

October 28, 1962
**Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington
(Campos), 2 p.m., Sunday**

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Summary:

Campos discusses the brief alleviation in tensions between the United States and Soviet Union over the Cuban issue due to a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships.

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

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FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

ON/28/28/X/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DAS/DAC/DOR/DNU/DEA/DAM/600.(24h)

Question of Cuba.

799 - SUNDAY - 1400hs - The acceptance on the part of the United States and Russia of a temporary accord for a limited-diversion of the Soviet ships, committing the United States to avoiding a direct confrontation - constitutes a brief alleviation, soon destroyed by the rejection by Kennedy of the second part of the proposal by Khrushchev, as is known, the simultaneous abandonment, under international inspection, of the Soviet installations in Cuba and the American [installations] in Turkey, with an exchange of commitments of non-aggression. The attitude of Kennedy is based on the following reasoning, accepted by the National Security Council, when it met yesterday: 1) Russia was dangerously altering the nuclear status quo, desiring now to obtain advantages in an exchange of incomplete installations in Cuba for operational installations in Turkey; 2) the NATO missiles in Turkey, in a number estimated at thirty, of the Jupiter type, of intermediate range, were openly installed, are not considered offensive, that are under the collective and defensive control of NATO and not unilateral of the United States; 3) there does not exist parity in the commitments of non-aggression, in that Turkey does not serve as a base of ideological infiltration, a step that Cuba, protected by a commitment of non-aggression, would continue with impunity in the task of infiltration and the subversive character of Marxist-Leninism; 4) the problem of the European bases could be negotiated in the general sphere of controlled disarmament, [but] any North American relaxation in the current crisis would generate future Soviet demands if not in relation to Berlin, known to be not negotiable, at least in relation to Northern Italy, where there exist roughly thirty Jupiter missiles. It is rumored that Washington already has made it known to Moscow and Havana that if within a few days, probably by the middle of next week, they will not cease the construction of bases and have admitted international inspection inside of, Washington will take "other measures," most probable being the precision bombardment of the missile sites [rampas], combined, if necessary, with the launching of paratroopers to assure the destruction of the installations. The other possible measures, total blockade, support to guerrilla wars and invasion, the first two having a slow effect and the extreme danger before the previous declarations of Khrushchev, significantly not repeated since of the beginning of the current crisis, that the Soviet Union would intervene in defense of Cuba. The policy of rejection of the offer of the exchange of bases does not encounter unanimous support in this country, since in liberal circles, including influential journalists like [Walter] Lip[p]man, to whom I explained the Brazilian denuclearization proposal, have already been propagandizing for some time for the abandonment of the bases in Turkey, arguing: 1) that the ethical posture of the United States in international opinion would be weakened [by] the attempts to preserve the Monroe Doctrine in this hemisphere and the Truman Doctrine in Turkey; 2) that the bases in the Middle East have become obsolete with the appearance of Polaris submarine projectiles. Exists in Latin American diplomatic circles in Washington (visible preoccupation) contrasting, before the State Department, the vigorous support that is being given to the OAS resolution, including the offer of ships and bases to support the blockade, with the call of the Brazilian [tibiaesa], based, as some allege, on an insufficient comprehension of the essentially expansionist character of the Castroist ideology and the fundamental alteration in the balance of power in Latin America that would result in the contrast between nuclearized Cuba under adventurist leadership

and the conventional armies of many countries. I denied tendentious news in the Miami newspaper according to which this Embassy is being pressured by the Soviet Embassy to obtain authorization for landing rights in Northeast Brazil for a Soviet airlift.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS