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Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 'Agenda Items Relating to Disarmament'

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Summary:

Summary of the Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly's agenda on disarmament

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Agenda Items Relating to Disarmament

Provisional Agenda
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1. Background

(a) Directives for Twentieth Session

The Directive relating to disarmament prepared for the twentieth session is attached to the master copy hereof as Annexure A.

(b) Consideration of the Disarmament Questions in the First Committee and the General Assembly during the Twentieth Session

Annual Report of the Secretary-General (Supplement No. 1 (A/6301)).

Disarmament and related matters were discussed by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva in the summer of 1965; by the General Assembly at its twentieth session; and again by the Committee from January to May 1966.

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1965

In accordance with the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission of 15 June 1965, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reconvened on 27 July 1965 and held seventeen meetings before adjourning on 16 September. The Committee reported to the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly that, although it had continued to discuss a treaty on general and complete disarmament, in view of international developments a number of members had concentrated on collateral measures. Among these measures was an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

On 17 August 1965, the United States submitted a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty would: (1) prohibit nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly or indirectly through a military alliance; (2) prohibit nuclear Powers from taking any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and any other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons; and (3) prohibit nuclear Powers from assisting any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear States would undertake corresponding obligations not to manufacture nuclear weapons, neither to seek nor receive, nor give assistance to manufacture these weapons; would undertake not to seek or to receive the transfer of such weapons into their national control, either directly or indirectly through a military alliance, and not to take any other action resulting in an increase of the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

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The representative of the USSR, supported by the East European members, restated his Government's objections to any non-proliferation treaty which would not ban all direct and indirect forms of access to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany. The nuclear arrangements under discussion within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were devised for sharing control over nuclear weapons with the Federal Republic of Germany, and thus were incompatible with the principle of non-proliferation.

The United States representative stated that that was a matter of nuclear strategic arrangements within NATO and as such was not within the Committee's competence. He gave assurances, however, that the proposed NATO nuclear arrangements were not disseminatory and that the United States and its allies would see to it that all future NATO nuclear decisions would comply with the provisions of a non-proliferation treaty. The United Kingdom representative supported the United States draft, but preferred a formulation which would grant nuclear Powers the specific right of veto in any arrangement with other States.

On 14 September Italy submitted a Draft of Unilateral Non-Acquisition Declaration whereby States would unilaterally undertake for an agreed period of time: (1) not to manufacture or acquire national control over nuclear weapons; (2) not to seek or receive assistance from other States in manufacturing these weapons; and (3) accept application of the International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on nuclear activities.

On 15 September the eight non-aligned members of the Committee submitted a joint memorandum. Regretting that it had not been possible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty, they declared that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but only a means to the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. They expressed the conviction that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

A comprehensive test ban to cover all tests was another measure discussed. The USSR expressed its readiness to extend the provisions of the partial test ban treaty to cover all underground tests relying on national systems of detection and identification for verification. The United States, however, stressed the need for a small number of on-site inspections per year to ensure against violations. Sweden submitted a memorandum on international co-operation in the detection of underground nuclear explosions which suggested the expansion of existing voluntary co-operation among States with a view to increasing the exchange of seismological data and to organizing a "detection club" with the participation of States advanced in seismology. The United Arab Republic suggested the extension of the partial test ban treaty to cover underground

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nuclear tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, accompanied by a moratorium on all other forms of underground nuclear testing until such time as agreement had been reached on an over-all ban on nuclear weapon tests. It also proposed the holding of technical discussions among nuclear Powers with a view to facilitating agreement.

On 15 September the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty which called for a suspension forthwith of nuclear weapon tests in all environments and expressed the belief that agreement on a treaty banning underground tests could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information by the nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques if necessary.

The USSR accepted the United Arab Republic suggestion for a threshold ban as well as a moratorium. The United States reaffirmed its opposition to an unverified moratorium, but accepted the eight-Power suggestion for an exchange of scientific information among nuclear Powers on the detection and identification problem.

On 9 September 1965 the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on its research on methods of distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions.

The report of the Committee concluded that, while no specific agreement was reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, its discussions may have facilitated agreement in the future.

I. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(a) The Secretary-General in his Annual report on the work of the organization for the period 16 June 1965 - 15 June 1966 (Supplement No. 1 A/6301) commented as follows on the consideration of this item by the First Committee and the General Assembly during its twentieth session:

At the outset of the session on 24 September 1965, the USSR submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation along with a request for the inclusion in the agenda of a separate item on the subject. The draft treaty contained the following substantive provisions: (1) parties possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to transfer them in any form - directly or indirectly through third States or groupings of States - into the ownership or disposal of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons; (2) the nuclear Powers would undertake not to provide nuclear weapons or control over them to the armed forces or individual members of the armed forces of States not possessing nuclear weapons; and (3) they would also undertake not to assist the non-nuclear States in the manufacture or the testing of such weapons. The latter States, by the terms of the treaty, would undertake a reciprocal obligation to refrain from receiving or acquiring nuclear weapons in the manner set forth in the treaty.

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The First Committee considered the item between 18 October and 8 November 1965. On 26 October the United States delegation submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would urge the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as early as possible and accord special priority to reaching agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The USSR delegation submitted a draft resolution on 27 October by which the Assembly would transmit the USSR draft treaty to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for detailed study and suggest that early agreement should be reached on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of certain enumerated main principles.

The eight non-aligned members of the Committee submitted a draft resolution on 5 November enumerating the following principles as a basis for negotiating a draft treaty: (1) the treaty should be free from any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate nuclear weapons in any form, directly or indirectly; (2) it should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; (3) it should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament; (4) there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure its effectiveness; (5) nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Among the issues raised in the course of the deliberations were the definition of what constituted direct or indirect proliferation, in view of the requirement that the treaty have no loopholes; the relationship between a non-proliferation treaty and other measures; and guarantees or assurances that non-nuclear States might require.

The USSR representative insisted that a treaty must exclude any possible spread of nuclear weapons through any channels, apparent or secret; through the direct transfer of such weapons to non-nuclear States; through giving access to such weapons; or through collective controls over such weapons in the framework of a military alliance; or through any other means.

A number of delegations supported the eight-Power joint memorandum which had been submitted to the Committee. As to the part of the memorandum that states that a treaty should be coupled with or followed by other measures, the Indian representative expressed the view that tangible steps should be coupled with measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. The Swedish representative was of the opinion that several measures need not be bound up within one treaty, but should be simultaneously negotiated. Both the United States and the USSR representatives were opposed to linking any other measures to a non-proliferation treaty.

A number of delegations expressed interest in the Italian proposal for unilateral declarations on the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, especially as a measure of last resort, to be considered after further efforts were made to agree on a treaty affecting both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

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After the First Committee had adopted the eight-Power draft resolution by a vote of 83 to none, with 6 abstentions, the United States and USSR representatives withdrew their respective draft resolutions. On 19 November the General Assembly adopted the eight-Power draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 93 to none, with 5 abstentions. The Albanian representative explained that his delegation had not taken part in either the debate or the vote because the item was designed to perpetuate the monopoly of nuclear weapons by certain great Powers.

(b) Delegation Report on the Item

The following is an extract from a report of the South African Delegation to the twentieth session of the United Nations :

The First Committee, to which this item had been assigned, decided to make it the first item on its agenda, no doubt because a large measure of agreement had already been obtained on the subject at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva, where both the United States and the Soviet Union had submitted draft treaties on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons for consideration.

2. From the outset of the debates, it became clear that there was a general consensus that the matter should be referred back to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for the purpose of marrying the two draft treaties into a mutually acceptable one, and on 26 October the United States submitted a draft resolution to the Committee by which the General Assembly would (1) urge the Conference of the Eighteen-Nations Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as early as possible and, taking into account all relevant proposals and the discussion on this question at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, to accord special priority at its next session to continued efforts to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to agree on other related steps to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race; (2) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. The Soviet Union, in turn, submitted a draft resolution the next day, by which the General Assembly would (1) consider it necessary to conclude the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, and urgently appeal to all States to exert every effort to achieve that aim; (2) consider that the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based on the following main principles : (a) States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to transfer to States not possessing nuclear weapons, in any manner - directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, or through military alliances - nuclear weapons or the right to participate in the ownership of such weapons or in the possession, control, emplacement or use of nuclear weapons; not to assist those States in the manufacture, in preparation for the manufacture, or in the testing of such weapons; and not to transmit to them any information which could be used in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons; (b) either independently or jointly with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States, and should renounce access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever - direct or indirect, through third States or through groups of States; (3) transmit the draft Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for detailed study; and (4) suggest that that Committee should come to an early agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the main principles stated above.

