

**June 11, 1960**  
**Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M.**  
**Puzanov for 11 June 1960**

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**Summary:**

Kim Il Sung briefs Puzanov on the Korean Workers' Party's policy toward the recent turmoil in South Korea as well as North Korea's Seven-Year Plan.

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USSR EMBASSY IN THE DPRK

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[Handwritten notations: to [[illegible name]] and G. Ye. Samsonov]

JOURNAL of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. PUZANOV

for the period

1 through 11 June 1960

Pyongyang

[...]

11 June 1960

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Jeong-sik reported by telephone that some corrections needed to be made in the materials given [me] yesterday by Pak Yong-guk [Pak Yong Guk]. He requested [I] send an Embassy official with them.

I sent interpreter B. M. Morozov to the MFA, where Choe Won-sik presented him with a second copy of the materials with additions and corrections which been entered. As Morozov reported about this, after checking Choe Won-sik took the first copy to be sent to the KWP CC.

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I visited Kim Il Sung in the KWP CC at his request.

At the beginning of the conversation Kim Il Sung reported that a KWP CC Presidium meeting was held today at which issues were discussed which it is proposed to raise during the conversation with Cde. N. S. Khrushchev and senior CPSU CC officials. It is proposed to examine the following two issues:

1) Discuss and map out the further direction of the KWP's struggle in connection with the current situation in South Korea.

2) Discuss certain economic issues and the difficulties which have arisen in connection with working out the seven-year plan for the development of the DPRK economy.

Kim Il Sung said that in connection with this he would like to give the Ambassador two documents in advance:

a) a document about the current situation in South Korea not containing specific figures or information, and giving the general idea of the situation in South Korea which Pak Yong-guk gave you yesterday.

Kim Il Sung said, it is intended to consult and exchange opinions directly during the conversation with Cde. N. S. Khrushchev about the immediate tasks and measures with respect to South Korea.

b) a Memorandum about the economic issues which arise in connection with drawing up the seven-year plan.

After handing [me] this Memorandum Kim Il Sung said that, as was discussed today at the CC Presidium, the first half of the seven-year plan will have the goal of a rapid increase of the people's standard of living. The tasks of the second five-year plan, planned earlier, will be done after the first three years of the seven-year plan, the last four years. The development of the economy in the first three years of the seven-year plan will depend on the correct use of the existing heavy industry base. Kim Il Sung said, we will not build new metallurgical works during this period. We will expand and strengthen the base for the development of light industry, firstly the chemical industry. Plants will be built to produce Vinalon and synthetic fiber from cellulose, and small enterprises will be created to produce nylon and plastic.

As a result of these measures we should achieve the production of 300 million meters of textiles a year in 1963. This is not a very large number, said Kim Il Sung, if one takes into consideration that 50 million meters are consumed annually for the needs of the army and about 50 million meters for industrial needs. Thus, if by 1963 we achieve the production of 300 million meters of textiles then the population will have 20 meters per capita. This will mean that we will not have people in acute need of clothing. Up to now there have been such people. This is especially felt in winter, when it's cold - there aren't enough overcoats and cotton clothes. If we do not solve the clothing problem it will be hard to compete with the South. Of course, there are many people both poor and poorly-clothed, but nevertheless there is clothing in South Korean stores, especially in the market, as a consequence of the fact that the Americans ship a large quantity of their surplus goods there.

Kim Il Sung said, in addition, we are also experiencing an acute shortage of basic consumer goods. We have a strong base of local industry but in view of a shortage of raw material it cannot be used at full capacity. And even though we will also try to supply the shortfall in raw material with our own resources, nevertheless it will be difficult for us to rapidly develop light industry without importing raw material from abroad.

Kim Il Sung continued further, the grain problem has not been finally solved. Agriculture needs to be completely mechanized to solve it. It is also necessary to bring the existing irrigation system into order, to improve reservoirs and cisterns built earlier and build new ones. It is insufficient to solve just the grain problem to improve the feeding of the population; meat and butter, which are still in short supply, are needed. The main key to solving these problems is the mechanization of agriculture.

Kim Il Sung said, if we exclude orchards and mulberry trees from the 2 million jeongbo of land we have under cultivation, then 1.8 million jeongbo remain. Of them 500,000 jeongbo are situated on steep hilly slopes which are difficult to work, for example, to deliver fertilizer. Therefore the harvest is small in these sectors: no more than 300-500 kg per jeongbo. The remaining 1.3 million jeongbo, is land suitable for working.

We have and are continuing to place reliance on cultivating such food crops as corn in order to develop livestock breeding. However, the corn and grain problem cannot be solved with one-time planting; biannual planting needs to be introduced. There are no suitable pastures in the DPRK. Although there are many mountains and hills it is impossible to graze cattle on them and to use [them] to cultivate fodder. Kim Il Sung said, we came to the conclusion that the most correct use of the mountains will be to transplant forests on them of economic importance, for example, to get timber as raw material for the production of cellulose, or to lay out fruit, walnut, and chestnut nurseries.

If the mountains are used to grow fodder then the existing forests will have to be cut down, but this will lead to a disastrous erosion of the fields by the rain flowing down from the mountains in streams of water. Therefore it is necessary not to cut down the forests and bushes, but to replace species of trees of little value with more valuable ones. This will provide an opportunity to preserve both the mountains and land in the valleys.

Thus, continued Kim Il Sung, the fodder problem can be solved by carrying out biannual planting. When this is done the production of biennially-planted crops should be completely mechanized since manual labor require great expenditures of time and therefore biannual planting would not bring the desired results. If there are enough machines then in the autumn after the rice harvest the land that is freed up can be quickly re-plowed and planted with winter rye, and harvested in the spring to feed cattle. If we employ such a method on 300,000 of the 500,000 jeongbo of the rice fields we have then we can get up to 60,000 tons of meat. Such a second planting of corn and winter wheat has been done for two years in the DPRK on an area of about 200,000 jeongbo and the results achieved in the process are not at all bad. In this event, if the wheat is harvested quickly and corn is also seeded quickly (with the aid of machines) right after it, then it is possible to even get grain. Kim Il Sung said, taking all these circumstances into consideration, after discussion and study of this issue for several years we came to the conclusion about the need to speed up the complete mechanization of agriculture. We will exert every effort to achieve this goal and are planning to completely solve the problem of the mechanization of agricultural work in the next three years (up to 1963 inclusively). Then the problem of livestock breeding will also be solved. We think that it will not be a bad result if we achieve just 20 kg of meat per capita.

When our base of light industry is expanded and established and, particularly, the chemical raw materials are provided for light industry then the issue of supplying the population with housing, food, and clothing will finally be solved.

There is no doubt that in the conditions of an improvement of the lives of the population the people will support our Party with even greater enthusiasm, even more actively, and rally around it even more closely. When the people's lives sharply improve then by the time of the opening of free visits between the North and South of Korea the residents of South Korea will envy us, and this will create even more favorable preconditions for the peaceful reunification of the country.

However, continued Kim Il Sung, at the present time the situation in the South is quite favorable. Labor troubles, demonstrations, and strikes are continuing there. It is especially important to note such a positive aspect as the creation of a number of parties with a progressive orientation. These parties distinguish themselves by the advancement of good slogans which are to our advantage, which demonstrate that the appeal of the KWP CC to the South Korean people has completely achieved its goal. The truth is, there are also some negative aspects in the platforms of these parties - anti-Communist slogans, calls to cooperate with the UN, etc. However, said Kim Il Sung, this is being done at our instructions so that these parties are not disbanded. In the final analysis, the anti-Communist slogans are easy to remove. The main thing is that the necessary grounds are being prepared for the creation of a Joint Committee of Representatives of the North and South, for mutual consultations and contacts on various issues.

In this situation it is very important for us to quickly improve the lives of the population of the DPRK in order that this constantly exerts an influence on the population of South Korea. Then together with us the South Korean people will exert strong pressure on the Americans, who up to now have clung to South Korea as a convenient military bridgehead. This will eventually lead to desirable changes in the international position of our country - the Americans will not be in South Korea forever.

Having discussed this issue in the CC Presidium Kim Il Sung summed up: we have come to the conclusion that the main thing right now is in accelerated economic development, in increasing the material security of the people, first of all. At the same time, he said, we will not be able to achieve success without the aid of the USSR and China. The planned economic development can be carried out successfully if we resolve the issue with foreign currency affirmatively. The essence of the problem comes down to the fact that if the commercial importation of goods this year is only about 380 million rubles then, by obtaining a release from the payment of the credits received for special needs, we will have the ability to import from abroad those goods for which we are experiencing an acute need in exchange for our goods.

The solution of the above issue will allow us to ensure the fulfillment of the outlined tasks in the next three years: the creation and strengthening of the base of light industry; mechanizing agriculture; and the solution of the grain problem and the problem of supplying the population with housing, food, and clothing.

Kim Il Sung added that the DPRK government can pay the credits received for special needs, but then we will not be able to solve the urgent problem of increasing the people's standard of living, which is acute for our country. It seems extraordinarily difficult to do this and pay the credits at the same time.

I thanked Kim Il Sung for the interesting information and said that the Memorandum will be sent to Moscow. I noted that Soviet Embassy officials see what great efforts the DPRK government and the KWP CC are making for the development of the economy, how closely the Korean people have rallied around the KWP CC, and how wholeheartedly it works in carrying out the general line of the Party in spite of the great difficulties in housing, food, and clothing.

I informed Kim Il Sung that the IL-18 aircraft had arrived. Its departure from Pyongyang for Moscow is set for 7 A. M. 13 June Moscow time in accordance with your wish. I asked, are there any comments or wishes?

Kim Il Sung said that he completely agrees with the proposed flight schedule.

Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol] and Pak Yong-guk were present at the conversation.

The conversation was interpreted by Choe Won-sik and recorded by Embassy interpreter D. A. Priyemsky.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE DPRK  
[signature] (A. PUZANOV)

Five copies printed - vp  
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2 - to Cde. I. I. Tugarinov  
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