

October 29, 1962
Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow
(Jaszczuk), 29 October 1962

Citation:

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Summary:

Jaszczuk discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis with Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firubin.

Credits:

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To: [Foreign Minister Adam] RAPACKI, EYES ONLY

From: JASZCZUK1

Upon my return, I paid a visit to [Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai] Firyubin. Here are some important points:

He did not have much to add to the already published statements made by Khrushchev. He believes that they will serve as the basis to eliminate tensions and to protect Cuba from [American] aggression. Based on [Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly] Dobrynin's information, it looks like Kennedy does not doubt Khrushchev's statements. When I mentioned that there were no clear guarantees of Cuba's security provided by Kennedy, Firyubin replied that in their [US-Soviet?] conversations that will take into consideration propositions that were put forth by F[idel] Castro.

When I asked about how the issue of eliminating the military bases in Turkey looked like, Firyubin answered that this problem has not left the daily agenda. He stressed that it was no accident that the issue of the military bases in Turkey was not mentioned in the statement made by Khrushchev on 28 October.

Carrying out this action takes some time and is connected with the issue of NATO-Warsaw Pact put forth by Kennedy. The issue of the Guantanamo Bay will surely constitute one of the points of detailed conversations. Firyubin is aware of difficulties connected with fully securing Cuba given the stormy moods in the Pentagon. Firyubin thinks that this fact, that is, that these events are not taking place after the elections, inhibits Kennedy's actions, but that after the elections the common sense will deepen within the US governing circles. As to the summit meeting, the USSR is not exerting any pressure in this direction, but there are those in the USSR who believe that talks at the highest levels are beneficial. The issue of a summit meeting is only a matter of time. The English, according to Firyubin, are feeling dissatisfied because they "were excluded from the game." Firyubin is fully convinced that the recent developments are in favor of the USSR and our countries and that the first goal (Kennedy's statement renouncing the US aggression against Cuba) has already been achieved. Firyubin thinks that the shooting down of the American U-2 plane by the Cubans should slow down the talks between [First Deputy Foreign Minister] Kuznetsov and [US Secretary of State Dean] Rusk.

Concerning the Sino-Indian border issue, he actually did not have much to say. He showed some concern. He thinks that the US does not want to get involved in the problem. Undoubtedly, SEATO is benefiting much from this event when it comes to spreading their propaganda. According to Firyubin's personal opinion, this conflict should be resolved by the parties involved. Firyubin promised that they he would keep us updated on the issue of Cuba.

Received by the following comrades: [...]2

[1] Boleslaw Jaszczuk, Poland's Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

[2] Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Gierk, Jedrychowski, Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski, Ochab, Rapacki, Spychalski, Zambrowski, Zawadzki, Jarosinski, Strzelecki, Czesak, Naszkowski, Wierna, Michalowski, Birecki, Katz-Suchy, Milnikiel, Krajewski