(b) states not possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to devise, manufacture or prepare to manufacture nuclear weapons, /...

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4. After this initial posturing by the two powers mostly concerned in the matter, the eight non-aligned members on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Brazil, Burman, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the UAR) submitted a draft resolution which took cognisance of the United States' and Soviet Union's position. The draft resolution (1) urged all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; (2) called upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the following main principles: (a) the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form; (b) the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; (c) a treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament; (d) there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty; (e) nothing in the treaty should affect adversely the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories; (3) transmitted the records of the First (Political) Committee during the discussion of the item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all relevant documents, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for its consideration; (4) requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On 8 November the latter draft resolution was adopted in the Committee by 83 (South Africa) to none with six abstentions (Cuba, France, Guinea, Mali, Pakistan, and Romania). The United States and the Soviet Union thereupon withdrew their drafts.

5. On 19 November 1965, the resolution was adopted in the General Assembly by 93 (South Africa) to none with five abstentions (Cuba, France, Guinea, Pakistan and Romania). The following countries were absent: Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, Ruanda, Singapore, Somali, Sudan - of these perhaps only the absence of Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, and some French-African countries are significant.

6. A constantly recurrent theme running through the debate was the point made especially by the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC, viz. that the balance reached was a delicate one and should not be disturbed by representatives coming forward with ideas unacceptable to one or other of the major powers concerned. In fact, one got the idea that the members of the ENDC

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were jealously guarding their preserve -with good reason perhaps, from being disturbed by starry-eyed or other members of the larger United Nations bodies.

7. The South African delegation voted for the resolution as adopted, as this was entirely in line with our basic approach to the question of disarmament.

C. Resolution 2028(XX) Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Mindful of its responsibility in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which stipulates that the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both,

Recalling its resolutions 1665 (XVI) of 6 December 1961 and 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,

Recognizing the urgency and great importance of the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic to achieve the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as contained in their joint memorandum of 15 September 1965,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the declaration adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first regular session, held at Cairo in July 1964, and the Declaration entitled "Programme for Peace and International Co-operation" adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964,

Noting also the draft treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively,

Noting further that a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration has been submitted by Italy,

Convinced that General Assembly resolutions 1962 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 aim at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further

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ports to conclude a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the following main principles :
 - (a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;
 - (b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;
 - (c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;
 - (d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;
 - (e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;
3. Transmits the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all other relevant documents, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for its consideration;
4. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

B. Directive

Since the South African stand on question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is in line with our basic approach to the question of disarmament, the delegation may support proposals for the adoption of a treaty along the lines envisaged in the above resolution. Please refer to Annexure C.

II. The Question of General and Complete Disarmament

- (a) The following is an extract from the annual report by the Secretary-General (A/6301 Supplement No.1) in which the consideration question of general and complete disarmament by the First Committee and the General Assembly is discussed :

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"This item, which was included in the agenda of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on the basis of resolution 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, was considered by the First Committee on 1 and 2 December. In addition to the two reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the nineteenth and twentieth sessions of the General Assembly, the Committee was seized of two draft resolutions. One draft resolution was submitted by Malta; under it the General Assembly would invite the Eighteen-Nation Committee to consider the question of transfers between States, whether by way of trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war, with a view to submitting to the General Assembly proposals for the establishment of a system of publicity through the United Nations. The other draft resolution was submitted by Cyprus; under it the General Assembly would: (1) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to continue its efforts to make substantial progress towards agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral matters contained in the reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee; (2) decide to refer to the Eighteen-Nation Committee all documents and records of the First Committee in connexion with all questions related to disarmament; and (3) request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work as early as possible and report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on progress achieved.

