkish Assistance to Pak Nuc. Program. Talking points for high level demarche to GOT asking them to halt export of inverters by Turkish firm to Pakistani nuclear program.

Ankara 3623, 5/5/82,S/NODIS. Demarche made per State 118552

Ankara 3821, 5/11/82,S/NODIS. Turks said invertors are not special nuclear equipment.

State 130919, 5/14/82,S/NODIS. Pak Nuclear Programs. Question of information sharing with Indians. Ambassador Barnes recommend that USG be responsive to Indian request for Info in Pak nuclear program.

State 133740, 5/17/82(C) Upcoming Pak bids for nuclear power plant. to Bonn, Brussels, Paris, Madrid, Stockholm. info Islamabad, Bern, New Delhi. Pakistan is expected to solicit bids from GE/Westinghouse (US), KWU (FRG), Aseatom(Sweden), Framatome (FRANCE) as well as firms from Italy, Belgium and Spain. US firms cannot export. Embassies are asked to approach host governments to convey US views on the Pakistani program and US view that suppliers should show restraint and FSS be adopted as a condition of supply.

State 135123, 5/18/82, to Bonn, Brussels, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Stockholm. info Islamabad, New Delhi, Bonn. Upcoming Pak bids for NPP. ref State 133740. FYI. clarifications of 6th talking point ff para 5 on US authorization of technology transfer.

Paris 17805, 5/19/82(C) Pakistan Nuclear power plant bids. Amigues of Quai said they have heard nothing from Pakistan regarding tendering of bids for a LWR.

Ankara 4218, 5/25/82,S/NODIS. Turkish Assistance to the Pak nuclear program. ref State 142649. Sec State's letter given to Formin Turkomen.

Bonn 11304, 5/25/82(C) (ref State 133740,135123) Upcoming bids for Pak NPP. Foreign Office does not presently know of any Pakistani approaches to German industry re sale of 1000MWe LWR. Rouget did hear about interest in a 600 MWe reactor but had no details. A German reactor manufacture manufacturer Interatom had been approached re Janus research reactor. FRG position is that discussions on such a sale could begin if Pakistan should accept FSS as a condition of supply.

Madrid 5699, 5/28/82(C) Upcoming Pak bids for a Nuclear Power Plant. Min. of Science and Technology Palazon said he would inform Foreign Minsiter Berez-Llorca of US concerns. He said Spain does not have a system of law and regulations to control nuclear exports and was interested in visit of US nuclear export control group to provide advice on setting up such a system.

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Brussels 7554, 6/3/82(C) Ref (State 133740, 135132) Upcoming Pak Bids for NPP. Consortium is being formed between Westinghouse Europe and Belgatom to bid on Pak Reactor project. Effort is now in a preliminary stage. GOB will impose stringent but not full-scope safeguards. Dept. action is requested.

State 154135, 6/5/82, S/EXDIS to Bern, Tokyo, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Bonn, Vienna, the Hague, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Dublin, Ankara, Athens, Oslo, London. Nuclear Export Alert- Flash X-RAY unites to Pakistan. We have reason to believe Pakistan may be attempting to procure flash X-ray units for use with its nuclear explosives program (high explosive tests to design a nuclear explosives device, specs exceed those for conventional explosives tests). US expects governments to block sale. It is important that requests for any such equipment be reviewed to see that end user was not Pakistani.

Paris 20241, 6/10/82, S/EXDIS Flash X-ray Unites to Pakistan. Amigues will pass info onto other GOF officials (State 154135).

State 161853, 6/11/82 (S/EXDIS). to Bern, London. Procurement of Electronics equipment and solenoid valves for Pak Nuclear Program. Talking points for GOS -

- Swiss firm Moder Electronics Int. is involved.
- Heinz Mebus in FRG or Bin Beladah Enterprises may receive equipment.
- equipment specs given.
- US requests government to block sale to Pak or entities acting on behalf of Pakistan. London: Inform FCO of US demarche.

Dublin 2109, 6/11/82, S/EXDIS. Nuclear Export alert - Flash X-Ray units. (ref State 154135). Agnew of DFA promised specs would be passed to export control officials to watch for license request for this type of equipment.

Brussels 8006, 6/11/82 (S/EXDIS). Flash X-Ray Unites to Pakistan. Mme Herpels said she would take immediate steps to block sale of such equipment to Pakistan but expect it would be much harder to block sale to third country.

Helsinki 2686, 6/11/82, S/EXDIS (State 154135) Flash X-Ray Unites to Pakistan. MEA said since equipment is not on trigger list, it may be difficult to block. It will do what is necessary to prevent such equipment from being sent from Finland to Pakistan.

