

October 17, 1974

**State Department telegram 228213 to U.S. Embassy
Moscow, 'Nuclear Safeguards Consultations'**

Citation:

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Summary:

The State Department took the first step to bringing the Soviets in by sending a telegram about the nuclear suppliers' project to the embassy in Moscow.

Credits:

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English

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Message Text

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DRAFTED BY ACDA:CVANDOREN.S/P:JHKALIKI
APPROVED BY ACDA:FCIKLE
C:NTERREL
PM:GVEST
EUR:JARMITAGE
NSC:JLODAL
AEC:JMAHY (SUBS)
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CORRECTED COPY (OMISSION OF TEXT PARAS. 3 AND 6)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, UR
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS

1. THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS WILL SERVE AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION WHICH YOU MAY FIND HELPFUL IN CARRYING OUT INSTRUCTIONS BEING SENT BY SEPTEL.

2. BEGINNING IN 1970, THE KEY WESTERN NUCLEAR EXPORTERS FORMED AN AD-HOC CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE) TO WORK OUT COMMON MINIMUM GUIDELINES WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS. THE MAIN ISSUES WERE (1) WHAT
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ITEMS OF NUCLEAR RELATED EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT BE EXPORTED

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UNLESS THE RECIPIENT SUBJECTED ANY NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED OR PRODUCED WITH THE USE OF SUCH EQUIPMENT TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS, AND (2) A REQUIREMENT THAT THE SUPPLIER RECEIVE ASSURANCES THAT THE MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE DIVERTED TO ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

3. THE SOVIETS DID NOT JOIN IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE, BUT WERE KEPT ADVISED OF ITS PROGRESS. THE SOVIET VIEW CONVEYED BY THE US TO THE COMMITTEE RESULTED IN AN EXTENSION OF THE LIST. (SEE IAEA VIENNA 1717 (1973), 6059, 6661, 7219, A-380 AND MOSCOW 12876.)

4. IN SEPTEMBER 1974, THE SOVIETS FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE IAEA THAT THEIR EXPORT POLICIES WERE IN ACCORD WITH THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE GUIDELINES. THE GDR AND POLAND LATER STATED THAT THEIR POLICIES WERE LIKEWISE IN LINE WITH THESE GUIDELINES.

SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPORT ACTIVITIES

5. WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE CAPABLE OF BECOMING MAJOR EXPORTERS OF THE FULL RANGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY, THEIR EXPORTS HAVE IN PRACTICE BEEN QUITE LIMITED. THEY HAVE EXPORTED A FEW RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS AND IN THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE AGREED TO PERFORM URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES FOR FOREIGN CUSTOMERS. THEY HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, EXPORTED HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM OR (AT LEAST SINCE THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH THE CHINESE) URANIUM ENRICHMENT OR REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY.

6. SINCE THE NPT, THE SOVIETS HAVE REQUIRED IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS (WITH THE TEMPORARY EXCEPTION OF ENRICHMENT CONTRACTS WITH CERTAIN EURATOM COUNTRIES), AND AS NOTED ABOVE, HAVE AGREED TO ABIDE BY THE EXPORT GUIDELINES EVOLVED BY THE ZANGGER (NUCLEAR EXPORTERS') COMMITTEE, EVEN THOUGH THEY DID NOT FORMALLY JOIN IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THAT COMMITTEE.

7. THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE REQUIREMENT THAT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS BE OF ADEQUATE DURATION AND COVERAGE, AND
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THAT THE MATERIALS NOT BE DIVERTED TO ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

8. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR MORE INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIALS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON THIS SUBJECT.

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9. THUS, THERE ARE NO EXPORT AREAS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE A LESS RESTRICTIVE POLICY THAN WE DO, AND THE MAIN PURPOSES TO BE PURSUED IN DISCUSSION WITH THEM WOULD BE TO DISCUSS OUR INTEREST IN FURTHER COORDINATION OF SUPPLIER POLICIES.

10. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WE HAVE FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON IAEA MATTERS THROUGH OUR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS TO THE IAEA, WITH AN EXCELLENT RECORD OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL SUPPORT IN THIS FIELD.

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS

11. IN THE SESSIONS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 1975 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN APRIL AND AUGUST, THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS HAVE CONSULTED AND COOPERATED CLOSELY. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE SUCH CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK THIS FALL AND IN GENEVA IN FEBRUARY WITH A VIEW TO DISPOSING OF THE REMAINING ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE.

12. AS FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE ITSELF, WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK, GENEVA AND VIENNA IN THE COMING MONTHS.

13. FYI. ALL CABLE TRAFFIC, INCLUDING ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS (SEPTEL), ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE HANDLED AS SECRET/EXDIS. END FYI. INGERSOLL

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