The draft resolution of Malta was rejected by 19 votes to 18, with 39 abstentions. The draft resolution sponsored by Cyprus was viewed by many delegations as a proper instrument for concluding the deliberations on the varied aspects of disarmament, particularly as it called for the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Italy suggested a brief preamble which would affirm that the General Assembly was conscious of its responsibility regarding disarmament and the strengthening of peace, and which would also recall several previous resolutions.

The draft resolution, after having been amended to include a reference to previous resolutions as well as the amendments proposed by Italy, was adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December 1965 by a roll-call vote of 102 votes to none, with 6 abstentions (resolution 2031 (XX)).

- (b) Resolution 2031(XX). Question of General and Complete Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having received the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962 and 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,

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Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures;
2. Decides to refer to the Eighteen-Nation Committee all documents and records of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;
3. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

(c) Delegation Action

From the report of the First Committee (Document A/6129 of 2 December 1965) addressed to the General Assembly as well as the provisional verbatim record of the 1388th Plenary Meeting of 3rd December 1965 of the General Assembly it would seem that the South African delegation did not participate in either the discussions or the voting in both the First Committee and the General Assembly when this item was considered.

B. Directive

The directive for the twentieth session is of continuing validity and is repeated below :

South Africa has consistently declared itself in favour of nuclear disarmament at the United Nations. South Africa is also in favour of holding a Conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes, and to suspend nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, but feels that the timing of such a Conference should depend on the prior attainment of a much greater measure of agreement amongst the Great Powers on the general question of nuclear disarmament and that any convention should make provision for an effective system of inspection and control.

III. Urgent Need for suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear tests : Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (Resolution 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965)

- (a) Consideration of the item in the First Committee and by the General Assembly during the Twentieth Session (A/6301 Supplement No.1)

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This item was included in the agenda of the twentieth session on the basis of resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963. The First Committee considered it between 24 and 26 November 1965. The issues that had been discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were reviewed in the context of widespread support for a universal, comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On November 25 the representative of Sweden introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the following thirty-five sponsors: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. In its operative paragraph the draft resolution: (1) urged the suspension of all nuclear tests; (2) called upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the Moscow test-ban treaty, and (3) requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee urgently to continue its work on a comprehensive treaty banning all tests in all environments, taking into account improved possibilities for international co-operation in seismic detection. On the suggestion of the representative of the United Arab Republic the words "and to report to the General Assembly" were added.

In the course of the debate, the United States representative maintained that on-site inspection was still required despite current scientific capability. The United Kingdom representative advocated scientific and technical discussions among the nuclear Powers. The USSR representative, on the other hand, contended that on-site inspection was unnecessary for the detection of violations and recalled its acceptance of the United Arab Republic proposal to ban tests above the seismic magnitude of 4.75 and to institute a voluntary moratorium on all others. The United States representative declared that the proposal for a moratorium was unacceptable to his Government.

The First Committee adopted the thirty-five-Power draft resolution on 26 November, and on 3 December the General Assembly adopted it by 92 votes in favour to 1 against, with 14 abstentions (resolution 2032 (XX)).

After the vote the Albanian representative explained that his delegation had not participated in the discussion or in the vote because it did not consider the agreement on the cessation of tests a measure of nuclear disarmament.

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Delegation Report (Adoption of Resolution 2032(XX))

The general lines of the debate on this item were drawn from the outset by the positions taken by the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the "Rest".

The United States Delegate made it clear that that country was of the opinion that it would be essential to have some on-site inspections in order to verify whether a general ban on nuclear testing was being observed. To this the Soviet Union objected, which made it clear that the U.S.S.R. did not want a moratorium. In fact, a previous moratorium had been broken by the U.S.S.R. Any compromise agreement which might be reached could, said the United States Delegate, weaken pressure for a comprehensive test ban treaty providing for the necessary on-site inspections which would render the treaty a working proposition.

2. The U.S.S.R. representative took the position that recent advances and improvements in the technique of national detection and identification procedures were such that on-site inspections were not a necessary pre-requisite for a comprehensive test ban treaty and, in any event, on-site inspections were a derogation of national sovereignty which the Soviet Union could not permit.

