

**July 26, 1977**

**US Presidential Memorandum, Jimmy Carter  
Administration, Talks between North Korea and  
South Korea**

**Citation:**

"US Presidential Memorandum, Jimmy Carter Administration, Talks between North Korea and South Korea", July 26, 1977, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Box 43, Korea, Republic of, 7-9/77. Obtained by Charles Kraus.  
<https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/114641>

**Summary:**

The Jimmy Carter administration attempts to develop a diplomatic strategy for inter-Korean talks in the wake of anticipated U.S. troop withdrawals.

**Credits:**

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**Original Language:**

English

**Contents:**

Original Scan

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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July 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MIKE ARMACOST

FROM:

DAVID AARON 


SUBJECT:

Talks Between North Korea  
and South Korea

Attached is the President's indication that we should develop a diplomatic strategy to accompany our troop withdrawals. Please develop a scenario and appropriate instruction to the Department of State.

Also indicate the substantive objectives of a negotiation and your recommendations on how we might, within the U. S. Government, develop our negotiating position.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6  
PER 6/13/07 NSC LRE NLC-96-48  
BY  NARS. DATE 8/5/07

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D. Talks Between South Korea and North Korea with or without PRC Participation:

This has been the missing dimension in our troop withdrawal policy. It would be appropriate soon to initiate talks with South Korea regarding a joint initiative along these lines, or regarding an initiative by the United States, but with South Korean approval. My own view would be to first discuss the subject with South Korea, then to inform and consult both the Chinese and the Russians separately, and on that basis then decide whether we issue a call for tripartite talks (North Korea, South Korea, and the US), or talks which would involve the major powers in the neighborhood, in which case we might consider including Japan as well. A discussion of this subject with South Korea, undertaken without excessive haste or pressure, might help to give the South Koreans the feeling that their concerns are being fully considered and that we are anxious to create a proper international context for the forthcoming military adjustments.

*Let's  
move  
on this*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 9/2/96 GSK/HYRE MR NLS-96-47

BY [Signature] NARS DATE 10/17/96

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