

October 31, 1962
**Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington
(Campos), 6:30 p.m., Wednesday**

Citation:

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Summary:

The Brazilian government offers elements of their Armed Forces for collaboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS and executed by the American government. Brazil does so for three reasons: their affirmative vote on the blockade in the OAS, most Latin American countries have contributed armed forces and it is a gesture of cooperate with the United States.

Credits:

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Contents:

Translation - English

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM
RECEIVED
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FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON
ON/31/X/1/XI/62

SECRET-URGENT
DAS/DAC/DEA/600.(24h)
Question of Cuba.

810 - WEDNESDAY - 1830hs - I am informed that the chief of delegation of Brazil in the JID and the Military Aides of this Embassy are suggesting today to [EMFA] and to the chiefs of the respective bigger states that the Brazilian government offers elements of our Armed Forces for collaboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS and executed by the American government. I should explain that until this moment I have not received any request or pressure from the State Department in this sense. I have, yes, sensed the desire of responsible elements that the Brazilian government do so and a certain disappointment for not having done so until now. It is my opinion that if there is a political possibility for so much, the decision should be taken as soon as possible, in case of a return to application of the blockade, because: 1) a gesture of cooperation, through an offer of elements of the Navy and auxiliary, the Air Force, constitutes a powerful factor capable of counterbalancing, in the Congress of this country, political currents unfavorable to our interests, especially as for application of the new foreign assistance law, holding a strong hand to the executive in its more liberal interpretation of the same with relation to Brazil; 2) the majority of Latin American countries have offered contributions, including [pressurosamente]; 3) the affirmative vote of Brazil for the blockade, in the OAS, and the new comprehension of the Cuban problem, on the part of the Brazilian left, conforming to the reflection in the recent declaration of Governor Brizola, is not a healthy foundation to explain [não são de molde a explicar], to American public opinion, the Brazilian abstention on the application of the blockade; 4) the eventual Brazilian offer will probably be a limited gesture of solidarity, if its implementation does not become perhaps necessary; 5) an eventual offer should precede any diplomatic management/gesture [gestão] either political pressure or of American public opinion in the same sense. I request to conserve the secret character of this communication.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS