

## **December 10, 1975**

### **US Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing**

#### **Citation:**

"US Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing", December 10, 1975, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, Korea - State Department Telegrams, to SecState - NODIS (8). Obtained by Charles Kraus.  
<https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/114612>

#### **Summary:**

The U.S. Ambassador to Korea Richard Sneider outlines follow up approaches in U.S. policy toward South Korea's planned purchase of a French reprocessing plant.

#### **Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

#### **Original Language:**

English

#### **Contents:**

Original Scan

NLF MR Case No. 94-146

Document No. # 36

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MNUC FARM KS FR CA  
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

REF: A. STATE 285640 B. SEOUL 9440 C. SEOUL 9459

1. NOW THAT I HAVE MADE CALL ON PRIME MINISTER ON NUCLEAR RE-  
PROCESSING, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT PLANNED APPROACH ON THIS  
ISSUE TO AMBASSADOR HAHM IN WASHINGTON (PARA 4, REF A) BE MADE  
SOONEST SO THERE IS AMPLE TIME FOR HIS REPORT TO BE TRANSMITTED  
AND DIGESTED PRIOR TO ANY MEETING I MAY HAVE WITH PRESIDENT  
PARK NEXT WEEK. GIVEN SERIOUSNESS OF ISSUE AND HIGH LEVEL ROKG

INVOLVEMENT, CONVERSATION WITH HAHM SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AT  
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

2. CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER (REF B) INDICATES THAT TO  
BE EFFECTIVE OUR APPROACH MUST EMPHASIZE ADVERSE IMPACT ON-  
OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP WITH ROKG IF THEY PERSIST IN COMPLETING  
FRENCH REPROCESSING DEAL. THIS POINT IS REINFORCED BY INITIAL  
NEGATIVE REACTION TO APPROACH TO PRIMIN WHICH I RECEIVED  
FROM DEPUTY PRIMIN HAHM THIS MORNING (REF C). THUS, IN APPROACH  
TO HAHM I BELIEVE WE MUST MAKE INDELIBLY CLEAR THAT FAR MORE  
THAN OUR NUCLEAR SUPPORT IS AT STAKE HERE, THAT IF ROKS PROCEED  
AS THEY HAVE INDICATED TO DATE WHOLE RANGE OF SECURITY AND  
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US AND ROK WILL BE AFFECTED,



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INCLUDING POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR KOREA. WHILE NOT STINTING ON NEGATIVE FACTORS, I WOULD SUGGEST ALONG POSITIVE LINES ASKING ROK COOPERATION IN FOREGOING NATIONAL REPROCESSING IN INTEREST OF PRESERVING AND EVEN STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONSHIP, A LINE I

INTEND TO TAKE WITH PRESIDENT PARK. WE SHOULD BY ALL MEANS REITERATE OTHER ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS WE HAVE MADE IN PAST BUT AS DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES IN REF D THESE ARE NOT LIABLE AT THIS STAGE TO WEIGH HEAVILY IN ROK THINKING.

3. Section 3.4(b)(6) of E.O. 12958



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