

1996**Meeting Minutes, South African Department of
Foreign Affairs, Handwritten Notes from a Meeting
on Nuclear Proliferation****Citation:**

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Summary:

Handwritten notes from a South African intelligence and security meeting covering topics of nonproliferation.

Credits:

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Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

32/2

Rob of NIA/SASS/MI/DFA

13/6/03

1. Information gathering on countries of proliferation concern.
 - Collection of information abroad.
 - Liaison with ^{Foreign} intelligence ^{Committee} services and foreign services
 - evaluation of foreign intelligence against own intelligence.
 - Joint responsibilities with emphasis on information sharing and evaluation
 - with a view to provide the client the NPC with a recommendation on the proliferation risk involve in nuclear SA tech and dual-use tech.
 - Formation of an Ad hoc Non-Proliferation Intelligence Committee.
 - * Working level
 - * to meet once a month or as needed.
 - * Task: to compile and update profiles for use by the CC and the NPC
 - * profiles are not policy but guidelines and should therefore not be endorsed as the GNU policy - no lists
 - * DFA as Council member responsible for provides the political/policy input of countries to host the meetings
 - * Responsibility of different role players.
 - MI: Military perspective of countries of proliferation concern. Technical input re equipment/tech.
 - SASS: Info/data on country's covert policy goals w.r.t WMD. Info on country's covert procurement programme on WMD.

renewed developed political analysis.

- NIA: Analysis of the country of concern
Info on the country's focus on SA
as a possible source for tech/goods
expertise.
- DFA: Collate info
Provide political perspective
Input re SA relations
Input re SA's international obligations

a. Companies of concern / recipients of SA tech/goods

- Ad hoc ~~data~~ non-preferential Intel Comm to identify
Companies in recipient countries
- Draw up profiles of these companies
w/ot ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~problem~~ of WMD
- Case studies on specific companies receiving
SA tech/goods. (MIT / SASS)
- Provide input/tellings input on SA ^(NIA) companies
 - * non-proliferation record
 - * companies activities abroad, especially
in countries of concern

(don't take for granted that SA
well established companies
in SA are above suspicion)
- * NB: Not spying on SA companies.
just to provide an analysis
of how company go
about with its transactions
Note that the ^{new} armaments market
is similar - profit opportunities
become fewer - and companies
should not be allowed
to have undue influence
on the decision makers

Intelligence on individuals involved with development of WMD. - NIA

- Info on activities of ex SA experts who worked on programmes or 1/BW. have the technical skills to aid other countries of concern.
- South Africans who are covertly involved in arms transactions
- foreigners ^{from countries} who operate in SA with the goal to obtain more info regarding SA techn.
- Russia Mafia and criminal org.

4. Transshipment through SA (NIA/SASS)

≠ Info on source countries.

- former Soviet countries

≠ info on companies/individuals involved with possible transshipment of controlled items.

- Customs.

5. International NP negotiations (SASS) - Next DIA

- Analysis of objects of the major players in different NP regimes

- NPT
- NSG
- Zangger
- IAEA
- CWI
- BWC
- CD - CTBT cutoff
- MTCR
- Australia Group
- Wassenaar
- UN 1st Comm

(4)

major players

- US
- Russia
- France
- Germany
- UK
- China
- Australia
- Pakistan
- India
- Iraq
- Brazil
- Argentina
- Mexico
- Argentina
- Israel
- Egypt
- Canada
- Japan
- Malaysia
- Indonesia

Mr. A. S. Wintz,
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27: Chemical,
1: Approval is
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2.3 Mr. Gosen's costs will be covered by his own Mission's