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**Report, South African Department of Foreign
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1963'**

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Summary:

Report by Armed Forces Attache G.T. Holl on South African relations with the U.S.

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Commandant-General
Defence Headquarters
Potgieter Street
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(in quadruplicate)

ARMED FORCES ATTACHE'S REPORT FOR
MARCH, 1963

Introduction

(b)

1. In his budget speech before the House Armed Services Committee at the end of January, 1963, Mr. McManera, the Secretary for Defence, gave an assessment of the international situation and its bearing on military policies and programmes. In his introduction to this particular subject, he had this to say:

(c)

"But while war and the threat of war have rightly occupied most of our attention, we must not neglect the fact that the struggle with Communism is continuing through other means. As long as serious political and economic instability exists in any part of the world, the Communists will have an opportunity to enlarge the area of the struggle. Even now they continue to demonstrate their ability to take quick advantage of any breakdown of law and order in any part of the world and to identify themselves with any change in the status quo or with any emerging threat to existing authority.

3.

In this regard, there has been no change in the policy of the Soviet Union to encourage what Mr. Khrushchev calls "wars of national liberation" or "popular revolts", and which we know as covert armed aggression, guerrilla warfare and subversion. And the Soviet Union has not diminished its efforts through the more subtle means of economic and military aid, political intrigues and propaganda to win over the neutral and emerging nations of the world to the cause of Communism. From Africa to the Near East, from Southeast Asia to Latin America, the pattern is the same. We may expect that the struggle in this area will intensify and we must be prepared to meet the challenge."

2.

Africa

Mr. McManera had this to say about Africa:

(a)

"Africa is another area in which the Communists will try to take advantage of any political and economic instability. Although overt Communist military aggression against Africa is conceivable, it is not very probable because of the logistic difficulties involved. The real danger here is quite similar to that in Latin America, namely that the Communists could gain a foothold by subverting and overthrowing an existing government. When we consider the large number of newly independent countries on that continent, the many

opportunities for trouble-making become readily apparent. We and our Free World allies have the military power, both in kind and in quantity, to preclude an overt Communist military attack on any African country, but we do not have the means to prevent Communist infiltration, subversion and other forms of covert aggression. Our best hope to foreclose the extension of Communist influence in Africa, therefore, is to assist the new nations of that continent in their efforts to build viable societies. This we can do by giving them economic and technical assistance, and whatever military assistance is needed to ensure internal security. Here, again, we also hope to use the Military Assistance Program to support Civic Action projects in selected African nations.

(b) We do not and need not carry the whole burden of helping to safeguard freedom in Africa. Other free nations, particularly the United Kingdom and France, have special interests and responsibilities in that part of the world. The United Nations, too, has a vital role to play. Our policy is not to supplant the assistance already being furnished by the metropole countries to their former colonies, but rather to supplement their programs where needed, and to help those countries where no other source of aid is available. Our programs in tropical Africa are extremely modest and are directed at internal security.

(c) More important from the longer term point of view are the economic and technical assistance programs. Here, again, we share this task with the other economically advanced nations of the Free World. But even with all the help that can be reasonably expected, the development of the African nations into modern viable societies will be a long, arduous and costly task."

Military Assistance Programs

3. The report by the Clay Committee concerning foreign aid and assistance prompted the Secretary for Defense to make this statement when appearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee:

"I do not support the Military Assistance Program only because its administration is one of my responsibilities and I am, therefore, naturally expected to defend it. There is ample recent evidence that I do not look with favour on any undertaking which I consider unpromising or non-productive: (The controversial TFX programme). I support the Military Assistance Program for a single, simple reason: I am fully convinced by the facts and figures that it is a sound dollar investment. This program yields excellent dividends to the security, foreign policy, and general welfare of the United States."

4. He then went on to the question of Communism and said more or less the same as quoted in paras 1 and 2, but added:

(a) "Single or double pronged, the thrust of Communist aggression is still directed against the entire free world; and the expansionist pressure of international Communism remains a constant threat to any weak spot where military vulnerability, political instability, or economic deprivation invites attack or subversion.

(b) "The interest of the United States in strengthening such weak spots is based not only upon our traditional commitment to the principle of freedom and the right of self-determination for all mankind, but also upon the very practical premise that the security of the United States is interdependent with that of the rest of the free world. Any attempt to return to a 'Fortress America' concept of national defense under present international circumstances would be a denial, rather than an expression, of self-interest. It would lead, not to self-preservation, but to slow suicide.

(c) "It follows, therefore, that there is no acceptable alternative to the Military Assistance Program through which the United States shares with its allies and friends both the burdens and the benefits of maintaining adequate free world power for peace."

Objectives of the Military Assistance Programs (as outlined by Mr. McNamara)

5. The paramount objective of the Military Assistance Programs is of course to maintain and develop effective military forces in friendly nations. Military equipment, training, and related services provided under this programs to the armed forces of allied and friendly nations strengthen their ability to meet both external and internal threats to their independence and, in many cases, to contribute to the common defense posture which gives substance to collective security. The degree and type of assistance are determined in relation to the nature of the threat, United States strategic concepts, the capabilities of the United States itself to assist beleaguered nations in the event of need, and the capacity and resources of recipient countries.