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State 163519, S/EXDIS 6/14/82 to Bonn, London. FRG Assistance to the Pak nuclear program. Demarche. US has info Heinz Mebus is procuring German electronic components which we believe will be used by the Pakistani program to fabricate electrical inverters. (Items listed). London: Inform FCO of US demarche to FRG.

Ankara 4875, 6/14/82, S/NODIS. (State 163023 ref). Amb. approached MFA per reftel. MFA said he would see that GOT orders to EKA would be obeyed.

State 164811, 6/10/82(S) PDAS Marshall visist to Brussels - Marshall intends to discuss Belgian Libyan nuclear cooperation and Upcomming bids for Pak NPP with Belgian officials.

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ROMANIA

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S24J

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Ottawa 2467, 4/6/82(C) Possible Romanian Purchase of Tritium
Ref(STATE 83290). GOC response to Romanian inquiry on purchase of
Tritium - Canada is not in a position to consider exporting Tritium.

State 83290, 3/29/82(C) Possible Romanian Purchase of Tritium.
(ref Ottawa 1841). US conveyed views on tritium export controls.
US recommends AECL not approve export of 100,000 curies of bulk
gaseous T to Romania, especially in view of vague end use statement.
The question of re export should also be examined.

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SOUTH AFRICA Notes

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S24K

State 126722, 5/10/82(S) Nuclear Trigger List, Export Control and Intelligence Sharing Discussions in UK (Stoiber trip). UK firm was asked to provide spent fuel handling equipment to South Africa and export was denied. Only safety equipment can be supplied to S. Africa.

State 152701, 6/3/82,S/EXDIS to Rome. Possible Italian/S. African LEU Exchange. Embassy is asked to provide GOI with intelligence info that ESCOM is attempting to arrange exchange of S. African owned LEU in US for comparable amount of LEU owned by Agip Nucleaire. Such a direct swap would clearly be an attempt to circumvent U.S. nuclear export control law. GOI is asked to contact Agip Nucleare on an urgent basis, inform them of US concerns and urge them not to enter into such a transaction.

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SYRIA Page 1

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Damascus 3096, 3/5/82(C) General Atomic Rep has held discussions with Syrian AEC officials re sale of a 1 Mwt research reactor. UK, FRG, Soviets are also interested.

State 108860, 4/22/82(S) Syrian interest in a research reactor. General Atomic Rep Peters told PDAS Marshall that Syrian AEC had invited potential suppliers to Damascus in May. Marshall said US could not support any nuclear cooperation with Syria.

Rome 10165, 4/27/82(S) Nuclear Consultations (Stoiber team visit). Italians had been contacted unofficially by Syria for supply of a LEU fueled research reactor which the Italians refused.

Damascus 2964, 4/30/82(C) Res. Reactor for Syrian AEC. Embassy called on Commission Director who denied conference of potential suppliers is planned.

State 128098, 5/11/82 to Damascus. Syrian Interest in a Res. Reactor. General Atomic Rep Peters gave PDAS Marshall more info on his meeting with Syrians. Syrians are interested in UK vendor General Electric Co Ltd. FRG had declined to participate. USSR expressed interest in project. Offers may be coming from French and Canadian vendors. Embassy asked to obtain more info. (C)

State 129052, 5/12/82(C) to Damascus, info London, Paris, Bonn, USIAER. Syrian Interest in Nuclear Research Reactor. Embassy should avoid giving General Atomic any indication sale might be approved by USG as that is highly unlikely.

Paris 16779, 5/12/82(S) Syrian interest in research reactor. Embassy asks for clarification - has US attitude to nuclear coop. with Syria relaxed. Embassy is concerned over General Atomic promotion of sale to Syria.

Bonn 10534, 5/13/82(S) Syrian Interest in Res. Reactor. FRG has been approached on this and had rejected possibility of selling a research reactor to Syria. FRG has no intention of starting nuclear coop. with Syria.

Ottawa 3381, 5/13/82 (C) Syrian Interest in a research reactor. Exstaff knows of no plans for Canadian vendors to supply nuclear research reactor to Syria. GOC has FSS requirements and regional instability precludes exports to Syria.

Damascus 3347, 5/14/82(C) Embassy at no time gave GA indication reactor sale would be approved by USG.

Damascus 1978, 5/19/82(LOU) Telex from General Atomic seeking Embassy support for sale of research reactor to Syria. Guidance requested.

London 12670, 6/9/82(C) (ref State 128098) GEC has been approached by Syrian AEC re sale of research reactor. GEC has been cautioned about high hopes. FCO is not discouraging GEC from dialogue with Syrians since Syria is an NPT Party.

Vienna 6901, 6/9/82(C) US/Soviet talks on IAEA and related matters at IAEA. Soviets had not been asked to supply research reactor to Syria but would do so if asked.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: ERIC W FLEISHER

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