3. The attitude taken by other speakers was that the need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty was so vital that some means must be found to attain this. It was in this atmosphere that the following resolution was submitted by the sponsors indicated:

"URGENT NEED FOR SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND
THERMO-NUCLEAR TESTS: REPORTS OF THE CON-
FERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT

Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco,
Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Sudan, Sweden, United Arab Republic,
and Zambia:
draft resolution :

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests and the relevant sections of the reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1910 (XVIII) on the cessation of all test explosions,

Noting with regret that notwithstanding these resolutions nuclear weapon tests have taken place,

Recalling the undertaking given by the original signatories to the Moscow Treaty to continue negotiations for the discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time,

Recognizing the mounting concern of world opinion for the fulfilment of this undertaking,

Mindful of the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban on the issue of non-proliferation,

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Noting with satisfaction the Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty tabled by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and attached to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5986),

Convinced that the agreement in regard to taking this further step towards nuclear disarmament would be facilitated, inter alia, by the important improvements in detection and identification techniques,

1. Urges that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended;
2. Calls upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty;
3. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and arrangements banning effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection and to report to the General Assembly."

4. The sponsors were subsequently joined by the Argentine, Cameroon, Chile, Finland, Ghana, Iraq, Japan and Senegal, and it became clear in the following debate that, although some Governments had doubts about the efficacy of the measures envisaged in the Resolution, the majority felt that some action was better than no action. Various delegates made suggestions as to what could be done, e.g. New Zealand would have preferred more specific reference to verification and identification techniques; Australia would have preferred a stronger operative paragraph two, with a reference to the Swedish suggestion for the creation of an "International Detection Club" i.e. a pooling of detection resources; the United Kingdom suggested that experts could perhaps first meet to decide whether national or international supervision would be sufficient; while China suggested that joint experiments could be undertaken to test the validity of statements that national supervision would be sufficient.

The sponsors repeatedly called upon speakers, however, not to disturb the delicate balance obtained in the draft resolution and it became clear that the United States would again not maintain its stated position (as explained through its Embassy in Pretoria) but would vote in favour of the Resolution.

5. The directive on this subject received from the Department read as follows:

"Suspension of Tests.

The delegation should follow the general Western line, as on previous occasions, bearing in mind the following comment of the Prime Minister which was embodied in the XVIth Session directive on this matter;

'If the opportunity arises the Delegation should speak against the continuance of nuclear testing. Reference should be made as at a previous session, to the serious concern of Women's organisations and other sections of public opinion in South Africa.

The Delegation may support any move as is envisaged by the item, provided of course that no conditions are embodied which are unacceptable to the West".

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The South African delegate therefore made the following declaration before the vote was taken, especially as it became clear that most Western States would support the Resolution:

"The South African Delegation will vote in favour of the resolution before the Committee because the Republic of South Africa, like the sponsors of the resolution, and other countries, is greatly concerned about the continuance of nuclear testing. Not only has this anxiety about the continuance of nuclear testing been referred to by the South African Delegation at a previous session, but the serious concern expressed by Women's organizations and other sections of public opinion in South Africa about this subject should again be placed on record. It is true that, as the New Zealand and other delegations have pointed out, there are some of the operative and other paragraphs of the resolution which could have been phrased differently, especially as regards identification and detection techniques. However, it is essential that the greatest possible consensus be obtained in a matter of such great importance, and it is with this in mind that we will vote for the resolution".

6. The Resolution was adopted by 86 to none with 13 abstentions (France, U.S.S.R. and most Soviet block countries plus Congo (Brazzaville) Guinea and Mauritania). It is interesting to note that Rumania, in line with its attempts to follow a more independent foreign policy, voted for the Resolution and did not abstain as the other Soviet-block countries did.

While voting for the Resolution, the United States delegate none the less informed the Committee that in the interests of United States security, his Government would continue to undertake under-ground nuclear and thermo-nuclear testing.

Albania was absent from the Committee during the vote.

7. The Resolution was adopted in the General Assembly by 92 votes (U.S.A., United Kingdom) to one (Albania) with 14 abstentions (Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Yugoslavia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.).

South Africa was absent when the vote was taken in the Assembly as the Delegation was fully occupied on inter alia the Apartheid item and could not attend the Assembly meeting. Other absentees were Cambodia, Ecuador, Gambia, Haiti, Maldives Islands, Nicaragua, Singapore, Yemen and Zambia.