6. "In addition to the direct contribution it makes to the total military posture of the free world, the Military Assistance Programs also enhances the security of the United States by helping to ensure our continuing access to overseas bases and installations which are still essential to optimum deployment of our own military strength and to the successful accomplishment of our forward strategy. Facilities on foreign soil and the existence of millions of combat-effective allied fighting men whom the Military Assistance Programs has helped to equip and train, and continues in part to support, enable the United States to place the first line of its own defense thousands of miles from its shores at the borders of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

7. "The Military Assistance Programs generates important economic by-products for our foreign policy with respect to the stability and economic progress of the less developed and emerging nations. Many such countries would, if it were not for our military assistance, devote substantial additional portions of their own resources to military purposes, rather than to urgently needed economic and social development. By providing the means for the maintenance of law and order, military assistance also promotes a sense and a state of security which are prerequisite to political stability and economic progress.

8. "With respect to our national welfare at home, there is a very definite relationship between that welfare and allied forces supported by the Military Assistance Programs. These forces represent an important and indispensable increment of total free world military strength for common defense. To replace

(c) this vital asset for collective security with comparable and similarly deployed American troops would involve a totally unacceptable drain on our manpower and monetary resources. It would send the defense budget soaring and add to the taxpayer's burden an amount many times the cost of the military assistance which makes possible the accomplishment of our own forward strategy with minimum expenditure in men and money. Even more significantly, it would require the drafting of many more young men, interrupting their education, disrupting family life and depriving the economy of the fresh manpower essential to vigorous growth.

9. "The Military Assistance Programme thus well serves our national self-interest, not only as a key instrument of United States foreign policy and military strategy, but also as a means of conserving our human and financial resources without sacrificing our security."

Countries to be Subsidised by the Military Assistance Programme

10. The Secretary for Defence gave a more or less summarised view of what he said in paras. 2(a), (b) and (c) concerning Africa (which he carefully confines to Tropical Africa) but I repeat it as a matter of interest:

Africa

- (a) "Although, quite properly, newly independent nations in Tropical Africa must rely primarily on their former metropolises for support of their economic development and military efforts, internal security problems and the obvious wisdom of denying an opportunity for Communist intervention have generated a need for a modest amount of military assistance. During the past two years, modest programs, therefore, have been instituted in a number of such countries. They are oriented from the military standpoint strictly to internal security and civic action projects, and are primarily designed to manifest United States interest in helping to maintain law and order in volatile situations which threaten the stability of emerging nations. Toward these ends, total military assistance to Tropical Africa in the amount of approximately \$9.5 million is proposed for fiscal year 1964."
- (b) "Small military assistance programs continue for Ethiopia and Libya. Although these programs are related to the maintenance of United States base rights, internal security problems in both countries would generate a requirement for some United States support."

South African Position

11. Being entirely independent and in no way connected with Military Aid, obviously places the Republic of South Africa outside the scope of these remarks concerning Aid and Assistance.

12. However, broad references such as "...the total military posture of the free world the security of the U.S. by helping to ensure our continued access to overseas bases and installations which are still essential to optimum deployment of our military strength and the successful accomplishment of our forward strategy", can hardly exclude thoughts on South Africa. These facts, together with our proven anti-communist policy must

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exercise the minds of those who are ultimately responsible for military strategic planning. This applies particularly when considering worldwide naval strategy, such as deployment and re-supply.

Naval Strategy

13. Admiral Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations, made the following interesting remarks concerning naval strategy when he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee to testify regarding the military posture of the U.S. Navy:

- (a) "The USSR is belatedly recognizing the importance of the seas and seaways. She obviously has come to understand that extension of empire can be effective only if control of the seas is assured. Some of her more recent roilings of the waters are in areas which traditionally have been of great strategic importance in the maritime sense: in Cuba and Latin America, for instance, which cover approaches to the Panama Canal; in Indonesia, the route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific; and in Egypt, Yemen, and the Middle East, which control Suez and the Red Sea.
- (b) "These actions, when combined with the rapid expansion of her merchant fleet, the remarkable increase in the scope of the activities of her fishing fleet, and her most effective use of oceanographic ships and trawlers in exploring the oceans and gathering intelligence, give us pause for reflection. They also emphasize the absolute necessity for the United States to retain effective naval capability to preserve our free and sovereign rights on the seas of the world. At the present time, we routinely accept the fact that the seas are free, that access to ports throughout the free world is guaranteed to us. But if these key areas were controlled by the Soviet Union, or any other Communist government, we no longer would be sure of access to them. There is no substitute for sea power now -- nor do I foresee any.
- (c) "The lessons of history, and particularly those of World Wars I and II, must not be forgotten! The task of protecting shipping at sea is vital to the sustenance of the people of the United States and its allies, for the viability of our economies, for the protection and support of their and our armies and air forces in fulfillment of their responsibilities. Let there be no underestimation of the importance or the magnitude of the task of preserving the use of the seas for our purposes and of denying them to an enemy. Submarines, surface raiders, aircraft, mines and missiles must be countered and mastered if this is to be possible. Furthermore, we must be able to control, to defend, or to seize from an enemy key geographical positions of strategic significance to the maintenance of the maritime position of the free world."

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
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14. There is nothing new or startling in these statements and I realize that many of the facts quoted have often been stressed in regard to the Republic of South Africa's value in the overall world strategic context.

15. The interesting problem is to try and visualize, or better still, discover just how strategically important the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the Republic of South Africa to be. Upon this will depend to what extent they are likely to try and influence U.S. State Department policy regarding our country.



Brigadier

G.T. Hall

ARMED FORCES ATTACHE