

**February 4, 1947**

**Information from Major of the Soviet Army,  
Interpreter Skoda, Concerning his Conversation with  
Gheorghiu-Dej about his Meeting with I. V. Stalin**

**Citation:**

"Information from Major of the Soviet Army, Interpreter Skoda, Concerning his Conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej about his Meeting with I. V. Stalin", February 4, 1947, Wilson Center Digital Archive, AVPRF, f. 0125, op. 35, p. 136, d. 12,1. 15-16. Published in Vostochnaia Evropa edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1, pp. 569-70. Translated for CWIHP by Svetlana Savranskaya. <https://digitalarchive.umd.edu/document/118461>

**Summary:**

Major Skoda reports that Gheorghiu-Dej's concerns about his conversation with Stalin.

**Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

**Original Language:**

Russian

**Contents:**

Translation - English

Information from Major of the Soviet Army, Interpreter Skoda concerning his Conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej about his Meeting with I. V. Stalin[1]

Moscow

4 February 1947

SECRET

On 4 February 1947, I accompanied Dej[2] to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was supposed to speak with Bucharest over the secure line.

During the trip, Dej began to tell me about his impressions from the conversation that he had with Stalin.

Dej believes that the conversation did not have a consistent character. He takes the blame on himself, saying that, as always, when he is in Stalin's presence, he feels disorganized and "loses his head."

Dej said that he was also depressed about the substance of the conversation.

He was concerned by the sharp words about the nationalist faction inside the Romanian Communist Party. Dej would like to know who was it, who informed comrade Stalin about that. He even asked me, whether I knew, who did that. I responded negatively.

Dej expressed the idea that the anti-Semitic faction does exist in the country, and that you cannot but take it into account. Still, followed Dej, it does not mean that we will implement a nationalist policy in our party.

Dej was struck by the interpretation that Molotov gave to his notes[3] and the fact that comrade Stalin said: "The Hungarians and the Austrians would not have written such a thing to us." On this question, Dej told me that not only he made a mistake, but also a stupid one, because he put himself in an unpleasant situation and "angered such people as Stalin and Molotov." Continuing, Dej emphasized that he did not think that they would pay so much attention to those memos, because he submitted them "simply so, as information" not expecting those report memos to turn into semi-official documents.

In conclusion, Dej said that he was very concerned about the situation, which will develop in the country after the signing and ratification of the peace treaties. In his words, they already have information that the Maniu people are raising their head in the country, and that the possibility of a bloc between the King and the Maniu people after the ratification of the peace treaty should not be excluded. In such a case, the King could even demand the resignation of the government.

Dej said that he would try to express those thoughts to one of the Soviet leaders before his return to Romania.

Major Skoda.

[1] Copies sent to I. Stalin, V. Molotov, A. Vyshinsky, S. Kavtaradze.

[2] As in the original. Should be Gheorghiu-Dej

[3] He refers to Gheorghiu-Dej's memos to A. Va. Vyshinsky, where he presented two requests. The first referred to reconsideration to cut the Romanian debt for payments for the damages caused by Romania to the Soviet Union during the war in Romanian goods, which was not satisfied by the Soviet side. The Soviet government also rejected the second Romanian request regarding "counting the expenses incurred by the Romanian government for maintenance of the Soviet troops in the period from July 1945 to January 1947 toward reparations" (Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 0125, Finding Aid 35.11.136, File II, pp. 15-16, 18 20,22-23).