B. Directive

The directive for the twentieth session is of continuing validity and is given below:

"The delegation should follow the general Western line, as on previous occasions, bearing in mind the following comment of the Prime Minister which was embodied in the directive for the XVIth Session on this matter:

"If the opportunity arises the Delegation should speak against the continuance of nuclear testing. Reference should be made as at a previous session, to the serious concern of Women's organisations and other sections of public opinion in South Africa.

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The Delegation may support any move as is envisaged by the item, provided of course that no conditions are embodied which are unacceptable to the West."

- IV. Question of Convening a Conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear weapons: Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (Decision of 3 December 1965)

In a letter (Document A/6125) dated 30th November 1965 from the Chairman of the First Committee to the President of the General Assembly it was reported that the First Committee at its 1390th Meeting, held on 30 November, 1965, decided to refer the item to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for further study and to defer consideration of this item in the General Assembly until its twenty-first session. The General Assembly on 3rd December, 1965, approved of this recommendation without objection.

- V. Question of Convening a World Disarmament Conference. (Not an agenda item.)
- (a) Consideration of the Item by the First Committee and the General Assembly.

The question of convening a world disarmament conference was included in the agenda of the twentieth session of the General Assembly in accordance with the resolution of the Disarmament Commission of 11 June 1965, which had recommended that the Assembly give urgent consideration to the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited. The First Committee considered the item between 17 and 23 November.

At the outset a draft resolution was submitted by the following forty-three countries: Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The draft resolution called upon the General Assembly: (1) to endorse the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited; and (2) to urge that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries for the purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee to arrange for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.

Among the issues discussed in connexion with the proposed conference were its task, participation, relation with the United Nations and with the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the establishment of a preparatory committee and its task, the date of the conference, its site and financing.

One of the most frequently mentioned objections was the participation of all countries and especially of all significant

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ary Powers. The participation of the People's Republic of China was considered especially desirable; some regarded it as necessary. The Albanian representative stated that the People's Republic of China could not take part in any international conference held under the auspices of the United Nations as long as its rights as the sole representative of China were not restored. In its final form the draft resolution contained an additional paragraph which provided that all countries be kept informed of the results achieved by the Preparatory Committee. The revised draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee by a roll-call vote of 91 to 1, with 1 abstention, and on 29 November 1965 the General Assembly adopted it by 112 votes to none, with 1 abstention (resolution 2030 (XX)).

After the vote, the Secretary-General stated that if the Preparatory Committee or the Conference should at any time decide that the assistance or facilities of the Secretariat might be helpful, he would meet any such request to the full extent of the Secretariat's capacity.

(b) Resolution 2030 (XX)

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem,

Reaffirming the paramount importance of disarmament for the contemporary world and the urgent need for the achievement of this goal,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament with effective international control, with a view to securing lasting peace in the world,

Convinced that all countries should contribute towards the accomplishment of disarmament and co-operate in taking immediate steps with a view to achieving progress in this field,

Convinced also that a world disarmament conference would promote the realization of general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June 1965,

1. Endorses the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;
2. Urges that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries for the purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee which will take appropriate steps for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967;
3. Urges further that all countries be kept informed as appropriate, of the results achieved by the preparatory committee in accordance with paragraph 2 above.

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Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament 1966

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee was resumed in Geneva on 27 January 1966, recessed on 10 May and resumed on June 14. The positions of the parties on the main issues remained substantially unchanged. One new proposal, however, submitted by Sweden, envisaged an agreement banning underground tests in which a party suspected of having conducted a clandestine test would have an opportunity of proving its innocence by voluntarily bringing forward clarifying explanations. But if the explanations were deemed unsatisfactory, it could be challenged to invite on-site inspection.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament ended its deliberations in Geneva on 25th August 1966. The report issued by the Conference under reference ENDC/184 is attached to the master copy thereof as Annexure B. Attention is invited to Annex I of the report which contains formal statements made by certain representatives of the participating countries at various times, as well as papers submitted and texts of draft treaties proposed.

As far as the South African safeguards policy on the sale of uranium is concerned attention is invited to the memorandum on the negotiations for renewal of the Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement with the United States which is attached to the Master Copy hereof as annexure C.