

**November 16, 1962**  
**Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington  
(Campos), 9 p.m., Friday**

**Citation:**

"Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 9 p.m., Friday", November 16, 1962, Wilson Center Digital Archive, "600.(24h)—SITUAÇÃO POLITICA—CUBA de novembro a dezembro de 1.962//6223," Ministry of External Relations Archives, Brasilia, Brazil. Translated from Portuguese by James G. Hershberg. <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/115388>

**Summary:**

A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

**Credits:**

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**Original Language:**

Portuguese

**Contents:**

Translation - English

## SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

TELEGRAM

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FROM THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

ON/16/17/XI/62

CONFIDENTIAL

DNU/DAC/DAS/DEA/DAf/DO<sub>r</sub>/604(04)

Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa. Aggravation of the Cuban situation.  
600.(24h)

167 - FRIDAY - 2100hs - The Cuban situation, which has been the object of contradictory information, has been aggravated, for the following reasons: A) the threat of Fidel Castro, apparently transmitted by [Cuban UN Ambassador Carlos] Lechuga to U Thant, in the sense of that American observation planes, that overfly Cuba, will be attacked; B) the American declaration that, if necessary, these planes will have a military escort; C) the Cuban intention to suggest amendments to the denuclearization proposal, impossible to be accepted by the United States of America, already that reopen the problem of the bases and the denuclearization of so-called dependent territories (Panama and Puerto Rico); D) the position of [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer favorable to the strong line in relation to Cuba.[1] Not knowing the results of the Mikoyan Mission, having the following interpretations: Mikoyan has gone to Cuba in order to assure the necessary cautions for the removal of the missiles to be made without violation of the military secrets, that would have to be effected, whether by American espionage, or by Cuban interference, if it is attempted to hold the dismantling; B) he has gone to make a complete evaluation of the state of the Cuban economy to calculate the economic and political cost for the Soviet Union of: I) maintain the present level; II) increase [promover] its development; III) abandon her to her own fate. This evaluation would serve as a subsidy for the formation of Russian foreign policy with relation to Cuba, today the object of stiff criticism, whether by Stalinist elements of the Soviet Union, or by China, a controversy that may be reached in the Meeting of the [CPSU] Central Committee, on the (next) 19th. The American position will be, probably, to abandon the blockade in exchange for the removal of the bombers, that, according to the latest aerial photographs, continue to be uncrated; it will maintain the aerial inspection and the non-invasion commitment, linking some form of effective inspection that will not be controlled through neutral diplomatic representatives in Havana, a formula apparently suggested by Lechuga and [Soviet deputy foreign minister Vasily] Kuznetsov and judged unsatisfactory. In a meeting with Latin American Ambassadors in the Department of State, I had to intervene in defense of the Brazilian denuclearization proposal, which was being criticized by the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Venezuela, because: A) they associate, erroneously, the idea of mediation and reintegration of Cuba in the inter-American system, considered unacceptable by these countries, the Dominican Republic declared that it would present, in brief, proof of subversive activities fomented by Cuba, joining it [was] Venezuela in the demand of stronger sanctions [against] Castro; B) because the draft has been presented in the UN and not in the OAS. I responded, explaining, that the Brazilian proposal in the UN had an objective more limited, not seeing the reintegration of Cuba in the OAS and yes [rather?] A: I) to avoid the proliferation of nuclear armaments; II) to avoid competition in Latin America in bases of nuclear arms, with the diversion of necessary resources to economic development; III) to facilitate the maintenance of a system of international inspection, that Cuba would be able to accept, without suffering what it calls a national humiliation. As, principally, the proposal contemplated, also, Africa and the continuation, even, in expectation of Cuban acceptance, the UN was the more appropriate forum, not having, however, hindered the participation of the OAS in the regulation of the implementation of the

project. The Uruguayan Representative recalled the convenience of our coordination with the Joint Inter-American Defense [JID], with fear that it had seen the proposal of the utilization of tactical nuclear arms as part of the program of defense.

ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS

[1] Ed. note. Adenauer was then visiting Washington. For translated West German records of his discussions with US President Kennedy regarding Cuba, on 14 November 1962. See in the Digital Archive (1) Memorandum of Large-Group Meeting of FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington and (2) West German Record of One-on-One Conversation between FRG Chancellor Adenauer and US President Kennedy, Washington.