

**April 24, 1991**

**John T. Kriese, US Defense Intelligence Agency,  
'Talking Points for Briefing to House Energy and  
Commerce Committee - Subcommittee on Oversight  
and Investigations'**

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**Summary:**

These talking points, prepared by John T. Kriese who at the time was both chief of the Nuclear Energy Division at DIA and chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Community, focused on the intelligence the US had available on the Iraqi nuclear program.

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Talking points for briefing to House Energy and Commerce  
Committee-Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on 24  
April 1991

(b)(3):10 USC 424

-- Good morning, I am [redacted] Chief of the Nuclear Energy Division at DIA. With me is



(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC  
403 (g), 1.4 (e)


-- I wear a second hat as Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee or JAEIC. The JAEIC is an interagency body charged with advising the DCI on the production of intelligence on all foreign atomic energy issues and promoting the effective use of community resources. "11 + - kkr 1 J

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-- My intention today is to describe our intelligence assessments of the Iraqi nuclear programs, focussing on two time periods- the 10' 89-90 time frame and then on the Desert Shield/Desert Storm


,)A period. My presentation will be at the Secret/Nofom/WNINTEL level and I will not discuss [redacted] intelligence data. (b)(1),1.4 (e)

Before I start, I would like to generally characterize the 2 nature of the intelligence we have on the Iraqi program.



(b)(1),1.4 (e)

Overall, I would characterize our knowledge as good at the strategic level. That is, we can identify programs underway and their status.



(b)(1),1.4 (e)



[REDACTED]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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-- In the 89-90 time frame:

\* There were only two known locations for nuclear activities. Tuwaitha, or the Baghdad Research Center

-70 MW French supplied Osirak reactor, the one bombed by Israel in 1981

-800 kW French supplied Isis reactor

-5 MW Soviet supplied reactor


-fuel fabrication facilities

-radiochemistry facilities

-a possible reprocessing facility

Al Qaim superphosphate mine where uranium ore was recovered as a byproduct and processed to produce yellowcake

\* Rumors of other nuclear facilities. We vigorously pursued all leads.



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

\* In Nov 89, NIE 36.2 was published, which concluded:

"Iraq probably could develop a nuclear device by the mid-to-late 1990s with foreign technical assistance. (State/INR and the Department of Energy believe that, even with foreign assistance, the earliest that Iraq would be able to develop a nuclear device would be the late 1990s.)

Although highly unlikely, Iraq might develop a nuclear weapon in the next two to four years if it received substantial foreign assistance and had a clandestine source of weapons grade nuclear material."

\* In the early 1990 time, frame, Iraqi efforts to acquire parts for gas centrifuges from the Germans and Swiss were uncovered and stopped. Also in this time, the Heathrow sting operations with capacitors occurred. Because these capacitors were so well suited to the job of

firing nuclear weapon detonators, I think they provide the first "direct" evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapon design effort.

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\* the Fall of 1990, because of the concerns after the Iraqi invasion, the community, under the auspices of the JAEIC, examined the potential Iraqi use of safeguarded nuclear material for a nuclear explosive. To paraphrase the executive summary of the paper published in Nov 1990:

It is unlikely the Iraqis had completed all the work need to ensure the viability of a nuclear design and therefore they currently did not have one.



(b)(3):42 USC 2162 (a) (RD)

There was enough safeguarded material for at least one device and the Iraqis had the equipment and materials to recover the HEU from the fuel

\* In the absence of a crash program, the community reaffirmed the judgement in NIE 36.2.

— During Desert Storm, again under JAEIC auspices, the community performed BDA and issued a typescript report on 14 Feb 1991 and identified several additional suspect nuclear facilities outside Tuwaitha including high explosive test areas at Al Qa Qaa and Al Hadre, the Baghdad Suspect Research Center, Mosul Unidentified Production Facility, and Samarra Suspect Centrifuge Production Facility.

— DIA has published a final BDA report on Iraqi nuclear facilities. We do not know the location of the safeguarded fuel, but because all known facilities for recovering the HEU from the fuel have been severely damaged or destroyed, we believe that Iraq does not have a near term capability to produce a nuclear device. The long term prospects will depend on Iraq's post-war priorities, but we believe that Iraq's capability to make a nuclear device using indigenously produced material has been pushed back to the next century.

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