

November 6, 1973

Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to Ismat Kittani, "UNGA Prospects on the Korean Question?"

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Summary:

Ozbudun sends Kittani a letter concerning the UNGA prospects on the Korean Question.

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CONFIDENTIAL : No. 229

2 November 1973

UNGA PROSPECTS OF THE KOREAN QUESTION

6 November 1973

Dear Mr. Kittani,

A most reliable source credited to me yesterday regarding his conversation with a Chinese diplomat, just back from Peking, concerning the following:

The diplomat had been told by a leading PRC official that (i) Peking is not at all anxious to have either the United Nations Command or the US Forces out from the ROK; (ii) the PRC was not really interested in Korean membership in the UN at this time either on a confederal single state basis or in **Dear Ahmet,** dual admission; (iii) any way confederal single Korean membership itself was a long-term project which could materialize in the future; (iv) the PRC would prefer to see the UN deal, gains preferred **Thank you for your letter No. 229 dated** **2 November 1973.** I have taken note of its contents. **status quo** about perhaps the date of UNCURK; (v) it would not mind a deferment of Korean deliberations to next year; and (vi) in fact it **With kind regards,** question came up at the current UNGA, the Permanent Representative of the PRC (and perhaps his key alternates) would absent themselves from the debate -- the Representative possibly staying away in Peking.

Yours sincerely,

If the foregoing proves itself to be the essential Chinese thinking on the Korean question, the following concomitant alternatives may also be considered:

Ismat T. Kittani
Executive Assistant to
the Secretary-General

First, the support for the UN by the PRC would slip **status quo**.

Second, if the PRC attitude is paralleled by that of the Soviet Union, the best created further poisoning of the UNGA atmosphere through vituperous Korean propaganda would be avoided or postponed.

Mr. Ahmet N. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK, Seoul,

and repudiation of the Sino-Soviet schism over also **status quo** Korea **status quo** this year might be also delayed.

Mr. Ismat Kittani
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
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2 November 1973

UNGA PROSPECTS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION?

Dear Mr. Kittani,

A most reliable source confided in me yesterday regarding his conversation with a foreign diplomat, just back from China, concerning the following:

The diplomat had been told by a ranking PRC official that (i) Peking is not at all anxious to have either the United Nations Command or the US forces out from the ROK; (ii) the PRC was not really interested in Korean membership in the UN at this time either on a confederal single seat basis or in the form of dual admission; (iii) any way confederal single Korean membership itself was a long-term project which cannot materialize in the foreseeable future; (iv) in the latter sense, as in general, China preferred no change in the status quo (except perhaps the exit of UNCURK); (v) it would not mind to see a deferment of Korean deliberations to next year; and (vi) in fact if and when the Korean question came up at the current UNGA, the Permanent Representative of the PRC (and perhaps his key alternates) would absent themselves from the debate -- the Representative possibly staying away in Peking.

If the foregoing proves itself to be the essential Chinese thinking on the Korean question, the following concomitant alternatives may also materialize:

First, PRC support for the DPRK would not actually go beyond lip service.

Second, if the PRC attitude is paralleled by that of the Soviet Union, the much dreaded further poisoning of the UNGA atmosphere through vituperous Korean debate might be either avoided or postponed.

Third, the predicted explosion of the Sino-Soviet schism over also the Korean issue this year might be also delayed.

Mr. Ismat Kittani
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary-General
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Fourth, Korean deliberations might thus be either curtailed to symbolic proceduralism or be altogether deferred.

Fifth, however the softened PRC support for the DPRK might encourage USSR efforts to regain for Moscow lost ground vis-à-vis Pyongyang through redoubled activism in proceedings.

Sixth, in any event, whatever chances there are to have no substantive votes on the two rival draft resolutions would be strengthened.

Eighth, however, certain diplomatic and Foreign Ministry sources believe that some "busy-body" would probably emerge proposing that since UNCURK's dissolution is the "sole issue on which both sides agree", the Commission should be eliminated.


Ninth, however an ever-growing number of students of Korean affairs are getting increasingly apprehensive that it is incumbent (i) either to avoid fatally implosive political vacuum by rejecting UNCURK's recommendation for its dissolution; (ii) or to institute in Korea, prior to such dissolution, a special personal representative(s) of the Secretary-General to maintain liaison with the Korean Government(s) and with the United Nations Command.

Finally, experts are getting close to unanimity that paragraph 107 of UNCURK's report (following paragraph 106 "recommending" the Commission's dissolution) in fact renders the "recommendation" highly conditional and subjects it to the required maintenance (in some form) of "political oversight of the situation in the Korean peninsula". To recall, this paragraph 107 reads as follows:

"The members of UNCURK make this recommendation (for dissolution) without prejudice to the accepted authority and competence of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take whatever action it may deem necessary, in the interest of preserving peace and security, to maintain political oversight of the situation in the Korean Peninsula."

All this is well, but the question is: "Must and would some member state be willing to broach the initiative at the UNGA to encourage the requisite political oversight"? If the matter must be resolved by vote (but it is not), overwhelming majority would certainly not be hard to come by.

With warmest regards,

Yours sincerely,

AHMET H. ZEBUDUN
Principal Secretary