

November 1992

Defense Intelligence Assessment, US Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1540Z-509-92-SI, 'Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets'

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Summary:

This extract from a collection of DIA reports on national nuclear weapons programs, focuses on North Korea - which is discussed in the both the key judgments section as well as in a chapter which examines several aspects of the North Korean nuclear program. The chapter examines North Korea's nuclear infrastructure, fuel cycle, the extent of foreign assistance, treaty obligations, the nuclear program and possible future developments, and delivery vehicles.

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Special Operations Branch

B353/DSP-2A6

Defense Intelligence Assessment

November 1992
DST-1540Z-509-92-SI

Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets (U)



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(b)(3) 50 USC
403-1(i)

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Defense Intelligence Assessment

Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets (U)

Information as of 30 July 1992

PT-1540-01-04L

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document

Prepared by:

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DST-15402-509-92-SI

Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets (U)

KEY JUDGMENTS

(U) The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a tremendous risk to world security and stability. Since the development of nuclear weapons by the United States in World War II, four additional countries (the former Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China) have developed nuclear weapon stockpiles. The changes taking place in the former Soviet Union and the revelations about the Iraqi nuclear program in the aftermath of Desert Storm have increased the level of concern about the status of nuclear programs in other countries and their potential threat to U.S. forces and interests.

~~(S/NF/WT)~~ The ready availability of open source information from which nuclear weapons designs can be developed means that the critical ingredient is only the production or acquisition of fissile material. Massive efforts to complete nuclear facilities have taken place in several countries, including India, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. These facilities could have nuclear weapons applications as well as peaceful civilian applications. International treaties and export controls have concentrated on safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, and technology. The only proliferation country known to have detonated a nuclear device is India, which conducted such a test in 1974.

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
Several other countries have advanced nuclear fuel cycles and have the nuclear infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons if they were to decide to do so. The growing concern in the 1990s is that more sophisticated nuclear countries, such as China, Pakistan, or North Korea, will assist others with whom they have close political ties and over which the United States has little influence.

~~(S)~~ The DIA Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets provide concise intelligence assessments for specific countries. These assessments are based on previous DIA publications, including aperiodic in-depth studies of a particular nuclear program or aspect of nuclear proliferation. Data Sheets on individual countries, together with a summary of all countries of nuclear proliferation concern, will be issued as new analyses become available.

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North Korea ~~(S//NF//NF)~~ North Korea initiated a high-priority nuclear program in the 1970s. Their reprocessing facility will likely be operational in 1992 and, if no problems are encountered, the North Koreans could have a deployed nuclear weapon within two years.

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
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 If such a facility has been operating for some time,
North Korea might already have a nuclear device.



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Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets

NORTH KOREA

(S/NP/WW) North Korea initiated a high-priority nuclear program in the 1970s. The reprocessing facility will likely be operational in 1992 and if no problems are encountered, the North Koreans could have a deployed nuclear weapon within a few years after the availability of plutonium. We cannot exclude the possibility that a smaller, pilot scale reprocessing facility may already be operating, though we have not located one. If such a facility has been operating for some time, North Korea might already have a nuclear device.

Nuclear Infrastructure

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(S/NP/WW) North Korea's 30 MWt plutonium production reactor became operational in 1987.

Koreans have claimed this reactor produces 5 MW of electricity. A second plutonium production reactor with a 50 kilograms annual capacity is estimated to be operational by the end of 1992. However, North Korea declared to the IAEA that this reactor would produce 50 MWe.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(S/NP/WW) A reprocessing facility to recover plutonium from production reactor fuel is externally complete and could be operational in 1992. Reprocessing of all accumulated irradiated fuel could only take a few months, and plant operation may be difficult to observe by national technical means.

Nuclear Fuel Cycle

(S/NP/WW) The North Koreans possess a complete indigenous plutonium fuel cycle, including uranium mines, ore concentration facilities, fuel element fabrication facility, plutonium production reactor, and reprocessing facility.

Foreign Assistance

(S/NP/WW) North Korea received no direct assistance from foreign governments in the development of their nuclear program, but their indigenous program did make use of openly available foreign reactor designs. North Korea did seek out the training, equipment, and suppliers for their program from numerous countries around the world.

Treaty Obligations

(S/NP/WW) North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in December 1985 and agreed to sign and implement a full-scope safeguards agreement within 18 months. In December 1991, they indicated that they would sign the safeguards agreement. In addition, on 31 December 1991, North and South Korea agreed to a Korean Peninsula non-nuclearization joint declaration banning the testing, manufacture, production, possession, storage, deployment, receiving and use of nuclear weapons. The North Koreans ratified the NPT in April 1992. An IAEA inspection team conducted a two week inspection in June 1992.

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
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
(U) Location of North Korean Nuclear-Related Facilities.

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Nuclear Weapons Program and Future Developments




~~(S/NF)~~ Parallel programs for nuclear materials production.



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North Korea's longer-term nuclear weapon production goals are uncertain

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North and South Korea are currently holding discussions on the inspection of their respective nuclear facilities.

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Delivery Vehicles

~~(S/NP/WT)~~ North Korea has increased missile production [redacted]

[redacted] Missile plant and test facilities have been built, expanded or upgraded to improve the quality and quantity of weapons produced.

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
[redacted]

The NO DONG-1 missile is under development [redacted]

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
[redacted] It has yet to be successfully test fired.

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

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A731	CASD/SP/IN/FA/CP	1			1	P077	STATE IR/IN/ESA	1
		1			1	P079	STATE IR/IN/PA	1
		12			1	P082	STATE EA & PAC AFF	1
		10			1	P083	STATE INTER-AM AFF	1
		1			1	P084	STATE AFRICAN AFF	1
		1			1	P085	STATE (PCR)	2
		1			1	P090	NSA/TSI/SCDB	2
		1			1	P100	NAT SEC COUNCIL	3
		1			5	P109	PRAB	1
		1			1	P111	WHITE HOUSE SIT RM	1
		1			1	P714	IC STAFF	1
		85			1	Q008	NAVMAINTCEN/0311	1
		1	C013	DASA RESCOV & ACQUISITION	1	Q043	AFMPC	1
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		2	C783	HQDA DAMM C. FRGM INTEL DIR	1	Q619		1
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		12	D182	SECNAV	1	S013	LLL	1
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