

August 17, 1972

Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan

Citation:

"Letters between Ahmet H. Ozbudun and C.V. Narasimhan", August 17, 1972, Wilson Center Digital Archive, "International incidents and disputes - Korea - correspondence (603.1)," Executive Office of the Secretary-General, S-0196-0007-01, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained by Charles Kraus. <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/117607>

Summary:

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan reports on the 27th session of the General Assembly and the deadlock on the Red Cross talks, views on the new Korean agenda item, significant statements by ROK officials on the Korean Question, report of UNCURK, reported initiative of Switzerland, remarks by Prime Minister on Korean Question, the text of the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 24, 1972, Red Cross talks, the presidential emergency order, and other matters.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Kyungnam University

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

CVN/tab

cc. Mr. Kutakov

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B/F

15 September
1972

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND RECONCILIATION OF KOREA

17 August 1972

Dear Ahmet,

Your confidential letters numbered 151 and 152 have been received and their contents have been noted.

Arising out of your 152, I shall certainly arrange for UNCURK to be fully informed about the progress on Korean items in the General Assembly. I note that you expect to meet the deadline of 24 August for the complete UNCURK report. I am also glad that Mr. Shail Upadhyia is doing so well as your Political Affairs Officer.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

Mr. Ahmet Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK
Seoul, Korea

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

UNITED NATIONS



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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL : No. 151

4 August 1972

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

Among a number of pertinent developments that have taken place during the past week, I would like to report on the following, the others being contained in the Summary of Developments:

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Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE
DEADLOCK ON THE RED CROSS TALKS

The current deadlock in the Red Cross talks may very well issue from factors above and beyond the talks themselves. As will be seen below, the deadlock is regarded in various quarters to be connected, inter alia, to the question of postponement of Korean deliberations at the forthcoming session of the UNGA.

The second working-level North-South meeting yesterday failed to resolve the deadlock on so-called "procedural matters", thereby precluding the commencement of the Red Cross formal talks which had been scheduled for tomorrow.

Two stumbling blocks among the "procedural matters" were reported to be the question of site for the first round, and the DPRK Red Cross proposal to include in the respective delegations a group of up to seven advisers comprising leaders of political and social organizations.

I have no reason to retract my earlier confidential reporting that there was already agreement between the parties for Seoul to become the initial site. I also know that the ROK was not at all adamant but in fact flexible on the choice of its own Capital for the first formal session.

As to the second cause advanced for the deadlock, the ROK continues to insist that the inclusion of the said advisers in the delegations is a political matter, decision on which does not fall within the authority of Red Cross negotiators. However, neither the DPRK proposal nor the ROK rejection are altogether valid as the actual reason for the deadlock is that both sides had earlier agreed, in the South-North Joint Communiqué, to pursue a far broader concurrent dialogue, including political issues, through the North-South Coordinating Committee.

Some diplomatic observers consequently go beyond the reasons advanced for the deadlock and diagnose it as "foot-dragging" prompted by altogether different motivations on the part of the ROK, the DPRK or both.

These observers basically appear to coalesce into three schools of conviction:

The first school attributes the "foot-dragging" to "second-thoughts" in either or both Capitals led by strong factions who have been "shocked" by the Joint Communiqué, the secret talks leading thereto, as well as the over-ambition targeted in scope and time. This school feels that the factions oppose the North-South contacts as unrealistic in that they have gone "too far too fast".

The second and third schools of thought attribute the "foot-dragging" to the concern respectively in Pyongyang and Seoul vis-à-vis the Korean issue at the United Nations.

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The second school blames Seoul for the deadlock which it says is apprehensive lest the so-called new "Algerian item" (96) in the UNGA provisional agenda would prompt a majority of Member States to actually seek measures to expedite a Korean settlement thereby causing the rupture of the delicately balanced UN posture on Korea. Proponents of this school of thought say that Seoul now wants to demonstrate that international optimism in respect of North-South contacts has been excessive and unwarranted.

The third school of thought takes almost a diametrically opposed stand and accuses Pyongyang for the deadlock. It alleges that upon the advent of the "Algerian item" with the full endorsement of the DPRK, the latter acquired an inkling that further success in North-South efforts at detente would cause the majority of Member States to take a "hands off" stance and to vote for the postponement of UNGA deliberations on Korea. Thus, Pyongyang is regarded to be anxious to prevent further progress and to blame this on the continued presence of the UN in Korea.

