

**February 1, 1973**  
**Theses On the Present State of Relations between  
DPRK and PRC**

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**Summary:**

A report on Chinese foreign policy toward North Korea and Beijing's efforts to push North Korea toward an anti-Soviet line.

**Original Language:**

German

**Contents:**

Translation - English

GDR Embassy to DPRK  
Pyongyang, 1 February 1973

T h e s e s  
On the Present State of Relations between DPRK and PRC

There is no doubt that Korea is ranking highly in the plans of the Chinese leadership.

Since the visit to the DPRK by Zhou Enlai in April 1970, it becomes ever more clear that China increasingly attempts to ratchet up its influence and pressure on the DPRK. Certainly the visit by [PRC Foreign Minister] Ji Pengfei was part of this effort.

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The Chinese leadership is exploiting both traditional ties as well as the nationalist policy of the KWP leadership. Historical, geographical and ideological commonalities are playing a role as well. Efforts by the Chinese leadership to solidify its positions in relations to the DPRK were not unsuccessful, as evident in the rapid development of bilateral and economic relations, cooperation in the military field, as well as in the development of party relations. These tendencies were furthered by the unofficial visits of Kim Il Sung, Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol], and Heo Dam [Ho Tam] to Beijing in 1972 and Zhou Enlai to Pyongyang.

The main goal of the Chinese leadership is, no doubt, to interrupt DRPK relations with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries and to draw the DPRK closer to its own policy.

The KWP leadership is currently willing to make major concessions towards the policy of the Chinese leadership. In contrast to internal remarks by leading DPRK individuals that they treat relations with USSR and PRC on equal level, actual policy demonstrates a preference for the PRC.

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Repeatedly the DPRK recently expressed its high regard for foreign and domestic policy of the Chinese leadership through speeches, articles, and telegrams. At the occasion of the 45th Anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on 1 August 1972, and the 23rd Anniversary of the foundation of the PRC on 1 October 1972, the role of the PRC was characterized in speeches, telegrams and articles as a "strong socialist great power," and as a "powerful majestic anti-imperialist force in Asia," based "firmly on the principles of proletarian internationalism that actively supported the struggle of all Asian revolutionary peoples and the entire world against the aggression of American imperialism." The "active peace-loving PRC foreign policy" is defined as a "major contribution to secure peace in Asia and the world and to strengthen the anti-imperialist revolutionary peoples of the world."

The Koreans recognize the course of the Chinese leadership, as proclaimed during the [CCP's] 9th Congress and 2nd Plenary, the "great proletarian cultural revolution," and Mao as the "great leader of the Chinese people." (It has to be mentioned that during the years between 1965 and 1969 the Korean leadership had repeatedly distanced itself from the policy of the Chinese leadership, in particular from the Cultural Revolution.)

DPRK foreign policy concurs to a large extent with the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership. For instance, many delegations in particular from Afro-Asian countries visit the DPRK after a stay in the PRC and vice versa. Such is also a result of the congruence of certain interests and political and ideological positions, like "self-reliance on its own capacities," "model of socialism," similar economic methods, and the like. This became clear, for instance, during the

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elevate national interests over international interests.

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Merten

Embassy Counselor

CC:

1 x Foreign Ministry

1 x Central Committee, Department IV

1 x Embassy