Naturally, there seem to be shades of opinion within each school which attribute the Red Cross deadlock to various combinations of the foregoing allegations.

The fact remains that until the actual scheduling of the formal talks for 5 August, both parties appeared sure that pending "procedural issues" were secondary and capable of easy settlement. The fact that recalcitrance has now developed on these matters is certainly indicative of "ulterior motives" probably in connexion with the forthcoming UNGA session.

Rumours have it that the stalemate precluding the formal level Red Cross talks is likely to continue at least until the end of August. This is one criterion to watch for -- and if the formal talks are delayed that long, they may be further delayed until the decision on the UNGA agenda.

Meanwhile, other complications could occur which, however, would hopefully not wreck the still surviving climate for further dialogue and detente on the Peninsula.

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VIEWS ON THE NEW KOREAN AGENDA ITEM

Government and diplomatic circles in the ROK continue their pre-occupation with prospects of the endeavour for another deferment of Korean deliberations at the forthcoming UNGA session with particular emphasis of the impact on prospects of the so-called new Algerian item.

Basic questions raised, that remain still to be answered in a mutually satisfactory manner, include the following: (i) Will the prospects for deferment be decisively hurt? (ii) Will items 35 (Withdrawal ...) and 36 (Dissolution ...) be excluded from the final agenda in favour of the inclusion of 96? (iii) Will there be more than one draft resolution tabled under item 96, if so which and by whom? (iv) Will one or more draft resolutions under the item still insist on unconditional and immediate withdrawal and dissolution as against one which might advocate a gradual and selective approach in those directions? (v) Will the USSR and the PRC see eye to eye or differ drastically in their tactics, voting or other means of support or the lack thereof? (vi) What would be the effect of deliberations on the agenda or, if included therein, on the items themselves on the North-South dialogue and detente? What indeed are the best means to save these from any adverse or perhaps fatal effects of UNGA deliberations? etc.

Preliminary attempts at replying the aforesaid questions are neither uniform, nor complete, nor convincing -- at this stage at any rate. However, the queries themselves appear to be relevant and to the point; and they do represent much food for thought.

I will naturally pursue the subject matter if and when further reporting is worthwhile and warranted.

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OTHER MATTERSSignificant Statements by ROK Officials on the Korean Question

On 1 August, ROK Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil was reported to have stressed inter alia that UNCURK and "other UN agencies" should be able to enter north Korea freely to carry out their functions as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of the UN forces from the Republic.

This report, along with a just-finalized and issued text of a statement by Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik on ROK foreign policy, dated 24 July, are annexed herewith for your information.

.....

The Report of UNCURK

I am grateful for your signal that the report of UNCURK to the United Nations may be received at Headquarters by 24 August 1972. Relevant developments, that have been taking place at fast pace, are prompting the Members to resort to requisite recasting. Moreover, they may wish to await the annual Presidential address to the nation on the double occasion of Liberation and Republic Days which fall on 15 August. However, no difficulty is anticipated to meet the suggested deadline.

Reported Initiative of Switzerland


Yesterday's local papers carried a report that the Swiss Charge d'Affaires in Seoul had expressed to the ROK Prime Minister his Government's readiness to play an intermediary role in contacts between the ROK and the DPRK.

Just in case this has been reported in New York as well, I wish to point out that the Swiss envoy confidentially denies this altogether.

* * *

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,



Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE
UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA

Information Note
No. 42/72

2 August 1972

Note from the Secretariat: Following is an unofficial translation by the Secretariat of remarks by the ROK Prime Minister on the Korean question reported in the Joong-ang Ilbo of 1 August 1972. This version was regarded by the Prime Minister's Spokesman to be the most accurate among those appearing in the Korean press.

Remarks by Prime Minister on Korean Question

On 1 August, at his meeting with the visiting Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes, ROK Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil said that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and other U.N. agencies should be able to enter north Korea freely to carry out their functions, as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of the U.N. forces from the Republic.

He said: "In view of the historical fact that it was Kim Il Sung himself who had caused the United Nations to send the United Nations to Korean Peninsula by attacking the south on 25 June 1950, a communist bloc-sponsored resolution calling for the withdrawal of the UN forces from the Korean Peninsula and the dissolution of UNCURK is a nonsense and is suspicious as to its hidden intention." He also said that this move by the PRC and other Communist nations was apparently aimed at alienating the Republic from the United Nations.

The Prime Minister added, "Since UNCURK and other UN Agencies have observed and established through their free activities in the ROK that the Republic has no intention to engage in an attack on north Korea, these UN agencies should be allowed to enter north Korea freely to witness and verify that Kim Il Sung of north Korea has abandoned his aggressive schemes against the Republic."

He said: "The debate of Korean questions at the United Nations by third countries may impair our efforts to settle the question by ourselves. Therefore, the Organization should, it is hoped, support us by giving enough time to settle the issue by ourselves."

The Prime Minister said: "The authority and competence of the United Nations will go downward and there will be no one who would trust in the United Nations in the future if and when the UN forces were withdrawn and the UNCURK were dissolved, without the settlement of this prerequisite, at the demand of north Korea, which has continuously rejected the competence and authority of the UN, and the PRC, which had been branded as an aggressor by the U.N."
(Joong-ang Ilbo, 1 August)

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE
UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA

Information Note
No. 42/72

2 August 1972

Note from the Secretariat: Reproduced below is an official text of the statement by the ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs on 24 July 1972, in connexion with the Algerian proposal on the Korean question.

The text of the Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 24, 1972.

"For over twenty years the Korean Question has been discussed at the United Nations and every year the United Nations has adopted the resolutions by an overwhelming majority reaffirming that the reunification of Korea should be achieved by establishing a democratic and representative form of government through genuinely free elections held throughout Korea in direct proportion to the indigenous population under UN supervision, while rejecting equally by an overwhelming majority all draft resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces in Korea and the dissolution of UNCURK.

"The United Nations General Assembly at its 26th session last year decided to postpone the deliberations of the Korean Question because a UN debate itself would not be of much assistance in solving the Korean Question in the face of the continued north Korean refusal of the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean Question. In the meantime, the Republic of Korea Red Cross Society last August proposed meetings with north Korean Red Cross Society with a view to paving a way to a solution of humanitarian problems between the south and the north.

"It is gratifying that a plenary meeting between the two Red Cross societies is scheduled to be held shortly. Furthermore, as a consequence of direct contacts which were initiated by the Republic of Korea, an epoch-making joint communique between the south and the north was issued on 4 July last, which laid a foundation for the opening of dialogue to settle various problems between them. These efforts on the part of the Republic of Korea have receive wholehearted support and acclamation from all over the world.

"However, to our great regret, a certain number of U.N. Member States, under the pretext of creating favourable conditions for the success of the dialogue between the south and the north and for the peaceful reunification of Korea, insist on a debate of the Korean Question at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, calling for the dissolution of UNCURK and the withdrawal of the United Nations forces in Korea, despite that the presence of UNCURK and the U.N. forces in Korea

has repeatedly been reaffirmed by the United Nations with the support of an overwhelming majority of the Member States. It is apparent that the hidden intention behind this move is, on the pretext of accelerating the south-north dialogue in Korea, to weaken the defense posture of the Republic of Korea, endangering our national security. We will never accept such a unjust proposal.

"Moreover, the discussion of the Korean Question at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will certainly revive the cold war polemics of the past poisoning the atmosphere and hamper a smooth and successful progress of the South-North dialogue. For these reasons the Korean Government strongly desires that the debate of the Korean question be postponed again at the 27th General Assembly session.

"The south-north dialogue is a most important endeavour by Koreans themselves in order to put an end to the division of their fatherland after 27 years of seperation, which was imposed against the will of the Korean people. Therefore, the Government of the Republic of Korea strongly urges Algeria and other co-sponsors to withdraw immediately their proposal and desist from any further move to obstruct the progress of the current south-north talks.

"We are confident that the majority of the peace-loving Member States of the United Nations, who earnestly hope for the successful progress of the South-North dialogue, will render their full support to the deferment of the Korean debate at the 27th session of the General Assembly."

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL : No. 152

11 August 1972

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

This week has been comparatively uneventful except for the new breakthrough in the Red Cross talks and the issuance of a Presidential Emergency Order aimed at stabilizing the ROK economy on which the National Assembly convened its 83rd session yesterday.

RED CROSS TALKS

I have cabled you already on the Red Cross issue. I could add at this point that the breakthrough was most welcome in diplomatic circles. It is attributed to a further spirit of compromise on both sides: the ROK accepting Pyongyang as the first site (despite the DPRK's confidentially reported earlier agreement on Seoul), and the DPRK temporarily shelving the controversial issue on the "vocal" participation in discussions of the so-called advisers comprising persons from political parties and social organizations.

ROK officials, who had appeared concerned by the recent deadlock which had caused the sine die cancellation of the 5 August formal session, are elated by the settlement. They believe that the actual conducting of formal talks would weaken the chances of the "Algerian item" and thus lead to another deferment of UNGA deliberations on Korea.

THE PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ORDER

On 3 August, President Park Chung Hee emerged with an Emergency Order which caught the country by utter surprise. Details of this Order, taken under the Constitution, are covered in this week's Summary of Developments.

However, I requested the Economic Affairs Officer of UNCURK to submit an analysis of the matter. Mr. Pierre Hudicourt kindly complied, as follows:

On 3 August 1972, President Park Chung Hee decreed a "Presidential Emergency Order" under the Constitution comprising several economic, financial, monetary and fiscal measures aimed at stabilizing the ROK

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
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economy. These measures impose a moratorium of eight years to all private loans; provide ₩200 billion of consolidated banking loans to industries; establish an "Industrial Rationalization Fund" of ₩50 billion; reduce the bank interest rate; fix the foreign exchange rate around ₩400 per dollar; freeze all commodity and utility prices; and cut several budgetary expenditures. The National Assembly, convened on 10 August, is considering the Presidential Order.

The implementation of the measures has encountered numerous problems which are being dealt with in a pragmatic way. This seems to indicate that all the possible side-effects of the Emergency Order had not been anticipated. The best example is the erroneous official information about the magnitude of the ROK private loan market, estimated on 3 August at ₩120 billion by the Finance Minister. On 10 August, 200,000 creditors had reported private loans for a total of ₩355 billion, three times more than the estimate of the Finance Minister.

The measures have provoked various reactions among the political parties, the business circles and the private citizens. They were welcomed by the DRP, but were denounced as "unconstitutional" by the NDP. Big business, which seems to be the main beneficiary of the measures, supports them. The medium and small businesses are afraid to lose their regular private money suppliers in the long run. Marginal institutions, like mutual funds, schools and churches, as well as the private citizens are anxious to know to what extent their personal finances would be affected by the Presidential Emergency Order. In general, the drastic intervention of the State in the private financing market appears to have shocked public opinion.

Analysts observing the ROK economy doubt that the measures decreed by the Presidential Emergency Order could eliminate as announced, the structural economic weaknesses of the country. Analysts believe that these measures would relieve the big enterprises for a while from their domestic financial burden and give them a larger margin to ensure their foreign debt servicing; reduce their production costs and improve their productivity. However, they doubt that other basic weaknesses in the economy could be corrected by virtue of the Presidential Emergency Order alone. Forecasts seem to indicate an improvement of the financial pressure and a partial recovery of the ROK economy, which may be accomplished particularly if accompanied by sound readjustments to the Emergency Order.

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OTHER MATTERSUNGA Documents, etc.

I am grateful for the various documents you have kindly been sending, including those on item 96 of the provisional agenda and the appointment of the new Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

I should be further indebted if you could instruct the cabling of the full text of draft resolutions tabled under Korean items and to have impending votes of the General Committee also cabled. As you would recall, you had arranged with my Department in the past few years for my cabling UNCURK on such matters through Mr. Chacko for which the Members and the Principal Secretary had been highly grateful.

The crux of the matter is that UNCURK members and the Principal Secretary have found it most embarrassing to seek such information from the local news media or the Foreign Ministry.

Commission Session

The Members of UNCURK are making substantial progress toward the completion of the report although handicapped by the need to recast sections as a result of frequent new developments. I maintain my hopes in any event regarding the prospect of pouching the report before your deadline of 24 August.

Political Affairs Officer

I would like to go on record once again regarding my sincere appreciation to you and to Mr. Kutakov concerning the designation of Mr. Shail Upadhyas as our Political Affairs Officer. Indeed, ever since his arrival, he has superbly contributed to the operation of this mission which has been working under tightest imaginable exigencies. Mr. Upadhyas indeed has already proven himself to be an excellent asset.

He is appealing for promotion under the recourse procedure which I wholeheartedly support. I would be personally gratified if you would bear this in mind and kindly give your invaluable endorsement if and when the opportunity arises.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary